The Historical Practice of Diversity

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Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World

Edited by

Dirk Hoerder

with

Christiane Harzig and Adrian Shubert

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Revising the Monocultural Nation-State Paradigm

An Introduction to Transcultural Perspectives

Dirk Hoerder

The composition of Europe's and North America's peoples has changed dramatically since the 1950s. Public discourse, however, remains welded to traditional concepts of national cultures, and scholarship continues to concentrate on a dichotomy of "Old World" emigration countries, considered culturally homogeneous, and "New World" immigration countries, considered pluralist or multicultural. While multicultural composition of state populations has become a catchphrase in public debates, few realize that cultural interaction was the rule throughout history. Late-medieval peasants visiting a roadside inn met itinerant traders carrying spices, imported from the South Sea islands, to an abbot's residence. Europe's Christian faithful undertook pilgrimages to a nearby shrine, to St. Jacques de Compostela in northern Spain, to Rome, or even to Jerusalem; others prayed to Black saints such as Mauritius and Benedetto il Moro or to one of the many images of saintly Black virgins. Early modern cities such as Kraków, Copenhagen, Frankfurt am Main, Paris, Marseilles, or Seville housed large immigrant populations: Scottish traders; Italian architects, scholars, and artists; Dutch Protestant refugees; Afro-Caribbean slaves; Muslim North African traders and sailors; as well as Jewish scholars and merchants, to name only a few. It took centuries of preaching to turn the "Occident" into a monoreligious Christian world, which, however, still divided itself into two major and numerous minor creeds often warring with each other and generating religious refugees. In the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries this Christian realm further divided itself into "nations," assumedly as monocultural as dynastic states had claimed to be monoreligious. Nation-states, in fact, had one hegemonic cultural group which ruled over others, and in the process generated political-cultural refugees.

In North America, the many cultures and polities of the First Peoples initially traded with European immigrants, then were pushed back or succumbed to diseases introduced from Europe and Asia. Anglicans, Lutherans, Catholics, Mennonites, and Presbyterians jostled each other, and slaves from Africa brought animist as well as Islamic beliefs. Where Africans formed the majority of a society, as in the Caribbean, or where large numbers of First Peoples survived, as in parts of South America, new mixed peoples emerged in processes of ethnogenesis. When Europeans divided themselves into nations, the new peoples of the Americas struggled for and—with some exceptions—achieved independence from Europe's colonizer states and they, too, began to construct nations. The United States, in addition to immigrants from Europe, comprised a large African-origin population, the Spanish-Native American cultures of the Southwest, and migrants from China and other Asian societies. British North America, after 1867 the Dominion of Canada, was culturally divided into English-speaking immigrants and the early settlements of French-speakers. In the context of the British Empire, a free African community had settled in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Immigrants from many of Europe's cultures were joined by Chinese merchants and laborers, and Sikhs from Punjab, who came first as auxiliaries of the British crown, then as immigrants.

Since the late eighteenth century, scholars in Europe began losing their trans-European connectedness, and increasingly withdrew into national discourses. In the late nineteenth century, scholars in the social, economic, and political sciences pursued nationalist ideologies disguised as research results. (In the German language these disciplines were called the "state sciences.") In North America, historians published national versions of the past and sociologists studied the "assimilation" of new immigrants. While in the United States the Chicago School of Sociology remained convinced of the assimilation paradigm, sociologists at Montreal's McGill University, observing the English-French dichotomy and thus a dual "nation," in the 1940s began asking questions about cultural cooperation and conflict as well as about negotiating between cultural groups. A combination of three factors—the continuing English-French dichotomy; the self-organization of immigrants from Europe, especially of the Ukrainian-Canadians; and arrival of increasing numbers of immigrants from the Caribbean and Asia—led to a reconceptualization of Canadian society from bicultural to multicultural. Scholarly research spearheaded the development of the new concept and took up the challenge of recasting the constraining historical framework of Canada from national British with a French enclave to multicultural. This involved a deconstruction of "British" into the ethnic components: English, Scottish, Welsh, Cornish, Protestant Irish, and Catholic Irish. Canadian historiography, long on a mission to propagate British-Canadian and Quebec-Canadian culture as national, became a truly empirical discipline again and reconsidered all peoples who created Canadian societies.

Such recasting of history has only begun in most European states. Sweden and the Netherlands, like Canada, have linked immigration from the

1950s on—"guestworkers" or labor migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers—to their own sixteenth- to eighteenth-century immigrant past. Britain and France have become multicultural as a consequence of: decolonization and the arrival of descendants of emigrants, families of mixed origin, and colonial auxiliaries, who would have faced prosecution or persecution in the newly independent states. Other countries moved slower or tried to avoid facing the new realities. Scholars' nationalist versions of their societies' pasts have been increasingly questioned since the late 1970s by research dealing with immigration and transcultural interaction. In May 2000, scholars from Canada and several European countries, including some of African and Indian backgrounds, joined in a conference, "Recasting European and Canadian History: National Consciousness, Migration, Multicultural Lives," at the University of Bremen, Germany.[1] This volume presents some of the results of the conference augmented by subsequently commissioned essays. A companion volume will deal with the late twentieth century and perspectives for the twenty-first century.[2]

The research presented here aims at a recasting of European and Canadian history, in a broad comparative framework, from the nation-centered paradigm developed in the nineteenth century to a long-range global perspective, a paradigm of cultural interaction and changes across centuries, up to the 1960s. Starting from the Islamic-Christian-Jewish Mediterranean world of the medieval and early modern periods, this research explores the empires of many peoples of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries as well as the worldwide European core-colonial interactions, the diaspora formation and the "Black Atlantic." The essays in the third section question assumptions about national citizenship and underlying homogeneous "received" cultures by analyzing changes in political and cultural belonging.

The transcultural past followed multiple models: hierarchized religious coexistence in the Ottoman Empire, hierarchized ethno-national coexistence in the Habsburg Empire, and lower-class intermingling and intercultural scholarship in the Iberian world. Colonialist and imperialist outreach changed the world of the colonized peoples by way of imposed power relationships, but like "the worlds the slaves made" in the Americas, the worlds the colonized made changed the cores, especially in Great Britain. Nineteenth-century Europe experienced a construction of dynastic-bureaucratic state nations out of empires which, after 1918, were turned into nation-states with little change of civil service personnel. People became citizens; folk culture as constructed by middle-class intellectuals became national consciousness. Regional diversity was homogenized into national unity; immigrants were no longer granted special status but were expected to assimilate. In Canada, the development began later and regional consciousness remained stronger. While the governmental institutions of the federal state and the provinces followed a British or, in the case of Quebec, a French model, local societies remained culturally diverse. All of these assumedly integrative or even assimilationist nations excluded many by gender, class, and territoriality. For example, women and workers were

excluded and people without a state such as Jews, traveling groups, and laboring diasporas. Concepts of membership in the polity (subject status, membership without political rights, citizenship, denizen status) and in its educated culture (literature and the arts) changed constantly and reflected the interaction with multiple other cultures.[3]

In the opening essay, Dirk Hoerder questions the received discourse about historical identity in the Euro-Atlantic world and critically examines identity formation through language and its connotations. Hegemonic national historiography is confronted with the complex empirical findings about cultural diversity and cultural interaction. The structures of societies, economies, and states, which provide the frames for cultural conflict and interactions, are conceptualized by intellectuals, operationalized by civil servants, and defended by gatekeepers. A historical-sociological approach casts light on the distinct interests of "civil servants" and questions the once paramount concept of the neutrality of state structures embodied in a belief in equality before the law. Multiple identities of people result in transcultural life-courses. A human-rights perspective, regardless of either national, religious, ethnic, or social status, or issues of belonging, is beginning to replace the state-centered approaches.

The Iberian Peninsula's mix of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian culture, the Ottoman's ethnoreligious coexistence in the Balkans and Asia Minor, and the Habsburg state of many peoples exemplify distinct types of culturally interactive societal organization. "Spain's" position as a place of cultural encounter from 711 to 1492 (expulsion of the Jews) or 1611 (expulsion of the *moros*) respectively, derives from the singularity of the *convivencia*, the living together—and fighting—of the three religions that produced a treasure of cultural achievements and multicultural experiences. Al-Andalus, the Islamic dominated part, was the occidental branch of oriental wisdom and the cradle of the renaissance of ancient Greek culture. After the decline of the caliphate of Córdoba, the capital of early Christian "Spain," Toledo, inherited the tradition of Al-Andalus, and Alphons X, the king of three religions, promoted multicultural translation groups. These texts crossed the Pyrenees and became deeply rooted in Western culture. The period is legendary because of distortions by later generations of historians (not only from Spain) and average Western intellectuals who lacked knowledge of this unique chapter in history. The essay by Norbert Rehrmann, "A Legendary Place of Encounter: The *Convivencia* of Moors, Jews and Christians in Medieval Spain," reviews the main political and cultural aspects of this first "multicultural state" of Europe.

Both the Habsburg and Ottoman realms were composite polities linked to a central power by indirect rule. In respect to nation-state building, a significant difference separated the two: the existence of feudal institutions in the Habsburg Empire and their absence in the Ottoman case. Before 1848 the Habsburg Empire was a conglomerate of historical territories, acquired in war or by hereditary title, each with its own distinct constitutional structures. In Hungary and Bohemia, for example, national

diets and provincial assemblies survived into the nineteenth century. By contrast, southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule did not know any representation of estates at a provincial assembly, nor did the pre-Ottoman Balkan kingdoms have such institutions.

Fikret Adanir, in his essay, "Religious Communities and Ethnic Groups under Imperial Sway: Ottoman and Habsburg Lands in Comparison," analyzes the Ottoman Empire's *millet* system with its peculiar mechanisms of political representation through basically ecclesiastical prerogative. The profound transformation these structures underwent in the course of the eighteenth century resulted in the ascent of local notables on the one hand and accelerated social mobility in the countryside on the other. Consequently, Christian communal leaders began to play a more active role and their Muslim counterparts openly challenged the central authority. However, such "decentralization"—some interpret it as imperial decay—lacked a constitutional basis. Processes of elite formation and the imperial policies of elite integration differ, too. The feeble civil societal potential within the Ottoman sphere, which was related to the traditional practice of communal autonomy along confessional lines, resulted in vertical segmentation rather than the horizontal overlapping of social structures. The different imperial response to elite nationalism in the Austrian case led to the emergence of the Dual Monarchy.

Michael John, in his essay, "National Movements and Imperial Ethnic Hegemonies in Austria, 1867–1918," approaches the Austro-Hungarian "empire of many peoples" as the arena of different national movements. The idea of ethnically and linguistically homogeneous nation-states contradicted the conceptual thinking of the Habsburg dynasty. Resulting conflicts ultimately contributed to the dissolution of the empire. The success of the Hungarian nationalist movement, as manifested by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, terminated the concept of an overall, unitary multiethnic monarchy—a realm, however, that was dominated by German-speaking elites. From the 1880s, a political-cultural axis of the imperial capital, Vienna, and the alpine provinces and Austrian regions directly adjacent began a series of maneuvers to increase the hegemony of the "German-Austrian" lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. This process, played out on the municipal political and cultural levels, intensified Austrian-German national self-definition and identity formation, but relied, above all, on the exclusion of "Others." Primarily the "Slavs" and the Jews—and, in the Tyrol, the Italians—were drawn in as negative symbols, as contrasting antitheses. In Vienna, a massive immigration of ethnoculturally "alien" groups constituted the background of this process. Austro-German nationalist groups began to force their version of state culture onto resident and immigrant Others, excluding and racializing German-acculturated Jewish Austrians in the process.

Parallel to the traditional empires and new nation-states, colonial empires and (mainly labor) migrants' diasporas occurred. The "Black Atlantic" had emerged from free African and massive slave migrations. Though

Canada hardly knew slavery, it became part of this cultural region as a segment of the British Empire and as a destination of slaves who rebelled in Jamaica or fled the United States. Black men and women understood the moral duplicity of their owners as well as the economic aspects of the system: they called escape from slavery "stealing oneself" (U.S. term) and in the process they reappropriated the surplus they produced as well as agency in their own lives. French planters, too, understood the doublethink of the system. When a slave purchased his or her own freedom, they called it "vendre un nègre à lui-même." A second labor diaspora occurred from indigenous traditions as well as from British rule in Asia and the Pacific. From the 1830s to the 1920s, Chinese and Indian contract laborers, often accompanied by free "passenger" migrants, created communities in the Americas. Sailors and small business families settled in some European cities. After the 1860s, a proletarian mass migration from European societies created ethnic enclaves or far-flung diasporas. Of the latter those of Polish, Italian, and Jewish working men, women, and children were the most important.

Whereas traditional scholarship has often perceived the evolution of North America as an extension of "white" European colonization and culture, recent scholarship has begun to examine the impact of Africans on the emergence of the "Western" world. A "Black Atlantic" perspective concentrates on a Caribbean-United States-British world; others suggest an "Afrocentric diaspora" approach. North African influences on early modern Europe were numerous and African writers in today's Atlantic world contribute to the emergence of postcolonial literatures. In Paul E. Lovejoy's essay, "The Black Atlantic in the Construction of the 'Western' World: Alternative Approaches to the 'Europeanization' of the Americas," he provides a new perspective on the racialized evolution of modern transatlantic societies. Biographies of various African men and women who chose Canada as a destination of their journey from slavery to freedom reveal complex patterns of cultural interaction and change. Africans and their descendants, whether slave or free, emerge as historical figures whose patterns of migration and dispersal share similarities with the adjustments of European immigrant populations, despite the experience of slavery. The African diaspora in the Americas was based on continuities in ethnic and religious affiliations that were shaped by slavery, and the "Black Atlantic" struggle to end slavery played an integral part in the formation of the modern world by challenging the hegemony of "European" culture.

Another aspect of the racialization of the internationally mobile working classes is exemplified by the several Asian diasporas worldwide and in particular in North America. In "Chinese Diaspora in Occidental Societies: Canada and Europe," Peter S. Li traces the emergence of the global Chinese diaspora to the Ming dynasty, which curtailed overseas trade in the mid-fifteenth century. In response, Chinese merchants, craftsmen, and laborers formed permanent communities in Malacca, Manila, and Batavia, and subsequently in much of the Southeast Asian world, *Nanyang* in Chinese.

Older scholarship, as well as an ethnocultural groups' own lore, often viewed primordial culture as the driving force that provides members of a diaspora with the capacity, endurance, and tenacity to adapt to harsh conditions in receiving societies. While cultural factors may serve as bases of resource mobilization and mobility, especially in situations of deprivation, the case of the Chinese diaspora in Canada and in Europe suggests that the mode of incorporation of "racial" minorities in host states plays a key role in shaping the structure of diaspora communities. The policy of inclusion and exclusion, opportunities available to diaspora members, and the normative construction of diaspora members by the receiving society set the structural parameters under which minorities develop their communities. The case of the Chinese also shows that diaspora communities often change in accordance with the conditions of immigration policies, citizenship boundaries, and labor market opportunities.

In processes of exclusion and othering, the Chinese have been called the Jews of the East. Jews in the West have been excluded as resembling Chinese; and Italians, constructed as "olive" rather than "white," have been linked to "dark" Slavic peoples. Adam Walaszek compares Polish working-class migrants with the experience of the diaspora of Italian proletarians in his essay, "Labor Diasporas in Comparative Perspective: Polish and Italian Migrant Workers in the Atlantic World between the 1870s and the 1920s." Polish and Italian peasants migrated as unskilled laborers to industrial centers in the United States, Germany, France, and elsewhere. In the case of Poles this mass migration was followed—in some cases preceded—by migrants from the Polish intelligentsia, déclassé nobles, and others, who became interpreters, leaders, and mentors of the ethnic communities. In the case of Italian workers, radical artisans and intellectuals, but also conservative entrepreneurs and notables, assumed similar positions.

As regards cultural or national identities, Poles, Italians, and Hungarians—more so than Slovaks, Ruthenians, and other peoples from imperial peripheries—brought some elements of a national identity from their homeland, but it was generally abroad where they consolidated and developed a national consciousness. Poles had been deprived of independence by the three neighboring empires and Italy became a united state only in the 1870s. Among Poles, the Catholic clergy played an important role in this process, conflating religious and national belonging. Class and national identities interacted in the two diasporic communities—neither Italians nor Poles became an international working class severed from national belonging. Polish workers both in the United States and Germany were active in reestablishing an independent Polish state after 1918. Though Italian and Polish working-class men and women migrated to the same destinations, they hardly interacted because they occupied different occupational niches of the receiving societies' labor market segments. When, after World War I, the two "old" diasporic proletariats began to enter the mainstream of the respective societies, new clusters of diasporic Poles appeared across the world, in France in particular.

The spread of British colonial administrators, military officers, planters, and educators across the reach of the empire created an overlay of power and alleged cultural superiority over resident but less powerful societies including the subaltern proletarian and racialized diasporas. In "Dialectics of Empire and Complexities of Culture: British Men in India, Indian experiences of Britain," Bernd-Peter Lange and Mala Pandurang discuss the kinds of transcultural contacts and constructions, including the gender implications, that emerged in colonial India. During the Orientalist phase in the late Enlightenment period some officials interacted with a part of the indigenous Indian elites to legitimize and regularize colonial hegemony. A contradiction emerged between liberal radicalism in England and the buttressing of colonial power by creating subservient groups. Anglicist attempts to produce an indigenous class of brown sahibs, *compradors*, or "mimic men" as a political force that would govern India on behalf of the British found expression in Macaulay's *Minutes on Education*. In the high imperialist period after 1880, a few men wavered between racist supremacy and an identification with India, but most segregated themselves from India's many societies. Indian elites, in contrast, had to imitate the colonizers in order to gain access to Western learning and positions in the colonial administration. The two elites moved in two constructs, an ideal of Britain as a land of philosophers and poets and an ideal Hindu culture of the past reflected in Sanskrit writings. They also interacted as colonizers-colonials in a power hierarchy, in which the British appeared as anything but fair and in which the Indians appeared as superstitious and caste-conscious. Neither elite mingled with the vast majority of the two societies, the British laboring classes or the lower castes in India. A historical-critical overview of the cultural exchange also reveals that sons of the growing anglicized privileged class in India set sail for England to attain the "invaluable" British education but returned as nationalist leaders, literary personae, or renowned scientists. These early nationalist leaders, poets, and reformers used the colonizer's language as a tool for organizing themselves into an anticolonial front. In the societies of the subcontinent with a multiplicity of languages, religions, and subcultures, English as *lingua franca* played a crucial role in the emergence of an imagined Indian nation-state. Out of the alleged homogeneity of the empire and European orientalism, the multicentered postcolonial world as well as postcolonial scholarship emerged. When Indian labor and educational migrants established a diaspora in Britain in the 1960s, the white gatekeepers constructed "Black Britons"—a phrase that in contrast to the "Afro-Black Atlantic" is assumed to incorporate Asian, African, and Caribbean men and women, that is, all immigrants of colors other than (the many shades of) white.

Europe's global empires, nation-states, and decolonized North American states—British-connected Canada and the newly imperialist United States—had to come to terms with the incorporation into "the nation" of women from the hegemonic culture, of immigrant enclaves and diasporas, of visiting colonized students, of descendants of slaves and contract

laborers, and of working class families as citizens or as persons of minor status and rights. Under the single-track concept of *nation*-state, citizenship was considered to involve cultural belonging including adherence to the Christian religion. As in the multilayered empires, a many-cornered struggle for inclusion or distinctiveness developed in the states of Europe and North America.

As a first step toward an understanding of the many cultures in Europe, it is necessary to recognize that Muslims were always present in Europe and, through slavery, reached North America. The image of a Christian Occident propagandized by the churches, in addition to marginalization of Jewishness, hid those of Islamic faith. For centuries after the expulsion of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula in southwestern Europe, Islam remained the hegemonic faith in southeastern Ottoman Europe and was a practiced, everyday faith among Bosnian Muslims. Islam lost its regional impact after the 1880s with emigration and flight during the contraction of Ottoman rule, but reinserted itself with migration from French West Africa into France in the 1930s. After decolonization, in the 1950s and 1960s, migration to the cores of colonial powers—Great Britain, France, the Netherlands—increased Muslim presence as did recruitment of laborers from Turkey, Morocco, and other Mediterranean societies into the cultures of western and northern Europe. As a result, new Islamic communities have emerged in many European countries. European societies once again become multifaith societies ranging from agnostic through the variants of Christian faith to Islamic and Jewish.[4]

While citizenship is the legal-constitutional aspect of belonging, literature and the arts both ponder and mirror society or the thought of particular social segments. In "The Diversification of Canadian Literature in English," Tamara Palmer Seiler explains how Canadian literature, especially writings in the English language, evolved in the twentieth century. Placed in the historical, political, social, and cultural milieus in which it is written and read, literary production has become contested as well as cooperative ground among many cultures. It occurs in interrelated discourses surrounding such issues as immigration, diversity, and nation-building. Focusing primarily on highly significant historical "moments" of major social transformations, Seiler highlights ways in which, first, the dominant discourses worked to construct non-Anglo-Celtic immigrants as the ethnic Others and placed the literature they produced as outside the boundaries of English-Canadian literature. In a second phase, literature became a site of struggle; texts produced by minority writers worked to subvert dominant discursive structures. In a third phase, strikingly diverse and polyphonic "Canadian literatures in English" emerged.

Similar developments now occur in European societies; in Britain, "the empire writes back"; an Algerian-French literature emerges, as does a Turkish-German one.[5] While literature is subjective and readers have a choice in what to select, citizenship laws provide formalized, binding texts. Yet they are neither objective, nor immutable, nor applied equally to

all. After Confederation, Canadian ideas about liberty, equality and solidarity—that is, about citizenship—emanated from many strands, as Jane Jenson argues in her essay, "Place-Sensitive Citizenship: The Canadian Citizenship Regime until 1945." Conservative politicians used the state for nation-building and economic accumulation. The response to the "social question" associated with the dislocation created by massive immigration, urbanization, and industrialization also illustrates a commitment to the traditions of social solidarity of Social Democracy. In his nation-state level comparison of Canada and the United States, S.M. Lipset has isolated the absence of a "revolutionary moment" in the Canadian experience to account for this country's greater commitment to collectivism than is found in the United States. Such simplistic views ignore the contribution of French-Canadian political thought to the substance of political culture in the nineteenth century.

Conservative Catholicism buttressed the Tory ideas of Loyalists and, as George Grant has argued, French-Canadian Catholicism fit well with the Calvinist Protestantism of English-speaking Canada. Both inhibited the move toward the liberalism of self-realization characteristic of U.S.-style liberalism. The fundamental concern with national development assigned to the state the role of uniting the disparate social, linguistic, and religious regions of the country and of guaranteeing fairness to all. This concept of citizenship was place-sensitive, and the political discourse from about 1900 to the 1930s was dominated by disputes over the factors contributing to regional inequalities.

Citizenship in Europe is complex. In the postcolonial period, Britain adopted a "race relations" paradigm for understanding and regulating difference and "otherness." The republican tradition in France, on the other hand, is based on assimilation (or integration) of others into the polity and refuses to recognize difference in the public sphere. Around 1900, German intellectual and political gatekeepers, in a third variant, invented a bloodline construction of national belonging. Christiane Harzig discusses these and other European states' constructions of citizenship and nation in "From State Constructions to Individual Opportunities: The Historical Development of Citizenship in Europe." She demonstrates that the seemingly coherent concept of access to citizenship through birth in a territory or into a nation is but a postulate, a simplification of several ways of inclusion. Governments pursued utilitarian goals in creating, for example, mobile labor forces during industrialization, reservoirs of soldiers in expansionist phases, or imperial subjects. States choose their citizenry from the resident populations of their respective territory while relegating segments of "the People" to a lesser status. Thus nation-states, rather than being based on all people of one (hegemonic) culture, were, in fact, political-ideological structures with hierarchized layers of people not equal before the law. Rather than being a founding principle of republican states, citizenship in the nationalist phase of European and North American history appears as a set of utilitarian relationships regulating the liaison

between individuals and the state. Harzig carries the analysis of belonging onto a new level by examining individual strategies of newcomers to achieve inclusion. Migrants decide to apply for citizenship according to personal preferences often unrelated to a concept of one body politic. Nation-states admit newcomers into the labor force and into social security systems ("denizen"-status) while refusing or delaying admission to the political system. Migrants counter such discrimination by also relegating citizenship to utilitarian goals. For example, passports are acquired to facilitate border crossings or labor market access, or to confer citizenship on newborn children. At the turn to the twenty-first century, people use citizenship in ways as utilitarian as states did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Since the 1960s, various concepts and understandings of multiculturalism guide the analytical understanding of political-cultural belonging and social developments. Christiane Harzig and Danielle Juteau, in a companion volume, note that diversity, rather than merely being permitted, needs to be culturally developed and constitutionally secured. Open societies have paid particular attention to educational systems in which the next generation of citizens is being socialized. Conservative segments of societies, on the other hand, impose on newcomers concepts of family life and moral norms no longer accepted by a receiving society. Detailed studies show how diversity affects the personal lives of individuals; how it shapes and changes private, national, and international economic encounters; and how institutions and legal systems are confronted with changing demands from a more culturally diverse clientele. A new theoretical and political understanding of the impact of diversity on national self-understanding and national dispositions may draw on Chinese entrepreneurs in Europe, on the Iranian diaspora, and on Spain as a recent, yet historically rooted multicultural state. In this study diversity is analyzed and theorized as an integral part of peoples' lives around the world rather than as the exceptional experience. Diversity is a processual concept, a category in construction, its meaning emerging in personal as well as institutional, societal, and economic interactions, closely related to power relations, hierarchies, and the unequal distribution of resources. Incorporation of diversity into entwined narratives has recast the master narrative, which—rather than being a comprehensive view—was a *pars pro toto* construction that turned a particular hegemonic class, ethnic, and gender culture into an allegedly national one.

Notes

1. The organizing committee consisted of Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder, both from the University of Bremen; Danielle Juteau, Université de Montréal; and Adrian Shubert, York University, Toronto. The symposium was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the three universities involved, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian embassy in Berlin, the state of Bremen, and the sponsoring organizations, the Association for Canadian Studies in German-Speaking Countries and the European Network for Canadian Studies. The conference activities were coordinated by Annika McPherson and Irina Schmitt. Annika McPherson was also responsible for preparing this volume for publication. The editors are deeply grateful to her for her efficient and knowledgeable contribution.
2. Christiane Harzig and Danielle Juteau, with Irina Schmitt, eds., *The Social Construction of Diversity: Recasting the Master Narrative of Industrial Nations* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).
3. Essays from the conference, edited by Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder, and Adrian Shubert, appeared as the special issue "Negotiating Nations: Exclusions, Networks, Inclusions" of *Histoire sociale/Social History* 33, no. 66 (November 2000).
4. Bernard Lewis and Dominique Schnapper, eds., *Muslims in Europe* (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994); W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, eds., *Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States* (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, [1996]).
5. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (London: Routledge, 1989).

— *One* —

TRANSCULTURAL STATES, NATIONS, AND PEOPLE

Dirk Hoerder

Identities and Languages

Received discourse informs us about what is meant by European and by Canadian historical identity. We know who we are and what we talk about. Or do we?

Europe? The Western Europe of the Cold War? The fifteenth-century southwestern Iberian Europe? Or could Europe be the seventeenth-century southeast under Ottoman rule, with its wooded mountains, "Balkan" in Turkish? The Ottoman system of ethnoreligious self-administration freed lowly serfs from feudal exploitation. But in the words of those who felt that their Latin Christian religio-culture, their feudal states, their whole self-styled superiority was threatened by the Muslim Eastern Mediterranean model of sociopolitical organization of interfaith societies, the region was ruled by a monolithic despot—"the Turk." Central- and Atlantic-European intellectual gatekeepers of the two Euro-Christian faiths constructed a unity that came to be called the Christian Occident out of a diversity of societies that were frequently at war with each other. These gatekeepers were certain that European identity and achievements were not derived from an Egyptian Black Athena or the cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean, but from the Roman Empire and Greek culture to which masculine warrior tribes, the Teutons and Anglo-Saxons, added their robust bodies. Empire and culture and strong men! Cultural imperialism? Multiple cultures? Transcultural interaction?

Canadian history—we know what we talk about: the history of the regions, the population, and the state add up to Canadian identity. But

this was not what a girl experienced whose last name was Petrone. She received her education in 1930s Port Arthur, "memorized the British money system and … linear measures … the achievements of the British around the world." Did she stomp grapes with her bare feet, as her classmates sneeringly noted? Probably not, since she was busy trying "to erase" her Italianness. She renamed herself "Penny" because her founding-nation British-minded teacher could not remember her real name, "Serafina." Was she Canadian or Italian, or British, or British-Canadian, or Canadian-Italian? The self-celebrating British, in fact, had barely finished constructing themselves out of Scots and Orkneymen, English, Welsh, and Cornish. They were still busy debating whether Irish were human or Catholic, whether they were a culture, if a deprived one, or a laboring underclass, and where the Protestant Irish fit in. Empire and culture and superior men! Cultural imperialism? The power to define! Serafina decided to define herself—individual agency, discourses, and social structures are inseparably linked.[1]

Neither Serafina nor her teachers took note of the other founding nation, to repeat this self-designation of the powerful: the St. Lawrence Valley French defined by cultural practice, the Quebec Act of 1774, and modern bicultural legislation as distinct in language, legal system, culture and, at least formerly, by religion. Gatekeepers of this culture emphasize that they were the first to arrive and were deprived of their claim to preeminence on the Plains of Abraham in 1759. *Je me souviens*, their past-oriented memory slogan—in these postmodern times displayed on every Quebec car license plate[2]—is incomplete: Acadians, Ontario French, St. Boniface's Catholics, Belgian, French, French-Swiss settlers in the prairies, Quebec-French contractors in the West, a Société Française in 1860s Victoria—French-speakers settled in all of Canada. Within the context of one, imperially created polity—British North America and the Dominion of Canada—British identity has been expansive, Quebec identity contractive. People may be born equal, but as children they are socialized into unequal constructs, which they designate as "knowledge" and then hand down to their children as self-evident.

Identity, rather than easily defined, was and is contested ground and only certain identity constructs provide access to a society's resources and power. Identities emerge when subjectivity of individuals intersects with narratives of history and culture in relationships which are constantly modified by individual men's and women's agency, by their interests, life-course projects, and everyday dealings. The polyphonic and hybrid identities constructed by gatekeepers and lived by common peoples are reproduced/modified with each new generation raised in the memory-keeping institutions of families and schools.

Reduction of multiple identities to one identity, whether personal and local or societal and national, involves a simplification of the complex, the multiple, the many-cultured, to a generic construct in accordance with socially accepted discourse and group-specific interests of the reductionists.

I will illustrate such cultural simplifications with one example from everyday language. "Mathematics," a term considered to refer to a value-free exact and universal science, is as multi-cultured as all other aspects of our lives and knowledges. Originating in the South Asian cultures it migrated westward, merged Arab numerals to replace the cumbersome Roman ones, was adapted to accounting by Venetian merchants and to new theoretical levels in twelfth-century tricultural Córdoba and Toledo. From there scholars transported it to the court of Plantagenet kings of England. Cultural content of language is more complex than we, who live it and live in it, who transmit and redefine it, know.

Transmission of cultural identities occurs to a large degree through language, and language loss is said to mean loss of culture. But language, like all of everyday life, incorporates many cultural particulars into a whole and in the process particles of Others, of diversity, integrate into one Self. Thus our very language misleads us about the world we describe, about the identity of the polities in which we live, about the societies in which we are embedded. It alienates us from our surroundings, from the world we inhabit. *Je me souviens* may be liberating or fettering. Historical memory hurts or excludes some and incorporates or helps others. It is selective.

Literary authors and scholars in the humanities may explore alternative forms of memory, experiment with multiple truths, play with parts of the mosaic of memory. Common people, engaged in the personal historiography of writing a life story or autobiography, also play with memory. They try to form a coherent story out of complex, perhaps complicated lives. In the process, writers come to terms with the multiplicity of cultural identities and the "duplicity" of language. Without an awareness of multiple meanings of words and other patterns of everyday life, knowledge of cultural origins recedes beyond memory to misty times immemorial: incorporation beyond recognition rather than acceptance of many-cultured origins and transcultural coexistence. Such parochial, unimaginative mind-settings close doors—doors whose opening would permit choice and flexibility.

Nations: Simple Stories and Complex Pasts

Since the nineteenth century, scholars and ideologues have attempted to mold the history of the two genders, of the very young and the very old, of several classes and of more cultural groups into one coherent story of a nation. If the present is the bridge between origins, the world into which we are born, the potentiality of the future, and the worlds we create—then scholarly homogenization, and confusion of meanings of everyday speech can lead us astray, perhaps into a maze without exit. Then comes the time of the great simplifiers, the strong men, who with incisive one-way logic or a bold stroke of their sword cut the Gordian knot. Suddenly everything falls into order—neat ethnic categories with "us" at the top and Chinese,

or women, or Black people at the bottom. The powerful simplification or master narrative of "national identity" and "nation-state history," in *longue durée* perspective, hides a complex interactive past, hides in particular the worlds the slaves made, the migrants built, the women created.

A few discerning glances into the past reveal the interactive worlds. The late-medieval Mediterranean world of three faiths and many denominations comprised the littorals of three continents and peoples of many colors of skin. It connected to gold-providing trans-Saharan African states, to the enticing Indian Ocean trade emporia and Chinese luxuries, as well as to marginal transalpine Europe. Al-Andalus on the Iberian Peninsula was Muslim-Arab; the Central European Hohenstaufen Empire (much later constructed as "of German nation") extended to Sicily; the Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewish diasporas spread; crusaders of many ethnic origins, labeled "Franks," destroyed parts of the highly developed interfaith cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean, then settled and shed their uncouth ways quickly; Flemish and Saxon men and women as well as an itinerant many-cultured military order from Palestine settled the Slavic lands that came to be called "German"; Norsemen roamed the Atlantic coasts, built states from England to Sicily, and married local women to gain access to their networks and resources; Mediterranean slaves were Christian or Muslim, were of many shades of white or black, were Circassian, English, Arab, or sub-Saharan African; merchants crisscrossed Europe and so did multitudes of pilgrims; free and enserfed peasant families moved and few could be traced in the same location for more than three generations. All consorted, conceived children, gave birth, and raised children in hybrid cultures. Late-medieval peoples, imagined as sedentary, were characterized by high mobility and multiple faiths, and were ruled by a trans-European aristocracy and clerics from many backgrounds. Even though different groups were often armed and in conflict, the coexisted and interacted.[3]

Seventeenth-century urban societies composed and recomposed themselves. In 1600, Frankfurt am Main drew much of its business and craft production from several thousand migrating journeymen artisans, 3,000 middle-class Dutch Protestant refugees, and 2,500 Jews—who jointly accounted for more than 40 percent of the population. In addition, inmigrating women from the neighboring countryside did much of the service work. In Kraków, Poland, Italian scholars taught at the university, Italian architects built the main church, Scottish merchants and peddlers traded.[4] In Hamburg, northern Germany, clothmakers, merchants, and stockbrokers spoke Flemish; Portuguese Jews from Amsterdam established the port's commercial connections to Latin America; and a few manumitted Danish-Caribbean slaves were baptized and intermarried with local women.[5]

From its capital in Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire had institutionalized multireligious hierarchical coexistence in the *millet* system. To avoid cultural and military hegemony of the Turkish group, its administrators used

a *lingua nullius*, the artificial Ottomanlica. To the highest ranks, officials were levied from among children of the realm's Christian peoples; wives for the elites came from among Caucasian and Central Asian slave women and rose to high rank. Istanbul accommodated Jewish refugees from Catholic Iberia and Balkan peasants liberated from feudal regimes. From the multifaith cities of Al-Andalus, on the other hand, the victorious but mind-numbing Latin Church expelled the religious Others, Jewish and Muslim intellectuals, long-distance traders, skilled agriculturalists, urban artisans, and simple laborers. Polities renounced good governance in favor of otherizing and of generating refugees. The formerly trans-Mediterranean Iberian societies were reduced from diversity to monoreligious doctrine, from the center of the Euro-Atlantic world to the periphery. They cut themselves off from innovative interconnectedness.[6]

Enlightened nineteenth-century middle-class reformers nurtured and cherished national culture and economic achievement. But villagers and working-class urbanites from the many regions of Europe moved between internationalized—globalized—labor markets and transcontinental family economies. From Bugiarno, one single village near Milan, Italy, young girls migrated to silk factories of the microregion (short-distance labor migration of women before marriage and mobilization of a female labor force), and young men went to France for seasonal or multiannual work (medium-distance labor migration). Once skilled female silkworkers—accompanied by a male foreman—even went to Japan (long-distance expert migration). Others, often married men, traveled to Missouri iron mines (long-distance temporary labor migration of the unskilled) and wives followed "to do the washing and cooking" for husbands and boarders (migration into unpaid service work). Rosa, one of these women, although remaining a villager and Lombardo in mentality, worked in a boardinghouse in a Missouri mining village, divorced an abusive husband under American law, migrated to the metropolis of Chicago, briefly returned to her home village, where she dared to talk back to local authorities, and then returned to the United States and worked as a cleaning woman in her Chicago neighborhood. Villagers from Zaborów, Poland, or Scania, Sweden, shared such trans-European and transatlantic experiences and transcultural life-worlds.[7] The "White Atlantic" and its industrial capital flows and proletarian mass migrations supplemented and replaced the "Black Atlantic," the involuntary slave migrations which, to the 1830s, had brought more Africans to the Americas than Europeans. Their transcultural worlds had been as complex as Rosa's but were characterized by violence, racism, and power relationships.[8]

The Bugiarno migrants' cultural identities remained both local and regional. They were not Italian. Only in the receiving societies did people from the Veneto to Calabria interact, for example in Mile End village on the fringes of Montreal, in hamlets along the railway lines to Winnipeg, or in the Rocky Mountains' Crow's Nest Pass mining towns. They became more similar, made themselves into Italians. Since neither Montreal's

French-Canadians nor British-origin Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) officials were able to tell the difference between a Lombardo, a Tuscan, or even a Sicilian, they, too, labeled these immigrants "Italians." Such processes cut the Gordian knot of complexity and arrived at a single ethnic group. Cognitive differentiation is, indeed, limited, needs categorizations, but easily turns into ethnic ascription and racist labeling: in structuring the complex, language helps and alienates at the same time.

The "Canada" the migrants reached was a composite of First Peoples' and European-settled areas. In so-called *British*-Columbia, the several First Peoples had integrated a fragment of the First Founding Nation's private sector, the Scots of the Hudson's Bay Company. When the many self-ruling cultural groups along the Pacific coast became a province, the first elites were Métis (Scottish Métis). The specific cultural input of the other half, Okanagan people for example and many others, is not part of memory-defining language. As English-speakers these Métis could redefine themselves as British. Other designations, like Similkameen-Scottish or Métis-Columbia, in terms of the elites in Ottawa, Dominion, and Empire, would have undercut the negotiating position. The Métis of the Red River Valley, on the other hand, spoke French. They could not redefine themselves as British and their self-government was destroyed by an alliance of speculators, army, and nationalists in government—all of them men. Their region and the prairies in general were later settled by "men in sheepskin coats"—as the ten-second sound bite of national memory has it. The Secretary of the Interior, Clifford Sifton, had called for men with "sturdy wives and a goodly number of children." He wanted family labor. Ukrainians came, a strong group that assimilated others into its linguistic fold, kind of a third founding nation. The novels of Vera Lysenko and Illia Kiriak evoke the complexity of the period.[9]

At about 1900, a period styled by gatekeepers as the height of the "age of nationalism," the Atlantic world consisted of peoples with growing national consciousnesses and hopes for self-determination; of empires in which hegemonic peoples oppressed smaller ones; and of a few states, like the Netherlands or Sweden that had admitted immigrants for centuries, but had coalesced into increasingly homogeneous cultures. In the two alleged model nations, France and Britain, French villagers could not understand each other's regional dialects and English men and women from the laboring classes left en masse for places where they could feed themselves and their children; they chose between states and nations. Again, the duplicity of language changed historical memory; dynastic, multiethnic and multidialect states developed homogenizing bureaucracies that used the state apparatus to form nations. Language turned such state-nations into nation-states—as if there had always been merely one cultural group, the nation.

People's experiences did not reflect the idea of monocultural nations. In September 1910, a Transylvanian woman with her two teenage daughters, left from an Adriatic port for New York. She was a descendant of the

German migrants who had lived interspersed with, if hierarchically above, Magyars and Rumanians for eight centuries. She and her husband had departed from the Habsburg Dual Monarchy of many peoples, whose core did not invest in the periphery. For several years the couple had lived in America, having left their daughters in Transylvania under the care of an aunt. When the mother returned to bring the two girls to America, she wore the traditional Transylvania Saxon dress, probably never used in America, to indicate to her kin that she had not become alien to them. But for her daughters she had bought skirts, stylish in urban America, to spare them from being ridiculed in the new society for wearing Old World garb. She spoke the Transylvanian German dialect intermixed with many American words; the daughters, schooled under Magyarization policies, spoke Hungarian among themselves. This family, one among the 50 to 60 million men, women, and children who left Europe between the 1820s and the 1930s, was neither dislocated (Chicago School) nor uprooted (Handlin), nor even hyphenated (1970s ethnic studies). They moved transculturally in multiple socioeconomic contexts: Transylvanian, Magyar, and American; rural and urban; intergenerationally tradition-bound and future-oriented. Migrants have multiple identities.[10]

Four years later, in August 1914, the imperial polities' hold over the cultures and economies of peripheral "subaltern nations" and the manipulation of cultural identities by self-interested elites, among other reasons, caused all-out war. Allegedly manly and superior "white" Germanic Europeans fought "dark" Slavic "races" and were, in turn, subdued by valiant Anglo-Saxon soldiers. Twenty million dead later, new nation-states were established. Another war, racial extermination, and 60 million dead later, untold millions of Europeans became refugees, and many headed for the United States and Canada. The Occident, self-constructed pinnacle of civilization, had engaged in a half-century of self-destruction.

In this period, the Atlantic migration system stagnated and, in the 1950s, came to an end. Since the 1960s, peoples of other cultures reestablished the Pacific migration system. On both continents of the Atlantic world, labor migrations brought people north from the Mediterranean and Caribbean basins. Even though new forms of racist exclusion followed, multicultural interactions also emerged. Refugee generation shifted from Europe to Africa and other parts of the Southern Hemisphere. Just as colonized peoples had to come to terms with the alien colonizers, now wealthy European and North American societies have to come to terms with refugees from poverty. In contrast to labor migrants, refugees often arrive with wounds in their identities, wounds of colonialism, of economic exploitation and unequal terms of trade, mutilations imposed by modern states ruled by clans, kleptocracies, or multinational conglomerates. The universally accepted type of political organization, the state, and the global capitalist economy often turn into "refugee-generating apparatuses" and many of those involuntarily on the move arrive at borders closed by "refugee-refusing" administrators of democratic states.

Societies, Economies, States

The ever-changing kaleidoscope of social interaction in Europe and the Americas notwithstanding, thinkers began the construction of single-minded political and economic theory, considering seventeenth-century England and France to be the models of nation-building. Yet, a close-up of the two societies reveals that England's First Peoples had mixed with Romans and Normans, had accommodated trans-European elite migrants, among them Cistercian monks, German and Italian merchants, and clerics from Italian cities. The mix was compounded by the Anglicization of Ireland and migrating Irish laborers, and by conquest of the Scots, Welsh, and Irish, whom the dynasty forced into one realm by 1707.[11] In France, the southern *langue d'oc* speakers and Albigensian believers had been subdued in the thirteenth century, the Bretons and the Basques later. The territory of France expanded and contracted—"un effet d'accordéon"[12]—and included regions of a London-based dynasty, French-German intercultural borderlands, and Spanish Roussillon. The expulsion of the Huguenots reduced religious diversity while expanding the impact of French-speakers across Europe. Migrants from these two colorful *mélanges* styled themselves Founding Nations when they arrived in Canada—not yet named—and were joined after 1774 by the United Empire Loyalists, who styled themselves quintessentially British but included Dutch, Germans, free African-Americans, and Black slaves.

Modern states emerged at arbitrary points of time from power relationships and homogenized national polities emerged from projects of nineteenth-century educated and enlightened segments of the middle classes. In Habsburg-, Hohenzollern-, or Romanov-ruled east-central and eastern Europe, this "springtime of peoples" came to an end when the revolutions of 1848/49 were defeated by dynastic armies and, in North America, when the United States waged war on Mexico and Native Peoples. Thereafter, ossified sociopolitical regimes in Europe interacted with a burgeoning founder capitalism and new proponents of national traditions. Common people's activities played but a minor role in state formation. Thus the relationship between state and identity was and is tenuous.

"People" are defined as " population," the totality of the inhabitants within the borders of a territory united by the system of rule. This succinct formula summarizes the thought of the trans-European elite of political philosophers from Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean Bodin via the power-centered approach of Thomas Hobbes, the commonwealth-oriented approach of John Locke, and the citizen-oriented approach of Hugo Grotius. With the exception of the Urban Netherlands with its patriciate and burghers, and Switzerland with its local popular assemblies, all "modern" political thought developed in European aristocratic societies and dynastic states. Rousseau's *contrat social* (1762) was but an attractive vision without historical reality. In the early 1800s, European

nation-state concepts expanded to the Americas and, after the 1940s, to the decolonizing world—there, too, identities emerged among regionally diverse peoples.

The status of a state's population, which had and has to underwrite the cost of the structures and its operators, changed from culturally diverse subjects of dynasties to economically active contributors as producers and taxpayers under mercantilism. The Enlightenment and the revolutionary project from the 1760s to 1848/49 made all "men" (in English in the generic sense, in French gendered as *citoyens et citoyennes*) equal before the law, but in practice the administrators of the law were male and middle class; women were excluded. Romanticism added emotional attachment through love of *Heimat*: a conflation of local region and structures of origin as experienced during childhood socialization by family and school, in a particular environmental setting.

In modern political thought, states are characterized by (1) a delimited (historic) territory, (2) a monopoly on the use of force/violence and tax collection, (3) an impersonal structure of power or system of rule and order, (4) external acceptance of this monopoly of rule ("sovereignty"), (5) internal common historic memory and actual legitimacy, and (6) a common economy. Though this continualist version is being challenged by postmodern interpretations, it still is part of memories.[13]

The first characteristic, territoriality, emerged at the end of Europe's Thirty Years' War in 1648, when one-third of the region's population of 15 million had died, in order to prevent further warfare that would once again reduce the reservoir of tax-paying producers. This Westphalian state system of 1648 postulated inviolability of the particular territorial boundaries (as defined by fortune or misfortune in war) and sovereignty of hereditary or warlord rulers over their populations and their religious identities ("mono-faith" societies). Subsequently, under concepts of nation-states, borders were assumed to be dividing lines between populations with culturally distinct identities and loyalties. Such self-defined nation-states appropriated to themselves the right to expel cultural Others and "disloyal" political Others.

The second characteristic of nation-states, "the claim to hold a monopoly on force and the means of coercion (sustained by a standing army and the police) became possible only with the 'pacification' of peoples—the breaking down of rival centers of power and authority.… This element of state was not fully attained until the nineteenth century," and had never been part of the ever-changing dynastic or "absolutist" states.[14] Rulers negotiated compromises between the diversity of law codices, of norms and local customs, and of corporate charters and princely "rights." By designating flexible dynastic systems as absolutist and homogenized nations as open and democratic, the agents of power established a misleading hegemonic discourse.

The problematic of historic memory and legitimacy is being addressed throughout this essay. I will not discuss the system of rule and the issue of

sovereignty. The last aspect, a common economy, evolved from mercantilism and included an expansive, imperialist drive. Once the concept of noble honor was replaced with economic interests, whether described as mercantilist policy or acquisitiveness, the concept of a god-given state changed to predatory economic units; catching of slaves, deporting of Acadians, or dispossessing First Peoples was easily integrated into a comprehensive theory. Historically, local societies had held dual membership in economic regions and in dynastic polities. States and economies, like Urban Italy, the fairs from Geneva to Bruges, or the Hanseatic League, overlapped. Checks and balances operated between economic and political actors until, in the seventeenth-century, chartered companies merged (dynastic) state with private business and dynastic imperial outreach with profit. In the nineteenth century, states temporarily regulated so-called national economies, which often included distant non-national colonies. However, in contravention to legal rules, economic actors relocated capital as well as technical know-how and skills to other states and laboring men and women relocated between segments of worldwide labor markets. Since the 1880s, trusts and multinational companies also operate outside of the frame of states.[15] The nation-state as cultural unit thus relied on the productive capacity of other, subdued colonial peoples. Non-national economies provided the productive base for European nations and later the United States.

In the year 2000, these organizing principles remained unchanged, except for the hierarchical inclusion—a vertical mosaic—of working-class men, all women, and persons of different colors of skin. But terms of trade imposed by Western democratic statist and capitalist systems relegate the economies of a large part of the world's population to inferior status and poverty under a system of global apartheid.[16]

The liberalist free-market ideology as well as the culturalist nation-state concept of the present is said to be rooted in the economic and cultural philosophy of the Age of Revolution, in the writings of Adam Smith and of Johann Gottfried von Herder, in particular. The Scot and Baltic-German (not British and German), however, developed complex arguments rather than apologetics of free trade and nationalism. Adam Smith, as moral philosopher, in his 1776 *Wealth of Nations* approached the economic aspects of human agency and argued for markets uninhibited by state intervention. His was a world of small regional economies—probably like his hometown Glasgow—in which each and every actor, whether small capitalist or skilled worker, could act according to his own best interests and select between multiple options. His free market was one of equal producers, but for the sum total, a self-regulating socioeconomic space, of these actions he used the unfortunate phrase "the invisible hand of the market." The state, largely controlled by a nonproductive gentry and nobility, was a burden.[17] The self-interested and self-enlightened actions were unconstrained by imbalanced power relations. The bicultural Johann Gottfried von Herder postulated the equality of cultures, particularly the

many eastern ones ruled by imperial dynasties relying on a hegemonic ethnocultural population.[18]

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), almost a precursor of modern discourse theory, emphasized the limitations of language and thought and argued that laws could be virtuous only if free from personal interests. He thus juxtaposed the public and the private, and recognized, as Jürgen Habermas would later phrase it, the connection between "knowledge and human interests" (*Erkenntnis und Interesse*). Thus alternatives to state- and capital-centered approaches were available on the marketplace of ideas and of projects for social organization.

It has long been clear that no story should ever again be told as if there was only one outcome. But these open, flexible, and egalitarian approaches lost out to single-purpose statism. Georg W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), who developed his theories when the position of the middle classes had been secured, started from the family as the basis of the state (*bürgerlicher Staat*). The state thus constituted the highest moral principle (*sittliche Idee*) and became primordial to society and to the families on which it was based—a circular argument if ever there was one.[19] Stepping out of such self-satisfied Eurocentric discourse by taking a perspective from Africa, Janet Ewald summarizes: "The state arose when a warrior transformed a cohort of young, unmarried men into an armed band."[20] From the experience of Europe's totalitarian systems, Tzvetan Todorov notes: "Imposing itself as an intermediary between the individual and its values, the state replaces humanity as the standard by which to distinguish good from evil and thus determines the direction in which society will evolve."[21]

Structures and Their Operators

If "states," human constructs, transform themselves into moral arbiters, we have to look for actors. Structures and concepts of states are neither neutral nor all-encompassing—the exclusion of women and the working classes has been mentioned. Within a state, three categories of privileged and salaried actors or "professional statists"—conceptualizers, administrators, and gatekeepers—supported by the general tax-paying population, develop the structures, keep them functioning, and decide about legitimacy. They develop distinct interests of their own, internal dynamics, and group organizations. To hide particularist (private) interests, the "civil servants" develop a *raison d'état* above and beyond that of individual citizens. Knowledge and interests are intricately linked; position provides access to resources and gives power.[22]

A first group, the *conceptualizers* or *intellectuals,* establishes legitimacy and Gramscian hegemonic discourse. Early concepts of popular rule and equality before the law were still trans-European but increasingly confined to distinct discourses in states and to knowledge production fragmented into scholarly disciplines. Middle-class literary and philological

experts expanded equality before the law to include equality of culture in their struggle to rid societies of the primacy of aristocratic discourse and power. Reformers, set on social innovation and intending to accumulate capital, looked for cultures not devoted to the nobilities' ostentatious consumption. They found such "pure" cultures in poor-but-honest rural folk, whose multiple regional lifestyles and narratives they collected, amalgamated, and standardized. Middle-class modes of thought and literacy alienated lower-class folks from their very own cultures. When their children could not spell according to the educators' new rules, they were flunked in the school system, excluded from the higher echelons of "national" education, and were streamlined into underclass status and low-wage positions. Children taught by nationalist (often exclusively male) teachers were to be cultural clones.

The second group, *administrators* or *bureaucrats*, demands and needs continuity—regardless of dynastic, revolutionary, theoretical, or constitutional change—to ensure that structures function and all involved keep their jobs. Trained administrators, mostly recruited from the emerging bourgeoisie, became professionals employing a legal terminology intelligible only to those trained in statecraft. On the positive side they could reduce intergroup conflict by equalizing duties of inhabitants. Administrators often represent one segment of societies only: either they are separated by an age gap of a whole generation from the many-cultured youth of the same societies, or "civil service" is restricted to "nationals." Hegemonic thought and concomitant language make the state paramount and grant male "civil servants" salaries and status while denigrating women's "domestic service," including the raising of children (that is, the next generation of "nationals"), as of inferior status and deserving low wages.[23]

Scholarly and literary *gatekeepers*, the third group, legitimize the established structures and processes by reference to the past and new national discourses. Scholarship passed through a first trajectory from discursive to statist. The accounting sciences of the intercultural Mediterranean merchants became rulers' instruments to assess taxes. The systems of thought dealing with social order became policing or political sciences; all became bureaucratic structures frozen in time.

When equality before the law became the maxim, a negative dialectic implied an end to diversity of legal and cultural group status in favor of uniformity of individuals. In political theory, the founding principle of universal and equal individual rights, however, contradicts the founding principle of nation-states, that is, special rights for a national group.[24] Formerly open-ended scholarship, under statist auspices, turned into *Herrschaftswissenschaften*, sciences—or apologetics—of rule.[25]

Scholarship's second trajectory from broadly integrative to narrowly monodisciplinary led to fragmentation and excluded the humanities. To the early twentieth century, scholarship attempted to deal with societies as a whole. The German *Staatswissenschaften* (state sciences), the American social sciences, the French *Annales—Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*—took

a broad multidisciplinary long-range perspective to complex societies.[26] Thus society, economy, and polity ideally became one integrated field of study, as, for example, in Max Weber's *Staatssoziologie* in Germany, Harold Innis's political economy approach in Canada, or the work of the Chicago School of Sociology. In the multicultural Montreal of the 1940s, Everett C. Hughes and Helen MacGill Hughes questioned the concept of monoculturalism. They realized that "people meet" and cross "racial and ethnic frontiers."[27] Such holistic understanding has been fragmented into different disciplines with incompatible methods and theories. In nation-state historical narrative and single-theory social sciences, diversity is lost or deliberately falsified by monocultural, single-gender, class-based gatekeepers. In their empire of knowledge, immigrant or minority groups are assigned their own compartment, ethnic studies.[28]

Analysis of the state has to close without a life story—unless that of a famous white male is selected. Serafina Petrone, the Catholic Port Arthur woman, would be labeled an ethnic rather than a political actor or a human being. Her life and aspirations would be studied by family history, sociology of religion, anthropology of childhood, social mobility research, ethnic studies, and many other subfields. She would never recognize herself in the resulting "knowledge" fragments. Her aspirations, her emotions, her anger, and her embeddedness in social relations might be captured by a novelist or be studied by scholars in the humanities. Gate-opening scholars would remain faithful to complexity in their journeys into the past or in their explorations of the present. It is time to reintegrate the fields, to understand societies from the people up rather than from the structures down.

People: Transcultural Life Courses and Human Rights

Many nineteenth- and twentieth-century European and Asian emigrants considered their states of origin oppressive; whether because of taxes, arrogant officials, or military service, states seemed unresponsive to their nationals. The global economic realm provided labor markets and receiving states made their markets accessible to newcomers. Societies appeared as local communities sharing cultural patterns: the break with loved ones upon departure, the hope for embeddedness in a new network of "co-ethnics." Canada as one receiving state provided a framework to create local communities and societal institutions.

In the late twentieth century, the economic nexus remains similar: availability of jobs permits migrants to secure their livelihood immediately after arrival. Better wages are but a secondary consideration since without a job they remain chimeras. Change involves the role of the state, which has become more exclusive and intrusive by elaborate immigration protocols or closing of gates. Change involves societies, many of which became more integrative by respecting multiple cultural lifestyles. Life

projects have become more societally and less locally embedded by state- and society-wide social security systems.

In June 1970, at the age of 26, Joyce Fraser reached Canada from Guyana. She left her four children in the care of her mother and sisters—emotions and family economy extended over the two Americas. She also left her husband, who was inflexible and "frightened of starting life afresh." Joyce had assets: a will to work and improve her life, knowledge of the host society's language, and a subaltern's ability to observe closely, to learn, and to fit in. She had three liabilities. The first, overblown hopes in the riches to be found in Canada, she had to shed the moment she looked for a job as a domestic. The second, her brownness, her kind of beauty, she could not shed—the receiving society would have to shed its prejudices. As a tourist, she incurred a third liability by taking a job in Toronto and becoming an illegal from the point of view of the law—an undocumented or *sans-papiers* in neutral language.[29]

Her life course and the interaction of state, economy, and society with individuals raises several questions. If freedom to migrate and to select an abode is a basic human right, why is the freedom to depart not matched by a freedom to arrive? Under the present global institutional regime, state borders interrupt processes of migration, truncate a human right, stop economic life-projects and cultural trajectories midway. However, even principles need to be negotiated. Receiving people, too, individually and collectively, may determine cultural preferences and social spaces. Newcomers' and residents' self-determination have limits imposed by equality of all and respect for all. Race-based admission criteria, racist individuals, and racist structures wound individual identities, "otherize" human beings: Turks in Germany, Jamaicans in Great Britain, North Africans in France, and Joyce Fraser in 1970s Toronto. However, at the turn to the twenty-first century, cultural rights and rights to difference are being elevated to the status of human rights. Social equality does not demand uniformity of cultural patterns, it permits individual or group distinctiveness. But again there are limitations: equality of and respect for the integrity of each and every person prevent, for example, oppression of women or child labor from being justified by cultural traditions.

Rejection of human complexity does not prevent economies and societies from permitting humans, reduced to disposable labor, to enter specific segments of a nation's labor market. Such labor—under the unequal power relationships of class, gender and color—was and is cheap. Gendered discourse and economic practice considers tuning in to a child unskilled labor but tuning up a car engine skilled labor. Native-born white women vacate the exploitative economic niche of child-care for better segments of the labor market. This involves a deep shift in national consciousness. Previously mothers were supposed to socialize children into the nation; now women of different cultural, historic, economic, and social background care for the next generation. Similarly, slave or subaltern

nannies provided childcare for generations of colonizers—these nurturing women helped create the societies they were part of.

Joyce Fraser, when treated like a slave in one of her jobs, cried out: "I felt divided into three enemies: the body, which moves to orders; the soul, which cries out, inwardly, to be accepted and released; the mind, which urges me to fight back, yet never can because it is divided within. Who am I? What am I doing?" One of her responses was to turn to alcohol as an escape from injury to identity. Another was to find a new identity: to activate a dormant aspect of her cultural heritage, she renamed herself Haile Telatra Edoney. Neither strategy brought immediate help and she never considered a culture of grievance to be an option since she did not want to remind herself time and again that she was vulnerable and treated like a second-class human being. She wanted to get on with her life and chose to face the complex present, to use the cracks in the system of exclusion. She applied for landed status, appealed when she was turned down, and then succeeded. She could bring in her children and found a new partner. She could become Canadian because administrators and intellectuals as well as a broad spectrum of Canadian people changed the processual structures of the society.

Jocye Fraser, like all other migrants and residents across the ages and the continents, led her life in relationships, in cultural groups, and in age-specific life-cycle positions. The life cycle helps to make ethnicity understandable: *Heimat* is memory of childhood and, since the actor is small, *Heimat* appears as large. Culture helps to understand the dichotomy between a universalist principle, in which each and every individual is equal and cannot claim special rights, and collective life in groups with special and distinct cultures. Citizens' self-organization in groups, networks, and relationships—whether defined by or transcending ethnicity, regional culture, or other shared characteristic—provides the environment: the competence, options, and social capital for individuals to lead meaningful lives as well as the potential for resistance against inequality and oppression. Interaction between individuals and groups involves a dialectic or multilectic of cooperation and conflict, of getting closer as well as of drawing boundaries. Identity involves a sense of uniqueness developed in dynamic interaction between self and others and limited by strictures on self-expression that hurt others—whether the perpetrator is a local bully, an abusive spouse, a powerful group or class, one discriminatory law or a whole state, or one exploitative employer or a multinational corporation.

In her life, Joyce Fraser had to integrate what scholars sort into different disciplines and had to overcome barriers erected by well-paid gatekeepers. Her life had many possible outcomes and remained more complex than the most sophisticated analyses: "We have too much accurate history and social sciences and too little accurate imagination," as critics have noted.[30] Like Joyce Fraser, who left a society with limited options, scholars—and public opinion—have to leave the straitjacket of constructed single-culture pasts, have to break the prison-gates of nation-state ideology. Scholars

need to unburden themselves of established discourses, of the gatekeepers' master narratives, whose "facts" are but myths not yet demystified, whose constructs hide and obfuscate rather than reveal and clarify. Scholarship needs to start from the people and consider multiple options.

States have accommodated multifaith and multiethnic societies and still do. Nation-centered, northwest European political theory was only one among many. Others included the Ottoman *millet* system of coexistence, the trade emporia of the societies of the Indian Ocean, the maroon polities of escaped slaves in the Americas, the Iroquois federation and Haida self-organization. None of them provide a blueprint—but they are accessible in the marketplace of concepts, in the exchange of ideas and theories.

Migration and its compression of time and space as well as communication strategies (not only new technologies) in past and present have contributed to a deterritorialization of residence and belonging, of work and consumption, of production and reproduction, of relationships and communities. Mental maps of migrants as well as nonmigrants include courses into the future, courses to options. Mobile citizens choose multi- or translocality. In Lloyd L. Wong's words, "The deterritorialization of social identity challenges the nation-state's claim of making exclusive citizenship a defining focus of allegiance and fidelity, in contrast to the overlapping, permeable and multiple forms of identity."[31] As to life-course projects and belongings, states have begun to take second place to urban spheres, to "a chain of cosmopolitan cities and an increasing proliferation of subnational and transnational identities."[32] Most migrants choose urban ways of life and since the mid-1990s, more than half of the world's population lives in urban conglomerates. The professional statists of the present have to come to terms with deterritorialization of economic pursuits, citizenship, and relational embeddedness. New types of states provide a framework of commonality in which people may interact and talk to each other. They do not provide prescriptions. The frame includes effective systems of rights, options for political and civic participation, and equal and easy access to resources—education, social security, labor markets, and spiritual experience among them.

Economic globalization and profit maximization at the turn of the twenty-first century are said to increase pressures to lower wages and cut costs, social costs in particular; replace Joyce Fraser by a Bangladeshi woman—in the dehumanizing rhetoric of the economically powerful and their talking heads.[33] Labor markets in the Atlantic world and the southern plantation economies were international in the nineteenth century, as those of the Pacific world have been since the mid-twentieth century. Britain's East India Company was a seventeenth-century equivalent of the modern multinational company (MNC) and, around 1900, internet shopping had its equivalent in long-distance mail order from Eaton's or Montgomery Ward. States, if agreeing on multinational cooperation, will build ethical parameters around global trade and abolish global apartheid. The present wasteful male-dominated MNC's are countered by women's

bottom-up development strategies which utilize resources sparingly. Nongovernmental grassroots organizations, like those that disrupted the Seattle World Trade Organization (WTO) conference, have an infinitely more complex understanding of economic interests and their bearing on social and individual identities than the male leaders of international high finance, trade, and production. Good governance, responsible to women and men, to children and the elderly, is the maxim.

Joyce Fraser was not willing to become an expendable social cost. She navigated to economic security in a global market for domestics; her *je me souviens* permitted her to sink roots in two worlds and to establish prospects in one metropolitan center of four million people and the Caribbean community within it.

Societies of the twenty-first century will be experimenting, negotiating nations with multicultural values. People unable to negotiate difference will alienate themselves from the creativity emerging from diversity and many-cultured initiatives of individuals and groups. Membership in social groups is voluntary and changeable. Belongings involve social and cultural communities, national polities, and supranational affiliations. Diversity does not imply ethnicity worship, hallowing of ancestors, or uncritical adoration of roots. *Je me souviens* provides positions in the present, signposts for men and women, citizens who make independent decisions and take responsibility for their life courses within a societal safety net. Free multiple choice is balanced by multiple embeddedness and belonging. Thus individual life-courses do not imply irresponsible individualisms but reaction and proaction in community settings and within shared core values.[34]

Scholars are part of a process moving the analytical historical and social sciences as well as discursive systems of thought ("theory") and the humanities ("literature") away from the traditional path of study from states and gatekeeper myths down, toward a new approach leading from people up. Emphasis on human agency and human rights within man- and woman-made structure-processes writes the many-cultured actors back into *our* history. The maxim remains *liberté, egalité, fraternité*—which I translate as cosmopolitan or global coexistence of gendered individuals in social groups on equal terms, and as respect for diversity, transcultural lives, and multiple options.

Notes

I am grateful to Danielle Juteau for commenting on an earlier draft of this essay.

1. Penny Petrone, *Breaking the Mold: A Memoir* (Toronto: Guernica, 1995), 165–91.
2. Eugène Taché, architect of the Quebec Parliament building, the *palais législatif*, suggested the province's coat of arms—fleurs-de-lis on azure, lion on royal red, green maple leaves on gold—and its motto *je me souviens.* The building, entirely dedicated to the evocation of French Canada's past, displays the motto, adopted in 1883, and the arms at the entrance. The painter Charles Huot later decorated the building with two large historical murals and the ceiling of the Assemblée nationale with a painting, *je me souviens*. At the time of the October Crisis of 1970, the sculptor and political activist Armand J.R. Vaillancourt created a *je me souviens* fountain sculpture.
3. Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002), chaps. 2, 3.
4. Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chap. 3; F.W. Carter, *Trade and Urban Development in Poland: An Economic Geography of Cracow, from its Origins to 1795* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Donna Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas* (London: UCL Press, 2000).
5. In northern and eastern Europe, African influences were small. But in the court of St. Petersburg, free Black Americans from New England served and Pushkin's (1799–1837) great-grandfather was an African slave brought to Russia.
6. Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*, trans. Colin Imber and Norman Itzkowitz (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); Inalcik and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Kemal H. Karpat, "*Millets* and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 vols., ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), 1:141–69.
7. Marie Ets Hall, ed., *Rosa: The Life of an Italian Immigrant* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 120–22; Christiane Harzig, ed., *Peasant Maids, City Women: From the European Countryside to Chicago* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
8. Joseph E. Harris, *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982); Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, *The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas 1441–1900* (Harlow, England: Longman, 1987); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
9. Dirk Hoerder, *Creating Societies: Immigrant Lives in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), chaps. 11–13.
10. Josef N. Jodlbauer, *Dreizehn Jahre in Amerika 1910–1923*, ed. Dirk Hoerder (Vienna: Böhlau, 1996), 28–29.
11. When an early spokesman for racial purity titled a poem about newcomers "The Foreigner," Daniel Defoe ridiculed the notion of "The True Born Englishman" (1701), reprinted in *Selected Writings of Daniel Defoe,* ed. James T. Boulton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 51–81.
12. Marc Augé, *Un ethnologue dans le métro* (Paris: Hachette, 1986), 18.
13. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 29–98; Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14, and Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, United Kingdom: B. Blackwell, 1986); Gérard Noiriel, *Le Creuset français: Histoire del'immigration XIXe–XXe siècles* (Paris: Seuil, 1988), trans. Geoffroy de Laforcade, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
14. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, 48.

15. After the separate economic structures and organizations from Italian cities to the Hanseatic cities and their federations, the fur traders' regions—or the Indian ocean trade emporia—lost their independence from political rule, and commercial interests and polities became congruent in the mercantilist state, which often expanded its economic (power) base into the colonies.
16. Anthony Richmond, *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism and the New World Order* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994).
17. His critique of the gentry's unproductive servant class, in a further unfortunate turn, devalued reproductive work as a whole—women's work. Adam Smith, *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, vol. 2, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* [1776], ed. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); Susan E. Gallagher, *The Rule of the Rich? Adam Smith's Argument Against Political Power* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).
18. Herder, *Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (n.p., 1784–91), book 16, chap. 4. Germanocentric scholars and intellectual history approaches have credited Herder with stimulating East European peoples' interest in their own cultures. Holm Sundhaussen, *Der Einfluß der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburger Monarchie* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1973). Recently, Liah Greenfeld has constructed Herder and other Romantics into early German nationalists. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 310–52. This hymn to "America" is best read as a late-twentieth-century Ivy League version of Mary Antin's immigrant autobiography, *The Promised Land: The Autobiography of a Russian Immigrant* (1st ed. 1911; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
19. In the nineteenth- and twentieth-century age of powerful imperial economies and cultures, Adam Smith, who lived in the regional world of Scottish urban producers linked to larger markets, was claimed by nation-state economists and free-market apologists as founding father. Hegel, claimed by political philosophers as advocate of a strong state and heroic statesmen, had lived in a German-language dynastic world that had divided itself into political oblivion but, at the time of his writing, had just partly been reorganized, consolidated, and reinvigorated by a powerful, outside statesman, Napoléon. Herder, highly aware of cultural interaction, was claimed as *rector spiritus* of cultural philosophy, the study of folk or national literatures.
20. Janet J. Ewald, "Slavery in Africa and the Slave Trades from Africa," *American Historical Review* 97 (1992): 465–85, quote p. 479. Other approaches to theories of state could begin from nonlineaged entrepreneurs of the Caribbean, labeled buccaneers or pirates, or from the free communities established by self-liberated ("escaped") slaves, the maroon societies.
21. Tzvetan Todorov, *Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps*, trans. by Arthur Denner and Abigail Pollak (New York: Metropolitan and Holt, 1997), 127–28.
22. Anthony Giddens, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with B. Blackwell, 1987); Jürgen Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, 2d ed., trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (London: Heinemann Educational, 1978).
23. Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Guy L. Thompson, *Paris and Its People Under English Rule: the Anglo-Burgundian Regime, 1420–1436* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 47–145; Sarah Hanley, "Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France," *French Historical Studies* 16 (1989): 4–27.
24. Legal historians dealing with founding texts, the constitution, realized the tensions between normative concept and societal practices and, before sociology or social history had developed, came to differentiate between text and reality, *Verfassungsnorm* and *Verfassungswirklichkeit*.
25. Intellectuals who defected from repressive systems and reactionary ancien régimes (Tocqueville), helped colonized peoples in their struggles for independence in the 1950s, or, in the 1970s, recast closed national consciousness into open many-cultured interaction.

26. They combined demography, constitutional theory, public law, economics (*"Volks"-wirtschaftslehre* in German in a significant change of focus from state to unity of producers), sociology, and political sciences.
27. Everett C. Hughes, "The Study of Ethnic Relations," *Dalhousie Review* 24 (1948): 477–82; Everett C. Hughes and Helen MacGill Hughes, *Where People Meet: Racial and Ethnic Frontiers* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952).
28. Howard Palmer, "Canadian Immigration and Ethnic History in the 1970s and 1980s," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 17 (1982): 35–50; Jean R. Burnet with Howard Palmer, *"Coming Canadians": An Introduction to a History of Canada's Peoples* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988); Wsevolod W. Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context* (Toronto: Thompson, 1999); Christiane Harzig, *Einwanderungspolitik in den Niederlanden, Schweden und Kanada: Historische Erinnerung und Politische Kultur als Gestaltungsressourcen* (Habilitationsschrift, University of Bremen, 2001).
29. J.C. Fraser, *Cry of the Illegal Immigrant* (Toronto: Williams-Wallace, 1980); Heiner Bielefeldt, *Philosophie der Menschenrechte: Grundlagen eines weltweiten Freiheitsethos* (Darmstadt: Primus, 1998), 1–41, 80–111.
30. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958).
31. Lloyd L. Wong, "Home Away from Home: Transnationalism and the Canadian Citizenship Regime," in *Communities Across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures*, ed. Victor Roudometof and Paul Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2002), 168–81; Aihwa Ong, "On the Edge of Empires: Flexible Citizenship among Chinese in Diaspora," *Positions* 1, no. 3 (1993): 745–78.
32. Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 175.
33. "As in many Asian states, international migration is governmentally supervised. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration connects family lives, international investments, and the exploitation of domestic labor. The equivalent importing agency in Malaysia announced in 1997 that it would reduce its recruitment of Philippine women for domestic labor in favor of cheaper Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan women." Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, 542.
34. Raymond Breton, "Social Participation and Social Capital," in *Immigrants and Civic Participation: Contemporary Policy and Research Issues* (Ottawa: Multiculturalism Program, Dept. of Canadian Heritage, 1997), 4–10; Veit M. Bader, ed., *Citizenship and Exclusion: Crossing Boundaries of Disciplines and Countries* (New York: Macmillan, 1997).

Part I

Transcultural Pasts in the Mediterranean World and Transalpine Europe

— *Two* —

A Legendary Place of Encounter

The *Convivencia* of Moors, Jews, and Christians in Medieval Spain

Norbert Rehrmann

For several centuries, in a unique chapter in European history, Jews, Christians, and Moors lived together in the so-called *convivencia* (coexistence). Jews and Christians had lived together long before the Islamic invasion of 711 C.E. The question of when the first Jews settled on the Iberian Peninsula has been prominent in the history of Jews and Christians, mainly because of the accusation that Jewish ancestors had been involved in the killing of Christ.[1] If, as one legend has it, Jews had already come to the peninsula after the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem in 586 B.C.E., the accusation would be absurd.[2] Inscriptions on tombstones indicate that Jews had already lived in the *Sefarad*, the westernmost part of Europe, during the first century before Christ—with the same rights as their Hispanic-Romanic neighbors—for example, in the towns of Tarragona, Tortosa, and Mérida.[3] They did not assimilate, but they maintained strong ties to the rest of the population and frequently intermarried. Segregation, or even ghettoization, was out of the question. Exclusion started only in the fourth century with the political and religious rise of the Christians in Rome and escalated into "keen anti-Semitic agitation"[4] after the Visigoths, the political heirs of Rome, had converted to Catholicism. The first *Lex Romana Visigothorum* of 506 excluded Jews from public office, prohibited intermarriage, restricted the building of new synagogues and barred them

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from keeping Christian slaves. This broad range of anti-Semitic measures leads to the conclusion that Jews had been an integral part of society, but after the new legislation, they were considered to be a threat to the unity of *Regnum* and *Ecclesia* and were persecuted, especially by the church priors. At numerous councils, Isodorus's *De fide catholica contra Judaeos* was ratified by the clergy and became the religious and social practice of the day. Society was to be purged of the "Jewish plague" and the adherents of this "heretical belief" were forced to convert. The seventeenth council of Toledo in 694 "left only one option for every Jew in the country who refused to renounce his faith: 'eternal slavery.'"[5]

It is thus understandable that Jews, among others, experienced the Islamic invasion of 711 via the Strait of Gibraltar as their liberation; their burden had become unbearable. The treason theory, however, according to which the Jews enabled the invaders to enter the Christian towns, belongs to the realm of anti-Semitic legends—not only because town gates could not be opened easily and because there were not many Jewish inhabitants in the first place, as Kenig comments ironically,[6] but mainly because the Visigoth Empire had arrived at its political end. According to some authors, the decline of the Visigoth Empire was caused by the combination of three major factors: the divisions and rivalries within the ruling classes; the explosive political and social situation within the exploited strata of the empire, which had started to influence the troops; and finally the brutal persecution of the Jews.[7] Nonetheless, it was the Jews who were branded as traitors by subsequent generations of historians—a legendary interpretation of history that is just as fictive as the legend interpreting the Moorish invasion as an avenging act of God. According to this legend, which "up to recent times was conceived of as reality,"[8] the daughter of Count Don Julián supposedly was dishonored at the court of Toledo. In order to take revenge, her father was said to have called the Arabs to the peninsula.

Islamic Conquest and Interfaith *Convivencia*

The Islamic conquest resembled a lightning victory. After only a few years, the troops coming from Africa had gained control over most of the peninsula. The border region, a broad stretch of no-man's-land ranging from Coimbra via Toledo to Guadalajara, was to remain relatively stable for centuries to come—aside from occasional invasions by Christian troops from the north. In a way, the conquest of the peninsula was a total one because the northern regions, which later were to become the kingdom of León, also formally acknowledged the Moors' sovereignty. According to some historians, the thesis of continuity from pre-Islamic to twelfth-century Spain is untenable because there were hardly any connections between the Catholic Visigoths of the north and the Spain of the Catholic kings.[9] The thesis that a Christian national *Reconquista* impetus had set the

tone in northern Asturia from the very beginning is even more untenable, since up to the eleventh century, no conscious aspirations of this kind can be documented. However, de facto the conquest remained only partial—supposedly no Moor wanted to settle in the rough climate of the north. "It was said," writes Watt "that the Arabs are only comfortable in areas where olive trees blossom."[10] Only in the middle of the ninth century did the kingdom of Asturia manage to advance to the Duero and to proclaim Léon the capital. Finally, the legend of Jewish traitors is contradicted by the fact that the rapid conquest met hardly any resistance from the Visigoth part of the population.

In the beginning, the invading troops comprised only 7,000 Berber and Arab soldiers. A few years later, their leader Táriq, a Berber himself, received support from 10,000 more Arab soldiers, none of whom returned to Africa.[11] While the Arabs populated the cities, where they were a clear minority, and soon brought about the cities' heyday, the Berber troops, former inhabitants of the mountain regions of northern Africa, settled predominantly in the mountainous areas. In the eighth century, significant numbers of Berber immigrants, who had been attracted by the country's prosperity, joined them. Also, Egyptians and Syrians "and whoever else belonged to the *Dãr al-islãm*" came.[12] Since the Berbers formed the majority of the new population, it is more accurate to speak of a Muslim instead of an Arab expansion.

The ethnic heterogeneity of the invaders and the immigrants led to tensions and violent conflicts, for instance the Berber Revolt of 741. Yet this was but one side of the multicultural emirate. Since the new rulers believed they represented a superior culture, there was no need for them to proselytize: a "large number"[13] of the more or less Christianized Visigoth population converted to Islam. The so-called *muladíes* (Arabic: *muwalladun*, "Muslims by birth"), who were dismissed as "renegades" by Spanish authors, had Christian neighbors who preserved their Christian religion and further enriched the religious-cultural diversity as so-called *mozárabes* (Arabic: *mustá ribun*, "Arabicized"). In spite of their Christianity, they were undoubtedly transculturalized, if not acculturized, as were the growing numbers of slaves from northern and central Europe, who added an all-European flavor to the ethnic and cultural amalgamate. Finally, although weak in numbers, the Jews contributed the finishing touch to this ethnic kaleidoscope. Only about one percent of the total population of approximately 4.5 million people was of Jewish faith and adhered to it.[14] In the newly conquered cities, the Muslim invaders assigned important administrative and security responsibilities to Jews, who were well established and knew their way around the *Sefarad*. To later generations of Christian authors from the twelfth century onwards, however, this was further proof of the Jews' collaboration with the invaders. The unprecedented rise of Jews in Al-Andalus,[15] which predestined them to take on the role of mediators between Moors and Christians, resulted in the influx of many Jews from other countries and made them religiously autonomous. While the

Jews had depended upon the interpretations of the Babylonian academies during the dark centuries of Visigoth repression, they not only achieved rabbinical autonomy under the new rule, but also became renowned interpreters of the Torah and Talmud themselves. The contrast to the subjugation before 711 could not have been greater. In spite of all persisting limitations that were imposed on the Jews in the caliphate of Córdoba, which separated from the Islamic East in 929, the Moors' rule must have felt like a "gift of God" to them.[16]

But was it really a gift of God? Was Al-Andalus, the Moorish territory, truly the "astonishing world of tolerance"[17] where "human and cultural contacts were normal and permanent"—in spite of agitation and sporadic persecution? This question remains highly contested. Scholars agree only on the fact that the Iberian Peninsula was the sole place in Europe where "the three major religions, the Jewish, Islamic and Christian" had a continuous encounter over several centuries, an encounter (*encuentro y desencuentro*) of "enormous relevance" even beyond the borders of the caliphate.[18] Most authors also agree on the obvious fact that, during the first three centuries of the Omayyad rule, there was hardly any persecution and there were no forced conversions. The vanquishers had a rather pragmatic approach to their relationship with the vanquished. Their only requirement was fiscal in nature: "The treaty of surrender that was negotiated with the religious authorities guaranteed full religious freedom and the continued existence of the economy in exchange for the levying of taxes through the notabilities of the respective religious communities."[19] With regard to the motives for this pragmatism, however, the interpretations differ a great deal. According to some authors, the Jewish culture in Al-Andalus could only thrive because the Islamic rulers dealt with religious and moral issues "negligently and lamely" and not out of "tolerance" or respect for "individual freedom."[20] Other authors are even stronger in their rejection of the thesis of multireligious tolerance:[21] If the Moors, and later the Christians, seemed to be tolerant, it was only because they had no other choice—to tolerate means to allow that which cannot be prohibited. The Islamic conquerors tolerated Jews and Christians solely because they could neither convert nor eliminate them—they were economically indispensable. In addition it is considered to be inadequate to speak of a "country of three cultures" because, strictly speaking, there were only two cultures in medieval Spain: first the Moorish culture, to which the Christians and Jews adapted; and later the Christian culture, into which mainly the Jews integrated themselves. Hence Maimonides, the best-known representative of the Jewish culture of Al-Andalus, was really a representative of Arabic culture. A group of authors, on the other hand, is convinced that the Moors were tolerant not only out of pragmatic considerations but also out of religious motives.[22] Similar to Muslims as "peoples of the Book"—people with a written holy text—Jews and Christians deserved to be respected. Historical development indicates that the Moors' tolerance was not only political and economic opportunism: only

when the Christian *Reconquista* troops seriously threatened the Moorish rule did Islam "show its cruel side."[23] The persecution of religious minorities thus was "more a reaction" to the advancement of the Christians than an element of religious doctrine.

To some extent, the contrasting interpretations seem to stem from terminological inaccuracies. The medieval notion of tolerance differed from the modern understanding of the term, which goes back to the Enlightenment period and is based on the conviction that all religions, in spite of their dogmatic differences, articulate related beliefs that do not contradict each other, especially in the sense of exclusive truths.[24] Apart from some intellectual minorities or professional skeptics, this notion of tolerance did not exist under the reign of the caliph. It can be assumed that there was no considerable *religious* osmosis, at least as regards intentional aims. The three religions kept their distance, looked at each other with suspicion and refused to renounce "their respective monopolies on truth." There was "no religious tolerance" and, "if there was assimilation, it was limited to cultural aspects only."[25]

A reduction of the *convivencia* to a purely intellectual-cultural sphere, to some kind of trireligious elitist culture, however, represents a very narrow view. It underestimates the general intermingling of people other than poets and philosophers in this medieval "melting pot."[26] In view of this "colorful mix of peoples"[27] it was quite inevitable that the coexistence of the different religions and cultures also affected everyday life. This "*mestizaje* on the level of the people"[28] manifested itself in the form of festivals, which in spite of the different calendars often were organized jointly. This was common not only in the lower strata of the population, but also became acceptable to the aristocracy: Moorish noble families were related to Christians and Christian aristocrats married Moorish noblewomen. In addition, some authors emphasize the importance of conversions between the three religions—in all three directions—for determining their permeability: conversions "were possible and were the order of the day, especially from the Jewish and Christian sides to Islam."[29] Although the Koran considered conversion as a renegade act, which in the extreme case was to be met with the death sentence, conversions of Moors to Jewish or Christian faith happened "apparently constantly." Yet the Islamic "renegades" must have been a clear minority. After all, apart from religious convictions, there was no reason for the Moors to convert to Judaism or Christianity. Jews and Christians, on the other hand, had obvious motives for converting: they saved on high taxes and were no longer subjected to statutory limitations. The main motive, at least for the Christians, derived from their admiration of Islamic culture, which was highly superior to Arian-Christian traditions. Far from romanticizing the *convivencia* as "idyllic," the tricultural coexistence in Al-Andalus was as a "changeable process of cultural fusion, conversion and conflict"—a complex process of acculturation that did not stop at the level of living "side by side."[30]

The "World of Synthesis" Threatened: The Fundamentalist Crusading Drive

In a way, even the eventual collapse of Al-Andalus and its disintegration into dozens of small successor territories can be seen as an indication of the tolerance that had lasted for centuries. For, apart from the aspects of inner-Islamic decadence, the religious fanaticism that in the course of the centuries to come also caught hold of the Moors, was mainly a Christian "invention." First, the pressure exerted on the Moorish territories after the *Reconquista* was extended to the interior. The fundamentalism of the North African dynasties that were called upon for help furthered this development. Yet, as hinted at previously, this fundamentalism was mainly a reaction to Christian fundamentalism. Second, and more importantly, thoughts of a righteous war against Islam, were "strongest in the northern areas in which the cultural fusion had left the least marks."[31] To turn the argument on its head, this means that where the *convivencia* had been more or less a fact of everyday life, whether on territory dominated by the Moors or in heavily frequented border regions, the "crusade" propaganda met with a clearly weaker response. These findings refer to a third factor, which set the spiral of fanaticism, to which the *convivencia* finally fell victim, in full motion: the European crusade propaganda. The ideological and military mobilization against Islam was also imported into Spain, mainly via the St. Jacob pilgrimage route to Santiago de Compostela in northern Spain and by the monks of Cluny, who most likely had never met a Moor themselves. The cult of Santiago, too, was very effective in terms of propaganda: When in 997 the Moors marched into Santiago de Compostela under the leadership of Almanzor, they pillaged and destroyed the church, but they did not touch the saint's tomb. The Christian writers of legends quickly agreed that it was Santiago, allegedly a twin brother of Christ,[32] who had driven the Moors away. The "myth of Santiago" was born: the Christians fought with divine assistance, supported by the continuous influx of pilgrims who crossed the Pyrenees from France. Even the term *Reconquista* originally came from France,[33] which can be seen as another indication that the *convivencia* did not fall apart primarily because of internal contradictions. Yet its first period, that of Moorish dominance, ended, at least politically, with the advance of the Christian troops. Culturally, the disintegrating caliphate experienced a renewed peak.

While the issue of tolerance has always been controversial, the cultural heyday of Al-Andalus remains largely unquestioned, even when considering renowned Spanish authors. The cultural climax brought about by the Moors in the westernmost part of Europe remains unique—there was no comparable development north of the Pyrenees. While the Islamic rulers of Baghdad studied Greek and Persian philosophers and had their works translated, their western contemporary, Charlemagne, had just started to learn to spell his name.[34] The Moorish territory of Al-Andalus was comparably advanced: Córdoba, the capital of the emirate and later the caliphate,

had asphalt roads which were lighted at night while, seven hundred years later, London still did not have public street lamps and, even later, Parisians still waded through mud after extensive rainfalls. And while the scholars at Oxford rejected baths as a pagan tradition, the Cordoban philosophers and poets enjoyed the advantages of the city's public bath culture. None of the countless possible comparisons leaves occidental culture in a favorable light. Yet culture—philosophy, poetry, architecture, music, and other areas—has always been a "world of synthesis,"[35] as can be seen in the art which combined Persian, Mesopotamian, Byzantine and even Visigoth aspects. Although Hellenistic and Roman cultures had formed a world of synthesis as well, their Islamic counterpart, especially in Al-Andalus, greatly surpassed them in dimension. The most significant phenomenon is the cultivation and blossoming of Córdoba, the old capital of the Roman Baetica (Corduba), which at the beginning of the Moorish rule did not have much to offer. The rapid development of the city seems fabulous indeed: in the tenth century, Córdoba was said to have had about 300,000 inhabitants, larger Córdoba even half a million.[36] Comparative numbers from European cities north of the Pyrenees are rather unimpressive: Paris, at the time by far the largest city of the Occident, reached 20,000–30,000 inhabitants only in the fourteenth century. The new cultural metropolis of Andalusia "offered all the luxury of the world"[37] and was deservedly called the "Baghdad of the West." The city's mosque, which even today fascinates tourists from all over the world, after numerous extensions could hold up to 50,000 people within its walls.[38] At the beginning of the tenth century, the Omayyad rulers even built an administrative center, the magnificent Medina Azara, of which there are only a few ruins left today, just outside Córdoba, only several kilometers from the city's center. These rulers surrounded themselves with famous scholars, poets and scientists, including Jews, from all over the Orient. The best-known Jewish "star"[39] at the caliph's court was Chasdai Ibn Schaprut, the Omayyad ruler's personal physician who was later appointed superintendent of customs and foreign trade and chief negotiator for foreign delegations and awarded the title *nasi* (prince) by Abd ar-Rahman III. An apt student of Muslim culture, he was almost indistinguishable from a Moorish nobleman. Just like the Moorish rulers, who fully trusted him, Ibn Schaprut surrounded himself with a flock of Jewish poets, philosophers and scientists and thus made Córdoba the "first intellectual center of the Golden Age of Andalusian Judaism."[40]

The "fantastical urban advancement"[41] was not limited to Córdoba. Cultural life in Granada was just as impressive. The intellectual output—of grammarians, lexicographers, Koran scholars, poets, translators, mathematicians, philosophers, geographers, and botanists—was unparalleled, as was the architecture: "It is no exaggeration to say that Granada was one of the most beautiful cities of the world, a sanctuary for the *Moriscos* (Arabs who had fled from the Christian north), a diaspora for Christians and a place of residence for a Jewish minority."[42] One of their best-known

spokesmen was Samuel ha-Nagid, a poet and statesman who played a decisive role in the domestic and foreign affairs of Granada for almost thirty years until 1013. He was a "thorn in the flesh of orthodox Muslims."[43] The city's architectural gem was and still is the Alhambra, which perhaps had originally been built for Josef Ibn Nagrela, the Jewish counselor of the Moorish king. Although there still is no definite evidence for it, some indications validate this thesis, for example, the poems of Salomon Ibn Gabirol. He was one of the "triple stars" (Heine) of the Jewish poets and philosophers of Al-Andalus and a member of the circle of friends of the Moorish king's Jewish counselor. Probably, the ruler's sumptuous present proved to be the Jews' undoing. In 1066, the powerful counselor and head of all Spanish Jews was assassinated in the palace. In the aftermath, approximately 3,000 Jews were killed in the first pogrom of Muslim Spain. The reasons for the massacre—possibly jealousy, latent tensions between the religious groups, or an indirect attempt at assassinating the king, who had been accused of treason against Islam in satirical poems—remain unclear. No other pogrom followed: "The shock waves soon subside. For the Jews in Muslim Spain, life goes on, and it continues not to be a bad life."[44]

Spain had become the intellectual center of Judaism long ago. At the latest with the arrival of Rabbi Mose ben Henoch from Bari in the year 954, the renowned scholars of the Torah and Talmud came to be supported by an undisputed religious leader. The *nasi* appointed him the highest rabbi of Córdoba and director of the Talmud academies, which was the final step toward religious autonomy for the Jews on the peninsula. When Rabbi Mose ben Henoch died around the year 970, all the Jews in Spain mourned for him. Intellectual spokesmen like him contributed to the rise of Al-Andalus as a cultural magnet: those who wanted to follow the latest developments in science, medicine, agriculture, philosophy, and literature had to come to Spain. The Occident went to the school of the Orient, with Spain acting as mediator.

The social and cultural climate in the caliphate also encouraged the participation of Jewish poets and scholars in the dominant culture. As a result, there was a surprising amount of integration of secular and religious elements previously unknown in Jewish culture.[45] The figure of the Jewish poet laureate, whose elitist appearance was not representative of the Jews of Al-Andalus, demonstrates the development of three basic features of Jewish poets: their relationship with the Arab court, their role in the Jewish community, and their significance as intellectuals or as protégés of other intellectuals. This triangular relationship of the Jewish cultural elite certainly inspired their artistic and intellectual creativity, but it also caused tensions and conflicts of loyalty. The liberal love poetry—although it most likely mirrored the life of its author at the court of the Cordoban caliph—certainly was not always acclaimed by the other visitors of the synagogue. Although secular culture largely harmonized with religious traditions, the gap between the refined culture of the Jewish "aristocracy" and the "naive belief of the masses"[46] was large enough to

cause open conflicts. The same can be said about the panegyric verses, with which the Jewish poets flattered the Islamic rulers. Despite the fact that a large part of the Jewish poetry of Al-Andalus has been lost,[47] the available body of literature clearly shows the tensions as well as the opportunities of living between two groups with different moral concepts.

Literature, in this case Jewish poetry, thus can be seen as a gauge of the *convivencia* climate in Al-Andalus, particularly for the upper part of the social structure. Some authors[48] see the religious and cultural tensions and resentments that are articulated in the works of Jewish poets as indications of the assumption that the coexistence of Moors and Jews was never based on full equality, but only on a more or less fragile "tolerance." Hence, they caution against the idealization of the *religious* and *political* coexistence, especially with regard to the time of the small Moorish territories that followed the disintegration of the caliphate. "Al-Andalus broke open like a ripe pomegranate"[49] describes the disintegration of the realm into approximately thirty kingdoms at the beginning of the eleventh century; this development became known as *reinos de tâifa* in Spanish historiography. Art, poetry and science indeed experienced another peak: each of the *tâifa* rulers was eager to imitate the glory of the old Cordoban caliphate, even within his comparatively limited possibilities. The level of artistic originality that had marked the caliphate of Córdoba, however, could never be reached again. A total renaissance of the glorious era was also inhibited by the changed political climate on the peninsula, which had shifted in favor of the Christians and the growing number of Islamic theologians who countered the military pressure from the North with religious dogmatism. These rather intolerant religious gatekeepers also played a major role in convincing the *tâifa* kings to call the Almoravides—North African Berber troops who crossed the Strait of Gibraltar in 1080—to Spain. Their presence was a threat not only to the Christian "reconquerors," who had to face a series of defeats. Before the Berbers retreated to Northern Africa, the "liberal" climate in the *tâifa* kingdoms had also changed. In comparison to their religious brethren on the peninsula, the Almoravides were not only stricter, but they also lacked the "decaying" experience of the *convivencia* of Al-Andalus. In 1146, the Almohades, even more intransigent inhabitants of the Atlas Mountains, followed the Almoravides and remained on the peninsula until the end of the century. The extent of their religious militancy is controversial. According to certain authors, they practiced their religion with "extreme strictness," came into conflict with the *tâifa* rulers, whom they accused of feebleness of faith and of collaboration with the Christian kingdoms, and mercilessly persecuted the religious minorities: "They destroyed synagogues and churches, persecuted the Jews, forced them to convert or into exile, and the *mozárabes* migrated to the North."[50] Other authors, too, describe a drastic increase in "religious control" and the end of "a *convivencia* that to date had seen no conflicts"[51] and state that the Almohades de facto revealed the centuries-old status of the Jews of Al-Andalus as *protegido*s or *tributarios* (*dimmí*). Yet recent research questions

whether there had really been an intense persecution of Jews under the Almohades' rule.[52] It seems certain, however, that the Almohades were opposed to Jews in general and favored their expulsion from Al-Andalus.

The assumption that the Almohades were only moderately hostile toward the Jews is supported by the fact that in the *tâifa* kingdoms, the Jewish elite experienced a similar cultural apogee as in the caliphate, where they had already climbed the political and cultural ladder. The Jews, at home in Arab culture for more than three centuries, had been much-sought-after strategists on the way to glory, efficient administration, a flourishing economy, and military successes: "What is being remembered as the 'Golden Age' of the Jews in Muslim Spain relates to this eleventh century."[53]

The interim era of the *tâifa* kingdoms, which pretty well lasted all of the eleventh century, was a European "anachronism"[54]—just like the previous caliphate of Córdoba. In spite of all signs of decay and the apparent increase in religious intolerance, the three denominations still lived next to each other, and occasionally also with one another—during a time when religious intolerance was already far more pronounced north of the Pyrenees. Yet the Spanish Muslims could maintain their position until 1492, among other reasons because of the military and political equilibrium between Moors and Christians, which ended only with the Christians' victory in the battle of Navas de Tolosa (1212). After that, the *Reconquista* of the Spanish kingdoms won battle after battle: the Portuguese troops conquered the southern part of the country, the Castilian troops captured Córdoba (1236), Valencia (1238) and Seville (1248). Toledo, the future focal point of the second period of *convivencia*, now dominated by Christians, had already been annexed to the Christian territories in 1085. When the *Reconquista* began to flag in 1270, the Moorish domain had dwindled to comprise only Granada and some small territories in the region of Huelva. The kingdom of Granada, relatively secure from the Christians because of its geographic location in the mountains and its proximity to Africa, experienced its cultural peak only in the fourteenth century: the most beautiful parts of the Alhambra were built between 1344 and 1396. At the same time, the conflict intensified on the religious front: the battles over territories and tributes now turned into "a religious war."[55] Although the lively economic and cultural exchange that had now determined the relationship between Moors and Christians declined with the victories of the *Reconquista*, the cultural "infection" of the Christian conquerors by Islam did not. It was precisely due to the *Reconquista* that the Christian troops came into contact with the culture of Al-Andalus: "First, the fanaticism and the predatory instincts of the barons of the North," as Lombardt describes this military acculturation process, "destroys parts of the sparkling civilization of Andalusia. Then, the new occupiers slowly get to know this culture. Craftsmen and artists continue their work. They adhere to their techniques under the regime of the 'infidels' (*mudéjar* art). The Islamic influences increase and become noticeable throughout the Occident. The

Juderías and *Morerías*, the quarters where Jews and Moors live, remain vivid."[56] Just like before, there still was no "iron curtain"[57] between the Moorish and the Christian territories. Especially the *mudéjar* art, the blending of Christian and Islamic artistic expression and architecture, attests to this symbiosis of the two societies: the Christian kingdoms of the North, although they had defeated the Moors almost completely from a military perspective, appropriated a large part of the material and intellectual culture of Al-Andalus.

From Cooperation under "Wise" Christian Rule to Intolerance

Toledo, on the banks of the river Tajo, had already been conquered at the end of the eleventh century. It became a kind of tricultural exhibition center: the products on display there were the result of the close cooperation of Christians, Jews, and Moors, and all of Europe was their clientele—which had lasting consequences on its cultural development. I am referring to the so-called translation groups of Toledo which, for about one and a half centuries, dug out the intellectual treasures of Al-Andalus and made them available to Christianity as a whole through their translation into Latin and, later on, Castilian. The two most important eras of the translation groups of Toledo are that of Archbishop (!) Don Raymundo (1130–1187) and that of King Alfons the Wise (1252–1284). During the first era, under the auspices of the churchman, they focused on the translation of the philosophical writings of the Moors of Al-Andalus into Latin. During the second phase—in between the two eras the translation activity subsided because of the lack of patrons—under the scepter of the *wise* king, the focus shifted to the translation of scientific texts in astronomy, astrology, mathematics, medicine, and other natural sciences, mainly into Castilian. These translations not only were a quantum leap for the Christian sciences but also laid the foundations of modern Spanish: "The effect of Luther's Bible on standard German two hundred years later can be equated with the effect of Alfons' body of work on standard Spanish."[58]

The two eras are linked by the outstanding contributions of the Jewish translators. Since, in contrast to the caliphate of Córdoba, there were hardly any Christians left who were educated in Arabic (*mozárabes*), the Jews became the "actual key figures,"[59] *the* cultural mediators between the Orient and the Occident. Together with a large number of Moors, among them some remarkable scholars, they continued to live within the city walls after the Christian conquest, largely tolerated in their religious credo and highly valued as "creators of culture." The effect of this "immense cultural project,"[60] especially north of the Pyrenees, can only be described in terms of magnificence. Renan considered the Toledo translations to be a caesura in European science and philosophy.[61] The amount of knowledge that reached Europe via the "Spanish bridge" was so significant that

without it, the Renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries would have been "inconceivable."[62]

The heyday of Toledo was also a central chapter of the Jews' history on the peninsula. At the end of the twelfth century, Toledo was home to the "biggest and wealthiest Jewish community in Europe and the whole known world."[63] From literary sources of Jewish authors of that time, it can be concluded that Moors, *mozárabes*, Christians, and Jews lived together in an open climate of pluralism and understanding, while keeping up their languages and their cultural and religious traditions. Yet the situation was far from an ideal *convivencia*. Cultural and ideological fusion is not without tensions.

The pressure on the Jewish minority of Toledo did indeed increase after the relatively tolerant era under Alfons X. The supposition that the city's name might be of Hebrew (*Tultelah*) origin proved to be a bad omen: *Tultelah* means hardship, sorrow and suffering—a future that awaited not only the Jews of Toledo. The first distinctly anti-Semitic law dates back to the year 1228. In the future, all Jews of Aragon were to be excluded from public offices. About one and a half decades later, all people of different faith in this kingdom—aside from the Moors, mainly the Jews—were legally forced to listen to the sermons of Christian agitators. It was also in Aragon, in the capital Zaragoza, that the first ritual murder accusation was laid against Spanish Jews.[64] This was the beginning of a long chain of infamous horror stories, the best known version of which, the bloodthirsty murder of the "Niño de la Guardia," marked the final chapter of the Spanish Jews. Only one decade later, in 1263, the "disputations of Barcelona," religious debates between Christians and Jews, marked the beginning of a large-scale missionary campaign. In the transparent guise of a putative debating culture of the better arguments, the Christian side laid down topics and theses which one rabbi was allowed to answer. Although the Jewish side, as later in Tortosa, fared rather well, the "disputations" were everything but discourses detached from the power play. Rather, they formed the "intellectual" front of the social exclusion of the Jews. From the thirteenth century onwards, Christian poets such as Gonzalo de Becero, the first Spanish-language author known by name, also entered service with the "intellectual *Reconquista*." Becero's religious exclusion aimed at Moors and Jews alike and used the coarsest stereotypes: "In the *Milagro* miracle story 'Los judíos de Toledo,' he does not even shy away from accusing the Jews of the ritual murder of a child and from justifying the Christians' deadly revenge in refined verses."[65]

Toward the end of the century, in June 1391, the malicious sermons of the Christian agitators finally turned into material violence. During this summer, "an orgy of murder, looting and fanatic religious zeal, which hit the core of the unique cooperation of Spanish Jews and Christians"[66] began, starting in Seville. In Seville alone, four thousand Jews are said to have been victims of the furious mob. In Barcelona, one-third of the Jews were killed; another third was forced into baptism. In each of the other communities of the peninsula, which caught hold of the murderous wave

shortly afterward, the number of murdered Jews added up to the hundreds. The bloody orgy was followed by several discriminatory measures: the Jews were forced to wear special clothes and Jewish doctors were prohibited from treating Christians. Hence, the pogroms of 1391 were a permanent break in the Jewish-Christian relationship on the peninsula: "For the Jews, the heyday of two hundred years they had experienced in Christian Spain ended violently."[67]

At the same time, the year of the pogroms marks the beginning of a new problem, the *converso* problem, which is closely related to the final expulsion of the Jews. The *conversos*, who converted to Christianity after 1391, were problematic in many ways—problems that historical research has not been able to solve.[68] The actual number of *conversos*, for example, remains controversial. After 1391, all doors that had been closed to them as Jews were now open to them as *conversos*. For example, they had access to administrative and academic posts and even found their way into the military and ecclesiastical hierarchies. One of the best known examples of advancement within the church hierarchy is Solomon Halevi,[69] who after his conversion, now under the name of Paulus de Sancta María, became bishop of Burgos and even promoted anti-Semitic laws. On top of that, a rich minority married into the old aristocracy—their social advance was indeed "vertiginous and resulted in envy and resentment."[70]

The religious dimension is just as complicated: Were the *conversos*, as the "old" Christians denounced them, really unreliable—religious hypocrites, as the Arabic meaning of the term *marrano* suggests? Or were their religious convictions, at least in the first generation of *conversos*, necessarily weak? After all, the mass conversion took place against the background of the 1391 pogroms. Answers to this question, which was central to the institution of the Inquisition, remain contradictory. In any case, those who accused the *conversos* of infirmity of faith—mainly Spanish authors, who thus tried to legitimize the persecution—misjudged their position. Even for the deeply convicted Christians among the *conversos* it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to cast off the old habits of life with the new faith. This comprised the whole range of everyday culture: food preferences, traditions of hygiene, and clothing habits. In addition, a strong group of "new" Christians, especially in the educated upper strata, took a "skeptical" position toward any religion for more profound reasons: they followed the tradition of Averroes and Maimonides, which had experienced a renaissance in Christian Toledo. The case of one *converso* who stated in his will that he wanted to be buried with a cross at his feet, the Koran on his chest, and the Torah above his head, illustrated this.[71]

All of these factors contributed to the transformation of the *conversos'* image into a stigma that slowed down their social advancement and blocked their social integration. The bloody persecution that had forced their Jewish ancestors to convert at the end of the fourteenth century now threatened them as well: "The 'conversos' became the 'new Jews' of the Spanish people."[72] This points to an enmity on the Christian side that the

Jews could not escape from even through baptism. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the rabble-rousing against the *conversos* began to bear bloody results with long-term effects. In the summer of 1449, Toledo became the site of turmoil and attacks on *conversos,* triggered by a special tax (levied to finance the Catholic king's war against Aragon) for which a convert was held responsible. The anti-Semitic agitators, who alleged the Jews to have sold the city to the Moors seven hundred years ago, claimed that they were now selling it to the king! The city council used the revolt as an opportunity to exclude the *conversos* from all public offices. This brought about "the first statute on the purity of blood."[73] From now on, the doors to the military, administration, and chambers and so forth remained closed to the *conversos*. Soon, the city council of Toledo was eagerly emulated, especially in Andalusia and in the Basque region, where the antagonism between "old" Christians and *conversos* led to bitter conflicts, mainly in trade and in the guilds. The statute on the purity of blood was a "mixture of religious fanaticism, racial prejudice, social ambitions and claims for political monopoly."[74] Intermingled with the chivalrous ideal of the *Reconquista* heritage, the ideological ingredients of the statute were to find a pronounced expression in the "old" Christians' notion of pride and honor. In spite of the manifold motives and ambitions that were expressed in the statute, it had one definite ingredient: blood lines. Hence, this late-medieval racial law was already based on a notion that was to follow a murderous career in modern times: blood as a signifier of individual and collective features—even over many generations.

This brought the *conversos'* social advancement to a full stop. Although many certainly managed to disguise their origin with forged documents—one's genealogy became a social weapon—most experienced a harsh and permanent social downgrading. And there was more: with the establishment of the Inquisition, the *conversos* also had to fear for their lives. Voltaire's dictum that the popes had established the Inquisition and the Spanish inquisitors had added barbarity, was to prove true especially in this decade of terror. When the Catholic "religious police" came into operation in 1479, religious motives in the fight against the actual or supposed secret "Judaizing" of the *conversos* were the decisive factor. Although the political calculation of the kings, who wanted to secure their political authority in the regions with the help of the religious tribunal, was another motive, it was certainly not the decisive one. In the "bloody years"[75] up to the expulsion order of 1492, it was mainly the *conversos* who were targeted by the Holy Inquisition. The Jews, whose creed continued to be tolerated, did not yet have to fear the Inquisition, until they were expelled from Andalusia at the Inquisition's instigation in 1483.

How, in the meantime, had those fared who had resisted the battle cry "death or baptism" of 1391? Only twenty years later the Jews were again caught in the crossfire of Christian fanatics. Between 1411 and 1416, the Dominican monk Vicente Ferrer and his religious henchmen attacked the remaining Jewish communities of Spain "like a fury."[76] The barefooted

religious warriors, who flagellated themselves to the point of collapse, forced entry into the synagogues or forced the Jews of the respective community to present themselves at a sermon to be held at night by torchlight on the market place. The permanent threat led to the conversion of many communities en bloc. The monks' terror was accompanied by a more subtle strategy of conversion. In 1413, in a repetition of the "disputations" of previous years, this time in Tortosa in Aragon, well-known rabbis were summoned to theological debates, in the aftermath of which a great number of Jews converted.

However, in the fifteenth century, there were still many traces left of an everyday *convivencia* of Christians and Jews, which apparently had not been touched by the malicious agitation. In some Spanish cities,[77] Christians asked their Jewish neighbors to take the Torah out of the sacred shrine and carry it on a procession over the fields in order to pray for rain together! Some authors even argue that the fifteenth century still belonged to the time of the greatest intellectual influence and contact between Jews and Christians.[78] For example, the poetry of Christian authors in this century features the largest amount of Hebrew words and references to Jewish everyday culture. Jewish authors such as Maimonides continued to be widely read by Christians: "In any case, the religious and cultural tolerance in Spain had not ceased to exist, even after the events of 1391."[79]

Such manifestations of a late *convivencia* irritated the clergy, especially the functionaries of the Inquisition when it concerned *conversos* or those who were labeled *conversos* after the racist criteria of the "purity statutes." Hence, the fate of Jews started to duplicate that of the *conversos* more and more in the bloody decade before the expulsion order. In 1480, the Catholic kings decreed that all of "their Jews"[80] from now on had to live in a certain part of town, surrounded by walls, which they were not allowed to leave at night—the Spanish ghettos were born. Another event, which created even more of a stir, became notorious in 1490 under the name of the alleged victim of a Jewish ritual murder: "The holy child of La Guardia." More than a dozen Jews and *conversos* were accused of having killed a Christian child in a most beastly way and of having mixed its blood into a stolen consecrated wafer. Although the accusations, as always, were completely fictitious, the sixteen accused were taken to court in a show trial and were burned at the stake in November 1491. The great inquisitor Tomas de Torquemada, under whose personal control the infamous show trial had been stage-managed, had almost reached his goal: the "definitive solution" to the "Jewish problem."

Year of Crisis: Religious Freedom, Conversion, Expulsion

Yet the Christian rulers of the country had to solve one more, almost as difficult problem before they could solve this "Jewish problem"—the complex issues emerging from the military victory over the last Moorish bastion,

Granada. In early January 1492, the city that "had been desecrated for eight hundred years," as a contemporary author put it,[81] gave in to the Christian troops. The surrender, which had been preceded by several years of siege, was effected without bloodshed in result of far-reaching promises made to the last Moorish ruler Boabdil: safety of people and goods, religious freedom, free disposal of the Islamic places of worship, a mixed Islamic-Christian jurisdiction, and free departure for North Africa. All in all, extraordinarily magnanimous conditions for surrender, although they were hardly worth the paper on which they were written. Persecution began almost immediately after the withdrawal of the Catholic kings. The Catholic fundamentalism that interpreted this very final phase of the *Reconquista* as a "crusade" obviously found it unreasonable to spare the main military and ideological enemy of the past eight hundred years. In this, the fanatics could rely on the European zeitgeist for support. For Machiavelli, the capture of Granada was *the* European "foundation episode" per se, and Ferdinand advanced "to the first ruler of Christianity."[82] Did the Jews, who had contributed to the financing of the campaign, have to expect that the ruler's unrestricted power would now turn against them?

For the large majority, among them the royal couple's closest counselors, the decree of 31 March 1492, which gave them the choice of converting or leaving the country within a few months, came totally unexpectedly. Had they relied too much on the monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, whose marriage had been arranged with the help of influential Jews and who had just promised the defeated Moors religious freedom?

What was the reasoning of Ferdinand and Isabella? Hardly any other topic caused as much speculation as the motives for their assent to the decree of expulsion. Recent research has concluded that neither the class interest of the aristocracy or the bourgeoisie, nor the frequently quoted popular hatred had played a major role. Rather, in spite of the fact that the major part of the document addresses the expropriation of Jewish capital and property,[83] the motive mentioned in the preamble to the edict has to be seen as the decisive one: the Jews had encouraged the *conversos* to relapse. Yet the primarily religious motives that induced the monarchs to sign the document, which had been inspired and formulated by the Inquisition, should not be understood only as an attempt to bring about the religious unity of the country. After all, the same rulers had *expressis verbis* promised the Moors of Granada religious freedom only a few months earlier.

The edict aimed at the *conversos*, at ending their secret "Judaizing" caused by the Jews' "bad example," and it intended the complete conversion of the Jewish minority.[84] Hence, the kings were surprised at the small number of willing converts who registered within the following months—negatively surprised. Although monks and members of the clergy in many cities went from house to house in order to animate the inhabitants of the *Juderías* to convert and to stay,[85] the majority of the Jews would not renounce their faith and started to prepare for emigration immediately after the edict came into effect.

The expulsion of the Jews from Spain was a political phenomenon unparalleled in the late Middle Ages. When in the preceding centuries—for example, in Germany and France—Jews had been expelled, these "operations" had been carried out either only partially or not at a single blow. Only the expulsion of the Jews from England also covered the whole territory—although the number of exiles had been considerably smaller. How many Jews left the peninsula? Estimates range from 200,000, most of whom crossed the boarder to Portugal,[86] to as low as 50,000.[87] The latter figure takes into account a group of return migrants who, based on a decree of November 1492 (another indication of the edict's aim at conversion!) decided to renounce their old faith and to return to their homes. Their number, however, is difficult to estimate. Whatever the figures, the expulsion of 1492 was the unparalleled and brutal end of eight hundred years of Jewish scholarly and cultural tradition, which had changed as well as it had been maintained in an interaction with Islamic and Christian majorities. As Barbara Beuys puts it, this "was a catastrophe for Judaism that was experienced by the exiles as the third destruction of the temple of Jerusalem."[88] One hundred years later the Moors, now forcibly converted to Christian *moriscos*, had to face a similar fate.

Notes

1. Mario Tedeschi, *Polémica y convivencia de las tres culturas* (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992), 13.
2. Evelyne Kenig, *Historia de los judíos españoles hasta 1492* (Barcelona: Ediciones Paidos, 1995), 43.
3. Manfred Tietz, "Mittelalter und Spätmittelalter," in *Spanische Literaturgeschichte,* ed. Hans-Jörg Neuschäfer (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1997), 5.
4. Ibid., 6.
5. Barbara Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle: Jüdisches Leben in Europa durch zwei Jahrtausende* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1996), 129.
6. Kenig, *Historia de los judíos españoles hasta 1492*, 52.
7. W. Montgomery Watt, *Historia de la España islámica* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986), 17f.
8. Arnold Hottinger, *Die Mauren: Die arabische Kultur in Spanien* (Munich: Fink, 1995), 45.
9. Watt, *Historia de la España islámica*, 186f.
10. Ibid., 50.
11. Maurice Lombard, *Blütezeit des Islam: Eine Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte, 8.–11. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1992), 90.
12. Tietz, "Mittelalter und Spätmittelalter," 7.
13. Ibid., 39.
14. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 149.
15. This term most likely stems from the Arabic name for the Vandals, which would be *al-Andalish.*
16. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 132.
17. Luce López-Baralt, *Huellas del Islam en la literatura española: De Juan Ruiz a Juan Goytisolo* (Madrid: Ediciones Hiperión, 1989), 34.
18. Tedeschi, *Polémica y convivencia de las tres culturas*, 9.

19. Lombard, *Blütezeit des Islam*, 21.
20. Y. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press, 1961), 1:38.
21. Joseph Pérez, *Historia de una tragedia: La expulsion de los judíos de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1993), 136.
22. Watt, *Historia de la España islámica*, 13.
23. Claus Leggewie, *Alhambra – Der Islam im Westen* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1993), 111.
24. This can also be seen in G.E. Lessing's parable of the ring in *Nathan der Weise*.
25. Tedeschi, *Polémica y convivencia de las tres culturas,* 113.
26. Pierre Vilar, *Historia de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1985), 23.
27. Fritz Heymann, *Tod oder Taufe: Vertreibung der Juden aus Spanien und Portugal im Zeitalter der Inquisition* (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag bei Athenäum, 1988), 25.
28. Watt, *Historia de la España islámica*, 132.
29. Leggewie, *Alhambra—Der Islam im Westen*, 106.
30. Ibid., 104.
31. Ibid., 111.
32. Watt, *Historia de la España islámica*, 45.
33. Leggewie, *Alhambra—Der Islam im Westen*, 109.
34. Lopéz-Baralt, *Huellas del Islam en la literatura española*, 19ff.
35. Lombardt, *Blütezeit des Islam*, 108.
36. Ibid., 150 ff.
37. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 134. Andalusia refers to the contemporary Spanish province and is used as a geographical marker in this text, whereas Al-Andalus designates the historical area of Islamic rule [translator's note].
38. Kenig, *Historia de los judíos españoles hasta 1492*, 53.
39. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 134 f.
40. Kenig, *Historia de los judíos españoles hasta 1492*, 87.
41. Lombardt, *Blütezeit des Islam*, 92.
42. Leggewie, *Alhambra—Der Islam im Westen*, 96.
43. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, 32 f.
44. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 23.
45. Aurora Salvatierra, "La sociedad cortesana en la poesía hebrea de al-Andalus," in *La sociedad medieval a través de la literatura hispanojudía,* ed. Francisco Márquez Villanueva, Ricardo Izquierdo Benito, and Ángel Sáenz-Badillos (La Mancha: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla, 1998), 139.
46. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, 37.
47. Raymond Scheidlin, "La situación social y el mundo de valores de los poetas hebreos," in *La sociedad medieval a través de la literatura hispanojudía,* ed. Márquez Villanueva, Izquierdo Benito, and Sáenz-Badillos, 58.
48. Tedeschi, *Polémica y convivencia de las tres culturas*, 24.
49. Hottinger, *Die Mauren*, 136.
50. Kenig, *Historia de los judíos españoles hasta 1492*, 57.
51. Viguera Molins and María Jesús, "La sociedad musulmana en al-Andalus: su reflejo en los textos," in *La sociedad medieval a través de la literatura hispanojudía,* ed. Márquez Villanueva, Izquierdo Benito, and Sáenz-Badillos, 45ff.
52. Hottinger, *Die Mauren*, 227.
53. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 214.
54. Bartolomé Bennassar, *Inquisición española: Poder político y control social* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1984), 127.
55. Tietz, "Mittelalter und Spätmittelalter," 11.
56. Ibid., 95.
57. Watt, *Historia de la España islámica*, 188.
58. Hottinger, *Die Mauren*, 416.
59. Tietz, "Mittelalter und Spätmittelalter," 21.

60. Francisco Márquez Villanueva, "Presencia judía en la literatura española: releyendo a Américo Castro," in *La sociedad medieval a través de la literatura hispanojudía*, ed. Márquez Villanueva, Izquierdo Benito, and Sáenz-Badillos, 16.
61. Tedeschi, *Polémica y convivencia de las tres culturas*, 98.
62. Tietz, "Mittelalter und Spätmittelalter," 21.
63. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 281.
64. Angus Mackay, "The Jews in Spain during the Middle Ages," in *Spain and the Jews: The Sephardi Experience, 1492 and After*, ed. Elie Kedourie (London: Thames and Hudson, 1992), 44.
65. Tietz, "Mittelalter und Spätmittelalter," 32ff.
66. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 404.
67. Tietz, "Mittelalter und Spätmittelalter," 42.
68. See, for example, the new study of Bension Netanyahu, *Los orígenes de la inquisición en la España del Siglo XV* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1999).
69. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, 139ff.
70. Kenig, *Historia de los judíos españoles hasta 1492*, 113.
71. Joseph Perez, *Historia de una tragedia. La expulsion de los judíos de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1993), 94.
72. Hottinger, *Die Mauren*, 338.
73. Pérez, *Historia de una tragedia*, 70.
74. John Lynch, "Spain after the Expulsion," in Kedourie, *Spain and the Jews*, 144.
75. Henry Kamen, "The Expulsion: Purpose and Consequences," in Kedourie, *Spain and the Jews*, 80.
76. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 406.
77. Ibid., 418.
78. Eleazar Gutwirth, "Towards Expulsion: 1391–1492," in Kedourie, *Spain and the Jews*, 59f.
79. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, 253.
80. Pérez, *Historia de una tragedia*, 97.
81. Bernard Vincent, *Das Jahr der Wunder – Spanien 1492: Die Vertreibung der Juden und Mauren und die Einführung der Grammatik* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1992), 18.
82. Vincent, *Das Jahr der Wunder – Spanien 1492*, 26f.
83. Gutwirth, "Towards Expulsion: 1391–1492," 71.
84. Kenig, *Historia de los judíos españoles hasta 1492*, 151.
85. Haim Beinart, "The Conversos and Their Fate," in Kedourie, *Spain and the Jews*, 114.
86. Beinart, "The Conversos and Their Fate," 114.
87. Pérez, *Historia de una tragedia*, 114.
88. Beuys, *Heimat und Hölle*, 485.

— *Three* —

Religious Communities and Ethnic Groups under Imperial Sway

Ottoman and Habsburg Lands in Comparison

Fikret Adanir

A comparison of the declarations of war made by the Balkan states in September 1912 would serve well to introduce the reader to the topic of this chapter. The rulers of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia all signaled the beginning of a war specifically between the Cross and the Crescent, Christianity against Islam, and European civilization and Asiatic barbarism. The Ottoman sultan, on the other hand, who was also the caliph of Islam, refused to indulge in similar rhetoric. Thus, in his declaration we find only an appeal to each individual soldier to uphold his commitment to the Ottoman constitution; otherwise no reference can be found to a duty to defend Islam against Christianity or to wage war against European barbarism.[1] Why this difference? Probably because in 1912 about 40 percent of the Ottoman troops in the Balkans were non-Muslim, representing the Greek-Orthodox, the Bulgarian-Exarchist, the Armenian-Gregorian, and the Armenian-Catholic along with various Jewish communities in the empire. The sultan-caliph could hardly expect them to fight and thereby risk their lives in the name of Islam.

The situation in the Habsburg Monarchy in this same period was very similar to that of the Ottomans. We have a description of the swearing-in of fresh recruits in a barracks near Vienna just a few years before the start of World War I. This ceremony was conducted in the presence of Austro-Hungarian army chaplains representing seven different religious communities: the Roman-Catholic, the Greek-Uniate, the Greek-Orthodox, the Protestant, the Armenian, the Muslim, and the Jewish.[2]

These examples are indicative of the situation in which the two multireligious empires found themselves on the eve of their dissolution. Did their multireligious structures result from some constitutional principle inherent in the respective systems of rule or are these structures to be attributed to mere historical contingency? In this chapter I intend to give a comparative overview of the historical foundations of multiconfessionality and its subsequent evolution in southeastern Europe. To accomplish this, one must go back in history, and the further one goes, the more dissimilar the neighboring empires appear.

Experiencing Multiconfessionality: Differences in Tradition

The House of Habsburg emerged as a major power of the early modern period during the course of a protracted rivalry with the Ottoman Empire, a rivalry that contemporaries viewed as "a contest between Christianity and Islam." Acting as defenders of Christendom, the Habsburgs finally succeeded in halting the Ottoman advance to Central Europe at the turn of the eighteenth century.[3] This conventional picture of two empires caught up in an unrelenting struggle in the name of religion complies, however, only partly with recent research. The religious and cultural organization and orientation of the empires in question were too different to lend themselves to such generalizations. Whereas in medieval Europe the Church and the polity were ideally unified within the concept of the Holy Roman Empire, in the Islamic East, despite the theoretical universality of the *Sharia*, the ruler was neither the representative of God on earth nor dependent on a thoroughly organized body such as the Catholic Church.[4] This fact implied divergent paths of development in accommodating religious and cultural differences. Thus, Christianity, since the time of the Crusades, behaved increasingly like an exclusive religion. The Jews were not the only group to be subjected to recurrent persecution.[5] A similar though less noticed fate awaited the Muslims in certain regions of the continent. In Hungary, for example, where Muslims—along with Jews—played an important role in socioeconomic life, a royal decree in 1341 confronted them with the imperative of either conversion to Christianity or emigration.[6] The conditions worsened during the Turkish wars of the following centuries, which produced the "standardized image of Islam as the faith of blood-thirsty, salacious heretics who thanks to the deception of the lusty heresiarch Mohammed had devoted themselves to the service of the Devil."[7] Jews were made the scapegoat for Austrian military defeats during the seventeenth century and expelled, for example, in 1669–70 from Vienna.[8] Gypsies, too, to cite yet another group victimized throughout history, increasingly became a target for popular and official persecution under the pretext of their spying for the Turks, if not for indulging in black art.[9]

In contrast to premodern Habsburg rule, the Ottoman case is a multireligious project from the outset. Already the burgeoning emirate of the early fourteenth century was clearly heir to two multireligious state traditions, the one Islamic and the other Turko-Mongolian. The religious tolerance of classical Islam is usually ascribed to the Koranic view of Christians and Jews as the "peoples of the Book" (*ahl al-kitab*). Under the condition that the adherents of these religions acknowledged the domination of Islam and the authority of the Islamic ruler, they enjoyed protection (*dhimma*) and were granted freedom of belief including the preservation of their church organizations and hierarchies.[10] The extent of such tolerance is illustrated by the fact that Saint John of Damascus, a monk and doctor of theology venerated by both the Greek and Latin churches, was a minister in the service of the Muslim caliph in Damascus in the early eighth century—incidentally, a position which neither hindered him from participating in the iconoclastic controversies of his time, nor made him feel obliged to abstain from scorning Muhammad as a false prophet.[11]

Yet the institution of *dhimma* as the Islamic basis for tolerance does not suffice to explain the complex interethnic and intercommunal developments of the subsequent centuries. An equally important factor was the Turko-Mongolian imperial tradition as it had developed between the sixth and thirteenth centuries. The khanates emerging in the vast space from China to the Pontic steppes sheltered diverse groups with shamanistic, Buddhist, Christian, Mosaic, and Islamic beliefs. The Turkic Khazars, for one, whose elite had converted to Judaism during the ninth century, formed a multicultural state and practiced tolerance toward both Islam and Christianity.[12] The Oghuz Turks, too, who under the Seljuk dynasty invaded Byzantine Asia Minor in the eleventh century, do not seem to have cared much for religious affiliation. Thus Sultan Giyâs ed-Dîn of Konya (Iconium) emphasizes in a letter he wrote to the Latin emperor of Constantinople in 1243 that his mother was a Christian and that she performed her religious duties freely at the Seljuk court, which included a chapel. It is also recorded that this Muslim ruler's two Christian uncles played an important role in the political life of the sultanate.[13] Moreover, such broad-mindedness was in no way restricted to the members of the ruling class. A good indication of the era's multiculturalism is provided by the fact that some coins circulating in the neighboring Turcoman principality of the Danishmendids carried—along with an Arabic inscription—a bust of Jesus in relief.[14] It was this kind of liberalism with regard to religion which prompted an eminent historian of the period to comment: "To a mind accustomed to the totalitarian mental categories of the twentieth century it is somewhat difficult to conceive how, in Asia Minor in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the convictions and behaviour of ghāzīs could co-exist with a religious tolerance superior to anything found elsewhere in Islam."[15]

The social roots of the Ottomans are thus to be sought in a highly cosmopolitan milieu. The geographic region in question, the ancient country of Bithynia in northwest Asia Minor, bordering on the Sea of Marmara and

the Black Sea, had a population of diverse ethno-religious backgrounds. Here a high percentage even of the ethnic Turks were actually Christians, and popular Islam itself was characterized by syncretism. Finally, burghers with any erudition, as well as wandering bards in the countryside, were all attracted to a mysticism that bore witness to the influence of Plato.[16] The Greek Orthodox theologian Gregory Palamas, archbishop of Salonika (1347–1360) and the leader of the hesychasts, who spent the years 1354–55 as a captive in the territory of the Ottoman emirate, was surprised to see that Greek Orthodoxy had not disappeared under Muslim rule; indeed, he was permitted to preach in parish churches in Bursa and Nicaea and to participate in theological debates with his Muslim counterparts.[17] Once liberated, he became the propagator of the idea that an Ottoman conquest of Byzantium would lead to the conversion of Muslims to Christianity.[18] This aspect of Muslim-Christian relations under Ottoman rule comes into focus again in later centuries. Thus in a document dating from 1689, when Austrian forces were advancing in the Balkans with the hope of liberating Constantinople, the Catholic bishop of Nicopolis (in Ottoman Bulgaria) beseeched the Habsburg Emperor Leopold to be magnanimous to the Turks, because they could "easily be won over to Catholicism, whereas the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, Jews and similar nations" were "all obstinate schismatics."[19]

Only against this cultural background can the numerous implications of religious interaction in the early modern period be understood. In a charter issued for a monastery in Salonika that was an endowment of Mara, a Serbian princess and Mehmed II's stepmother, Mehmed used the phrase "my mother, the most noble of Christian princesses."[20] About a century later, in 1557, Mehmed Pasha Sokolović, the Grand Vizier of the sultan-caliph, reinstated the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate of Peć, installing his own brother, the Monk Makarije of Mount Athos, as the new patriarch.[21]

In the light of these examples, the prevalent interpretation of Ottoman expansion in southeastern Europe in terms of Islamic holy war (*djihad*) and the widespread tendency to designate the early Ottoman rulers as "holy warriors" of Islam (*ghazi*) appears implausible.[22] A more persuasive explanation stresses the pragmatic character of Ottoman rule which sought compromise.[23] Another well-known but rarely appreciated factor in this context is the role played by the antagonism between the Greek Orthodoxy and the Catholic West. The resentments that abounded between Greeks and Latins since the Fourth Crusade generated considerable support from local Christians for the Ottoman cause, because the recovery of some lost eparchies for the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople was expected, as was the reinstatement of former local leaders (*archontes*) who had been supplanted by Latin masters.[24] The patriarchate of Constantinople itself was re-established by Mehmed II in 1454, henceforth to function as an Ottoman institution.[25]

In short, it can be argued that Ottoman rulers followed a policy consciously geared to promote antagonism toward their main adversary in

Europe—first, the Catholic kingdom of Hungary and, later, the House of Habsburg which represented the Holy Roman Empire. Developments in connection with the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in east central Europe support this assumption. There is a consensus among specialists, for example, that the Protestant Reformation was greeted in Istanbul both as a religious movement thought to be congenial to Islam and as an opposition movement against the imperial authority of Charles V.[26] One historian has even argued that "the Infidel Turk was, in fact, the probable savior of Protestantism in Germany and the ultimate guarantor of Protestant interests in Hungary and Transylvania."[27] Public opinion in Hungary was favorably impressed when, in 1545, an Ottoman pasha attended the reformed church in Szeged and sided, on the occasion of a dispute, with the Protestant congregation against Franciscan friars.[28] A scholar, commenting on the "Long War" between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans (1597–1606), points out that the "lack of Habsburg sensitivity to Hungarian national feelings and of the Catholic Church to the issue of freedom of conscience following the Reformation assured to the Ottomans the overlordship of Hungary for another hundred years."[29]

It can therefore be argued that the Roman Catholics were the least privileged among the non-Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. However, this never meant a formal prohibition of Catholic activities, even though provincial authorities in Bosnia or Hungary promoted Orthodox or even Jewish interests at the expense of those of the Catholics; an "unestablished" Catholicism continued to persist throughout the Ottoman centuries.[30] Not only did the Holy See retain its vicariate of Constantinople after the fall of the city in 1453, but the Franciscan friars of Bosnia continued and even extended their activities under Ottoman rule, establishing new centers in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Macedonia.[31] On the communal level, too, the Roman Catholics enjoyed a remarkable degree of autonomy. The predominantly Catholic population of the Cyclades, for example, elected their own bishops, who were then issued an authorization document (*berat*) by the Sublime Porte, the Ottoman government. Antonio de Marchis de Santorin (1588), Dionisio Rendi de Naxos (1594), Francesco Ottumazzi de Milos (1600) and Angeolo Gozzadini de Naxos (1617) were all installed in office by this procedure.[32] To the abhorrence of some Protestant nations such as the English and the Dutch, the sultan's government even allowed the Jesuits and the Capuchins to carry on missionary activity within the empire, which led inter alia to the establishment of the first Armenian Catholic congregation in the Ottoman capital (1701).[33]

Spheres of Autonomy: Personal and Territorial

The support of Greek-Orthodox or Hungarian-Protestant opinion was no doubt an important factor in the Ottoman calculation, especially because of its legitimizing effects on Muslim rule. But such support would hardly

suffice to secure the survival of a multiethnic empire over centuries. Arrangements of a constitutional nature were needed if efforts to politically integrate the subject peoples were to have any success. It is well known that, in the Austrian case, stipulations of a constitutional order also played a decisive role. The conglomerate of Habsburg territories acquired either in war or by hereditary title was held together by sophisticated juridical mechanisms. Hungary and Bohemia, for example, were linked with the House of Habsburg in the fifteenth century, when Duke Albrecht V married Elisabeth of Hungary. The internal order of these "acquired" kingdoms remained more or less intact, and the respective national diets and provincial assemblies survived into the nineteenth century. On another level of integration, the estates played a crucial role: the higher clergy formed the first estate, the lords and knights the second, and finally the royal cities the third. From time to time these estates were summoned in order to levy extraordinary taxes, and they also had some influence over the modes of tax collection and the distribution of the tax burden.[34]

Conventional wisdom suggested until recently that the Ottoman Empire was an autocratic regime, a kind of Weberian patrimonialism, a system in which the central authority was surrounded by a functional cadre, the members of which owed allegiance to and were dependent for their lives and fortunes on the sultan alone. Recent research has begun to revise this one-sided picture.[35] More and more historians concede that the Ottoman Empire, even though exemplary for its absolutist regime during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was nevertheless a politically organized unit, resting to a considerable extent on negotiated solutions and popular acceptance.[36]

Autonomous religious communities known as *millets* served as cornerstones of the political structure of the emerging multireligious empire.[37] Non-Muslim peoples were grouped, partly for fiscal purposes, into several organizations along religious lines. Their leaders enjoyed a clearly defined position within the ruling elite. The sultan's government was committed to respecting the religious status of the members of the established *millets* such as the Greek-Orthodox or the Armenian-Gregorian communities. It recognized juridically the ecclesiastical hierarchies and their spiritual chiefs, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs of Constantinople, and it granted privileges and immunities to the heads of these churches and, by extension, to the members of their respective clergies. The patriarchs were also the political heads (*ethnarch*) of their *millets* and could as such exercise a certain degree of civil jurisdiction over the members of their communities. Finally, the officially recognized churches enjoyed the right to possess real estate along with the right to levy taxes from the members of the community under their jurisdiction.[38]

The above description refers, however, only to a model of the *millet* system; in reality the evolution of this organizational system was a complex process. It seems that various non-Muslim congregations specifically avoided categorization. Such was the case particularly with Jewish

communities, the number of which increased as a consequence of the expulsions from the Iberian Peninsula after 1492.[39] There is some evidence that in the 1460s Mehmed II tried to establish a Grand Rabbinate in Istanbul within the framework of a larger project of repopulating the city, at a time when he also ordered the compulsory transfer (*sürgün*) of various Jewish (Romaniot) congregations from the Balkans to the new imperial capital. However, the sultan was not successful; his efforts did not result in a large, well-organized, reasonably homogeneous Jewry of Istanbul. Instead, the deportees formed separate communities according to their places of origin, each community jealously guarding its autonomy.[40] This pattern could also be observed with the Ashkenazi Jews arriving in the 1470s, who established several independent congregations in Balkan towns such as Sofia and Salonika, again "on the basis of common language and common origin."[41] The Armenian ecclesiastical organization followed a similar path. The Armenian community of Istanbul grew substantially during the reign of Mehmed II, but the authority of the capital's Armenian bishop, whose title of a patriarch was apparently merely honorific, remained restricted to Istanbul and its immediate dependencies, while the bishoprics in Anatolia could preserve their independence. It was only in the second half of the seventeenth century that an edict issued by the grand vizier allowed the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople to proclaim itself Catholicos of all Armenians of the empire.[42]

In view of these facts, the conventional picture of the Ottoman Empire as a polity organized along religious lines alone appears shaky. Instead, recent research has brought into focus the hitherto neglected importance of communal autonomy on the territorial level as the basic structural element of political integration. In other words, communal autonomy was granted not because communes happened to be religious congregations, but because they were the smallest administrative units. In principle, a commune was an incorporated neighborhood, either as an individual district in a town or representing the totality of the members of a single village. Whether urban or rural, the basic functions of the communes were the collecting of taxes for the state and the securing of local public order. In both cases they functioned as quasi-institutions of the state.[43] Collective liability emerges in this context as an important institution of Ottoman public law.[44] It served to integrate the individual into the social fabric by means of mutual warrants and guarantees. By belonging to a corporate community, the members of which were collectively liable to fulfill common duties, the individual acquired civil status. The institution of collective liability was closely connected with the development of the common organs of local autonomy.[45] Each commune was represented by an elected body (of elders), functioning under the leadership of a chief or headman (*kocabaşı, muhtar*). Their most important duty was to negotiate within a larger unit of the provincial administration the total amount of taxes to be collected from individual communities as well as the intracommunal distribution of the tax burden. As representatives of their villages or neighborhoods, the leaders appeared

before courts, for example, in order to ask permission to repair churches or synagogues or to resolve disputes with other communities.[46] In short, these leaders "frequently walked a tightrope, on the one hand scrupulously following the letter of the law lest they and their constituents suffer dire consequences, while on the other hand utilizing every legal loophole in order to benefit their communities."[47]

In matters related to culture and family, not laymen but the communities' ecclesiastical leaders held control. For example, the schools were almost always attached to a church, monastery, or synagogue. Furthermore, the Jewish rabbinical or Christian canonical courts had their recognized fields of jurisdiction such as marriage, birth, death, and, to a limited extent, inheritance. As far as the Jewish communities are concerned, "both the scope and nature of judicial activity" of their courts seem to have gone "far beyond what was customary in other Jewish communities of the same period—in Central Europe, in Italy, in the Low Countries and even in Poland-Lithuania. In most of these places, the Jewish law courts served as courts of arbitration, whereas in the [Ottoman] Empire their authority was further reaching."[48]

Whether of a secular or ecclesiastical character, whether grounded in territorial or personal law, the system proved conducive to the emergence of a communal life that in some urban centers had a noticeably cosmopolitan flair. In sixteenth-century Salonika, for example, there were twelve Jewish neighborhoods, along with ten Greek Orthodox and forty Muslim quarters.[49] On account of their diverse backgrounds, both geographic (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Germany) and sociocultural, the Salonika Jews were organized in an even greater number of congregations, each of which sent a representative to the general Jewish council of the city. When Rabbi Moshe Almosnino was chosen in the 1560s to head a delegation to Istanbul in order to negotiate with the Porte, he depicted his role as that of a representative of the "Republic."[50]

Belgrade on the Danube, captured by the Ottomans in 1521, likewise developed into a multicultural center. The Ottoman garrison guarding the strategically important citadel consisted of both Muslims and Christians. In the town, Muslim craftsmen and traders formed the majority, followed by a Christian community which seems to have been mostly of Vlach origin. The Gypsies, the third largest group, were partly Muslim and partly Christian. They enjoyed considerable tax exemptions apparently because they were entrusted with the maintenance of the Ottoman flotilla on the Danube. The Jews, too, were exempt from certain taxes (e.g., the poll tax). Though a very small community of twenty registered adult males in 1570, they nevertheless sustained a synagogue along with a functioning Jewish communal court.[51] When Rudolph II's special envoy to the Porte passed through Belgrade in the summer of 1608, he noticed—apart from Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and "numerous" Jews and Gypsies—Franciscan friars, who publicly celebrated mass in a chapel of their own.[52] Likewise in Skopje, yet another predominantly Muslim city during the seventeenth

century, a Greek Orthodox metropolitan resided along with a Jewish rabbi and a Roman Catholic archbishop.[53]

Urban settlements in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean experienced, from the sixteenth century on, a spectacular upswing that found its expression both in demographic growth and in increased volume and diversity of artisanal production.[54] This development seems to have prepared the ground for "a regime of freer and competitive economy."[55] Even in the closely scrutinized sphere of Ottoman public life involving the selection of the head of a craftsmen's or merchants' guild, not the religious qualities of the candidates, but their "professional proficiency was the most important feature taken into account," as has been emphasized in a recent work on Ottoman Jerusalem.[56] From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, almost all the guilds in that city had an ethnically and religiously mixed membership. For example, the head of the gold- and silversmiths' guild was a Jew in 1559, a Christian in 1624 and a Muslim in the 1680s.[57] All the heads of the blacksmiths' guild in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were Christians, although the guild had a substantial number of Muslims as members.[58] The guild of cotton merchants was dominated by Muslims, but Christians, who were also included, "were regarded as equal members."[59] In Istanbul, the capital of the empire, especially Greek-Orthodox and Muslim craftsmen collaborated within various corporations.[60] Another recent study dealing with Ottoman Bulgaria points out that craftsmen's guilds from the beginning had had a multiethnic and multireligious character and that even in the nineteenth century, when the tendency toward more homogeneous guild structures had become evident, the number of mixed corporations had not declined.[61]

Contemporaries traveling in the Ottoman lands usually noticed this pluralist aspect of social life; the general impression they recieved was usually a kind of mélange. Thus Everard Fawkener, a British envoy to the Porte, reporting about political unrest in the Ottoman capital during the summer of 1740, expressed his astonishment at the extent of the influence exercised by certain Jews connected with the guilds of the city and with the Janissary Corps, closing with the comment: "there is a jumble here of power & dependence not easily to be accounted for or explained."[62] The travelers of the following century were even less capable of "reading the Turkish city," which appeared to them as a labyrinth harboring ethnic chaos.[63] Such contemporary impressions of blurred ethnoreligious boundaries notwithstanding, some modern historians continue to hold on to the notion of a compartmentalized Ottoman society, organized along vertical lines, with minimal intercommunal relationships.[64] But research conducted during the last decades revises this conventional picture of rigid segregation within the Ottoman city along religious lines. The contours of a much more integrated everyday life are becoming visible. In Istanbul, "families of all three religions lived next to each other in mixed neighborhoods during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."[65] In the Thracian Philippopolis (Plovdiv) likewise the population of several neighborhoods

was multireligious, the boundaries between different communities were less rigid than previously assumed, and the quarters of the town, each supposed to have been inhabited by a single religious group, were "in reality intertwined and not strictly separated."[66] As for rural areas, one study on the Macedonian district of Kara Ferye (Veroia) the local population appears to have been capable of organizing "large-scale collective action in case of need" by overriding religious divides.[67] But research on Ottoman peasant life is not yet developed enough to permit more general conclusions in this regard.

Questions of Status: Peasants, Serfs, and Burghers

The dynamics of intercommunal relations had, however, another dimension that requires due attention: how the legal status of the individual was determined and defined. On this level there was an obvious inequality between Muslim and non-Muslim. Only non-Muslim adult males were required to pay a poll tax called *cizye,* usually one gold piece annually, women and children, ill and elderly persons, the poor, and the clergy being exempt.[68] Until the end of the seventeenth century the *cizye* was levied as a household or hearth tax.[69] Thus in Hungary it was called *resm-i filuri*, which indicated the payment of one Hungarian florin or its equivalent in *akçe* per household; for example, a *resm-i filuri* of seventy *akçe* was taken from each household in the *sancak* of Srem annually.[70] In Palestine, too, the *cizye* was collected per household, not per person, sixty to seventy *akçe* being the average rate during the sixteenth century.[71]

The poll tax, apart from being a financial burden, was perceived as a humiliating sign of inferiority, until it was finally abolished in the early 1840s. By contrast, the agricultural tithes, the most familiar form of taxation, were due to be paid by every person cultivating land. Also the so-called extraordinary obligations (*avarız-ı divaniye*) were universal levies, theoretically to be decreed only in times of war, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries exacted practically annually. However, various groups of people such as horse breeders, bridge builders, miners, tar extractors, salters, charcoal burners, or producers of gunpowder, oil, and grease were freed from the extraordinary obligations, constituting thus the category of the "exempted" population (*muaf reaya*). Some groups with semimilitary duties such as the "guardians of mountain passes" (*derbendci*), the "warriors" (*voynuk*), and the *martolos,* who policed the countryside, also belonged to this category.[72] During the seventeenth century, one-third of the non-Muslim population in the Balkan Peninsula fell under one of these tax exemptions. In some districts the percentage was even higher: in Radomir, 45 percent of the households enjoyed some degree of exemption from state taxes; in Kustendil, 46; in Varna, about 50; in Demirhisar, 51; in Zihna, 55; in Kratovo, 58; in Salonika, 68; in Drama, 79; and in Siderokapsa, 90 percent.[73] These figures corroborate the view that the Ottoman

system relied heavily on the loyalty and cooperation of the indigenous non-Muslim populations.

Even more significant was the fact that Muslim and non-Muslim alike had an equal status in society *qua* subjects (*reaya*) of the sultan vis-à-vis the fief-holding or the feudal class. Those who were assigned revenue in form of a fief (the "feudal" class) or who were entitled to rent on account of their property rights (private landowners or institutions such as religious foundations) could determine neither the conditions of the actual production processes nor the amount of their rents themselves.[74] The peasants owned their buildings (houses, shops, sheds, etc.), vineyards, or orchards in the form of freehold property (*mülk)* with the corresponding rights of transfer, donation, or bequest.[75] The parcels they cultivated for cereal growing and the pastures fell under the category of state property (*miri*), the peasants' rights over them taking the form of a perpetual lease.[76] It should be emphasized that the conditions of landholding under both categories, *mülk* and *miri*, were the same for all Ottoman subjects irrespective of their religious or ethnic affiliation. Another significant characteristic of this system was that neither the fief holders, nor the owners of private estates had personal jurisdiction over the peasantry, every subject (including the lords) being equal before the *kadi*.[77] And finally, the almost total absence of labor services deserves mention. In the sixteenth century, for example, the average Ottoman peasant was expected to provide only three days of field work per annum, in lieu of which he could also pay three *akçe*s, 120 *akçe*s being worth one Venetian ducat around 1590.[78] Even though the situation of the peasantry worsened during the subsequent centuries vis-à-vis a new type of land-owning group (*çiftlik sahibi*), the peasants' right to move to another locality or to give up agriculture altogether remained fundamentally uncontested.[79]

Historical studies in a regional perspective support this interpretation. The Christian peasants of the district of Maçuka in Pontic Anatolia, for example, were remarkably mobile; along with agriculture, some of them mastered artisanal skills, which they practiced not only in the neighboring urban center Trabzon but also in the imperial capital Istanbul.[80] Agriculture was not dependent on cereals alone; just as important were the products of orchards, of hazelnut and olive groves, of vineyards, beehives and pastures. Although geographically an isolated region, the people of Maçuka seemed "very much part of a cash society; everything in the society had its cash value."[81] Similar conditions existed in Chalkidiki, where the land was generally controlled by the monasteries of Athos.[82] A substantial portion of the peasantry seems to have been exempt from the state taxes, and instead of the natural tithes, many paid a lump sum in cash which was decidedly more advantageous. Apart from field cultivation and livestock raising, mining (saltpeter and silver), burning of charcoal, and extraction of salt from the sea were important occupations. Likewise, the inhabitants of the island of Imbros were exempt from the poll tax and the tithe, paying only a fixed sum proportional to the surface of the land they worked, and in

Thasos only fifty *akçes* were required under the title of *resm-i çift* (a land tax) in lieu of the tithe.[83] The population of Chios, which had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy under Ottoman rule since 1566, also specialized in the production of mastic.[84] In these areas, cereals surely continued to be the dominant crops, but olives, fruits, and vegetables played an ever larger role. Viticulture served as supplier not only of grapes, raisins, wine, and vinegar, but also of *pekmez*, the grape syrup that was an important substitute for sugar. A diversified agriculture of this type was highly conducive to the development of a cash economy, and the fact that a high percentage of the taxes was levied in cash proved in the long run a strong inducement for the peasants to seek a market for their produce.[85] In this connection it should be mentioned that the Ottoman ruling elite and the landowning classes were barred from monopolizing the retail trade in the countryside, leaving the field to enterprising elements, often of a peasant background.

Such factors explain the remarkable mobility of peasants. When peasants turned to growing cash crops, as was the case, for example, in the village of Radilofo in Eastern Macedonia,[86] a parallel tendency to abandon agriculture in order to pursue a different trade in a town was observed.[87] Both developments were closely linked with the emergence of local merchant groups in the Balkans, where commercial life in pre-Ottoman times had been dominated by Italian or Ragusan traders, and from the sixteenth century on, Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman merchants appear frequently in Italy, as witnessed by the existence of a *Fondaco dei Turchi* in Venice.[88] Beginning with the seventeenth century, Greek Orthodox subjects of the sultan established themselves in the Ottoman tributary principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania, where they enjoyed a privileged status. Apparently, they were the first to introduce "oriental goods" to the markets of Hungary, Poland, and Russia; and this upswing in commercial life in the Danubian basin was largely due to, or at least partly encouraged by, the institution of the autonomous merchant guild as it had developed in the southern part of the Ottoman Balkans.[89]

Compared with the Ottoman case, the situation in the Austrian Empire showed some significant differences. It is true that here, too, the peasantries made considerable progress toward a self-administering communal system by the 1450s, yet in the subsequent centuries the development—particularly in Hungary and Bohemia—followed a different path; it was characterized by the growing dominance of landlords over rural society. In the process, the landowning classes acquired preemptive rights to the surpluses of the peasantry, which resulted in a monopoly over the retail trade, most typically in alcoholic liqueurs (*Schankrecht*), but also in cereals and animal products.[90] Parallel to this development, the traditional *robot* services lost their former character of being extraordinary exactions and became a "universal and uniform obligation" of the subject peasantry.[91] In Styria, for example, landlords were authorized by the state to demand labor services amounting to 165 days a year.[92] The *robot* regulations of 1737 for Silesia, of 1772 for Lower Austria, of 1775 for Bohemia and Moravia, and of 1778 for Styria

and Carinthia fixed the annual duration of labor services between two and three days a week. In addition, landlords under Habsburg rule exercised patrimonial jurisdiction over the rural population, and as late as 1782 it was not possible to appeal against patrimonial court decisions in civil cases.[93]

Under this system, non-Catholic subjects suffered from various disabilities. For example, members of Protestant communities and the Jews were not eligible to register as owners of real estate (*Landtafelfähigkeit*) as late as 1755.[94] Austrian insistence on preserving the religious homogeneity of the subject peoples led to the phenomenon of secret Protestantism (*Geheimprotestantismus*).[95] But as long as Ottoman power in Hungary was perceived as a threat to Habsburg domination, no radical measures against the Protestants even in regions such as Tyrol or Salzburg could be undertaken, the oppressive regime resigning itself merely to disciplinary measures.[96] The political conflicts in Hungary since the 1660s, however, which triggered off the war of 1683–1699 between the Holy League and the Ottoman Empire, were accompanied by a profound religious discord. During the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the rural population in Austria partly sympathized and sometimes even collaborated with the Ottoman "enemy."[97] Immediately after the Habsburg victory was assured, a set of oppressive measures known under the term "Counter-Reformation" began to unfold. The Protestant burghers of Steyr, for example, were confronted with the charge of having sympathized with the Turks and were ordered by the authorities either to return to the Catholic religion or to leave the town.[98] In many parts of Tyrol, Upper Austria, Styria, and Carinthia a significant portion of the Protestant population was forced to emigrate during the first decades of the eighteenth century.[99]

Millet System in Austria?

The Habsburg success and territorial gains at the expense of the Ottomans in the Danubian basin were thus the deathblow to Protestantism in that part of Europe. By way of a historical irony, however, the same victory obliged the Habsburgs to introduce and tolerate a new regime in their territory which seemed to counteract their original policy of Catholic unity; the Serbian patriarch of Peć, Arsenije III Crnojević, who had supported the Habsburg cause during the Balkan campaign of the imperial army in 1688/89, emigrated with a large following to Austrian territory in 1690 when the invading forces were pushed back to the former border. This created a novel situation for the imperial administration: at a time when the imperial authorities persecuted the Protestants in Transylvania, the military began to negotiate with the Serbian immigrants over their demands for cultural and territorial autonomy. The resulting proclamation by Leopold implied a *translatio* of the Serbian *millet* organization to a Habsburg environment. Despite protests by the Catholic Church and the feudal

estates, the emperor and his generals were prepared to grant the Serbs practically the same "privileges" they had enjoyed under Ottoman rule since 1557, namely, freedom of belief, lower tax rates, and the right to elect their leaders.[100] When the Habsburgs experienced military reversals in Transylvania in 1691, Emperor Leopold was again ready to practice tolerance; he supported the religious liberties of that autonomous principality as it had existed under Ottoman rule and promised to respect its constitution, although the latter promise remained merely a piece of paper.[101]

In the course of the eighteenth century, the development of international trade made a policy of toleration necessary. The treaty of Passarowitz (1718) had improved Austria's position in trade with the Levant, yet the Habsburg lands lacked an experienced merchant class. Maria Theresa undertook, therefore, administrative steps to attract non-Muslim Ottoman subjects to Austrian lands. When Trieste was declared a free port in 1769, the new burghers were granted comprehensive religious freedoms.[102] With the emergence of Russia as a Black Sea power after 1774, Greek traders and mariners became even more valuable assets in an increasingly competitive international environment.[103] It was during this period that the Transylvanian town of Hermannstadt (Sibiu) began to grant burgher status to non-Germans—Greeks, Armenians, and Italians.[104]

However, neither Maria Theresa nor her son, Joseph II, was as lenient toward the Jews and the Gypsies; in the 1740s, the empress contemplated the expulsion of all Jews from Prague and the rest of Bohemia, a treatment against which the Ottoman government "formally remonstrated."[105] A few years later the empress wanted Gypsies to be driven out from all her domains. But from the early 1770s on there was a change in the treatment of vagrant groups, evidently inspired by enlightened principles of government. A decree of 1773 forbade marriage between Gypsies and provided for children to be taken away from their parents in order to be brought up by non-Gypsy families. Joseph II continued this policy of assimilation. He wanted the Gypsies to become a settled population. Undesirable Gypsy occupations such as smithery or music-making were to be restricted.[106] Similar pragmatic concerns characterize his policy toward Jews as well. Since he believed that the Jewish lifestyle did not harmonize with Christian mores and was hardly compatible with rational government, he attempted to weaken their communal identity by granting them equal rights and integration into the civil society, but only on an individual basis on condition that Jewish traditions were abandoned in favor of assimilation to the German culture.[107] But such policies found little acceptance in the general public. As late as 1848, an attempt to grant complete equality to Jews met with opposition led by Catholic circles, but with great popular support.[108]

Accommodation of cultural difference by means of polyreligious structures described above proved especially fragile when challenged by ethnic nationalism. Ever since the expulsion of the Ottomans from Central Europe at the end of the seventeenth century, Hungary had been the major national problem for the Habsburg Empire. The medieval concept of the

Hungarian political nation with its specific territorial content (including Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia) and its constitutional traditions such as the national diet and independent county administrations were seen in Vienna as obstacles to the modern centralist state. Joseph II's "enlightened absolutism" was geared to undermine the power bases of the nobility. The abolition of serfdom and the famous tolerance patent of 1781 were therefore met by a spirit of resistance, especially in Hungary and Bohemia. By 1790 Joseph II was compelled to revoke most of his reform decrees.[109]

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of the following decades plunged the monarchy into further disasters, but the Congress of Vienna at the end of the period also brought great prestige and new territorial gains. From 1815 to 1848 the Austrian Empire could play the role of a policeman of Europe; in 1820–21, Habsburg troops marched into Naples; in 1831, Austrian military expeditions targeted central Italy; and in 1846, the Austrians suppressed a Polish revolution in the Republic of Kraków and then simply annexed the area.[110] But with the revolution of 1848, the monarchy found itself confronted once again with the national problem that had acquired in the meantime new social and political content: as the Hungarian nobility felt increasingly alienated from the Habsburgs and turned to the emerging urban groups for political support, the opposition of the old privileged groups, which was previously expressed in historical-territorial forms, began to emphasize linguistic and cultural identity.[111] But this in turn provoked anti-Hungarian nationalism of subordinate ethnopolitical and religious groups within the historical kingdom of Hungary. The Slavs and Romanians, "deprived of institutionalized privileges through which to express their ambitions, came to base them simply upon language, religion and other forms of cultural identity."[112] Similar processes took place in Bohemia as well as in the German-speaking parts of the empire.

These new national demands found their expression in the draft constitution of Kremsier of 1849, which elevated the idea of the equality of nationalities to the supreme principle. Article 21, for example, stipulated that it was the duty of the state to guarantee that all local languages had equal status in schools, state offices, and courts.[113] How did the Austrian state respond to this challenge? Seemingly, it welcomed this development. The postulation of national equality could become an effective weapon in the hands of an imperial authority to strike back at its particularistic opponents. Already in early 1848 the emperor granted the so-called Bohemian Charter which placed the Czech language on an equal footing with German.[114] After this concession, the government of Felix Schwarzenberg followed an opportunistic policy toward Hungary. When the Hungarian liberals declared the annexation of Transylvania, the Vienna government decidedly took sides with the Romanian leaders who organized mass protests against the Hungarian injustice and demanded equality for their nation. In the same manner, Felix Schwarzenberg supported the Serbs and the Croats against Hungarian integrative nationalism by declaring an

imperial policy that each national group should be treated equally and should have equal opportunity to develop its language and culture. However, after the first impact of the revolution had been mastered, Austrian absolutism began to show its true face. Thus in 1849 Schwarzenberg rejected the constitution prepared at Kremsier as being too liberal and dissolved the Reichstag. Instead of receiving a constitution from the representatives of the people, the monarchy promulgated its own. Still, it should be pointed out that Francis Joseph remained loyal to the principle of equality. Since a settlement with the Hungarians was still to come, the emperor emphasized the importance of the equality of all nationalities and wrote this principle into the new constitutions of the *Länder* (Carinthia, Silesia, Moravia, Bohemia, Tyrol, Istria and Galicia).[115]

This instrumentalization of the principle of equality in the interest of the Austrian state succeeded—also thanks to Russian military help—in suppressing the independence movement of the Hungarian liberals. Not surprisingly, therefore, the first criticism of the principle of national equality came from a Hungarian liberal. József Eötvös (1813–1871), who had been the Hungarian minister for public instruction and religious affairs in 1848, in an anonymous pamphlet (1850) pointed to the impracticability of equality if it was based primarily on language. Carried to its logical end, the linguistic principle would entail the destruction of the "historical territorial individualities" within the empire, without, however, accomplishing true equality. According to Eötvös, national consciousness had its basis in the belief in the superiority of one's own nation, and its goal was political domination. If the various levels of national consciousness observable in the populace were to be heeded at all, why not go further and introduce the principle of personal autonomy, which in Eötvös's opinion was the only system that would ensure linguistic minorities a say on all administrative levels.[116]

The Austrian debacle in 1859 allowed a return to the liberal practices of 1848. In Hungary, the provincial diets were resurrected, the autonomous county administrations restored, and the national parliament could reconvene.[117] In Transylvania, however, where the Hungarian and Romanian aspirations collided, Vienna imposed in 1863 the stipulation that the Romanians were to be consulted when the diet deliberated on the future constitution of the province. This stipulation caused the Hungarians to abstain from participating in the new assembly. In their absence, the Romanian delegates declared the equality of their nation within Transylvania and the separation of their Romanian Orthodox Church from the jurisdiction of the Serbian Church of Karlovac.[118]

The next military disaster, the 1866 battle of Königgrätz, saw a humiliated Austrian Empire with only two plausible options left. The first option would be to create a federal state in which each national group enjoyed autonomy on equal terms—this position was taken by Count Richard Belcredi (1823–1902), minister of state in 1867. He suggested the partition of the Habsburg territories into five autonomous regions: German-Austrian,

Bohemian-Moravian, Polish-Ruthenian, Hungarian, and Croato-Serbian. The Slavic Congress of Vienna of August 1866 had recommended a similar solution.[119] The second option meant a federalist solution on the basis of an Austro-Hungarian dualism and was vigorously propounded by Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (1809–1886). Beust argued that if the Slavs were also included in the projected national compromise, German-Austrians would be reduced to a negligible minority and would begin to re-orient themselves politically toward Prussia. It was, therefore, better to risk the alienation of the Slavs whom one would be able, with Hungarian help, to keep under control.[120] The reference to Pan-Slavism proved convincing. On 15 March 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise was finalized, and in December of the same year the constitution of the new Dual Monarchy could be proclaimed. The Habsburg Empire was thus divided into two states with different structures. In the Austrian half of the monarchy, the equality of nationalities was declared the guiding constitutional principle.[121] Hungary, by contrast, was a national state exclusively of the Magyar people; other ethnic groups were perceived as minorities. However, without regard to ethnicity, confession, or language, all citizens of Hungary were declared members of the indivisible political Hungarian nation, and the Magyar language was to be the official state language. In the last analysis, the dualism benefited the German-speaking Austrians and the Magyars, whereas the Slavs along with the Romanians had every reason to be dissatisfied.[122]

In the Hungarian half of the empire, the national question became, after a brief period of détente following the *Ausgleich*, even more explosive. It is true that the Hungarian parliament passed a liberal Law of Nationalities in 1868—according to Charles and Barbara Jelavich, "one of the most progressive pieces of legislation ever enacted in a multinational state" that "guaranteed the right of each nationality to use its own language in all phases of its cultural and political life." In schools, the instruction was to take place in the mother tongues of the students; in district courts of justice, the local languages would be the standard, and so forth.[123] Under the government of Koloman Tisza after 1875, however, the assimilation of non-Magyar populations gained priority. From 1879 on, all elementary school teachers were required to learn Hungarian. After 1907, the teachers' fluency in this language was deemed insufficient; also, the content of instruction was to be adapted to the needs of Magyar patriotism. At the same time, the Hungarian state took control of the Vlach (Romanian) communal schools in Transylvania.[124]

In the meantime, the national question in the Austrian half of the monarchy was developing in the opposite direction. The Czech liberals, who were bitterly disappointed with the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, had demanded since 1867 the coronation of Francis Joseph as the King of Bohemia. Simultaneously, they insisted on the recognition of the "Bohemian state law," namely the integrity of the historic Bohemian lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia. In 1871, when Francis Joseph

accepted the idea of his coronation in Prague, the aims of the Czech nationalists were about to be realized. The Habsburg Empire was about to be transformed from a dualistic into a trialistic monarchy, but a wave of vehement protest from the German-Austrian liberal circles thwarted this plan. After this experience, the Czech nationalists concentrated their energies on pragmatic agitation with the purpose of attaining equal status for the Czech language in public schools and offices in Bohemia—a goal that led to another crisis. In 1897, Austrian Prime Minister Count Badeni proclaimed a solution for the linguistic conflict. His plan boiled down to an administrative reorganization in Bohemia according to the principle of bilingualism. All civil servants were to learn either German or Czech within four years. This authoritarian measure provoked an indignant reaction by the German adherents of centralism and Count Badeni was forced to resign.[125]

Even the Social Democratic Party in Austria, which had among its membership influential Bohemian groups, could not remain aloof from these nationality conflicts. At its congress in Brno in 1899, the party for the first time addressed the question of nationalities. In the subsequent resolution it demanded that the historical *Länder* be substituted with new administrative bodies. In territorial terms, the units were to be defined solely according to the national affiliation of the population. Consequently, Austria should be transformed into a federal state of nationalities. Since no privileged nation would be left in such a federation, there would also be no need for a state language.[126] Even though such a far-reaching program did not have much chance of implementation, during the first decade of the twentieth century the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy experienced a virtual ethnicization of politics. National compromises in Moravia (1905–6) and Bukovina (1909–10) led to the emergence of a great variety of electoral systems on the local level, such as the improvisation of multiple networks of constituencies along ethnic lines, although many persons were nationally uncommitted or had multiple loyalties.[127]

An interesting approach to the solution of the national question was taken by Karl Renner, a prominent figure in the history of Austrian Social Democracy. His concept, which seems to have been borrowed directly from the Catholic Church, has even been compared to the Ottoman system, since Renner "proposed that nationalities in the Austria-Hungarian Empire be treated like churches; each citizen could choose whatever nationality he wanted to belong to and could send his children to schools of that nationality. Such a policy would make nationalities into *millets*."[128] However, Renner had something else in mind; his concept had both a territorial and a personal aspect. The autonomous members of a future Austro-Hungarian federation would have a core territory of their own plus a sphere of cultural autonomy that would be defined on the principle of personality. In short, Renner conceived the development of political democracy on the basis of the territorial principle, but that of national democracy on the principle of personality.[129]

Ottomanism vs. Ethnic Nationalism

When we return—after this synopsis of the nationality question in the Habsburg Empire—once again to the Ottoman case, the similarities can hardly be overlooked. In one respect, however, the Ottomans' situation appears further complicated inasmuch as they saw themselves confronted with the threat of partition by the Great Powers under the pretext of solving the Eastern Question; Austria actually belonged (until the Crimean War) to those states which stood to profit from such a deal.[130] National liberation and imperialist expansion were thus intricately connected in the perspective of Ottoman state elites, although they were also accustomed to attributing political unrest to traditional misgovernment and to seeking alleviation primarily in redressing the evils of administration. For example, the increasing power of local notables was for them the chief cause of the sociopolitical crises the empire was experiencing. Thus, when the First Serbian Uprising broke out in 1804, the sultan's government saw it as an expression of local discontent caused by provincial corruption and attempted to restore order by arming the Serbian peasantry against the local Muslim usurpers of power.[131] A similar approach was evident during the Greek Revolution of 1821–29; again the Porte was bent on destroying the power base of a local leader, Ali Pasha of Yanina, instead of concentrating all available forces against the rebellious Greeks in the south.[132] The assumption behind this policy was that the Pasha of Yanina could become a tool of European interests (as Muhammad Ali of Egypt was to become a few decades later) if not suppressed first. Ottoman concern about the appearance of rival dynastic centers in the provinces that might lead to European intervention was then a very important factor, and, as is well known, the revolutionary élan of Serbian or Greek peasants did not, alone, bring about national independence but did so in conjunction with the military interventions of Russia, Great Britain, and France.[133]

Ottoman statesmen of the period tried to learn from these events. Particularly baffling for them was the phenomenon of Philhellenism. Coupled with the romantic idea that a nation was an organic community of shared destiny, with a collective soul articulating itself through the medium of language, the new emphasis on ancient civilizations, historical rights, and ethnic descent seemed capable of disrupting any multicultural society.[134] Secondly, the men of the Porte were aware that the emergence of ethnic kingdoms on the fringes of the empire was an omen for future irredentism.[135] But they were equally cognizant of the fact that the survival of the Ottoman state depended to a large extent on the goodwill of the same European powers that had imposed the Greek nation-state upon a defeated Ottoman Empire. Lastly, Ottoman statesmen of the reform era *Tanzimat* seem to have understood at least the propaganda value of civic equality. As they saw it, it was the inferior legal status of Ottoman non-Muslims that served European powers as a moral legitimization for their interventions in the East.[136] The imperial edicts of 1839 and 1856 therefore stressed legal

equality for all and equal access to public office irrespective of religious or ethnic allegiance as the main points in the Ottoman reform program.[137]

These reforms were implemented with some judiciousness especially in the decades after the Crimean War; the one statesman whose name stood for their success was Midhat Pasha (1822–84), the architect of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876.[138] Midhat viewed secularized education as a potent instrument in the service of strengthening the common ties between the members of various communities. As governor of Danubian Bulgaria in the 1860s, he attempted to establish in major towns a new type of school in which Christian and Muslim youth alike would enjoy all the advantages of modern education. Instruction in these institutions was to be bilingual, in Turkish and Bulgarian, with students also learning French as a third language. The local administration, too, would be bilingual. For the purposes of internal security, Midhat set up a militia, the composition of which was to reflect again the ethnic and religious plurality of the local population.[139]

However, such projects of educational, cultural, and economic reform were not viewed favorably by either Christians or Muslims. Education being traditionally a prerogative of the individual *millet*s, nationalist leaders discouraged the attendance of the mixed schools lest the children develop an Ottoman political consciousness. Midhat Pasha's own ideals were soon forgotten, the Ottoman public education tending more and more to disregard local conditions and peculiarities.[140] In the meantime, the non-Muslim communal school systems prospered, with programs of instruction that were geared to inspire the youth to struggle for national independence.[141]

An episode from the period of Midhat's governorship in Bulgaria points to another Ottoman susceptibility that might explain the final failure of the reform. The Taen Centralen Bŭlgarski Komitet (Secret Bulgarian Central Committee) that was founded in Bucharest in May 1866 published in December of the same year a pamphlet entitled "Bŭlgarija pred Evropa" (Bulgaria before Europe).[142] In this document (and in a memoir addressed to the Ottoman government) something similar to the conversion of the Ottoman Empire into a Turko-Bulgarian dual sultanate was proposed. The sultan would be crowned as the Tsar of Bulgaria, and Bulgaria would then be granted religious and political autonomy within a rejuvenated Ottoman state. The issue was hotly debated in Bulgarian revolutionary circles, which saw in the issue a threat to their own ideals, but by all accounts, the Bulgarian middle class responded favorably. Only Midhat Pasha seems not to have been enthusiastic, and the Porte hardly took note of it; consequently, the moderate Bulgarians behind the scheme "were eclipsed by a more revolutionary type of leadership."[143]

The Ottoman defeat in the Russian War of 1877/78 brought in its wake the end of *Tanzimat* liberalism. A pro-Islamic re-orientation of political life began under the impression of waves of Muslim refugees from Bulgaria, Austrian-occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Caucasus. The principle of equality lost its urgency during the long reign of Abdulhamid II

(1876–1909), and the ideal of solidarity among the Muslim subjects of the sultan-caliph, not the concept of a multicultural empire, served as the basis for political loyalty.[144] Parallel to this change of mood, a new awareness of the need for Islamization and/or Turkification of the geographic space of the empire could be discerned, so that the problem of the resettlement of Muslim immigrants became a hotly disputed issue of nationalist politics.[145]

These changes were reflected also in the economic philosophy of the period. The Hamidian regime saw the first instances of an etatist interpretation of national economy that in the long run implied the elimination of non-Muslim intermediary groups, the so-called comprador bourgeoisie. Inspired by the ideas of Friedrich List, a popularizing writer such as Ahmed Midhat Efendi frequently discussed the preconditions for the development of a Turkish middle class.[146] In 1904 a nationalist author argued that Ottomanism as a policy had failed and that the future would belong to nationalism based on ethnic identity.[147] A positivist and partly Darwinist perception of social relations became a characteristic trait of Young Turk opinion which otherwise promised, against Hamidian absolutism, the restoration of *Tanzimat* liberalism.[148]

However, after the Ottoman catastrophe of the Balkan War in 1912/13, the liberal project was abandoned entirely in favor of a petit bourgeois populism that instrumentalized Muslim grievances at the expense of non-Muslim citizens.[149] Consequently, already in the first half of 1914 about 100,000 Greeks were compelled to leave Aegean Anatolia for the nearby islands. Once World War I began, the forced transfer of Greek population continued, this time to places in the Anatolian interior.[150] More comprehensive and radical measures were taken against the Armenians living in the eastern provinces. Their indiscriminate deportation after 1915 was a virtual "ethnic cleansing" leading in some places to wholesale extermination.[151]

The Habsburg and Ottoman practices of accommodating religious and ethnic difference developed along lines diametrically opposed to each other. From the 1740s to 1848 the Habsburgs were bent on erecting a centralized absolutist state, whereas the Ottoman Empire, once thought to be the shining example of absolutist rule, appeared to be on the verge of falling apart into its constituent elements. In reality, the Austrian monarchy was compelled, already in the eighteenth century, to adopt some forms of religious autonomy not unknown to Ottoman political tradition. Confronted with the dynamics of ethnic nationalism of the nineteenth century, especially after having lost its historical mission within Germany, Austria was even obliged to pursue a course of outright national decentralization.[152] However, because of its basically feudal structures, as well as its Great Power standing within the state-system, the Dual Monarchy was spared the degree of ethnic strife which characterized political life in the Ottoman realm exactly at a time when the Sublime Porte was engaged in strengthening bureaucratic centralism in the name of secularization and modernity.

Still, it can be argued that the response of both multicultural empires to ethnic nationalism was a kind of imperial nationalism, perhaps with the difference that in the Ottoman case the nationalism was articulated in more militant terms. What is clear is that the abandonment of pluralist positions was concomitant with the ascendancy of ethnic exclusiveness, the final implications of which far surpassed the narrow boundaries of intercommunal rivalries within the ancien régime. Significantly enough, neither of the multiethnic empires investigated here survived World War I, and the legacy of both has been stained by deportations, massacres, and even genocide.

Notes

1. See Andreas Hemberger, *Illustrierte Geschichte des Balkankrieges 1912/13* (Vienna and Leipzig: Hartleben, 1914), 1:42–48.
2. Adam Wandruszka, "Katholisches Kaisertum und multikonfessionelles Reich, " in *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, vol. 4, *Die Konfessionen,* ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985), xi.
3. Karl A. Roider, Jr., *Austria's Eastern Question, 1700–1790* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 3.
4. For a comparative approach in this regard, see Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (London: MacMillan, 1969), 50–68.
5. For massacres of the Jews of Germany during the First Crusade, see Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 1:134–41.
6. On Muslims in medieval Hungary, see Tadeusz Lewicki, "Węgry i muzulmanie węgierscy w swietle relacji podróżnika arabskiego z XII w. Abū Hāmid al-Andalusī al-Garnātī'ego," *Rocznik orientalistyczny* 12 (1937): 106–22; Ivan Hrbek, "Abū Hāmid al-Andalusī und sein Werk 'Mu'rib,'" *Archiv orientální* 23 (1955): 109–35, especially 121–22; Smail Balić, "Der Islam im mittelalterlichen Ungarn," *Südost-Forschungen* 23 (1964): 19–35; Hansgerd Göckenjan, *Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter im mittelalterlichen Ungarn* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972), 44–89.
7. Stephen Fischer-Galați, "The Protestant Reformation and Islam," in *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern*, ed. Abraham Ascher et al. (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), 54–55.
8. Robert A. Kann, *Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches 1526–1918*, 3d ed. (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 123.
9. Joachim S. Hohmann, *Geschichte der Zigeunerverfolgung in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 1981), 32–33; David M. Crowe, *A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 34–36; Angus Fraser, *The Gypsies*, 2d ed. (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), 84–128.
10. For various interpretations of the term *dhimma*, see Claude Cahen, "Dhimma," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2d ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 227–29; Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, vol. 1, *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, pt. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 208; Bat Ye´or, *The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam* (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985).
11. Johannes Damascenus, *Drei Verteidigungsschriften gegen diejenigen, welche die heiligen Bilder verwerfen*, ed. and intro. Gerhard Feige (Leipzig: Benno-Verlag, 1994); Johannes

Damaskenos and Theodor Abu Qurra, *Schriften zum Islam*, trans. and comments by Reinhold Glei (Würzburg: Echter, 1995).

12. Dieter Ludwig, "Struktur und Gesellschaft des Chazaren-Reiches im Licht der schriftlichen Quellen," (Ph.D. diss., University of Münster, 1982); Kevin Alan Brook, *The Jews of Khazaria* (Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 1999), chaps. 6 and 7 and passim.
13. Osman Turan, "Les Souverains seldjoukides et leurs sujets non-musulmans," *Studia Islamica* 1 (1953): 82–83.
14. Nicolas Oikonomidès, "Les Danishmendides, entre Byzance, Bagdad et le Sultanat d'Iconium," *Revue Numismatique* 25 (1983): 194.
15. Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c. 1071–1330* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1968), 203.
16. Michel Balivet, "Culture ouverte et échanges inter-religieux dans les villes ottomanes du XIVe siècles," and Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "La population non-musulmane de Bithynie (deuxième moitié du XIVe s.–première moitié du XVe s.," both in *The Ottoman Emirate (1300–1389)*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1993), 1–6 and 7–22 respectively. See also Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, "Co-Existence and Religion," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 15 (1997): 119–29, and Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 62–90 and passim.
17. See Georgiades G. Arnakis, "Gregory Palamas Among the Turks and Documents of His Captivity as Historical Sources," *Speculum* 26 (1951): 104–18; Arnakis, "Gregory Palamas, the *Chiones* and the Fall of Gallipoli," *Byzantion* 22 (1952): 305–12; J. Meyendorff, "Grecs, Turcs et Juifs en Asie Mineure au XIVe siècle," *Byzantinische Forschungen* 1 (1966): 211–17; Anna Philippidis-Braat, "La captivité de Palamas chez les Turcs: Dossier et commentaire," *Travaux et Mémoires* 7 (1979): 109–221.
18. Aristeides Papadakis, "Gennadius II and Mehmet the Conqueror," *Byzantion* 42 (1972): 88–106, here 93.
19. See Bistra Cvetkova, "Novi dokumenti za istorijata na osvoboditelnite dviženija v bŭlgarskite zemi prez XVII v.," *Izvestija na Instituta za istorija pri Bŭlgarska akademija na naukite* 19 (1967): 243–62, here f. 383r of the Latin original in facsimile.
20. Franz Babinger, "Ein Freibrief Mehmeds II., des Eroberers, für das Kloster Hagia Sophia zu Saloniki, Eigentum der Sultanin Mara (1459)," in *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas und der Levante*, vol. 1, Franz Babinger (Munich: Südosteuropa-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1962), 97–106.
21. Ladislas Hadrovics, *Le peuple serbe et son église sous la domination turque* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947), 48f.; Radovan Samardžić, *Mehmed Sokolović*, 2d ed. (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1971).
22. E. Tyan, "Djihād" and I. Mélikoff, "Ghāzī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2d ed., 2:538–39 and 1043–45 respectively. The *gazi* thesis stems from Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1938). For a similar, recent interpretation, see Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300–1600," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914*, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 11ff.
23. Ronald C. Jennings, "Some Thoughts on the Gazi-Thesis," *Wiener Zeitschrift zur Kunde des Morgenlandes* 76 (1986): 151–61; Rudi Paul Lindner, "Stimulus und Justification in Early Ottoman History," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 27 (1982): 207–24; Colin Imber, "Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History," in *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, ed. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (London and New York: Longman, 1995), 138–53.
24. See B.J. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus: Les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane c. 1500–1718*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1982), 57. Cf. further Franz Dölger, "Die Kreuzfahrerstaaten auf dem Balkan und Byzanz," *Südost-Forschungen* 15 (1956): 141–59; David Jacoby, "The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade," *American Historical Review* 78 (1973): 873–906; and the contributions in Ben-

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25. Franz Babinger, *Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit: Weltenstürmer einer Zeitenwende* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1953), 85f.; Aristeides Papadakis, "Gennadius II and Mehmet the Conqueror," *Byzantion* 42 (1972): 88–106.
26. See, for example, Christine İsom-Verhaaren, "An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V," *Turcica* 28 (1996): 299–318.
27. Fischer-Galaţi, "The Protestant Reformation and Islam," 58; Stephen Fischer-Galaţi, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521–1555* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).
28. Mihály Bucsay, *Der Protestantismus in Ungarn 1521–1978: Ungarns Reformationskirchen in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, pt. 1 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1977), 85.
29. Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 159.
30. On the decline of Catholicism in Bosnia during Ottoman rule, see Srećko M. Džaja, *Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina: Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463 bis 1804* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984), 151–218.
31. G. Hofmann S.J., *Il vicariato apostolico di Constantinopoli 1453–1830* (Roma: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1935). On Roman Catholic activities in the Balkans in this period, see Bazilije S. Pandžić, "L'opera della S. Congregazione per le popolazione della Penisola Balcanica centrale," *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda fide memoria rerum*, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Rome, 1972), 292–315, reprinted in Pandžić, *Bosna Argentina: Studien zur Geschichte des Franziskanerordens in Bosnien und der Herzegowina* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1995), 227–50. See also Krista Zach, *Die bosnische Franziskanermission des 17. Jahrhunderts im südöstlichen Niederungarn* (Munich: Trofenik, 1979).
32. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, 110.
33. Ibid., 145; Nerses M. Setian, *Gli Armeni cattolici nell'Impero ottomano: Cenni storico-giuridici (1680–1867)* (Rome: Don Bosco, 1992), 8–9.
34. Kann, *Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches*, 26.
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36. Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, "Aspects of the Legitimation of Ottoman Rule as Reflected in the Preambles to Two Early *liva kanunnameler*," *Turcica* 21–23 (1991): 371–83; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570–1650)," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 35 (1992): 1–39; Colin Imber, "Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History," 138–53.
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43. Elena Grozdanova and Svetla Ivanova, "Einige Parallelen zwischen den Dorfgemeinden und den Stadtviertelgemeinden in den bulgarischen Landen (16.–17. Jh.)," *Bulgarian Historical Review* 20, no. 4 (1992): 32–61, here 33; Elena Grozdanova, *Bŭlgarskata selska obština prez XV–XVIII vek* (Sofia: Bŭlgarskata akademija na naukite, 1979), passim.
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— *Four* —

National Movements and Imperial Ethnic Hegemonies in Austria, 1867–1918

Michael John

This essay will deal with the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a "state of many peoples" and the development of national movements in this dynastic state. It will focus upon diverse nationalities, but especially upon the Germans in Cisleithania, the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire. The state of Austria was created following the end of World War I, but the initial stages of the development of such a German-speaking state can be identified much earlier. Industrialization, mass culture, and the constitution of mass parties characterized the second half of the nineteenth century in Austria, and standardization affected the questions of national and individual identities as well. The idea of ethnically and linguistically homogeneous nation-states contradicted the thinking of the Habsburg dynasty and the concept of state and nation held by the House of Austria. We can clearly identify a multiethnic/nationalistic double character in Austrian society. This dual character had specific consequences for the identity of the state, for the diverse ethnicities within it, and for the individuals themselves.[1]

The newer historiography presents the tensions among the different nationalities within the monarchy as clearly connected to the collapse of the empire, although not as the sole cause. The stress of four years of war, military defeat, and the interests of the victorious powers also played an important role.[2] Whereas older literature (often written by Austrian or German historians) viewed the nationalisms of the smaller nations as central to the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, modern research places more

emphasis on German-Austrian and Magyar nationalisms and their hegemonic aspirations.[3]

The Supranational State and Growing Nationalism

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the second largest state in Europe. Within it lived eleven nationalities: Croats, Czechs, Germans, Italians, Magyars, Poles, Romanians, Serbs, Slovenes, Slovaks, and Ukrainians, as well as more than a dozen smaller ethnic subgroups. The state compiled statistics on sixteen recognized religious confessions. The Dual Monarchy thus constituted a multinational state (*Nationalitätenstaat*),[4] and was part of what historians such as Jenö Szücs and Istvan Bibo have described as the specific spatial and cultural entity of Central Europe. [5] According to Moritz Csaky, plurality was the main characteristic of a distinct Viennese modernity that was an engine for modernity all over Central Europe.[6]

Although the nineteenth century has been characterized as an era of rising nationalism, prior to 1848 nationalism did not dominate politics, daily life, and individual identity as it would later on. The collective identities of the middle and lower classes in the Habsburg Empire were influenced by the national idea, but language was not yet a predominant factor. The individual town, country, and even the state were of far more importance. Nascent nationalist sentiments and movements were of marginal significance during this period. The nobility was German dominated, but nevertheless a truly supranational system. The ruling Habsburg dynasty, and not the nation, was of central importance. The Habsburgs based their right to rule on a number of factors: divine right, its economic necessity for Central Europe, its geostrategic legacy as protector of "Europe" against Russians and Turks, and its cultural mission to "civilize" parts of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

Symptomatic of the construction of the empire was an 1857 proposal to expand Vienna and divide the imperial capital into national districts that would better reflect the nature of the empire. The neo-absolutism of the 1850s was the last attempt to superimpose a politically homogeneous, unified, modernly administrated, although German-dominated state-nation-society on the multiethnic and multilanguage territory of the Austrian Empire. The success of Magyar nationalism, which led to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867, dealt the final blow to the idea of a multiethnic joint monarchy and helped accelerate the process of national polarization.

On the other hand, according to the Austrian State Foundation Act (*Staatsgrundgesetz*) of 1867, all nationalities within the empire were to enjoy equal rights in the spheres of education, civil service, and public life. In Galicia, for example, the act strengthened the Polish ethnicity and Polish was granted the status of an official language. Later in the decade, further legislation made Galicia into an autonomous region within the monarchy.

From that point on, the Poles above all assumed the key positions in the provincial government. The educational and judicial systems were oriented toward Polish traditions and culture, and the Polish nobility could extend its position of power. Polish became the dominant language: by 1871, the University of Lemberg/Lwow had become a Polish-speaking institution and the following year the German-language theater was forced to close its doors.[7]

Meanwhile, the important German-Czech conflict, as well as other ethnic conflicts, remained unaddressed until 1897, when the Austrian government issued new language ordinances strengthening the status of the Czech language. These ordinances provoked bitter opposition on the part of German nationalists and liberals, who saw German preeminence threatened. The situation culminated in acts of violence in the parliament. One conflict even led to a duel involving Prime Minister Badeni and the Pan-German MP Karl Hermann Wolf, who had referred to the prime minister as a "swindler," and who triggered a large-scale melee in parliament by shouting that the Slavs were culturally inferior to the Germans and that Prague was a German city built by German hands and a testament to German culture. He compared Czech culture to that of the Eskimos and Zulus, and asked what Czechs could possibly have been thinking to demand that Germans learn the language of an inferior people.[8] From the halls of parliament, the conflicts spread to the streets of Vienna and Graz as well as to Prague and other cities in Bohemia. As the rioting showed no signs of abating, the prime minister was forced to resign and the successor cabinet ultimately withdrew the ordinances.[9]

Thereafter, Vienna, Prague, and Graz were sites of extreme sensitivity in nationalist matters. Graz—because of the proximity of its university (including many German nationalist students) and its garrison (housing a multiethnic army)—was even called "the monarchy's most feared military post."[10] During the Badeni Riots, a Graz student leader was fatally injured in a duel with an army officer. German nationalist students provoked rioting in Leoben, Laibach/Ljubljana, Innsbruck, and Brno/Brünn, as well as in Graz. In the final analysis, German nationalist radicalism hindered the moderating influences of the Badeni language ordinances, as well as sending a signal of opposition to Slovenian and Italian efforts toward emancipation.

Despite some attempts to reach a compromise, on the eve of World War I, the Czech, Slovene, South Slav, and Italian questions were far from being resolved. Even in Galicia, which enjoyed restricted autonomy, the situation was problematic: Polish dominance did not correlate with the fact that at the turn of the century Poles comprised just over a majority of the population. During this phase, Habsburg Austria was characterized by national struggles.[11] The highly emotionally charged nationalism of ethnic groups was matched by the rigid conservatism of the old elites who wanted to maintain German preeminence.[12] The unfailing bastions of "Austrianness" as an established aim of national policy were the supranational state

bureaucracy, a large segment of the Jewish population, an influential portion of the aristocracy, and, of course, the imperial court and the Crown. The armed forces, truly multinational institutions, were particularly important. On the eve of World War I, the imperial army was 25 percent German-Austrian; 22.5 percent Magyar; 13 percent Czech; 7–9 percent Croat, Serb, Polish, Ukrainian, and Romanian; 3 percent Slovene and Slovak; and 1.3 percent Italian. In theory, if more than 20 percent of the soldiers in a regiment spoke a certain language, the officers were expected to know it. In addition to 142 monolingual regiments (only 31 were German speaking), there were 162 bilingual and 24 trilingual regiments.[13]

The Impact of Migration

In the nineteenth century, society was set in motion physically as well as politically and ideologically. Industrialization produced large-scale migration movements and urbanization, which were habitual consequences of industrialization in Europe—but had especially significant consequences in Austria-Hungary, where millions of individuals of different ethnicities changed their place of residence.

The affiliation of an individual was regulated primarily by the community of birth, the so-called *Heimatrecht*, not by the state-defined concept of citizenship. When people migrated, the indigenous rights (*Heimatrecht*) of the diverse ethnic groups were of particular importance in determining whether immigrant communities were considered foreign or domestic national entities. Until 1901 most itinerant workers were denied access to their indigenous rights and to the naturalization process because of their inferior social status. By linking social and communal policy, this Austrian migrant legislation had a highly disintegrative effect. Not until the continuing modernization of the domestic industrial system finally took hold was the outdated indigenous rights stipulation adapted to the needs of the new social order. Indigenous rights and naturalization requirements were the legal and conceptual linchpins of the process of incorporating those ethnic groups that found themselves in a minority position. Communal policy was very clear on this goal of accelerated assimilation.

In dealing with its largest minority, the Czechs, the municipal government of Vienna adopted a policy of not recognizing Czechs as a national minority, denying public school status to their educational institutions, and requiring newly naturalized citizens of the city to swear an oath of allegiance that meant recognizing and supporting the German character of the city. The oath of allegiance was interpreted in such a way that mere membership in a Czech savings association was considered a breach. Based on the State Foundation Act of 1867, the Czech community's demands that their language be used in the public education system were denied by the Supreme Court on the grounds that the "Czech ethnic clan" was not indigenous to Vienna and Lower Austria.[14]

In Hungary, the hegemonic aspirations of the Magyars made assimilation policy even more severe than in Austria. On the other hand, in Prague, České Budějovice (Budweis), and Brno (Brünn), Czech hegemonic aspirations were on the rise.[15] The large cities of the empire were transformed into melting pots as the assimilation and acculturation of even major ethnic minorities became a main objective of Austro-Hungarian rule.[16] A few changes in educational and language fields in the period between 1900 and 1914 demonstrate that integrative, more conciliatory voices were slowly gaining the upper hand. However, because these steps were taken so late and dealt with secondary problems only, one can not speak of an actual reverse of policy.[17]

The censuses conducted in Cisleithania, whereby a certain pressure was exerted upon respondents to indicate one single, vaguely defined language of everyday use (*Umgangssprache*), do not clearly reflect the multiethnic composition of the population (see table 4.1). Information was not collected on the language of everyday use of resident aliens, a group which included the citizens of the Hungarian half of the empire.

TABLE 4.1: Place of Birth of the Population of Vienna, 1880–1910

Place of Birth	1880	%	1900	%	1910	%
Vienna	271,429	38.5	777,105	46.4	991,157	48.8
Austrian Provinces*	131,694	18.7	250,857	15.0	301,275	14.8
Bohemia/Moravia	188,379	26.7	411,037	24.5	467,158	23.0
Galicia/Bukovina	13,577	1.9	36,763	2.2	47,115	2.3
Other parts of Cisleithania	16,746	2.4	36,616	2.2	41,955	2.1
Hungary**	54,128	7.7	140,280		155,519	
Germany**	20,142	2.9	21,733		22,930	
Other Nations**	8,661	1.2	13,422		18,469	
Total Residents	704,756		1,674,957		2,031,421	

Language of Everyday Use, Vienna 1900

German	1,327,808	92.2
Czech	102,974	7.2
Others	8,193	0.6
Not surveyed: resident aliens***	177,625	–

* Equivalent of today's Austrian *Bundesländer*. Tyrol and Styria as defined by borders in force at the time; without Burgenland, which was included in Hungary.

** In 1900 and 1910, the place of birth was not specified by state; the figures specify the place of official citizenship.

*** Including the citizens of the Hungarian half (Transleithania) of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Source: Michael John and Albert Lichtblau, *Schmelztiegel Wien – einst und jetzt. Geschichte und Gegenwart von Zuwanderung und Minderheiten* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 14–15.

The ethnic background and place of birth of the population residing in Vienna, however, provide a clearer picture of ethnic group affiliation.[18] Around 1880, the percentage of Viennese who had been born in the city reached 38.5 percent, its lowest point up to that date. Around the turn of the century, approximately 410,000 of the city's 1.6 million residents had been born in Bohemia and Moravia. Based upon the criterion of individuals with the right of permanent residence, even as many as 520,000 Viennese (representing 31 percent of the population) originally came from these two crown lands, of whom about 350,000 were from districts in which Czech was the predominant language.[19] About 43,000 and 11,000 individuals, respectively, came from predominantly Slovak-speaking and Croatian-speaking regions of the Hungarian half of the empire; 90,000 from other regions in Hungary; 37,000 from Galicia, as well as another 37,000 from the monarchy's southernmost districts. And to this can be added the second generation born after immigration who, although they grew up in Vienna, often displayed linguistic and cultural characteristics of their parents' homeland.

Their positions as supraregional centers in a multiethnic state led to multiethnicity in the cases of other cities as well: Kraków, Czernovitz/Cernivci, Lemberg/Lwow, Trieste, and Prague. The best known and documented case is certainly Czernovitz/Cernivci and the crown land Bukovina. Easternmost Bukovina bordered on Romania and Russia, as well as on the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire. Since it was a land in which the coexistence of various ethnic groups unfolded in a seemingly peaceful manner, and since it is an entity that no longer exists today but has rather become a synonym for wasted chances for the peaceful coexistence of different peoples in one land, various mythologies have been retrospectively woven around this part of Eastern Europe. Bukovina has been labeled as "Europa Minor" and has been characterized as a microcosm of the monarchy, the Habsburg Empire in miniature. Its capital Czernovitz has been named "Little Vienna," "Little Jerusalem," and "Little Paris." Unlike Vienna, Prague, or Budapest, Czernovitz was much more like a mosaic than a melting pot.[20]

This multiethnic immigration was also directed to the smaller industrial settlements producing for the domestic market. Here the composition of the population of the multiethnic state was evident, since many of the mass-production workers required by the factories were unskilled laborers who worked hard for low wages and often came from the less-developed regions of the monarchy. In the west, the small crown land of Vorarlberg was a classic example of a labor immigration land. Prior to World War I, East Austrians and Italians made up approximately 50 percent of the industrial labor force. In the Bludenz region, the Italian-speaking population constituted over 12 percent of all residents; due to high birthrates, for example, about 30 percent of all children baptized in 1914 in Bludenz were members of Italian families.[21] As a result of migration during this period, Italians had already established themselves in modern-day South Tyrol as well as in North Tyrol. About 4,000 Italian laborers were counted in the

Innsbruck area, for instance.[22] An additional example of bilingualism and multiculturalism can be found in Styria. So-called Lower Styria was a part of the province until 1918, when it was ceded to Yugoslavia. According to 1910 statistics for the communities of Marburg/Maribor, Pettau/Ptuj and Cilli/Celje, 78 percent of the population gave German as their language of everyday use and 16.3 percent cited Slovenian. Figures compiled in 1921 showed 19 percent German-speakers versus approximately 70 percent speaking Slovenian. Without going into the large number of factors explaining this phenomenon, these results not only show the problematic nature of historical census material, which is strongly influenced by struggles among nationalities, but also permit the conclusion that the population living in this region was bilingual.[23] Similar findings apply not only to Carinthia, where bilingual population groups had been long established in some regions, but also to traditionally predominantly German-speaking West Hungary. The 1900 and 1910 censuses present us with a clear picture of a bilingual and even trilingual population in these regions.[24]

At the turn of the century, immigrants comprised 80 percent of the population of Graz, the capital of the province of Styria. Of these, a third came from bilingual or non-German speaking regions. Although this is not expressly mentioned in the census results, it is highly probable that a considerable number of Slovenian-speaking or bilingual individuals lived there. According to the 1900 census, 1,430 residents named Slovenian as their language of everyday use. On the other hand, at the turn of the century, 29,795 persons representing 21.6 percent of the population came from the bilingual and Slovenian-speaking region. Another 16,081 came from regions of Lower Styria in which more than half the population spoke Slovenian.[25] An analysis of statistics on individuals with permanent right of residence allows us to conclude that a considerable proportion of the population of Graz consisted of originally Slovenian-speaking or bilingual immigrants who were placed under pressure to assimilate and to name German as their language of everyday use for census purposes.[26]

The Jewish migration to the Central European metropolises was also of relevance at this time. Jews were defined statistically as a religious group, not as nationality or ethnicity. The Jewish population played a specific role because of their overrepresentation in the cultural, scientific, and economic life of the empire. Although thousands of Jews immigrated to Vienna prior to the Revolution of 1848, the mass migration to Vienna and Budapest began only after they received their full civil rights and liberties in 1867. The Jewish population of the capital increased both absolutely and proportionally. In 1857, 15,116 Jews lived in Vienna (3.2 percent); in 1869 there were 40,230 (6.6 percent). After large incorporations of suburbs, there were 118,495 in 1890 (5.3 percent), 175,318 in 1910 (8.6 percent), and the peak had been reached after the war in 1923, when 201,513 Jewish inhabitants were counted in Vienna (10.8 percent).[27]

Vienna followed Warsaw and Budapest as the third-largest Jewish center in Europe. Linked to the ever-present danger generated by the pogroms

that were taking place in Czarist Russia, between the 1890s and the beginning of World War I large numbers of Jews emigrated from Galicia, causing Vienna's Jewish population to rise to nearly 20 percent. The Jewish community as a whole thereby became more heterogeneous. Galician Jews were located in the lower segments of the middle class as well as the working class and especially the older members of their community represented an "antimodernist" element within the city. They were a visibly distinct minority within Viennese Judaism, manifesting endogamous marriage patterns. Galician Jews tended to speak Yiddish or, in some instances, Polish, and because they were highly religious they lived culturally at odds with the assimilated Jewish majority. The pejorative term *Ostjuden* (Eastern Jews) was used by the Viennese Jews and Gentiles alike when characterizing the Galician minority. Tensions within the Jewish community between the well-established "old" minority and the recently settled "new" minority were manifest.[28]

In this context Western Hungary, which became an Austrian province in 1921, has to be mentioned again. Normally Jews tended to settle in the big cities. But in this rural region less than 100 miles from Vienna, approximately 8,000 Jews lived in small towns and villages. They had been invited to the region after the expulsion of the Jews from Vienna and Lower Austria in the late seventeenth century by the Hungarian counts Eszterhazy and Batthyany and were granted limited autonomy. As subjects of the Hungarian Crown, after 1867 they were allowed to found official religious autonomous communities, which had limited legal jurisdiction. This concept is very similar to the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire.[29] While the autonomous Jewish community of Mattersdorf (Mattersburg) was abolished in 1903, the Jewish community of Eisenstadt continued to exist even during the years of the first Austrian Republic up to the year 1938.[30]

Assimilation as a Principle of the Crown Lands and the Big Cities

In politics and in their daily lives, the ethnic groups in the empire interrelated via hierarchical structures which were not egalitarian in nature, based rather on concepts of inferiority and superiority. In Vienna these ethnic groups did not coexist on an equal footing. They existed either side-by-side or diametrically opposed to each other. Because the Jewish population was not easily defined along national lines, it was threatened most by this situation. Most Jews in the Austrian part of the empire considered themselves to be culturally German and at the same time Austrian, in the sense of being loyal to the Habsburg dynasty. This association with German culture did not have an impact on the German-speaking population alone; the two-pronged anti-Semitism common in Central Europe also built on this position. German-nationalist anti-Semitism based its rejection of the ethnically and culturally very similar Jews mainly on racist arguments. In contrast,

the anti-Semitism of the smaller nations of the empire, that is Czechs, Slovenes, Poles, incorporated the argument that the Jews considered themselves German and were therefore a threat to national liberation,[31] or, in a stronger version, that, despite not being "Germans," they were nevertheless loyal Habsburg subjects and thus antinational. Even where Czechs, Slovenes or Poles had been assimilated in the German speaking provinces or regions, this did not block anti-Semitism. As John Boyer has noted, the anti-Semitism of many assimilated Czechs in Vienna and Lower Austria assumed a stabilizing emotional function, compensating for a feeling of national inferiority.[32] Sometimes the adoption of the widespread anti-Semitism could be the ticket for the integration of Slavic migrants.

The result of this situation was an identity crisis on the part of the Jews.[33] The Viennese author Hugo von Hoffmansthal, who came from Jewish, Italian, and Swabian ancestors, wrote, "Wir besitzen unser Selbst nicht, von außen weht es uns an" (We do not even possess our selves, but rather they are rained down upon us). The spirit of the age and way of life at the end of the empire did not allow multiple loyalties. People had to make clear choices. Contradictions and disorientation could be found even within the same individual: "German" vs. "Jewish" vs. "supranational Austrian" was the problem. A gap also existed between the generations and between "old" and "new" Jewish identity. In the voluminous literature analyzing this phenomenon, prominent names such as Theodor Herzl, Victor Adler, Otto Weininger, Arnold Schönberg, and Franz Kafka are often mentioned.[34]

The problem of identity did affect not only the Jews within the empire, but also hundreds of thousands of others, mainly, from the politically relevant middle classes of Bohemia, Moravia, Vienna, and Budapest. Heinrich Fügner and Miroslav Tyrš (formerly Thiersch, he tried to slavicize his name), both founders of the radical Czech mass-movement Sokol, and the founder of the Czechoslovakian state, Tomas G. Masaryk, whose mother was German speaking, are cases in point. Immediately after the end of World War I, the Slovene Rudolf Majster, whose German-speaking father was an imperial officer, ordered his troops to fire on German-speaking demonstrators who were demanding territorial changes to Austria and Slovenia to the advantage of what was left of Austria. These cases demonstrate that potential aspects of individual identity were systematically suppressed. The year 1900 was the age of crisis not only for the outdated imperial state but also for many people's individual personalities.

This problematic nature of identity, as embodied in individual personalities drawn from the cultural elite, has already been thoroughly studied. Carl Schorske, Allan Janik, and Jacques Le Rider deserve particular mention for their work in this direction. Critics have quite justifiably pointed out, however, that this research has been centered almost exclusively on prominent figures from the world of culture and science, while the effort to expand the investigative focus to include a wider variety of social groups has been generally lacking. The effort to draw upon more broadly based sources, by means of the thematic focus upon the choice of children's

names, for example, is one attempt to counteract this deficiency. An examination of the names selected by parents for their children shows that actually a broad segment of the population tended to exhibit a high degree of assimilation and contradictory patterns of behavior. Concrete conclusions can be drawn from a database containing information from the period 1820–1913 on the estates of more or less well-to-do Viennese: entrepreneurs, upper echelon government officials, and persons of independent means. The sample, with data on 1,250 individuals, includes 50 percent Catholics, 24 percent Jews, 22 percent with unknown or unspecified religious affiliation, and 4 percent Protestants. An investigation of the distribution of names characterized by a pronounced German nationalist connotation (e.g., Siegfried, Sigmund, Adolf, Walter, Gernot, Herwig, etc.) shows that 69 percent of those bearing these characteristic names were Jews, 19 percent Catholics, 6 percent Protestant, and 6 percent confession unknown. In the case of the name Siegfried, 80 percent of the instances in the sample were Jewish children.

The problem of identity manifests itself with particular clarity, for example, in families such as that of Viennese businessman Jakob Hirsch, in which the firstborn male child was named Salomon in 1860 while the fourth son born in 1882 received the name Siegfried. In the end, this form of assimilation was not accepted by the gentiles. Jokes concerning Jewish Siegfrieds were frequently heard and many Austrian Jews were quite isolated despite their illusion of being integrated.[35] The results of another name survey of Czech immigrants to Upper Austria were similar to those of the Jewish middle class in Vienna.[36]

German National Policy vs. Multicultural Options

Finally, we ought to take a closer look at German national developments and German national policy in the German-speaking regions of *Altösterreich*, the territory to which it was reduced following its defeat in World War I, with essentially the same dimensions as the present-day Austrian state. In the 1880s, a shift took place in these predominantly German-speaking lands of the monarchy, as German nationalism on a massive scale and in a highly structured form began to establish itself both politically and culturally in many Austrian towns. It positioned itself in opposition to the dynastically organized Habsburg Monarchy and the theory that all nationalities should enjoy equal rights. It was especially evident among (German) nationalist parties, but was also used by Christian Socials and Social Democrats. Economic crises, demographic developments (i.e., a downward tendency in the number of German-speakers throughout the entire monarchy), and the increasing orientation of *Altösterreich* as a state of multiple nationalities provided the background to this rise of German nationalism.

The 1882 Linzer Programm can be regarded as a key early warning sign of growing German nationalist sentiment.[37] Among the diverse group of

individuals who collaborated on it were the Pan-German radical Georg Ritter von Schönerer and future Social Democrats Engelbert Pernersdorfer, Heinrich Friedjung, and Victor Adler, who went on to become chairman of the Social Democratic Party. It is remarkable that the process of turning away from the Austrian state that was later so prevalent among German Nationalist Party faithfuls was not expressed in this original 1882 program, nor did it yet contain massive anti-Semitism. (The anti-Jewish point 12 of the program was inserted by Schönerer in 1885). Victor Adler, co-author of the 1882 original version, was of Jewish descent, and resigned from the nationalist movement; co author Heinrich Friedjung was also—at least partially—of Jewish descent. The program's highest priority was the "German question," and it stated: "It is in the interest of both the nationalities and the state that those lands of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which were previously members of the Deutscher Bund form an entity enjoying the greatest possible independence, and organized in a fashion which is as strictly unitary as possible, and, accordingly, efforts must be undertaken in this direction. Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina should be absorbed by Hungary; Galicia and Bukovina either be united with Hungary or be accorded a special status."[38]

The program of the "whole organized in unitary fashion" was to be ensured through "legislation declaring German the official language of the state" and mandating strict enforcement in the army, civil service, and educational system. This Germanization program was designed to be carried out in predominantly German-speaking lands, in Italian-speaking and Slovenian-speaking areas of the monarchy, as well as in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; it was assumed that such a program could not succeed in Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other provinces. Also consistent with this conception was the admonition formulated by Pan-German leader Schönerer himself that "Austria ought to give up striving to be a major power."[39] Exclusion and "otherizing" were the thrust of this political direction, which was then directed against Jews as well.[40] In 1887 Schönerer proposed an extreme anti-Semitic bill in parliament, the so-called Chinese Bill. With this name Schönerer put Jews together with "Asiatic Chinese" to make the former more "foreign." Schönerer's bill was inspired by the United States "Chinese Exclusion Act" (1882) which prohibited continuous Chinese immigration.[41]

Parallel to the formation of a highly elaborated program, the 1880s and early 1890s also saw a growing emphasis upon Germanness independent of political affiliation in the Alpine regions of *Altösterreich* and the provinces immediately adjacent to them. There emerged a political axis of provincial capitals linking Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Graz, and Klagenfurt in which the prime movers were city councils. These municipal bodies passed a series of resolutions in which they focused their attention on the interests of Austria's Germans or even made direct reference to the "German-Austrian" lands of the Habsburg Monarchy.[42] In this phase of formation of a German-Austrian national self-consciousness, otherizing Jews

and Czechs was a central element. Other important aspects were the Austrian defeat by Prussia in 1866, the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, and the deep Austrian economic crisis after 1873, which in turn was followed by a political crisis. All these events led to feelings of inferiority toward the German Reich, which appeared to be the more successful and effective state.

An 1886 resolution can be cited as a typical example of the new political axis. Demonstrations in Laibach/Ljubljana by Slovenians demanding greater autonomy were deemed by the Linz City Council "to be a sign of moral depravity, deeply insulting to the Germanic feelings of a large segment of the monarchy's population," and to which the city council expressed its "utter indignation."[43] Similar resolutions were passed in Graz, Klagenfurt, Leoben, and Innsbruck. Developments in this direction picked up steam toward the end of the century. As Georg Ritter von Schönerer and nationalistically oriented delegates to the imperial parliament (Reichsrat) were coming out publicly for "Germanization" and "unadulterated Germanness" in connection with the Badeni Riots and the disputes following the language regulations issued in 1897–98, city councils in the provincial capitals in Alpine regions and adjacent provinces responded with notes of protest such as the one issued by Linz:

> In consideration of the fact that the latest language regulation artificially expands the realm of use of the Czech language and … fosters the process of Czechification, and in further consideration of the fact that the possibility of earning a living and the potential for advancement of those persons born in purely German lands like Upper Austria are not inconsiderably diminished thereby, it seems—not merely as a consequence of the feelings of solidarity which unite all Germans in Austria but also in accordance with the precept of taking into consideration the interests of the German Alpine provinces—incumbent upon us to lodge a protest against these language regulations.[44]

Following the turn of the century, proponents of German nationalism continued to gain ground—less in the Reichsrat and the province legislatures than in the city councils of German-speaking "rural" regions in which the unequal, collegiate system of suffrage still privileged the middle class. At the Reichsrat level, however, several more small steps were taken in the direction of instituting a state of multiple nationalities, although one more significant attempt failed. In 1900, Chancellor von Koerber proposed a substantial program of economic development which included railway and canal construction and other infrastructure projects. Koerber wanted to stimulate Austria's economy and to defuse the conflicts among the various nationalities by giving a better infrastructure and binding the nationalities closer together through economic interests. An Investment Bill passed the Reichsrat quickly, but in 1909 only the railroad portion was fulfilled and by 1914 no more steps had been undertaken.[45]

In 1901 a reform of the *Heimatrecht* (indigenous rights) became effective and no doubt had integrative effects. In two provincial legislatures (Moravia in 1905 and Bukovina in 1909–10) formalized agreements regarding the rights of ethnic groups were implemented. The Moravian Settlement of 1905 was particularly interesting: it gave people the opportunity to decide voluntarily to which ethnic group or nationality they wished to belong. Personal choice played a role in the Budweis Settlement (1906–14), too, which was seen as model of national compromise in Bohemia.[46] The attempts to strengthen the multiethnic character of the monarchy came late and were counteracted by German national as well as Christian Social and Social Democratic politics. In the end, centrifugal nationalisms triumphed.[47]

The Pyrrhic Victory of German Homogenization

Ernst Bruckmüller has formulated the hypothesis that the bourgeois and petit bourgeois protest movement against rapid social change, industrialization, capitalism, competition, and liberalism in Austria split into two parts: the Christian Social Party in Vienna and the German Nationalists in rural regions. "Among the bourgeoisie in small and medium-size towns such as Salzburg, Krems, Linz … or Völkermarkt, growing linguistic nationalism combined with an overwhelming attitude of opposition not only to the wishes of the non-German nationalities, but also, first and foremost, against Vienna, and, at times, old-fashioned local identity and consciousness blended together with the realization that 'the sticks' were disadvantaged and suffered from retarded development."[48] In addition, the attraction exercised by the German Reich can be seen as both a protest against modernization and the expression of hope for it. The belief that the mighty German Reich was expanding economically, intellectually, and in the foreign policy sphere, while Austria was stagnant, unable to get beyond the logjam of discordant nationalities, and governed by a decadent clique of courtiers and aristocrats, was shared by many members of the middle class. To many in the western crown lands, the German Reich seemed to be the symbol of modernization and technological-economic progress, in contrast to which the Austrian *Nationalitätenstaat* produced feelings of inferiority among German nationalists in almost all predominantly German-speaking regions.

In the crown land of Upper Austria, for example, at the turn of the century the population was highly homogeneous linguistically. According to the census, 99.4 percent of the population cited German as their everyday language. In the crown land of Salzburg, the figure was 99.6 percent.[49] In other cultural areas, however, society was more heterogeneous in these provinces as well. In these crown lands, the nationalist parties wanted to maintain linguistic homogeneity, and they reacted with massive opposition toward any and all measures to promote heterogeneity. They sought to counter the intensification of communications brought

on by industrialization with standardization of communication codes, and of the written language above all. German nationalist doctrine held that the industrial division of labor called for cultural homogenization. Their objective was to establish as much congruence as possible between German culture—which was identified with the German linguistic community—and the superordinate power of the state. The thrust of the nationalists' offensive in German-speaking rural areas was aimed at non-German ethnic groups and against the multiethnic city of Vienna that represented the polar opposite of what German nationalists sought to achieve.[50]

Since cultural homogeneity could no longer be imparted through cultural socialization within the family, nationalist lines of reasoning came out in favor of a state-organized educational system with a uniform written language. In 1903, for example, the German nationalists demanded that German be the sole official language of the church in Upper Austria, and in 1909, they obtained imperial ratification of a law in that province mandating the exclusive "use of German as the official language in the land above the River Enns." Identical legislation was approved for the crown lands of Salzburg and Vorarlberg.[51] In the city of Salzburg in 1913, a law was successfully introduced that limited municipal citizenship to German applicants, and which imposed upon such applicants an oath "acknowledging the German character of the city of Salzburg as capital of the province, and especially vowing to maintain that German character to the best of their ability."[52] This was designed to prevent "the City of Salzburg as well from facing the future danger of having to accommodate foreign-speaking elements within its walls on an ongoing basis."[53] The law ultimately failed to obtain the approval of the emperor, who regarded its provisions as a violation of the principle of equality.

The German Nationalist Party basically saw standardization as modern and "progressive." Everything that seemed to go against this trend was perceived as "reactionary." Jews and Czechs (or "Slavs" in general) served as negative symbols in this context, but the other non-German-speaking minorities were also regarded as "foreign bodies within the nation"—a typical phrase, often used by German Nationalist Party activists in Austria around 1900. To give a concrete example, in 1903 the city council of Linz proposed to ban Italian and Czech workers in order to "preserve the German character of the City of Linz."[54] This city council also supported the "German mission" in multilingual areas of the monarchy inhabited by German-speakers. Here, the neighboring crown land of Bohemia and, in particular, Budweis/České Budějovice were the focus of regional interest. Thus, a 1908 Linz city council motion stated: "It is well known that Budweis faces the greatest threat, and that the Czechs would spare no expense or other sacrifice to get their hands on this key to penetration into Upper and Lower Austria. This struggle … obliges us to provide the Germans in Budweis with vigorous support."[55]

Among the mass of the population, German nationalism met with broad-based response and backing.[56] Many restaurants and taverns in

German-speaking areas, in which adherents of Schönerer and other nationalist politicians gathered, displayed a sign stating, "Czechs, Jews and dogs will not be served here."[57] In Linz, for example, the appearance of a Hungarian singer was boycotted and a concert by the renowned Prague violinist, Jan Kubelik, was broken up by a raging mob; three days of violent protest made it necessary to call in troops to restore order.[58] In Graz, German nationalism was not only shown in cultural presentations but also in demonstrations where students and masses of people protested against "anti-German politics"; the protests often led to physical fights and conflicts in the streets.[59] In the crown land of Salzburg nearly all members of the Alpinists' Association were opposed to permitting Jews and Slavs to spend the night in the mountain huts the group maintained.[60] Thousands of citizens enthusiastically attended performances of Wagner's operas in the city of Salzburg, but at the outset of the twentieth century it was Linz to an even greater extent than Salzburg that could be characterized as the hotbed of cultural fervor for Richard Wagner. All performances of the his works were sold out and Linz became known as "little Bayreuth."[61]

Adolf Hitler, who lived in Upper Austria from 1889 to 1907, grew up in this cultural climate. In *Mein Kampf* he had the following to say about his school years in Linz:

> Money was collected there for the *Südmark* and the *Schulverein*, one's convictions were blatantly expressed through cornflowers and the colors black, red and gold, others were greeted with "*Heil*," and, instead of the emperor's hymn, one preferred to sing "Deutschland über alles" despite the warnings and the punishments. Boys were schooled politically thereby.… One can well imagine that I was not among those with lukewarm convictions in this regard. I quickly became a fanatical German nationalist.[62]

What is remarkable is the timing of the emergence of a nationalist movement among German-Austrians in the Austrian Alpine regions and adjacent provinces. Miroslav Hroch, in his work on the development of nationalist movements in Europe, differentiates between three phases. Phase A of a nationalist movement is characterized by predominantly scholarly interest in phenomena having to do with nationalities or in those relevant to their development. Phase B begins with organized, goal-oriented nationalist agitation that strives to expand nationalist consciousness. Once this is accomplished, the nationalist movement can enter Phase C as a mass movement. According to Hroch, these phases took place in Germany during the first half of the eighteenth century (A), in the final decades of the eighteenth century (B), and, finally, between 1848 and 1871 (C). There was essentially a time lag of one or two decades (or more) before these phenomena manifested themselves among the "little" nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy.[63] This temporal shift can also be observed among the German-Austrians. Here, the formation of a mass movement became a dynamic process beginning in the 1880s and achieved an initial high point

in 1897/98. During the Habsburg Monarchy's final two decades, the respective vociferous nationalist movements engaged in conflicts with each other that added another dynamism, one of escalation.

In the Austrian Alpine regions and adjacent provinces, thoughts of independence in the sense of a German-Austrian consciousness, or ideas involving annexation by or unification with the German Reich had already become politically correct during the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy. With the collapse of the empire, these ideas took on immediate social relevance. In late October 1918, German-Austrians tried to secure territories in southern Bohemia and Moravia. On 12 November 1918, the provisional national assembly of the new state of Deutsch-Österreich declared the country to be a republic and, simultaneously, a component of the German Republic. Chancellor Karl Renner, a German Moravian and Social Democrat with longstanding nationalist leanings, personally submitted this motion. The German-Austrian state thus came into existence with an over 90 percent German-speaking population (and without any territories from the Czech lands), though reduced to an eighth of the geographical area of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This was not how the proponents of German hegemony had imagined things would turn out.[64]

Notes

1. The topic of the Austrian nationality question is a very complex one. This essay shines only a small light on the historical scene to outline the specific process of nation-building and to formulate some hypotheses.
2. See, for example, István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Helmut Rumpler, *Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa: Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter, 1997), 553–58.
3. See, for example, Jiri Koralka, *Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa 1815–1914* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1991), esp. 173–74; Christian Gerbel et al., *Urbane Eliten und kultureller Wandel: Bologna-Linz-Leipzig-Ljubljana* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1996); Reinhard Kannonier and Helmut Konrad, eds., *Urbane Leitkulturen 1890–1914* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1995); Michael John, "'We Do Not Even Possess Our Selves': On Identity and Ethnicity in Austria, 1880–1937," *Austrian History Yearbook* 30 (1999): 17–64.
4. Gerald Stourzh, "Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848–1918," in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918,* vol. 3, *Die Völker des Reiches*, 2. Teilband (Vienna: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 975–1206; Robert Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848–1918*, 2 vol. (New York: Octagon Books, 1964); Gerald Stourzh, "The Multinational Empire Revisited: Reflections on Late Imperial Austria," *Austrian History Yearbook* 23 (1992): 1–22.
5. Jenö Szücs, *Die drei historischen Regionen Europas* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1994); István Bibó, *Die Misere der osteuropäischen Kleinstaaterei* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1992).

6. Moritz Csaky, "Die Wiener Moderne," in *Nach Kakanien: Annäherung an die Moderne*, ed. Rudolf Haller (Vienna: Böhlau, 1996), 59–102.
7. Maria Klanska, "Lemberg: Die 'Stadt der verwischten Grenzen,'" in *Lemberg/L´viv 1772–1918: Wiederbegegnung mit einer Landeshauptstadt der Donaumonarchie*, ed. Hans Bisanz (Vienna: Eigenverlag des Historischen Museums, 1993), 12.
8. Andrew G. Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 168–80.
9. Hannelore Burger and Helmut Wohnout, "Eine 'polnische Schufterei'? Die badenischen Sprachverordnungen für Böhmen und Mähren 1897," in *Politische Affären und Skandale in Österreich: Von Mayerling bis Waldheim*, ed. Michael Gehler and Hubert Sickinger (Thaur: Kulturverlag, 1995), 79–98.
10. Friedrich Torberg, *Kaffeehaus war überall: Briefwechsel* (Munich: Langen Müller, 1982), 42.
11. Emil Brix, "Der Gleichheitsgedanke in der österreichischen Sprachenpolitik um 1900," in *Wien um 1900: Aufbruch in die Moderne*, ed. Emil Brix and Wolfgang Mantl (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1986), 176–84.
12. Ernst Bruckmüller, *Nation Österreich: Kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1996), 271.
13. Lonnie R. Johnson, *Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 307.
14. Monika Glettler, "The Acculturation of the Czechs in Vienna," in *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies: The European and North American Working Classes During the Period of Industrialization*, ed. Dirk Hoerder (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 297–321.
15. Luda Klusakova, "Cultural Institutions as Urban Innovations in the Czech Lands, Poland and the Eastern Baltic, 1750–1900," in *The City in Central Europe: Culture and Society from 1800 to the Present*, ed. Malcolm Gee, Tim Kirk, and Jill Steward (London: Ashgate, 1999), 85–100.
16. Péter Hanák, *The Garden and the Workshop: Essays on the Cultural History of Vienna and Budapest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
17. Michael John and Albert Lichtblau, *Schmelztiegel Wien – einst und jetzt: Geschichte und Gegenwart von Zuwanderung und Minderheiten* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 266–89.
18. An impressive statistical survey on fin-de-siècle migration is presented in Heinz Fassmann, "Immigration in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchie, 1910," in *Roots of the Transplanted*, ed. Dirk Hoerder and Inge Blank (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1:253–310.
19. *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien für das Jahr 1902* (1904), 34–41.
20. Albert Lichtblau and Michael John, "Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernovitz: Two Divergent Examples of Jewish Communities in the Far East of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," in *Jewries at the Frontiers*, ed. Sander L. Gilman and Milton Shain (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 41–57.
21. For the Italian migrants in the most western part of the monarchy, see Robert Sutterlütti, "Italiener in Vorarlberg 1870–1914: Materielle Not und sozialer Widerstand," in *Im Prinzip: Hoffnung. Arbeiterbewegung in Vorarlberg 1870–1946*, ed. Kurt Greussing (Bregenz: Fink, 1984), 133–58.
22. *Österreichische Statistik* vol. 64, pt. 1 (1902): xviii–xix.
23. Emil Brix, "Zur untersteirischen Frage in der Nationalitätenstatistik," in *Als Mitteleuropa zerbrach: Zu den Folgen des Umbruchs in Österreich und Jugoslawien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. Stefan Karner and Gerald Schöpfer (Graz: Leykam, 1990), 119–32.
24. *Ungarische Statistische Mitteilungen, Neue Serie Band 64 (Volkszählung in den Ländern der Ungarischen Heiligen Krone im Jahre 1910), Teil 6* (1924), 150–51. In Transleithanian censuses the respondents could indicate more than one language.
25. *Österreichische Statistik* vol. 64, pt. 1 (1902), 3–25.
26. *Österreichische Statistik* vol. 64, pt. 1 (1902), 4–23; 2 (1905), 2–3.
27. John and Lichtblau, *Schmelztiegel Wien*, 36–37.
28. Norbert Elias and John Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems* (London: Sage, 1994).

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53. Verhandlungen des Salzburger Landtages, 14 October 1913, quoted in Dopsch and Hoffmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Salzburg*, 517.
54. *Rechenschafts-Bericht des Gemeinderathes der Landeshauptstadt Linz über seine Thätigkeit im Jahre 1903* (Linz, 1904), 329.
55. *Rechenschafts-Bericht des Gemeinderathes der Landeshauptstadt Linz über seine Thätigkeit im Jahre 1909* (Linz, 1910), 96.
56. Lothar Höbelt, *Kornblume und Kaiseradler: Die deutschfreiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs 1882–1918* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1993), 66–105.
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59. Heidemarie Uhl, "'Bollwerk deutscher Kultur': Kulturelle Repräsentationen nationaler Politik in Graz um 1900," in *Kultur-Urbanität-Moderne: Differenzierungen der Moderne in Zentraleuropa um 1900*, ed. Heidemarie Uhl (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 1999), 42–43.
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63. Miroslav Hroch, "Das Bürgertum in den nationalen Bewegungen des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ein europäischer Vergleich," in *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich*, ed. Jürgen Kocka (Munich: dtv, 1988), 3:337–59.
64. The new Republik Deutsch-Österreich (German-Austria) was said to lack viability, which gave rise to the wish for annexation to the German Reich. The declaration from 12 November 1918 had never been realized. The alliance of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States forbade any unification of Germany and Austria. The Anschluss was realized in March 1938 when Austria was annexed to Hitler's Germany.

Part II

GLOBAL INTERCONNECTIONS: BLACK ATLANTIC, CHINESE DIASPORA, WHITE EMPIRE

— *Five* —

The Black Atlantic in the Construction of the "Western" World

Alternative Approaches to the "Europeanization" of the Americas

Paul E. Lovejoy

Africans and their descendants were a major factor in the construction of the Atlantic world. As slaves their labor contributed to the extension of the European world in the Americas, and hence Africans were ironically responsible for its "Europeanization." If they did a significant proportion of the physical labor that built the Americas, in what ways did they also shape the ideological and cultural parameters of the so-called "western" world, thereby participating in its "construction"? How one participated in the construction of the "western" world depended upon background, and how one viewed the construct varied accordingly as well. It is in this context that I wish to explore the ways in which the Black Atlantic was involved in the modern world.[1]

The African background has often been overlooked or misrepresented in understanding how the subaltern has struggled against oppression, and the ways in which this struggle was interpreted. The contradiction between slavery and freedom has not just been a theoretical debate in the courts of kings and parliaments. The "African" has been neglected or ignored because of the cultural hegemony of (western, even northwestern) "Europe," despite influences from elsewhere. Analysis has been racialized to privilege the European background at the expense of the "African" contribution in the settlement of the Americas.

This study reconstructs the life of one individual, Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua, who experienced an unusual odyssey in his movement along the slave routes from West Africa to the Americas.[2] The networks that he exploited and the identifications with which he is credited provide insights into the making of the transatlantic world and the ways in which individual Africans adjusted to enslavement and forced, intercontinental migration. Baquaqua's strange journey took him to Canada West in 1854, where he was naturalized and put down in writing his personal history. Despite the unique features of Baquaqua's life, his story is not unusual in that there are other biographical accounts of adult Muslims, all males, in the diaspora. Moreover, Baquaqua's story helps us to understand the fate of those enslaved Muslims in the Americas who converted to Christianity, however nominally or qualified, and illustrates how biography can reveal the range of responses of individuals to enslavement.[3]

Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua: A Profile

Baquaqua was born in the early to mid 1820s in Djougou, a town located in the north of present-day République du Bénin that was an important commercial center and caravan stop in the early nineteenth century. His father and mother were both from successful merchant families; his father came from Nikki, the capital of Borgu, to the east of Djougou, apparently with North African connections, and his mother came from further east, the Hausa city of Katsina, in present day northern Nigeria, and at the time one of the major cities in the Sokoto Caliphate. Both families were Muslim in background, members of the merchant caste known locally as Wangara, and spoke Dendi, a dialect of Songhay, and Hausa, the dominant commercial tongue along the caravan route through Djougou to Gonja and Asante.

Baquaqua was enslaved twice. The first time he was ransomed by his brother, but the second, in approximately 1844 or 1845, he ended up in the hands of merchants who relayed him to the Bight of Benin and the notorious slave port of Ouidah. He was shipped out through a nearby lagoon port to avoid the British anti-slave-trade patrol, and landed outside of Recife in Pernambuco, in northeast Brazil. After two years slaving for a baker in a small town near Recife, he was sold south to Rio de Janeiro, where a ship captain purchased him, employing him as cabin steward. Fortunately for Baquaqua, the captain took on a consignment of coffee for a merchant in New York. When the ship reached New York in late June 1847, Baquaqua jumped ship and was rescued by the Underground Railroad. He traveled first to Boston, and then took a ship to Haiti.[4]

After two years in Port-au-Prince with the American Baptist Free Mission, Baquaqua went to upstate New York where he attended Central College from 1850 to 1853. His sojourn in Canada West (later named Ontario) began with a brief visit in late 1853, and he moved there in early 1854, settling in Chatham, whereupon he filed naturalization papers, and shortly

thereafter published his life story in Detroit. A committed "emigrationist," as those who advocated the repatriation of freed slaves and their descendants to Africa were known, Baquaqua was determined to return to Africa. He longed to visit his mother's home city (Katsina) in the Sokoto Caliphate, where he apparently assumed his mother could be located, but repeated efforts to raise the required finances fell short. He left for Britain in early 1855. For some reason he did not join the Delaney mission to the Niger through Yoruba country in 1859–60, although this would have been a logical expedition to join.[5] At this time, instead, he dropped out of sight in Britain, his fate unknown.

Baquaqua's Networks and Identifications

Although he did not go directly to Canada, nonetheless, in a complex manner, he followed the same route to Canada West as many fugitives from the northern United States. He had safely traveled to the United States only after it was certain that his master had long since returned to Brazil and therefore was not in a position to press charges to reclaim him or otherwise re-enslave him. Technically, nonetheless, he was a fugitive after 1847, even when he returned to New York in late 1849 and subsequently enrolled in Central College in McGrawville. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 also placed him in danger of re-enslavement, even if only through the risk of seizure by an overly zealous bounty hunter. His letters to George Whipple of the Mendi Mission, which had been responsible for the resettlement of the *Amistad* survivors in Sierra Leone and which was looking for additional recruits at the time, suggest that Baquaqua was more interested in returning to Africa than relying on his Free Mission friends.[6] At the same time that he was supposed to be raising funds for a Baptist Free Mission, he was eagerly trying to join the Congregationalist-led Mendi Mission. When he arrived in Chatham and discovered that the Free Mission was not willing to help him raise funds to return to Africa, he turned to Gerrit Smith, abolitionist crusader and politician, who at the time was a congressman from upstate New York. Although Smith was associated with New York Central College and otherwise promoted radical abolitionism, he was not a Baptist, but rather was nondenominational.[7] The desire to return to Africa seems to have outweighed Baquaqua's newly adopted religious convictions, whether that was manifested in his conversion from Islam to Christianity or his shifting loyalties among groups and individuals who might help him return to Africa. Baquaqua's story reveals how individuals fit into different networks and how identifications changed accordingly.

Tracing the routes that individuals used to make their escape raises theoretical issues about networks and diasporas, making a distinction between the two. The Underground Railroad was a network that allowed slaves to escape into the diaspora through *marronage*, that is, the establishment of

fugitive communities through flight.[8] The organized assistance given to fugitives constituted a network that provided individuals with the ability to move, offering the possibility of changing identifications within the diaspora. Although the two concepts overlap, the distinction highlights the place of the individual in diaspora studies. Just when a network constitutes a diaspora is to some extent a question of scale; it is not easy to determine the relative density of diaspora communities for successful maintenance, but it is clear that for diasporas to be effective, they have to be able to facilitate the movement of recognized members within networks. There can be institutional networks that facilitate movement that are not based specifically on ethnicity (although there may be an ethnic dimension). Religious networks like ethnic-based diasporas, too, facilitate communication and community.[9]

Baquaqua was an individual Muslim removed from contact with his community, although his identification with his community of origin is clearly revealed through his story. Separation did not eliminate his identification with Islam, at least in a secular sense (he did after all convert to Christianity and was baptized). His name, however, testifies to his ongoing, personal identity. His first name, the most common male name in Islam, is a variant of Muhammad. His middle name, Gardo, confirms his account that he was born after twins; the name (*gado*) both in Dendi, the language of his father, and in Hausa, the language of his mother, is (and clearly was) the name given to a child born immediately after twins. His last name has not yet been deciphered, but appears to indicate an association with some title, perhaps reflecting his rendition of his status in the court of a village official near his hometown of Djougou, in the interior of the Bight of Benin.[10]

Baquaqua's itinerary establishes him as a migrant, readily associating with the emigrationist movement because he wanted, above all else, according to his own testimony, to return to Africa.[11] In the absence of a diaspora of Muslims with whom he could interact, Baquaqua had to move within the network of abolitionist Christians who rescued him, in the first instance the New York Vigilance Society that spirited him out of the Eldridge Street Jail in lower Manhattan to Boston, helping him reach Haiti, where the American Baptist Free Mission then took him under their guardianship. Besides giving him shelter, the Baptists provided for his education, teaching him English and arranging for him to return to the United States and enroll in Central College. Nonetheless, despite his association with the Free Will Baptists, he tried to join the Congregationalist-led Mendi Mission, which had been founded in Sierra Leone by the survivors of the *Amistad*, which suggests that his religious conviction was perhaps more ecumenical than his Baptist friends might have wished. While there is no evidence that he approached the Liberian advocates or other emigrationists, it is likely that he did so, since in arranging publication of his book, he worked with Moore, a Unitarian, and his printer had previously published other emigrationist tracts and he included in his autobiography a poem by another noted emigrationist, James W. Whitfield.

Hence, Baquaqua's sojourn in Canada was clearly associated with his efforts to return to Africa, and it is in this context that his impressions of Canada West should be viewed. In his own words, he was "induced" to go to Canada because of "a desire to see the manners and customs of the people living under the Government of Queen Victoria, of whom I had heard so much." After remaining a short time, he was "so well pleased with the reception I there met with, I at once determined to become a subject of her Majesty, for which purpose I attended the proper office, gave the oath of allegiance, and procured my papers of naturalization without any difficulty."[12]

Fugitive slaves entering Canada West were usually received by one of a number of organizations that looked after their naturalization, short-term relief, and otherwise assisted in directing individuals to places where they could get land or jobs. Baquaqua almost certainly moved through such circles, traveling across Canada West, visiting a number of communities. His report is impressive:

> I was kindly treated by all classes wherever I went, and must say in my heart I never expected to receive in a nation so distant from my native home, so much kindness, attention and humanity. I am thankful to God that I enjoy the blessings of liberty, in peace and tranquility, and that I am now in a land where "none dare make me afraid," where every man acting as a man, no matter his color, is regarded as a brother, and where all are equally free to do and to say.[13]

Perhaps Baquaqua was only trying to sell his pamphlet; black immigrants were not always well received in Canada West. Nonetheless, Baquaqua's description, considering the events surrounding his departure from upstate New York, suggests that Canada West was relatively speaking a haven.

After arriving in Canada West in February 1854, he undertook to commit his story to writing, with the assistance of Samuel Moore, who apparently wrote down and otherwise edited what Baquaqua had to say. Baquaqua had earlier been on a speaking tour in eastern Pennsylvania to raise money, and he clearly discussed his early life at these meetings. Whether or not he spoke from notes is not known, but certainly he had been thinking about his life history and his African background, answering questions to clarify his points, before working with Moore. The book was published in Detroit in August 1854, through the printing firm of George E. Pomeroy and Co.[14] Although Baquaqua was literate, and at least fifteen of his letters from this period have survived, he apparently did not actually write the biography himself. Nonetheless, he is credited as being the "author" on the title page, and the copyright was taken out in his name in the U.S. District Court for Michigan in 1854 and deposited with the district clerk on 21 August.[15]

Baquaqua apparently wrote his biography in Chatham, where he was living by late May 1854, and where he continued to reside until he left for Britain in early 1855. Although his intention was to return to Africa, he

considered the possibility of living in Canada West, and approached Gerrit Smith with a request for enough money to buy land, probably in neighboring Buxton, a black community which required land ownership as a condition of settlement there. Smith was well known for his philanthropy; he gave land from his vast holdings in upstate New York to over 3,000 poor black and white settlers with abolitionist and reform sympathies (including John Brown). Baquaqua, who had stayed at Smith's home in Peterboro, N.Y., near Syracuse, in 1851, and perhaps on other occasions too, was well aware that Smith might help him, either in obtaining land in Canada West or giving him land in upstate New York, and he also approached Smith for a loan to publish the biography.

Baquaqua makes it clear that being in exile in Canada was essential to the undertaking of the biography. He had felt the strain of racial tensions in upstate New York, and his experiences in Canada West were remarkably different:

> Being thus surrounded by friends, and enabled to enjoy the blessing of peaceful freedom, I came to the conclusion that the time had arrived when I might with propriety commit to paper all that has been recounted in this work, and whenever the day may come that a way may be opened to me of being useful in the regeneration of my own loved country, I shall be ready to say "I come," and God in his infinite wisdom hasten that day, is the constant and fervent prayer of the subscriber, whose sufferings and tortures it is to be hoped have still further opened the ears and hearts of sensibility.[16]

Baquaqua's editor was also of the opinion that Baquaqua would go home if he could, despite his warm reception in Canada West. According to Moore, "Should a call be given him to return once more to the land of his birth, he will cheerfully respond, and is sure friends will not be wanting to aid him in his benevolent purpose."[17]

Who noticed Baquaqua in Canada? Certainly the Baptist Free Mission knew of his existence in Canada West, although Baquaqua complained bitterly that they did little to help him, and indeed he claimed, "The Free Mission did not do right by me at this time."[18] Radical congressman Gerrit Smith knew his whereabouts; they were in correspondence. Moreover, it seems that the Rev. William King at Buxton knew about him and may have taken him to Detroit, introducing him to Pomeroy at the *Detroit Tribune*; both King and Pomeroy were Presbyterians. It is highly likely that most black residents in the bustling town of Chatham, which was a focal point of the Underground Railroad, would have recognized him after he lived there for some time. Perhaps he was not more visible because he was not typical of the black fugitives who came to Canada West, since he had escaped from slavery after having been brought to New York from Brazil, rather than from the slave states. Nor had he long been a resident as a free person in the northern states, as many refugees had been. As Michael Wayne has observed, very little is known about individuals like Baquaqua

who came to Canada from outside North America.[19] Baquaqua's education was perhaps not unusual; there were a number of black students already enrolled in schools in Toronto and elsewhere, even at the college level. Baquaqua had been in the primary department at Central College, not in the college program itself, and there was at least one other African-born student there in the 1851–53 period, a man known as "Senegal," who as his name suggests apparently came from the Senegal region of West Africa and hence was probably a Muslim in origin.[20] There were many black residents in Canada with comparable education, but few had previously been educated in Arabic. Moreover, Baquaqua also spoke Portuguese, Dendi, Hausa, Fon, and perhaps Haitian Creole.[21] We have no idea how many other individuals with such remarkable backgrounds also passed through Canada West.[22]

Baquaqua took advantage of the Underground Railroad network. He traveled as an individual, unconnected with the diaspora of his origins, but was he "creolized"? He learned Portuguese on the slave ship and English while in jail in New York and at an American mission in French-speaking Haiti. He went to college in upstate New York, and dictated/ghostwrote his life story in English, and yet his stated intentions were to return to the home of his mother in Katsina. Was this man "creole" or "African," "Christian" or "Muslim"? No matter how these questions are answered, Baquaqua emerges as a significant figure in Canadian immigration history, as well as many other historical genres.

Baquaqua was one of many people escaping from slavery who passed through Canada but did not remain, the largest number being those who returned to the United States after the Civil War. Nonetheless, in the 1840s and 1850s, the numbers of black settlers steadily increased and constituted a significant portion of the population. Although Baquaqua was not unusual in leaving, many black immigrants remained in Canada, and Baquaqua almost did.[23] The fact that so many stayed in Canada is understudied in terms of our conceptualization of the creolization process. The ethnic background of the fugitive community has not been examined, for example. The international abolitionist network is understudied. How were people moved about? What did people know, and what did they not know, and how was knowledge interpreted?

Baquaqua's travels, and his education, indicate that he described his life in Africa to others, not just to Samuel Moore. We know he told his mentors in Haiti, Rev. and Mrs. Judd, and Mrs. Judd's sister, many details of his early life, and he addressed the annual conventions of the American Baptist Free Mission, and traveled through eastern Pennsylvania, lecturing to audiences at sympathetic Baptist churches. What did he say about Haiti and Brazil to other people, particularly to those of African descent? At Central College, he was a student at the same time as the sons of the important Philadelphia black families of Purvis and Forten.[24] While he was at Central College, Frederick Douglass gave a series of seminars, and it is highly likely that he engaged with Baquaqua, who was only one of ten

black students there.[25] The contact is based on circumstantial evidence, but the connections among abolitionists, especially in upstate New York, were close. Vigilance groups in Rochester, Syracuse, Utica, and the many small towns of the Finger Lakes region, where McGrawville and Central College were located, kept in touch with each other.[26] From his surviving correspondence, we know that Baquaqua stayed in Syracuse and also in New Berlin, near Utica.[27] He also visited Brooklyn, and he may well have stopped in Rochester on his way to Canada West.

Baquaqua's association with William G. Allen also suggests that he remained in contact with a relatively small number of abolitionists. Allen was a professor at Central College while Baquaqua was a student, the second black professor at the College (Charles Louis Reason being the first), but he fell in love with a white student, Mary King, the daughter of an abolitionist minister from Fulton (near Syracuse). When Allen visited Mary at her home, the racism of upstate New York revealed its ugly self. Allen had to flee, via refuge in Syracuse while he arranged things with his sweetheart, whom he subsequently married in New York City before moving to England. Both Allen and his wife became speakers on the abolitionist circuit, especially in Ireland.[28]

The Allen/King saga directly affected Baquaqua, who was also involved, although perhaps less romantically so, with the daughter of another white abolitionist minister. In 1853, Baquaqua was living in Freetown Corners, a few miles south of McGrawville, where he was apparently being tutored and may also have been farming on land that he had leased. The mother of the girl, who is otherwise not named, forced a break when it was rumored that Baquaqua and her daughter intended to marry. His correspondence reveals that he had to break off this friendship; undoubtedly, the Allen/King scandal infected the situation, and indeed he stayed indoors to avoid racist threats. When Baquaqua left Freetown Corners and McGrawville in late January 1854 for Canada West, his stated intention was to return to Africa. He was no longer exclusively tied to the Baptist Free Mission, and since the summer of 1853, at least, he had been in correspondence with Whipple and the Mendi Mission to Sierra Leone. For unknown reasons, Baquaqua was not accepted, perhaps for sectarian reasons. His letters reveal despair in his failure to be accepted as a candidate for missionary work.[29] The Baptist Free Mission seems to have lost interest in him thereafter, although he again applied for assistance in 1857, but to no avail.[30]

Marginality, Creolization, and the African Background

The purpose of concentrating on one person is to indicate that marginality is relative, depending upon perspective. I want to shift the focus from an assumption that the political expansion of European empires into the Americas, and the settlement of populations, both white and black, resulted in the extension of a "Europeanized" or "western" worldview

without ongoing linkages and influences from Africa. My intention is also to challenge many of the interpretations of the process of adaptation of the enslaved to their bondage, and specifically the ways in which the emergence of a "creole" culture marginalized the African background. Often the term "creole" is used to describe the hybrid cultures of the Americas, emphasizing the distinction between those born in the Americas and those born in the Old World, whether in Europe or in Africa. In slave studies, the generation born in the Americas is usually referred to as creole, whether white, black, or mulatto (whose mixed ancestry meant that they were born in the Americas). Obviously, the term has ambiguous and complementary applications as used by linguists, anthropologists or historians. The Portuguese-speaking community that evolved around the Atlantic in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has also been referred to as creole, whether or not people were born in the Americas. Moreover, the term takes on specific linguistic meaning in Haiti; the patois known as Creole is a dialect of French. Hence, the term has a generic linguistic meaning as well as designating a specific language, and in West Africa the term is even used for an ethnic group (Krio) whose corporate identity arose in the context of the slave trade. In North America, the term can be equated with the use of "American" in many contexts where the cultural and social features are attributed with the innovation arising from the transatlantic setting. These various (even conflicting) uses of "creole" and related terms raise issues about the ways in which the enslaved were able to find means of accommodation that guaranteed the relative autonomy of communities and assured independent cultural expression. And the conflicting uses of creole and similar terms also raises questions about the expectations of those born in Africa and how personal experiences shaped reactions to the oppressive conditions of slave society in the Americas.

The emphasis on agency draws attention to the communities of slaves that somehow forged new, collective identities that were based on African origins and in some cases ongoing links with the homeland, even under slavery. The focus on community and collectivity neglects individuals like Baquaqua, however, who were divorced from community, at least the community of the enslaved. Baquaqua moved as an individual within an abolitionist network and never successfully established connections with other people from his home, or any of his kin. Nonetheless, it is argued here that his isolation from his country people did not destroy his memories of his past nor those of the community from which he came. However, without children and isolated from Muslim society, the only way he could transmit this tradition was through his biography. In his name and his personal history, he asserted a strong attachment with Africa that was not reinforced by a supporting community of shared memory or ethnic allegiance. His story reveals the contradiction between the adaptation required by slavery on the one hand, and the effort to escape from slavery on the other. The continued identity with a broader community, as evidenced by the retention of

his Muslim name, reveals resistance to accommodation, even though he converted to Christianity to make good his escape.

The important distinction between African-born slaves and those born in the Americas is widely recognized in the study of slavery; the analogy between the American-born "creole" generations associated with slavery and the second generation of other immigrant populations is clear. Whether coerced or not, the timing and extent of immigration affected the rate and direction of adaptation and the pace with which cultural retentions were modified or dissipated. The extent to which Africans of similar background were concentrated sufficiently to allow the emergence of ethnic communities also varied widely, just as with later European migration, despite the extreme coercion that Africans experienced. Continued immigration from the same areas often reinforced cultural and linguistic continuities, but later immigration from other parts of Africa sometimes overwhelmed earlier concentrations. When regions entered the slave system or became havens for those escaping from slavery also varied considerably, as did the timing of the abolition of the slave trade and the emancipation of slaves.[31] Nonetheless, the distinction between first and second generations still marked a fundamental division within the slave population, especially in situations where new arrivals were sufficiently numerous to reinforce earlier concentrations.

Edward Brathwaite describes the "creole" world of Jamaica as resting on a dominant European culture and a subordinate African culture, but with the two in dynamic interaction.[32] For Sidney Mintz and Richard Price, whose anthropology has had an important influence on slave studies, the "creole" world of the Americas was innovative and adaptive, thereby transforming the meaning of "creole" from simply meaning "born in the Americas" to cultural regeneration, explicitly including people of African descent and their important cultural influence.[33] Even this usage has been challenged in several ways. Ira Berlin has demonstrated that the early transatlantic world was characterized by similar communities all around the Atlantic, and hence has referred to these as "Atlantic creole" whether or not people were born in the Americas.[34] In challenging the concept, Maureen Warner-Lewis has even gone so far as to suggest that the term "creole" is not Portuguese in origin, as previously thought, but in fact is derived from a Kikongo word.[35]

Africans and their descendants had an early and continuous presence around the broader Atlantic rim, centered on ports, as well as in specific plantation areas or mining zones. Africans were involved in virtually every military expedition, frequently were crew on ships, and otherwise were fully represented in the multiethnic, mixed population around the Atlantic.[36] Recent research has revealed a wealth of documentation for the reconstruction of this history. From a data set of over 27,000 slaving voyages, the demographic structures of the slave trade can be determined with considerable accuracy with respect to where slaves came from and where they went, and the numbers involved.[37] We now have a reasonably

clear understanding of the regional and temporal variations in the gender, age, and sometimes the ethnic and religious composition of the transported enslaved population. As a result, the demographic study of the transatlantic slave trade is probably as advanced as any comparable area of migration studies. More difficult to trace is the movement of enslaved Africans to various destinations in the Americas. Moreover, there was a secondary dispersion of Africans throughout the Americas related to escape from slavery. The relative ease of flight in many areas led to the formation of cimarrón and maroon communities. In this context the Underground Railroad is a variation on a common theme, and Upper Canada, and especially Canada West, was central to the black experience in the Americas during the period that it served as a sanctuary.[38]

The statistical overview provided by demographic study can be supplemented with biographical accounts of the enslaved, such as that of Baquaqua.[39] Biography offers the possibility of collecting details for a study of the connections between the African homeland and the diaspora; relatively few scholars have used such material for that purpose. With few exceptions, however, biographical accounts have not been situated within the demography of the slave trade, thereby limiting the analysis of African influences. Biographies, in combination with the demographic data, make possible a paradigm shift in the study of the Black Atlantic by following enslaved Africans along the slave routes to the Americas; the view of the transatlantic world looks outward from Africa, that is, from the perspective of the enslaved. In Djougou, if much less so in Ontario, this man's life story has taken on new meaning.

Such a realigning of vision suggests that the opposition between "freedom" and "slavery," "European" and "African," "white" and "black" should be reconsidered with respect to possible African influence in the Americas and the significance for understanding the political history of West Africa.[40] The change in perspective reconfigures the European-controlled North Atlantic onto a geopolitical map centered in Africa. Or as Jane Landers and others have demonstrated, such an approach would also explore the interaction among Africans and Amerindians.[41] From such a perspective, for example, late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Canada would appear as a bastion of "maroon" history, sheltering a native son of Djougou.[42]

There are alternate approaches to the study of the transatlantic world of the modern era that highlight the role of Africans in shaping the cultures of the Americas. Specific examples can be highlighted to establish that African history extended into the Americas in ways that earlier conceptual frameworks have not allowed. As many studies of slavery in the Americas have recognized, the African background was important in the shaping of slave society in the Americas, and the legacy of black culture in music, art, and language is widely evident, also apparent in religion and cuisine.[43] Nonetheless, there has been a general failure to recognize the varying layers of influence revealed over the generations.

The tendency in historical analysis is one that seems to telescope history, reading backwards from the present, an interpretation viewing African influence as being largely dissipated over the centuries, one channeled through the restorationist claims of later generations, largely divorced from any contact with the African continent. I would contend that traditional scholarship has often perceived the evolution of North America as an extension of European colonization and culture, with minimal African impact, because there has been a failure to recognize the demographics of emigration to the Americas from the Old World, including both Europe and Africa.

The demographics show clearly that transatlantic migration was largely African until the abolition of the slave trade. By 1760, just under 6.5 million people had left Europe and Africa for the Americas; approximately two-thirds of these immigrants were Africans, and the proportion of Africans in the migrating population was steadily increasing.[44] For the eighteenth century, the percentage rose to three-quarters of all transatlantic migrants. Africans continued to arrive in very large numbers well into the nineteenth century, but after the revolution in St. Domingue and particularly after the abolition of the slave trade to British territories and the United States in 1807, the forced migration of Africans was increasingly concentrated in Brazil and the Spanish Caribbean. Nonetheless, as late as the early nineteenth century, relatively few Europeans were crossing the Atlantic in comparison with Africans, and while there were places where there were more whites than blacks, such as the Canadas, the number of people on such frontiers were relatively small. And even in such places, there were almost always blacks as well.[45]

Afrocentric scholarship shifts the perspective. One does not have to make fanciful claims of African influence, although this has been done. Amateur and politically motivated studies have asserted that "Ohio" is a corruption of "Oyo," in an attempt to prove that Amerindians of the Great Lakes region were Yoruba. Whether or not such claims are simply dismissed for want of evidence, and common sense dictates that such evidence does not exist, there are still legitimate claims to important and ongoing links across the Atlantic, both during the days of slavery and continuing after. Hence, the questions remain: What impact did Africans have on the emergence of the transatlantic world, and therefore to what extent is the history of the Americas also an extension of "African" history? More specifically, in what ways has the African diaspora had an impact on Canadian history?

A view of modern developments situated in Africa provides an alternative perspective on the evolution of the racialized transatlantic societies that have characterized the modern period and have often been considered an extension of "European" history. This alternative perspective assesses the influence of Africa in all parts of the Americas, not only in urban settings, the plantation sector and mining, but also along the frontiers of European settlement and control. For this reason, frontier

regions are particularly important to study, because it is in these places that fugitive slaves established communities or otherwise lost themselves in a bid to remain free, even in places where they were not treated well or not always welcome. These communities existed on all the frontiers of European-controlled territory.

The Black Atlantic was the subaltern Atlantic, the flip side of the frontier of opportunity for Europeans, even allowing for gender discrimination, the strain of indebtedness, and religious persecution that prompted many Europeans to emigrate. Africans did not generally contribute to the development of the Americas of their own will; their enslavement reflected the institutionalization of caste based on racial hierarchy. The treatment of black women reflected a peculiarly distorted vision of transplanted European society. Women were generally scarce among immigrant populations in the Americas, whether white or black, but white women were particularly rare. Black women mothered the "European" colonies of the Americas to a far greater extent than has been recognized because of the racialization of attitudes and perspectives. Simply, black women were far more numerous than white women in most so-called "European" colonies until the nineteenth century.[46] Relationships involving women, and attitudes toward such relationships, changed with the demography of creolization, as Hilary Beckles has shown.[47] Hence, the population descended from immigrants tended to become "darker," not more "European," a trend that was only reversed with the massive immigration of people from Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the reinforcement of racial endogamy.

Of course, many Europeans also came to the Americas under coercive conditions, persecuted individuals as well as various minorities, thereby revealing the extent to which the transatlantic world was one of relative depredation, relying on various means of coercion, to shape development and maintain European hegemonic influence as well as political control. A focus on the subaltern, however, raises questions about alternate perspectives that open to view autonomous paths outside the dominant paradigms. This focus concentrates on memory and the selective use of history. By following Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua to Canada West in the 1850s, I hope to challenge some of the myths of how national consciousness comes about, especially by identifying what seems to have been forgotten. My intention is to suggest that the detailed study of individuals can reveal the ways in which information flows and therefore uncover what may have been known at the time within the northern U.S. black community. Baquaqua's presence in North American abolitionist circles has been virtually overlooked, although it is now clear that he was well known among Baptist abolitionists, both through the pages of the *Christian Contributor and Free Mission* and *The American Baptist*, as well as from his various addresses to Baptist Free Mission conventions (in Utica, N.Y., in June 1850, and annual meetings in 1852 and 1853) and his speaking tours in eastern Pennsylvania and upstate New York in 1853.

Maroons and Black Refugees in Canadian History

In Canadian history, the term "maroon" is usually used to designate the resettled population from Jamaica after the last Maroon War of 1795 and therefore is not used in a generic sense to indicate communities of escaped slaves and black refugees, as the term was in fact used in Jamaica and elsewhere. In the Canadian context, the term took on a distinctive, almost ethnic meaning, and denoted those who were taken to Nova Scotia from Jamaica in 1795 and other black refugees from the newly independent United States who had retreated to Nova Scotia with the evacuation of British troops in the 1780s.[48] The refugee community in Canada West (later Ontario) has seldom been referred to as a "maroon" community, and hence the fugitive settlers who followed the Underground Railroad from the United States have not been included in the general study of marronage (maroon/cimarrón/quilombo).[49] Nonetheless, the communities of fugitive slaves and freed blacks who chose to move to Canada West, especially after the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, can be considered as "maroon" communities.[50] Settlement names reflect the conscious identification with freedom: Buxton and Dawn being prominent communities in Canada West. Like the cimarrón communities that dotted the Spanish domains of the circum-Caribbean, from Florida to Neuva Granada (Colombia), Canada West was also on the frontier for those blacks who wanted to escape slave-based society.

An examination of any part of the Americas, whether Brazil or Canada, establishes the importance of African settlement in the shaping of the modern state, although of course not for the same reasons. Canada, like Spanish Florida, was a place of refuge for escaped slaves, not a primary area of slave economy. Very few slaves were brought to Canadian territory.[51] Brazil, by contrast, received more enslaved Africans than all of the Caribbean and North America combined, and some of the largest fugitive slave communities were to be found there.[52] Baquaqua traveled through these different worlds, and he expressed himself in no uncertain terms about what he thought about these different places and the people he encountered. His story highlights a period in the history of Ontario when Canada West was a major sanctuary for fugitive slaves and free(d) blacks who feared the Fugitive Slave Laws of the United States. As Herbert Aptheker demonstrated in 1939, resistance was fundamental to the slave condition, and for many persecuted African Americans, British territory north of the border was an option. Flight was frequently the easiest resort in seeking amelioration of unbearable conditions.[53]

In the 1840s and 1850s, Canada West was the site of some of the most important maroon settlements in the history of resistance to slavery. In his collection of narratives of fugitive slaves published in 1854, Benjamin Drew estimated that there were 30,000 blacks in Canada West by that date.[54] According to Robin Winks, the number of people of African descent in Canada West by 1860 was about 40,000, three-quarters of whom came via the Underground Railroad or were descended from those who

did.[55] They were scattered throughout the territory, as Michael Wayne has demonstrated. According to the 1861 manuscript census of Canada West, "Blacks appear in a total of 312 townships and city wards in the schedules, representing every county and city of the province and the Algoma district."[56] In 1861, there were over 1,250 blacks in Chatham, including nearby North Buxton, and over 1,300 in Elgin and other parts of Raleigh township. Moreover many of these refugees from U.S. slavery and persecution remained in Canada, choosing a permanent life of "marronage."[57]

The patterns of escape from slavery and racial persecution in the United States and elsewhere in the Americas reveal cultural interaction and change. As Jane Landers has argued, it might be more appropriate to consider maroon communities in the forefront of "creolization" in the sense that cultural amalgamation and creativity in response to oppression were dominant features of maroon survival.[58] The experience in Canada West conforms to this model. The fugitives who reached the land of the "North Star," as Canada was often referred to by blacks in the United States because they followed the North Star to guide them in escaping, had a stronger commitment to remaining in their new homes than chancing further migration. There was a nativist movement and what might be labeled an earlier "search for a homeland" for the survival and regeneration of a persecuted population. For black refugees, the options were Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Britain, or various frontiers in the Americas. Others proposed the establishment of independent republics elsewhere in Africa. Canada West, for some, was a final destination, but for others like Baquaqua it was only a stopping point on an indeterminate journey.[59]

Emigration, as opposed to adaptation and assimilation ("creolization" in other contexts), was an option that had some support among free blacks, but it was a minority position that reached its peak in the decade or so before the U.S. Civil War (1860–65). There were various levels of commitment to the idea of returning to the "homeland" or some other perceived sanctuary where blacks were politically in control. Even then, however, the perception only extended to "westernized" black enclaves, whether it was republican/imperial Haiti or colonized Liberia and Sierra Leone. In many accounts, Canada appears to be a refuge of convenience, especially in the minds of mid-nineteenth-century abolitionist black intellectuals.[60] Like Spanish Florida before 1820, proximity to freedom was the attraction, but the place itself was not really seen to be attractive. By the 1850s, although black settlers were considered to be industrious, available jobs were widely scattered in Upper Canada, so many refugees did not have easy access to land or work in particular places.[61]

Black Refugees, Anti-Slavery, and Canadian Identity

In the history of Canada, the presence of Baquaqua, however briefly, raises interesting questions. What role did the presence of black refugees

play in the development of a self-conscious anti-Americanism in Canada? The debate over whether people of African descent should be accepted or not was part of the construction of Canadian identity and the tradition in Canada of accepting refugees, buttressed by distrust and disrespect of things "American." The willingness to accept fugitives and the connection with the abolition movement represents an early preoccupation with human rights, as long as such a quest was tied to anti-Americanism.

Baquaqua's account is also a contribution, although thoroughly unrecognized, to the literary history of Upper Canada in the nineteenth century. Baquaqua composed his life history while he was living in Chatham, although this has not previously been known. While the American Baptist Free Mission in Canada West failed to provide him with the support he needed, he was able to draw on other assistance, notably that of Gerrit Smith, and apparently in this manner was able to make the connections that allowed him to publish the pamphlet in Detroit.[62] Because the biography establishes Baquaqua as a "Canadian" author, it is important to analyze how the biography fit into the genre of Canadian abolitionist literature.

Abolitionist writing on the refugee community in Canada West was a well-developed genre by 1854. Benjamin Drew had been collecting slave narratives since 1852, publishing a portion in his 387-page collection, *A North-Side View of Slavery. The Refugee: or the Narratives of Fugitive Slaves in Canada, Related by Themselves, with an Account of the History and Condition of the Colored Population of Upper Canada*, in Boston in 1856. The collection included 105 accounts. According to Drew:

> The narratives were gathered promiscuously from persons whom the author met with in the course of a tour through the cities and settlements of Canada West. While his informants talked, the author wrote: nor are there in the whole volume a dozen verbal alterations which were not made at the moment of writing, while in haste to make the pen become a tongue for the dumb.[63]

Drew collected many more narratives, although where these are now located is not clear.[64] Moore's methodology in recording Baquaqua's life, which he claims was "written and revised from his [Baquaqua's] own words" differs from the one that Drew claimed to employ. While Drew may or may not have actually revised his texts, the hand of Moore is frequently visible in Baquaqua's account. Certainly it was generally known among abolitionists that autobiographical accounts were being collected to demonstrate the horrors of slavery. Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was based on such biographical accounts, and she modeled her characters on people who had moved to Canada, Uncle Tom being partly based on the experiences of Josiah Henson, the leader of the fugitive community at Dawn (Dresden), north of Chatham in Canada West, as well as several students at Central College whom Baquaqua likely knew.[65] While Baquaqua's account is not unusual, therefore, it is unusual in that it appears not to have become widely known outside of the Baptist Free Mission network.

Biographical material on fugitive slaves was popularized through *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, and there were other fictional accounts of slavery that further built on the connection with Canada West. The point is that, despite the disregard of Baquaqua's text, the literary and cultural history of slavery is a Canadian phenomenon as much as anything. The refugee community and abolitionist sympathies had important influences on the early development of literate culture in Canada West.

Canada West was a maroon setting unlike any other in the history of slavery, resulting in an outpouring of literary expression and political action. The various biographies and autobiographies, as well as the fiction, speak of grief and liberation in great detail, providing textual proof of an ongoing African influence. Baquaqua's narrative had no apparent influence on the struggle to end slavery, but together with other texts, the voices and thoughts of the time have been recorded. They constitute a genre that connects Canada West with the abolitionist movement and an extensive literature. The convergence of the Black Atlantic and Canada West has meaning that previously has been under-recognized.[66] Upper Canada, a frontier region in the 1840s and 1850s, evinced strong abolitionist sentiments that had international significance that is not always recognized in the study of Canadian history. Baquaqua's narrative does not fit neatly into the Canadian literary canon; it is as if the views of black refugees were not important at the time and are not important now.[67]

Africans and the Shaping of the Americas

Biographies of Africans who were caught up in transatlantic slavery reveal the tension between the individual need to survive under racialized slavery and the quest for broader, social identity. The individual account provides a corrective for generalized views of the slave experience. The individual is always in some ways deviant from the pattern, that is, a statistical collection of individuals. Hence, deviance can bring the trend into focus, and also demonstrates that slaves as individuals had to cope with a system in which they theoretically had virtually no rights and were subjected to the arbitrary rule of another individual, who inevitably also was unique. Those who escaped this destructive interdependence between master and slave revealed innumerable ways to reassert their identities, often collectively. The experience of individual "maroons" who remained largely aloof from black communities is a subject that deserves much more attention.

Africans and their descendants, whether slave or free, emerge from the biographical record as historical figures whose patterns of migration and dispersal share certain similarities with other immigrant populations, as well as the important differences associated with the unprivileged African past. The enslaved wanted to escape their bondage, not contribute to the maintenance of a slave system in which they could have no stake, except at great personal cost and a lot of luck.

Both Europeans and Africans crossed the Atlantic under specific historical circumstances that affected settlement patterns in the Americas, and both Europeans and Africans formed diasporas with recognizable homelands. However, a racial division increasingly scarred the reinterpretation of ethnicity in the settlements of the Americas. Dispersed communities were able to maintain connections with their transatlantic roots, but in the case of Africa, contact was usually infrequent and often lacking entirely. However, it should not be assumed that there was no contact between enslaved Africans in the Americas and their homelands. Examples of redeemed pawns, displaced royalty, students of African merchants and officials, and black crew who traveled between different parts of the Americas and Africa have often been neglected, but nonetheless exist.[68] The absence of research on the impact of this intermittent communication between Africa and the Americas (the "colonization" of the Americas by Africans) stands in sharp contrast to the detailed studies of relations between Europe and its colonial world.

Ethnicity reflected the historical backgrounds of communities in the Americas, which for black residents were reinterpreted through the lens of slavery. In any one part of the Americas there were no more than a few key ethnic groups among the slave population, while for the Americas as a whole, there were probably fewer than a dozen key groupings.[69] In some places, more than one African language survived the Atlantic crossing, although often only one African language predominated. This relatively small number of languages and ethnic identities reveals that people were concentrated in recognizable communities. Slavery shaped the African migration, inserting ethnic identity into racial distinctions that emerged as the principal means of social control. The African migration shaped the "creole" societies of the Americas through ethnic patterns as well as interracial sexual and familial relationships that prevailed as a result of the heavily male migration of Western Europeans and the relatively high ratios of black and mulatto women in the general population.

Despite intermittent contact, the cultural and historical identification of Africans, like Europeans, with their homelands rested as much on communal memory as ongoing contact, and hence was tied to the forms and content of religion, the rhythm of daily life and leisure activities, and the languages of communication. The cultural and psychological theater of slavery brought into contact many different ideas and innovations, from different technologies to divergent belief systems. Boundaries were crossed in the technical, metaphysical, and cultural spheres, even as ethnic and racial barriers were being constructed and defended. Yet individual slaves, and indeed free blacks and mulattoes, were often isolated from communities, and frequently had to live in surroundings that required major adjustments and that could prevent public expression of cultural autonomy. Under such circumstances, it may seem surprising that cultural and religious identities could survive at all, let alone sometimes be so strong. How boundaries were crossed and what and who crossed them were

shaped by racial stereotypes and the categorizations of legitimacy that varied widely.

Africans were not like the later generations of European immigrants in the Americas, of course. The coercive bonds of slavery denied access to political power, imposed a caste structure that allowed a small portion of the European population to monopolize political and economic power, and instead promoted a mixed caste, truly "creole," as mediators of the contradictions of racialized society. Even when blacks were free, racial discrimination imposed caste barriers limiting their upward mobility, no matter the amount of African background. The racialized elites of the Americas often excluded individuals of African ancestry from access to political power and hence much of the wealth and opportunities of the Americas. Clearly, therefore, African immigration influenced the Americas in ways reflecting hegemonic forms.

The settlement of the Americas involved the construction of diasporas, whether of European or African origin; ethnicity characterized the transatlantic world. The overlapping identities of political nation, common language, and pan-ethnic unions demonstrate the complexities which people in the Atlantic world seem to have recognized as layers of self and group identification. Members of deviant Christian sects, Jewish refugees, and displaced Muslims formed their own networks of social relationships and interconnected communities of settlement, often in diaspora. Despite the racialized barriers isolating blacks, enslaved Africans were clearly involved in shaping their own refugee communities wherever sufficient concentrations of populations of common background were to be found. Enslaved Africans tended to be taken to areas of economic development, moving into regions in boom periods and being taken elsewhere in periods of stagnation and inability to purchase slaves in the face of local demand. In some ways, European dissenters and deviants were forced to follow parallel migrations that were determined by patterns of development. The effective differences between relative freedom of emigration for Europeans and the coercion of slavery for Africans often meant primarily that the concentrations of people of similar backgrounds were to be found in different places.

The African diaspora was coterminous with European domination throughout the Americas. Black settlements constituted a series of dispersed communities that were able to sustain an autonomous existence only against enormous odds, but they still retained some cultural distinctiveness. Identification with others of similar background (however defined) in the diaspora gave a semblance of continuity with the homeland, in contrast to the experiences of isolated individuals who were cut off from both homeland and diaspora. The ethnic categories that were prevalent in slave America demonstrate that many enslaved Africans found ways of establishing communities based on continuities in ethnic and religious affiliations that had been formed in Africa and continued to exist, develop, and change—although under slavery in the Americas earlier affiliations were of

course reshaped and redefined, not only by slavery but also by the struggle to end slavery. Many people could not retain links with a community that traced its origins to Africa, and such isolated individuals had to find other ways of coping with the conditions of slavery. Baquaqua was one such individual, although in his case, he demonstrates that individuals could retain links in isolation through memory and the use of cultural markers that carried the African context to the grave.

From an Africanist perspective, the Black Atlantic played an integral role in the drama of the modern world, not only because the slave trade stripped Africa of many of its sons and daughters but also because the continuing interaction with the emergent Atlantic world was central to the development of western Africa itself. By focusing on the perspective of the enslaved, Afrocentricity challenges the racialized views of a hegemonic "European" culture. Inspired by Asante and Gilroy, the historical approach to the Black Atlantic situates settlement patterns and cultural amalgamation in context.[70] Western Africa, like the rest of the Atlantic basin, experienced several hundred years of interaction that was crucial in defining modernity.

Notes

1. The research for this essay was funded under a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, under its Major Collaborative Research Initiative, and the Canada Research Chair in African Diaspora History at York University. The study is part of a larger project on the biography of Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua which has been undertaken with Robin Law; see *The Biography of Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua: His Passage from Slavery to Freedom in Africa and America* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2001). I wish to thank Cheryl I. LeMaitre, Thor Burnham, and José Cairus for their assistance in searching newspapers, archives, and other sources.
2. Baquaqua's story was originally published as Samuel Moore, *An Interesting Narrative: Biography of Mahommah G. Baquaqua, A Native of Zoogoo, the Interior of West Africa (A Convert to Christianity,) with a Description of that Part of the World* (Detroit: Geo. E. Pomeroy and Co., 1854), and has been reprinted in Allan D. Austin, *African Muslims in Antebellum America: A Sourcebook* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984), including excerpts from A.T. Foss and E. Mathews, *Facts for Baptist Churches* (Utica: American Baptist Free Mission Society, 1850).
3. For other accounts of enslaved Muslims, see Austin, *African Muslims in Antebellum America: A Sourcebook;* Philip Curtin, ed., *Africa Remembered: Narratives by West Africans from the Era of the Slave Trade* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); Carl Campbell, "John Mohammed Bath and the Free Mandingos in Trinidad: The Question of Their Repatriation to Africa 1831–38," *Journal of African Studies* (1975–76): 467–92; Paul E. Lovejoy, "Jihad e Escravidao: As Origens dos Escravos Muculmanos de Bahia," *Topoi* 1 (2000): 11–44; Sylviane A. Diouf, *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas* (New York: New York University Press, 1998); and Michael Gomez, *Exchanging Our Country Marks: The Transformation of African Identities in the Colonial and Antebellum South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 59–87.

4. See Robin Law and Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Interesting Narrative of Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua," introduction to Law and Lovejoy, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 1–84. Also see Paul E. Lovejoy, "Identity and the Mirage of Ethnicity: Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua's Journey to the Americas," in *Confronting Social Issues of the African Diaspora*, ed. Jay B. Haviser (London: Routledge, 2003).
5. African-American Martin Delaney was one of the key proponents of emigration in the United States, and a close associate of James Whitfield, one of whose poems is included in Baquaqua's narrative. For the Niger River expedition of 1859, see Martin Delaney, *Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party* (Leeds, 1861).
6. The letters are reproduced in Law and Lovejoy, *Biography of Baquaqua*, Appendix 3.
7. For Gerrit Smith and his role in the abolition movement, see E.P. Tanner, "Gerrit Smith: An Interpretation" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the New York State Historical Society, Lake Placid, N.Y., 1923), 22–37; and Ralph Volney Harlow, *Gerrit Smith, Philanthropist and Reformer* (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1939). Also see Robin Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 179–80, 254. For Baquaqua's relationship with Smith, see Law and Lovejoy, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 6–8, 15, 54, 57, 58, 62–64, 247, 250.
8. Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, 114–232. Also see C. Peter Ripley et al., eds., *The Black Abolitionist Papers,* vol. 2, *Canada, 1830–1865* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); and William Still, *The Underground Railroad* (Chicago: Johnson Publishing, 1970 [Philadelphia, 1872]).
9. James Oliver Horton and Louis E. Horton, *In Hope of Liberty: Culture, Community and Protest among Northern Free Blacks, 1700–1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Jason H. Silverman, "Mary Ann Shadd and the Search for Equality," in *A Nation of Immigrants: Women, Workers, and Communities in Canadian History, 1840s–1960s*, ed. Franca Iacovetta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 101–14.
10. Law and Lovejoy, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 25, 33–34.
11. For a discussion of the movement, see Howard H. Bell, "The Negro Emigration Movement, 1849–1854: A Phase of Negro Nationalism," *Phylon* 20 (1959): 132–42.
12. Moore, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 64.
13. Ibid., 65.
14. George Eltweed Pomeroy, b. 16 September 1807, in 1841 founded an express company between Albany and Buffalo, New York, which eventually became Wells Fargo, selling out to his brother in 1844. He then founded the *Detroit Tribune*, residing in a palatial home in Clifton, Michigan, to the west of Detroit. In later years, he lived in Toledo, Ohio, where he died on 12 January 1886; see Albert A. Pomeroy, *Genealogy of the Pomeroy Family* (Toledo, Ohio, 1912), 453–54; and Friend Palmer, *Early Days in Detroit* (Detroit, 1906), 194–97.
15. I wish to thank Silvia Lara for giving me a copy of the cover of the biography in the Detroit Public Library, which bears the handwritten note of the district clerk.
16. Moore, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 65.
17. Ibid.
18. Baquaqua to Gerrit Smith, 25 May 1854, Gerrit Smith Papers, Syracuse University Library, Syracuse, N.Y.
19. According to Wayne ("Black Population of Canada West," 81n), "we know next to nothing about the relatively small number of blacks who came from outside North America." Whether Wayne would consider Baquaqua, who moved to Canada from upstate New York, someone from "outside North America" is unclear.
20. Law and Lovejoy, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 57. John Lagrow, from Senegambia, with whom Baquaqua roomed for a time in 1852, joined the College in 1852. His place of residence is given as "Senegambia, Africa" in the *Catalogue of the Officers & Students* for 1852/53. He is said to have come from Africa two years earlier "as a cabin boy on a vessel"; he had lived the previous year with a family at Augusta, Maine, but had then been taken by J.E. Ambrose to Utica and then to Syracuse in New York, where Gerrit Smith, the principal benefactor of Central College, "manifested a very deep interest in his welfare" and paid for his fare to McGrawville: letter of J.E. Ambrose to W. Walker, 27 July

1852, in *The American Baptist*, 5 August 1852. In a letter to Ambrose dated 17 July 1852, in *The American Baptist*, Lagrow wrote, "I wish to inform you that I am well, and well pleased with my school and place. I am boarding with Mr. Briggs on the College farm, and at work for him the most of the time that I labor. I think I am doing well in my studies, and think we have very good teachers, and I feel glad that I came here. I room with Mahommah, and find him a very pleasant companion."

21. Baquaqua spoke Dendi (a dialect of Songhai), the language of the commercial community of Djougou, and Hausa, the language of his mother and also the trade language of the interior where Djougou is located. According to his own account, he learned some Fon while in Dahomey, and he began to learn Portuguese crossing the Atlantic to slavery in Brazil. He had trouble with the Creole of Haiti in 1847, which is why he first worked for a black émigré from the United States and then attached himself to the American Baptist Free Mission in Port-au-Prince, which provided him with the connection to reach Central College in upstate New York. See Lovejoy and Law, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 47–54.
22. Winks (*Blacks in Canada*) does not mention the book or the fact that Baquaqua was in Canada West. To the best of my knowledge, no Canadian historian has noticed Baquaqua. He has been described in various studies of slavery in the United States and Brazil, however. In addition to Austin, *African Muslims: Sourcebook*, see Graham Russell Hodges, *Root and Branch: African Americans in New York and East Jersey, 1613–1863* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 247; Allen Austin, *African Muslims in Antebellum America: Transatlantic Stories and Spiritual Struggles* (New York: Routledge, 1997); and Diouf, *Servants of Allah*, 42–45, 53, 203. Gomez (*Exchanging Our Country Marks*) does not mention Baquaqua because he ends his study in 1830 but otherwise provides a useful overview of Muslims in North America. For Baquaqua in Brazil, see Silvia Lara, "Biografia de Mahommah G. Baquaqua," *Revista Brasileira de História—São Paulo* 16 (1988): 269–84; Robert Krueger, *Biografia e narrativa do ex-excravo afro-brasileiro* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasilia, 1997); and Mary Karasch, *Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1850* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
23. Baquaqua wrote to Smith: "I should like to get a peace [piece] of land, but I have nothing to begin with. I should be very happy to have you give me advice. If you can help me if you will puy [buy] me a land in Canada, or in the stat[e] of New York"; letter of 25 May 1854.
24. For references to the students who attended Central College, see Catherine M. Hanchett, "New York Central College Students" (Cortland County Historical Society, Cortland, N.Y., 1997). Also "After McGrawville: The Later Careers of Some African American Students from New York Central College" (paper presented before the Cortland County Historical Society, 26 Feb. 1992). For the Forten family, see Julie Winch, "'You Know I am a Man of Business': James Forten and the Factor of Race in Philadelphia's Antebellum Business Community," *Business and Economic History* 26, no. 1 (1997): 213–28; and Gary B. Nash, *Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720–1840* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).
25. For Douglass at Central College, see Benjamin Quarles, *Black Abolitionists* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 114–15.
26. For a discussion of abolitionism in upstate New York, see Whitney R. Cross, *The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800–1850* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950), 211–321; Quarles, *Black Abolitionists*.
27. See, for example, letters dated 14 September 1853, Syracuse, and 18 and 25 September 1853, New Berlin (American Missionary Society Archives, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, La.).
28. Allen told his story, including various newspaper accounts of the Fulton incident, in *The American Prejudice against Colour: An Authentic Narrative, Showing How Easily the Nation Got into an Uproar* (London: W. and F.G. Cash, 1853). Various letters and speeches of Allen and his wife are published in C. Peter Ripley, ed., *The Black Abolitionist Papers,* vol. 1,

The British Isles, 1830–1865 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 355–82, 423–26, 453–56; and in Carter G. Woodson, ed., *The Mind of the Negro as Reflected in Letters Written during the Crisis, 1800–1860* (Washington, 1926; reprint. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 282–90.

29. See, for example, letters of 26 October 1853, McGrawville; 6 and 22 January 1854 (in Law and Lovejoy, *Biography of Baquaqua*, Appendix 3). Also see Quarles, *Black Abolitionists*, 79. The Mendi Mission was initially comprised of the survivors of the *Amistad*; by the early 1850s the Mission was in serious need of new recruits, but Baquaqua was not selected as one of these.
30. *Free Mission Record* (New York), February 1857. I wish to thank Silvia Hunold Lara for this reference. Also see Lovejoy, "Mirage of Ethnicity."
31. See, for example, the various studies in Paul E. Lovejoy, ed., *Identity in the Shadow of Slavery* (London: Continuum, 2000).
32. Edward Brathwaite, *Contradictory Omens: Cultural Diversity and Integration in the Caribbean* (Kingston: Savacou, 1974).
33. Sidney W. Mintz and Richard Price, *The Birth of African-American Culture: An Anthropological Perspective* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976).
34. Ira Berlin, "From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of African-American Society in Mainland North America," *William and Mary Quarterly* 53 (1996): 251–88.
35. Maureen Warner-Lewis, "Posited Kikoongo Origins of Some Portuguese and Spanish Words from the Slave Era," *América Negra* 13 (1997): 89–91.
36. See, for example, the various studies in Joseph Harris, *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora*, 2d ed. (Washington: Howard University Press, 1993); W. Jeffrey Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
37. David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein, *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
38. The literature on maroon/cimarrón communities is extensive. The classic collection is Richard Price, ed., *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), although it is worth noting that there is nothing in the collection that deals with Canada. For the Caribbean region, see also, most recently, Jane Landers, "Cimarrón Ethnicity and Cultural Adaptation in the Spanish Domains of the Circum-Caribbean, 1503–1763," in Lovejoy, *Identity in the Shadow of Slavery*, 30–54. Also see Gad Heuman, ed., *Out of the House of Bondage: Runaways, Resistance and Marronage in Africa and the New World* (London: Frank Cass, 1985); Barbara Kopytoff, "The Development of Jamaican Maroon Ethnicity," *Caribbean Quarterly* 22 (1976): 33–50; Richard Price, "Resistance to Slavery in the Americas: Maroons and Their Communities," *Indian Historical Review* 15, nos. 1/2 (1988–89): 71–95; Flávio dos Santos Gomes, *Histórias de Quilombolas: Mocambos e Comunidades de Senzalas no Rio de Janeiro—século XIX* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 1995); E. Kofi Agorsah, ed., *Maroon Heritage: Archaeological, Ethnographic and Historical Perspectives* (Kingston, Jamaica: Canoe Press, 1994); José Jorge de Carvalho, Siglia Zambrotti Doria, and Adolfo Neves de Oliveira, Jr., *O Quilombo do Rio das Ras: Histórias, Tradições, Lutas* (Salvador, Brazil: Editora da Universidade Federal da Bahia, 1996).
39. Paul E. Lovejoy, "Biographies as Source Material: Towards a Biographical Archive of Enslaved Africans," in *Source Material for Studying the Slave Trade and the African Diaspora*, ed. Robin Law (Stirling, Scotland: Centre for Commonwealth Studies, 1997), 119–40.
40. As David Brion Davis and, more recently, David Eltis have argued, freedom and slavery were opposites that required one another; see David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966); and David Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
41. Landers, "Cimarróns in Circum-Caribbean," 30, 45.
42. According to Elisée Soumonni, Directeur, IBERDA, Université Nationale du Bénin: "Baquaqua's place in the history of the Republique du Bénin is now assured" (personal communication, 1 July 2000).

43. See, for example, Sterling Stuckey, *Slave Culture: Nationalist Theory and the Foundations of Black America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
44. Eltis, *Rise of Atlantic Slavery*, 9, 11.
45. Benjamin Drew, *A North-Side View of Slavery. The Refugee: Or the Narrative of Fugitive Slaves in Canada. Related by Themselves, With an Account of the History and Condition of the Colored Population of Upper Canada* (Boston: John P. Jewett and Co., 1856). Also see Winks, *The Blacks in Canada*, 85–113.
47. Hilary Beckles, *Centering Woman: Gender Discourses in Caribbean Slave Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener, 1999).
48. Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, 29–46, 78–95; and James Walker, *The Black Loyalists: The Search for a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone, 1783–1870* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992)
49. Canada West is not included in Price, *Maroon Societies*.
50. See Daniel Hill, *The Blacks in Early Canada: The Freedom Seekers* (Agincourt, Ont.: Book Society of Canada, 1981); Fred Landon, "The Negro Migration to Canada After the Passing of the Fugitive Slave Act," *Journal of Negro History* 5 (1920): 22–36; and Jason H. Silverman, *Unwelcome Guests: American Fugitive Slaves in Canada, 1830–60* (Millwood, N.Y.: Associated Faculty Press, 1985).
51. For enslaved Africans in Quebec, see Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, 1–23, 46–51.
52. Eltis et al., *Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database.*
53. Herbert Aptheker, "Maroons within the Present Limits of the United States," *The Journal of Negro History* 24 (1939): 167–84, which does not, as indicated in the title, deal with Canada West. Also see *American Negro Slave Revolts* (New York: International Publishers, 1963 [1943]).
54. Drew, *North-Side View of Slavery*, v.
55. For a discussion of population estimates, the extent of exaggeration in many reports, and underrepresentation in official census figures, see Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, 233–40.
56. Michael Wayne, "The Black Population of Canada West on the Eve of the American Civil War: A Reassessment Based on the Manuscript Census of 1861," *Histoire sociale/ Social History* 28 (1995): 67.
57. Allen P. Stouffer, *The Light of Nature and the Law of God: Antislavery in Ontario 1833–1877* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1992).
58. Landers, "Cimarróns in Circum-Caribbean," 30–49.
59. William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease, *Black Utopia: Negro Communal Experiments in America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 255–72.
60. Quarles, *Black Abolitionists*, 145–67.
61. Howard Law, "'Self-Reliance Is the True Road to Independence': Ideology and the Ex-Slaves in Buxton and Chatham," in Iacovetta, *A Nation of Immigrants*, 82–100; Wayne, "Black Population of Canada West," 58–82.
62. The chronology of Baquaqua's travels is discussed in Law and Lovejoy, *Biography of Baquaqua*, 22–23.
63. Drew, *North-Side View of Slavery*, vi.
64. According to Drew (ibid.), "Many who furnished interesting antidotes and personal histories may, perhaps, feel some disappointment because their contributions are omitted in the present work. But to publish the whole, would far transcend the limits of a single volume. The manuscripts, however, are in safe-keeping, and will, in all probability, be given to the world on some future occasion." For a discussion of the manuscripts, see Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, 239.
65. Robin Winks, "The Making of a Fugitive Slave Narrative: Josiah Henson and Uncle Tom—A Case Study," in *The Slave's Narrative*, ed. Charles T. Davis and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 112–46.
66. The history of the Maroons and Black United Empire Loyalists in Nova Scotia, and the migration to Sierra Leone, is a separate story; see Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, 114–41; and Walker, *Black Loyalists*.

67. Thus, the effort to identify a Canadian publisher for Baquaqua's story proved abortive. ECW Press, which prides itself on its promotion of Canadian literature, for example, was not interested even in a copublishing arrangement that took advantage of the publication of the text in the United States and the Caribbean (e-mail correspondence with Jack David, ECW Press, 5 May 2001).
68. For redeemed pawns and the education of elite Africans in Europe, see Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "Trust, Pawnship and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of the Old Calabar Slave Trade," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (1999): 341–44; and various studies in Lovejoy, *Identity in the Shadow of Slavery*.
69. These included Kongo and Mbundu from West-Central Africa; Igbo from the Bight of Biafra interior; Yoruba and Gbe (Fon, Ewe, Aja) from the Bight of Benin; Akan from the Gold Coast; Mande/Bambara from the western Sudan; Hausa, Nupe, and other Muslims from the central Sudan; and the conglomeration of people from the upper Guinea coast.
70. Molefi Kete Asante, *The Afrocentric Idea* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

— *Six* —

Chinese Diaspora in Occidental Societies

Canada and Europe

Peter S. Li

The Chinese settlement outside of China dates back to the sixteenth century and even earlier, when China expanded its trade relations in Southeast Asia.[1] However, the migration of Chinese to North America and Europe was relatively recent. Whereas Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia was originally prompted by China's imperial aggrandizement and its people's unofficial trade relations with regions outside of China, the migration of Chinese to North American and European countries in the latter half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was largely triggered by industrialization of the West and the subsequent demand for Asian laborers during times of labor shortage.[2] Even today, Southeast Asia remains home to about 75 percent of Chinese overseas. The geographical proximity of Southeast Asia to China, its historical political and economic relations to the Chinese Empire, and the relative ease with which people in the coastal provinces of China could reach there by ship made Southeast Asia an attractive destination for Chinese immigration historically.

The ethnic Chinese in North America and Europe make up a small but growing segment of the global diasporic Chinese population; they share a similar history of being a racialized minority in Western industrialized societies which have risen to power through industrial development and capitalist expansion. Historically, the majority members of these societies viewed the ethnic Chinese minority as racially inferior, culturally distinct, and socially marginal. The history of Chinese diasporic communities in North America and Europe is essentially a history of survival and

adaptation of a racial minority in a majority setting that was culturally hostile, politically intolerant, and economically confining toward the minority. Thus, the ethnic Chinese in North America and Europe can be viewed as constituting a type of Chinese diasporic community, distinct from the much older and larger ones in Southeast Asia.

The dispersion of people of a similar cultural origin in different countries around the world incorporates two sets of narratives that bewilder researchers. The first one has to do with the story of the people who move. Whether it is a case of people driven by forces at home or drawn by opportunities in the destination, the story of migration involves migrants mobilizing cultural resources, kinship ties, and regional identities in order to organize themselves and to overcome barriers of settlement. The emphasis of such a story is on culture and affinity as sources of strength, and on how people convert them into resources to overcome the hardship of migration and resettlement. The second narrative is about how the receiving society reacts to migrants as outsiders, and how in the process, national and social boundaries are created to demarcate a sense of "we" and "they." It is a story not only about how the receiving society guides its gates, shapes its institutions, and controls its future, but also about how normative standards are defined and maintained in the receiving society to facilitate the distinction between rightful citizens and dangerous foreigners. It is also a story about the development of a national identity and about the social construction of difference. Despite different emphases in these narratives, there are compelling reasons to integrate the two in order to formulate a more complete picture of how nation and nationhood have been formed and transformed. The case of the Chinese in North America and Europe shows how culture and race have been used to socially construct similarities and differences, and how such outcomes have been institutionalized. As well, it shows how over time such social constructions give way to forces of social change that result in an emerging new story about the reformulation of cultural, social, and normative boundaries of nations.

The Chinese Diaspora

The term "Chinese diaspora" has been used metaphorically to refer to the dispersion of Chinese traders, settlers, and migrants outside of China, a process that began in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), continued in the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) with the emigration of Chinese laborers and workers in the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, and expanded in the twentieth century in the form of global migration of Chinese of diverse cultural and occupational backgrounds from Hong Kong, Taiwan, mainland China, and other countries to different parts of the world.

The Chinese diaspora does not have a political or national boundary, and its membership can only be defined based on a loose interpretation of descent, origin, or other cultural features. It is intricately connected to

China, from where ancestral roots and cultural heritage are linked or claimed. China as a nation has historically presumed its jurisdiction over all Chinese outside of China proper, based on a loose interpretation of Chinese descent. This mentality explains why the term *huaqiao*, which means Chinese nationals sojourning overseas,[3] was used in Chinese diplomatic documents after the Opium War (1839–42), and later widely adopted in the Chinese language to refer to all Chinese outside of China, with the implicit assumption that overseas Chinese would eventually return to their homeland. The term *huaqiao* is typically translated as "overseas Chinese," that is, people who migrated from China to foreign countries as sojourners but not permanent settlers.[4] In many countries in Southeast Asia, the local Chinese often prefer to refer to themselves as simply *huaren* (Chinese person) or *huayi* (descendant of Chinese) to mark the fact that they owe no loyalty to mainland China or Taiwan.[5] Some scholars now advocate using the more neutral term "Chinese overseas" to refer to ethnic Chinese outside of China, in recognition of the fact that many Chinese immigrants and their descendants have acquired the citizenship of the adopted country where they settled permanently.[6] Without reference to a homeland or allegiance to a homeland, the Chinese diaspora may be simply referred to as the global settlement of ethnic Chinese outside of China.

The Chinese diaspora covers roughly 33.3 million ethnic Chinese in 150 countries, based on the 1998 population estimates (table 6.1). About three-quarters of the Chinese diaspora population are located in ten countries in Southeast Asia; the three countries of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are home to roughly 19 million ethnic Chinese, or 57 percent of the 33 million

TABLE 6.1: Estimates of Chinese Diaspora Population by Region, 1998

Region	Number of Countries	Number of Chinese	Chinese as Percent of Global Chinese Diaspora Population
Europe	25	945,171	2.8
North America	2	3,859,000	11.6
South America	14	870,588	2.6
Central America	23	290,725	0.9
Southeast Asia	10	25,079,970	75.3
Asia (except Southeast Asia)	23	1,566,209	4.7
Oceania	17	563,901	1.7
Africa	36	125,650	0.4
Total (All Regions)	150	33,301,214	100.0

Note: The Chinese in Macao are included in the original data file as belonging to Southeast Asia; however, they are excluded in the above table.

Source: Compiled from a 1998 database developed and supplied by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Taipei.

ethnic Chinese in the diaspora. In comparison, Europe and North America together account for only 14 percent of the Chinese diaspora population.

Data compiled by the *Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission* in Taipei indicate that there were about 945,000 ethnic Chinese distributed in twenty-five countries of Europe in 1998, in contrast to roughly 3.9 million ethnic Chinese in North America (table 6.2).[7] Slightly over a quarter of the ethnic Chinese in Europe are located in the United Kingdom, and about another quarter in France. The ethnic Chinese population in all of Europe accounts for only 2.8 percent of the global Chinese diaspora, roughly equal to the number of ethnic Chinese in Canada. However, the ethnic Chinese in Europe account for no more than 0.2 percent of Europe's population, in sharp contrast to the ethnic Chinese in Canada who make up 3.1 percent of Canada's population. Only in Austria and the Netherlands do the ethnic Chinese constitute more than half a percent of the country's population.

The Chinese communities in North America and Europe share a similar history. The recruitment of Asian labor followed the decline of slavery, and some authors referred to the Chinese "coolies" as "the new slaves of the colonized world" during the industrial expansion of the nineteenth century.[8] These societies adopted an anti-Asian ideology in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in which the Chinese were portrayed as culturally undesirable and racially inferior, albeit useful in addressing labor shortages.[9] Much of the history and development of the Chinese diasporic communities in North America and Europe can be understood as consequences of racial exclusion on the part of the host society, and as attempts by the Chinese minority to find a social and economic niche for survival.

Since the end of World War II, the Chinese in these Western societies have gained greater social acceptance and have benefited from the expanded opportunities of industrial growth and postwar prosperity. At the same time, these capitalist societies have to deal with the contradictions of racial inequality and cultural diversity in that their historical stance toward racial minorities is at odds with the principles of equality and nondiscrimination subsumed under the liberal democratic framework. These forces resulted in Canada, the United Kingdom, and other European countries changing their immigration policy in the postwar decades, in turn creating new opportunities for Chinese communities to expand and to replenish their population through immigration.

Chinese in Canada

One way to understand the history of the Chinese in Canada is to periodize it into three segments, which roughly correspond to the major shifts in Canada's legislation toward the Chinese with respect to civil rights and immigration. The first segment covers a period of sixty-five years, from 1858, when the Chinese first immigrated to Canada, to the adoption of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1923. It was a period in which the Chinese

TABLE 6.2: Population Estimates of Chinese Diasporic Communities by Country, for Europe and North America, 1998

	Chinese Population			
Country	**Number**	**Percent of Continent's Total Chinese Population**	**Percent of Country's Population**	**Percent of Global Chinese Diaspora Population**
Europe:				
Austria	41,000	4.3	0.5	
Belgium	23,000	2.4	0.2	
Czech Republic	12,000	1.3	0.1	
Denmark	7,257	0.8	0.1	
Estonia	20	0.0	0.0	
Finland	1,636	0.2	0.0	
France	228,500	24.2	0.4	
Germany	100,889	10.7	0.1	
Greece	505	0.1	0.0	
Hungary	10,050	1.1	0.1	
Ireland	10,020	1.1	0.3	
Italy	60,600	6.4	0.1	
Latvia	29	0.0	0.0	
Lithuania	40	0.0	0.0	
Luxembourg	1,160	0.1	0.3	
Malta	20	0.0	0.0	
Netherlands	132,000	14.0	0.8	
Norway	5,168	0.5	0.1	
Poland	1,557	0.2	0.0	
Portugal	2,734	0.3	0.0	
Slovakia	5	0.0	0.0	
Spain	35,000	3.7	0.1	
Sweden	8,081	0.9	0.1	
Switzerland	13,900	1.5	0.2	
U.K.	250,000	26.5	0.4	
Subtotal	945,171	100.0	0.2	2.8
North America:				
Canada	960,000	24.9	3.1	
U.S.	2,899,000	75.1	1.1	
Subtotal	3,859,000	100.0	1.3	11.6
All Regions:				
Total Global Chinese Diaspora Population	33,301,214			100.0

Note: The Chinese in Macao are included in the original data file as part of the overseas Chinese population, but they are not included in the above table.

Source: Chinese diaspora population estimates are compiled from a 1998 database developed and supplied by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Taipei. Population figures for individual countries are based on U.S. Bureau of Census, Report WP/98, World Population Profile: 1998, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1999.

became victims of institutional racism and were intensively subjected to legislative controls. The twenty-three years following the passage of the act may be referred to as the exclusive era, during which time no Chinese were allowed to immigrate to Canada, and the Chinese in the country continued to face legislative exclusion and social animosity. The third period embraces the years after World War II: the discriminatory laws against the Chinese were repealed, and Chinese Canadians gradually gained full civil rights and enjoyed an improved social status. Further changes in immigration regulations in the third period, especially after 1967, brought record levels of Chinese immigration to Canada.[10] Throughout, the Canadian government's policy toward the Chinese and the social reception accorded to them largely determined the structure and direction of the Chinese community.

First Period: Development of Institutional Racism (1858–1923)

Chinese immigration to Canada began as a result of discovery of gold in the Fraser Valley of British Columbia in 1858. However, large numbers came only when the western section of the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed between 1881 and 1885. In 1881 and 1882 alone, over eleven thousand Chinese arrived by ship in Victoria.[11] The number of Chinese in Canada more than doubled in official census counts from 4,383 in 1881 to 9,126 in 1891.[12] By 1901, the number had reached 17,314.[13]

Like other international migration, the emigration of Chinese was propelled by two sets of forces. On the one hand, disruptions brought about by foreign invasions and internal revolts, as well as problems of declining farm productivity and rising population, forced many Chinese in the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian to migrate overseas.[14] On the other hand, the industrial development of western Canada in the latter half of the nineteenth century required massive labor power that was not readily available from existing white workers.[15] Since Chinese labor was available in large quantity and at low cost, it was attractive to railroad contractors, manufacturers, and employers in Canada.

From the outset, neither the Canadian government nor the Canadian public looked upon the Chinese as permanent settlers. Considered useful to the development of western Canada, the Chinese were not accepted as desirable settlers or citizens. Prior to the completion of the railroad, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald was unwilling to take any measure to restrict Chinese immigration that might jeopardize the project. The subsequent public outcry against Asian labor and the state's exclusion policies reflected the utilitarian mentality toward what was considered an inferior race.

The first federal legislation against the Chinese was passed in 1885, after the Canadian Pacific Railway had been completed. The law imposed a head tax of $50 on virtually every Chinese entering the country. This tax was raised to $100 in 1900, and to $500 in 1903.[16]

In their first four decades in Canada, the Chinese helped to build up many industries in British Columbia. The usefulness of the Chinese labor

in mining, railroad construction, land clearing, public works, gardening, lumbering, salmon canning, and domestic service was well recognized by many employers and witnesses who appeared before royal commissions in 1885 and in 1902.[17] The Chinese were welcome as cheap laborers in pioneer industries where other labor was not available. As long as they accepted their menial positions and avoided competition with white workers for higher-paying jobs they were tolerated, but as white workers were attracted to expanding industries and labor disputes surfaced, the Chinese became the target of racial attacks.

Between 1875 and 1923, the Parliament of British Columbia passed numerous laws against the Chinese, restricting their civil rights and confining their employment opportunities.[18] In 1923, the Canadian parliament passed the Chinese Immigration Act, the most comprehensive legislation to exclude Chinese from entering the country and to control those already there.[19] The act also required every person of Chinese origin in Canada, regardless of citizenship, to register with the Government of Canada within twelve months and to obtain a certificate of such registration, with harsh penalty for failing to do so. Furthermore, every Chinese in Canada who intended to leave the country temporarily and return at a later date had to give written notice to the Controller before departure, specifying the foreign ports the person intended to visit and the route to take. Those who had so registered would be permitted to return within two years. The Act virtually stopped Chinese immigration to Canada until its repeal in 1947.

Second Period: Exclusion and Adaptation (1923–1947)

By the time the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 was passed, about 83,000 Chinese immigrants had paid $22.5 million to the Canadian government for entering and leaving the country, mostly from the head tax.[20] The cumulative effects of exclusionary policies and discriminatory legislation against the Chinese reduced them to virtually second-class citizens in Canada. Institutional racism against the Chinese was entrenched in the economic and political institutions; unequal treatment was sanctioned legally and officially. The Chinese were denied many of the basic rights, including the right to pursue a living in many occupations. They were frequent targets of political demagogy. The unequal treatment of the Chinese further contributed to their marginal social status in Canadian society as members of an undesirable race.

The restriction on citizenship rights and their legal exclusion meant that the Chinese were basically being excluded from the core labor market by the 1920s. The available data on the occupation structure of the Chinese indicate that between 1885 and 1931, the employment of Chinese workers in industrial sectors declined, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the ethnic business sector. By 1931, 40 percent of the Chinese in the Canadian labor market were concentrated in several jobs, typically servants, cooks, waiters, and laundry workers, and another 11 percent were

laundry and restaurant owners.[21] The restaurant business was a haven for many Chinese before World War II, and it remained an important sector of employment and self-employment for Chinese after the war, even when opportunities in professional and technical occupations became available to postwar Chinese immigrants.

Another consequence of institutional racism and restrictive immigration policy toward the Chinese was to hinder the development of the Chinese-Canadian family. Chinese immigrants who left China for Canada in the latter half of the nineteenth century were mainly men. Economic hardship and uncertainty of the future made it difficult for the majority of these men to bring their families with them. With the imposition of the head tax in 1885, and its steep increase to $500 in 1903, it became financially impossible for an average worker to be able to afford the passage money and the head tax for family members. Social hostility, rampant discrimination, and violent attacks such as the riots of 1887 and 1907 in Vancouver also tended to discourage immigrants from bringing their families with them.[22]

As a result of these financial and legal hardships, the Chinese-Canadian community remained a predominantly male society until decades after World War II. Data from various Canadian censuses indicate that in 1911, among the 27,831 Chinese in Canada, the sex ratio was 2,800 men to 100 women; and in 1931, the sex ratio remained 1,240 men to 100 women among the 46,519 Chinese. Throughout all the census years before the war, the imbalanced sex ratio among the Chinese population was the most severe of any ethnic group in Canada.[23] In the absence of Chinese women, many Chinese men in Canada maintained a married bachelor life. Those who had the means would take a periodic trip to China for a sojourn with their wives and families. However, they could be away for a maximum of two years, otherwise they risked losing the permission to return to Canada. Many Chinese had to wait for decades before they had a chance to reunite with their family after World War II, when Chinese immigration to Canada resumed.

The absence of women and family also meant that the growth of a second generation was delayed. For example, by 1931, despite being in Canada for seventy-three years, Chinese Canadians born in Canada made up only 12 percent of the total Chinese population.[24] It was only after the war that a more balanced sex ratio was gradually restored among the Chinese community, and a sizable second and third generation of Chinese Canadians began to emerge.

Throughout their history in Canada, and especially before World War II, the Chinese organized many voluntary associations which served important functions to the Chinese community, such as organizing social services for those in need, mediating internal disputes, and dealing with the external pressures of discrimination and segregation. The way by which the Chinese formed associations in Canada showed an ingenious use of limited resources for mobilizing collective efforts. Common locality of origin, common surnames, principles of fraternity, or common Chinese heritage were used as bases of organization. No doubt, the denial of family life increased

the need to rely on the ethnic community for support. Consequently, as postwar Chinese immigrants entered Canada in larger volumes, they gradually altered the structure of the Chinese community. Correspondingly, the importance of traditional Chinese associations declined as they failed to meet the needs of postwar immigrants.

Discrimination and exclusion also contributed to the development of segregated neighborhoods in many cities in Canada that came to be known as "Chinatowns." In the nineteenth century, a Chinatown was both a commercial area and a community center, although most so-called Chinatowns today are mainly commercial and tourist districts. The term "Chinatown" was coined in the nineteenth century as a European concept to designate an undesirable neighborhood characterized by vice and unsanitary conditions and populated by an inferior race. Over time, the stereotypical and mythical images associated with the term became entrenched in the ideology of white Canadians as legitimate interpretations of Chinese culture and Chinese place.[25]

Third Period: Gaining of Civil Rights and the Post–World War II Chinese Community

Toward the end of World War II, the discriminatory policy toward the Chinese had become an embarrassment for Canada; many Chinese Canadians had contributed to the war effort and China had been an ally during the war. The denial of civil rights based on race also contradicted the charter of the United Nations. In 1943, the United States repealed its Chinese Exclusion Act and permitted a quota of 105 Chinese to be admitted annually. Canada repealed the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947. The Chinese in British Columbia were allowed to vote in 1947, and those in Saskatchewan in 1951. By the 1950s, most of the discriminatory laws against the Chinese were removed.[26]

Although the exclusion of Chinese immigration came to an end, the Canadian government did not consider the Chinese as equals of European and American immigrants. Admission of Chinese and other Asian immigrants before 1962 was restricted to spouses and minor children who were unmarried, compared to the relatively free migration from Europe and the United States. As a result of a change in immigration policy in 1962, Chinese could apply as independent immigrants to Canada, but it was not until 1967, when Canada adopted a universal point system of assessing potential immigrants, that Chinese were admitted under the same criteria as people of other origins.

In the years immediately after 1947, few Chinese actually came to Canada. Between 1949 and 1955, 12,560 Chinese immigrants were admitted, about 60 percent of whom were wives and children. In the two decades following 1947, a total of 40,593 Chinese immigrants came to Canada, many immigrating as family units. Chinese immigration to Canada reached a record level after 1967. By 1994, an estimated total of 565,167 Chinese

had been admitted to Canada in the forty-five years since 1949, but about 92 percent of them came after 1967.[27] This wave of postwar Chinese immigration increased the Chinese-Canadian population and restored a balanced sex ratio. A sizable second and third generation of Chinese Canadians also began to emerge. Immigrating mainly from Hong Kong, but also from Taiwan, mainland China, and other Asian countries, postwar Chinese immigrants came from more diversified occupational and educational backgrounds, many from sophisticated urban cultures. These postwar Chinese immigrants transformed the demographic and social features of the Chinese community, and contributed to the multicultural composition of Canadian society.

Compared to earlier Chinese immigrants, those who came after 1967 tended to be better educated, more cosmopolitan, and upwardly mobile. The arrival of these immigrants and the growth of native-born Chinese Canadians helped to produce a new Chinese middle class, which began to take up professional, technical, and managerial jobs that historically had been denied to the Chinese. Further changes in the immigration policy in the mid-1980s favoring business immigrants, together with the prospective return of Hong Kong to China, triggered another wave of Chinese immigrants to Canada. Many of the new immigrants brought substantial wealth and human capital to Canada. They came from Hong Kong, but also Taiwan and other parts of Asia that had experienced rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. The immigration of this wave of Chinese immigrants to Canada substantially increased the Chinese-Canadian population, and brought new wealth and social status to the already upwardly mobile Chinese-Canadian community. The new Chinese middle class numbered 44,450 in 1981, or 26 percent of all Chinese Canadians in the work force. A decade later, in 1991, this class numbered 114,133, or 38 percent of the total of Chinese in the Canadian labor force.[28]

By the late 1980s, there were many indicators that a new affluent class of Chinese Canadians has emerged, and their spending power and investment capacity stimulated the expansion of a new "ethnic" consumer market. In turn, urban Canada went through many changes as middle-class Chinese Canadians moved to traditional white neighborhoods, as Chinese businesses flourished in suburban malls, and as Canadian corporations and investment firms went after the rapidly growing, lucrative consumer market created by the new wealth of Chinese immigrants and by the social mobility of middle-class Chinese Canadians.

Despite the financial and occupational achievement of Chinese Canadians, segments of Canadian society have shown reluctance to accept them fully. Racial tensions have surfaced in Canadian urban centers where Chinese Canadians have grown in number and have outperformed other groups in terms of their business success, financial security, and educational and occupational achievement.[29]

The conspicuous presence of wealthy Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan sometimes obscures the fact that many working Chinese

Canadians engage in different lines of work. Despite the declining importance of service occupations as opportunities in professional, technical, and managerial positions improve, those in service jobs still accounted for 18 percent of the entire Chinese-Canadian labor force in 1991. Data from the 1991 census also indicate that Chinese-Canadian workers earned, on average, less than other Canadian workers, even after differences in education and other factors have been taken into account.[30]

The prospect for the Chinese-Canadian community depends on how receptive Canadian society will be toward growing racial and cultural diversity. For much of its history, the development of the Chinese-Canadian community has been greatly constrained by societal forces which marginalized the Chinese. Despite the entrenchment of individual rights and the official commitment to a multiculturalism policy, there is little assurance that Canada in the twenty-first century will be free of racial discrimination and cultural stereotypes. It would appear that despite having come a long way from the days of being second-class citizens, Chinese Canadians have yet to be fully accepted in Canadian society as bona fide Canadians free to pursue their residential choice, linguistic aspiration, and cultural fulfillment without the burdens of cultural stereotypes and racial stigmatization.

The Chinese in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany

Chinese immigration to Europe began around the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. Like the Chinese immigration to Canada, it was also prompted by the industrial expansion of the West, and the demand for low-cost labor during periods of labor shortage. Throughout the nineteenth century, the development of the shipping industry in the United Kingdom and the technological revolution of steamships in Germany created new job opportunities for young Chinese sailors. Chinese sailors, exclusively male, from the southern coastal provinces of China were noted in London and Liverpool in the nineteenth century; some of them had been brought to Britain earlier as a result of Britain's trade expansion to East Asia.[31] The demand for Chinese seamen grew in the first few decades of the twentieth century until it peaked in the 1930s. The increased employment of Chinese sailors on German ships led to an open conflict in 1898 between white and Chinese workers, but as late as 1927, the Chinese Sailors' Employment Agency was found to be operating in Hamburg caring for Chinese sailors.[32]

Some of the Chinese seamen who went to various ports of Europe in the early part of the twentieth century stayed behind, although they tended to live in isolation in dock districts, such as East London, Liverpool, Cardiff, and Bristol in England. Trade union exclusion of Chinese made it difficult for them to join the union, and many of them eventually moved from seafaring to the restaurant business.[33]

During World War I, large numbers of Chinese workers were contracted to relieve the labor shortage of France. An estimated 140,000 Chinese were recruited to the western front in France to build barracks, clear roads and engage in other types of menial labor. Chinese workers on the western front were hired as contract laborers, with contractual specifications regarding the days of rest, medical care, and cash payments to families in China. After the war, most Chinese were repatriated, but about 3,000 remained in France and 1,850 of them were contracted to work in metallurgical industries.[34]

Beside the large-scale deployment of Chinese laborers during World War I in France, the Chinese presence in Europe was relatively small in the early decades of the twentieth century. The censuses of England and Wales reported several hundred Chinese between 1901 and 1911, and two to three thousand between 1921 and 1931.[35] In France, only three to four thousand Chinese citizens were recorded in various censuses from 1931 to the 1970s.[36] With the exception of France, where a "work-study" program enabled some 1,600 Chinese students to study and work in France in the 1920s,[37] most Chinese in Europe between the two world wars were engaged in limited lines of work as seamen, hand laundry workers, restaurant operators, and laborers.

Like their counterparts in Canada, the Chinese in Europe were viewed by majority members with suspicion and hostility. Considered the "Yellow Peril," Chinese communities were seen as morally objectionable and Chinese workers were characterized as "beasts of burden."[38] They were seen as coming from a civilization that was "inscrutable and cunning."[39] Working class racism and the negative depiction of the Chinese in the media and popular culture contributed to restricting the employment opportunities of the Chinese. In Britain, the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union lobbied against Chinese seamen in the 1910s, branding them as strikebreakers and unfair competitors undercutting wages,[40] and in Germany, conflicts between Chinese and white seamen in 1898 led to banning the use of "colored" workers on the main shipping route to Australia.[41] Parker suggests that the decline of shipping, restrictions on Chinese immigration, and xenophobia worked against the Chinese community and retarded its growth in Britain after the 1920s.[42]

Before World War II, the Chinese in Europe, like Chinese elsewhere in the absence of their immediate family, also had a tendency to form voluntary associations as sources of emotional and social support. The Chinese associations, along with schools and newspapers, have been referred to as the three pillars of the Chinese community.[43] By and large, these associations supported various cultural activities and represented the Chinese to the larger society. One such association was the Oi Tung Association, founded in the East End of London in 1907, which routinely made donations to the Sailors' Hospital before World War II so that the Chinese seamen could receive better attention while hospitalized. Other functions performed by the Oi Tung Association included looking after the sick and

burying the dead for those with no relatives. There were other Chinese associations formed throughout the history of the Chinese in England, such as the Chung Sam Workers' Club, Tai Ping Club, the Association of Chinese Restaurateurs, and the Workers' Union Club.[44] These associations often provided emotional and material support to Chinese immigrants when mainstream unions and voluntary organizations were unreceptive to them. In continental Europe, the Chinese were also known to have formed voluntary associations, performing various philanthropic functions for the needy and offering some political and economic protection against hostility from the larger society.[45] However, as the Chinese immigration became more diversified and as "Chinatown" changed in the decades after World War II, the importance of these associations also waned.

The Chinese community in Europe began to grow only after World War II, when some countries permitted limited Chinese immigration. In Britain, the Chinese population grew steadily from 19,396 in 1951 to 38,795 in 1961, and from 96,030 in 1971 to 154,363 in 1981. Much of this increase can be attributed to the demand for labor in postwar Britain, and the revised immigration policy of Britain to permit Commonwealth citizens to settle in Britain after 1948.[46] In France, Live estimated the Chinese population to be around 20,000 in 1975, but refugees from Indochina between 1975 and 1987 added about 72,500 to 87,000 Chinese to the ethnic Chinese population in France.[47] In Germany, the Chinese population rose from 3,342 in 1975 to 10,171 in 1985, and to 37,077 in 1993.[48]

Occupationally, the Chinese in Europe could follow only limited lines of work before World War II. In England, for example, about 60 percent of the Chinese at the turn of the century were seamen, and as late as 1921, about 23 percent of the Chinese in London remained seamen, and another 27 percent were in personal services. However, there were small numbers of Chinese students who had gone to England since the beginning of the twentieth century. It was estimated that by 1931, there were some 450 Chinese students in various British universities.[49] In France, a work-study scheme brought seventeen groups of Chinese students to France between 1919 and 1921, for a total number of about 1,600 Chinese students. These Chinese students provided some diversity to the otherwise mainly working-class Chinese community. Although many did not stay after their studies, 400 to 500 Chinese students remained in France.[50] Among the Chinese students who studied in France during the early part of the twentieth century were those who later became important leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.[51]

As the Chinese communities in Europe expanded after the war through the immigration of Chinese from a more diverse educational background, the Chinese began to branch out into other occupations beyond the conventional enclave of food catering services. Nevertheless, the family-operated catering business remains a key livelihood for many Chinese in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.[52] For example, in Paris around 1992, about 59 percent of the Chinese businesses were estimated to be in

catering and food services, about 25 percent in general trade, and the remaining 16 percent in other services.[53] In the United Kingdom, data from the 1997 census indicate that more than half of Chinese men and over one-third of Chinese women were employed as managers in services and personal services, but at the same time, about 7 percent of Chinese men were in science and engineering, and about 11 percent of Chinese women were in health-related jobs.[54] These statistics suggest that the historical niche in the catering service which enabled the Chinese in Europe to survive continues to be the main livelihood for many Chinese, despite the opening of new mobility opportunities for the postwar Chinese.

The case of the Chinese in the United Kingdom clearly suggests that despite its history, the Chinese population of about 156,938 in 1991 remains a relatively young one, with only 28 percent born in the United Kingdom. At the same time, the Chinese appeared to have been able to improve their education and to move to more desirable occupations. For example, the 1991 census of the United Kingdom indicates that 10.7 percent of the Chinese had at least one degree, compared to 5.2 percent among the white population; however, it was the foreign-born Chinese who tended to have higher educational levels. Occupationally, too, Chinese men and women tended to be overrepresented in professional jobs and underrepresented in partly skilled and unskilled jobs.[55] These statistics clearly suggest that the Chinese communities, like their counterparts in North America, have been in transition. The traditional working class Chinese communities in Europe have been renewed and changed by fresh Chinese immigration from Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, many immigrating with better educational qualifications and professional skills than their predecessors.

Conclusion

The history of the Chinese diasporic communities in Canada and Europe suggests that the communities follow a relatively similar pattern. The initial immigration of Chinese to Canada and Europe was related to the industrial development and capitalist expansion of the receiving societies. Chinese workers were recruited mainly because they were available in large numbers from China at a low cost.

Canadian and European societies developed a similar ideological response to the Chinese presence. Throughout much of their history, the Chinese in Canada and Europe were seen as useful workers, but belonging to an inferior race with questionable morality and culture that would contaminate European societies. The idea that the Chinese were destitute laborers from an alien culture, with customs and values perceived to be not assimilable with the European traditions, was well entrenched throughout the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century.[56] As well, the historical perception of "Chinatown" by majority members as

congested and immoral was premised on the belief that the Chinese were backward and clannish.[57] The ideological construction of the Chinese in Canada and Europe was an extension of the colonial mentality of the West toward China and its people. This image of a "Yellow Peril" persisted in much of the history of the Chinese diaspora in the West.

As a racial minority in European societies, the Chinese developed their own survival mechanisms. They essentially retreated to an ethnic enclave in the service sector where their marginal businesses and employment did not pose as a threat to majority members. Socially too, in Western cities the Chinese congregated in Chinese quarters dubbed Chinatowns, where they developed a self-imposed residential and commercial segregation from the majority members in response to social hostility.

The post–World War II period witnessed a revival of the Chinese diasporic communities in Canada and Europe, largely through the abolition of immigration restrictions and the arrival of new immigrants with a more diverse educational and occupational background. The population expansion of the Chinese diasporic communities and the changing composition of the new arrivals gradually altered the social status and occupational position of the Chinese in Canada and Europe.

The case of the Chinese diaspora in Canada and in Europe suggests that the mode of incorporation of racial minorities into the receiving societies plays a key role in shaping the structure of diaspora communities. The policy of inclusion or exclusion, opportunities available to diaspora members, and the normative construction of diaspora members by receiving societies set the structural parameters under which racial minorities develop their communities. The case of the Chinese also shows that diaspora communities often change in accordance with the immigration policies, citizenship boundaries, and policies of inclusion and exclusion of receiving societies. Finally, the degree of societal restriction on the Chinese as a racial minority, and the way Chinese organized themselves economically and socially constitute a basis for understanding the differentiations within the global Chinese diaspora.

Notes

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1. Anthony Reid, "Chinese and Southeast Asian Interactions," in *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, ed. Lynn Pan (Singapore: Archipelago Press and Landmark Books, 1998), 50–52; C.P. Fitzgerald, *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People: Southern Fields and Southern Ocean* (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972); and Wang Gungwu, *China and the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991).

2. Gregor Benton and Frank N. Pieke, *The Chinese in Europe* (London: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Peter S. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998); and Lynn Pan, *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*.
3. Zhuang Guotu, "Huaqiao Yici Mingcheng Kao" (An inquiry into the term Huaqiao), in *Huaqiao Huaren Shi Yanju Ji* (Collected works on the history of overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese), ed. Zheng Min and Liang Chuming (Beijing: Haiyang Publishing House, 1989), 1:39–48.
4. Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 30; and Paul C.P. Siu, "The Sojourner," *American Journal of Sociology* 58 (1953): 34–44.
5. Wang Gungwu, "The Question of the 'Overseas Chinese,'" in Wang Gungwu, *Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), 249–60.
6. For an argument in favor of the term "Chinese overseas," see Wang, *China and the Chinese Overseas*, 253–54. It should be noted that it is contentious to refer to Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao as "Chinese overseas" or "overseas Chinese," on the ground that these areas are part of China albeit under different political jurisdictions due to historical circumstances. The same contention also puts to question the use of the term "Chinese diaspora" to include Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao, even though in reality, marked political, economic, and ideological differences exist between these areas and mainland China. Indeed, China has officially adopted the term and the policy of "one China, two systems" to recognize the differences between Hong Kong and mainland China, while upholding the principle of national sovereignty. A contrary view is advocated by Redding who contends that "overseas Chinese" include Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore because, according to him, people in these regions normally think of themselves as "overseas Chinese"; see Gordon S. Redding, *The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1993). The East Asia Analytical Unit in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia uses the term "ethnic Chinese" rather than "overseas Chinese" to delineate those Chinese directly under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China and others outside its jurisdiction, including Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao; see East Asia Analytical Unit, *Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia* (Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995), 1.
7. The 1996 census of Canada indicated that 800,470 ethnic Chinese reported a single origin in the census, and 121,115 reported multiple origin, that is "Chinese origin" in combination with some other origin. In total, 921,585 persons may be said to have a Chinese origin in the 1996 census of Canada; see Statistics Canada, 1996 Census of Canada, National Series [electronic resource], Table n01_0217.ivt, "Population by Ethnic Origin (188) and Sex (3), Showing Single and Multiple Responses (3), for Canada, Provinces, Territories and Census Metropolitan Areas, 1996 Census (20% Sample Data) (93F0026XDB96001)." The 1990 U.S. census indicated that 1,645,000 individuals were of Chinese origin; see U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991). However, between 1991 and 1996, the United States admitted 398,300 immigrants from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. These statistics, together with the natural increase of the ethnic Chinese in the United States, would suggest that the total ethnic Chinese population in the United States would be well over 2.3 million people by 1998. Thus, based on both census data and immigration data from Canada and the United States, the estimates of the ethnic Chinese population by the *Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission* appear to be rather credible.
8. Donna Gabaccia, "The 'Yellow Peril' and the 'Chinese of Europe': Global Perspectives on Race and Labor, 1815–1930," in *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, ed. Leo Lucassen (Bern and New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 177–96.
9. Kay J. Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875–1980* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991); Jenny Clegg, *Fu Manchu and the "Yellow Peril"* (Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books, 1994); Li, *The Chinese in Canada;* and Peter W. Ward, *White Canada Forever: Public Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978).

10. The changes in immigration policy in 1962 permitted, for the first time since 1923, Chinese who had no relatives in Canada to apply as independent immigrants, but applicants from China or other Asian countries were not qualified for sponsored immigration to the same extent as immigrants from Europe and America (Privy Council 1962–86). Further changes in 1967 resulted in a universal point system of assessing potential immigrants irrespective of country of origin (Privy Council 1967-1616).
11. Royal Commission, Canada, *Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration: Report and Evidence* (1885), 397–99.
12 See Department of Agriculture, Canada, *Statistical Abstracts and Records Canada* (Ottawa, 1886), 48; and Department of Agriculture, Canada, *The Statistical Yearbook of Canada* (Ottawa, 1893), 134.
13. See Li, *The Chinese in Canada,* 55.
14. China was defeated by Britain in the Opium War (1839–42), a war over Britain's claim to trade opium in China. Between 1839 and 1900, Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Japan, the United States, and Russia engaged in a series of wars with China in her territories and succeeded in securing unequal trading rights and privileges from the Qing government of China; see Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *The Fall of Imperial China* (New York: Free Press, 1975). For changes in farm productivity and population, see Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).
15. Mable F. Timlin, "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1896–1910," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Sciences* 26 (1960): 517–32.
16. *Statutes of Canada*, "An Act to restrict and regulate Chinese Immigration to Canada," C. 71 (1885); *Statutes of Canada*, "An Act to restrict and regulate Chinese Immigration to Canada," C. 32 (1900); and *Statutes of Canada*, "An Act to restrict and regulate Chinese Immigration to Canada," C. 8 (1903).
17. Royal Commission, Canada, *Report* (1885); and Royal Commission, Canada, *Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration* (1902).
18. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 27–43.
19. *Statutes of Canada,* "An Act respecting Chinese Immigration," C. 38 (1923).
20. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 42.
21. Peter S. Li, "A Historical Approach to Ethnic Stratification: The Case of Chinese in Canada, 1858–1930," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 16 (1979): 320–32; and Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 50–56.
22. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 61–73.
23. Peter S. Li, "Immigration Laws and Family Patterns: Some Demographic Changes Among Chinese in Canada," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 12 (1980): 58–73.
24. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 67.
25. For a discussion of the ideological basis of the term "Chinatown," see Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown*.
26. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 90–91.
27. Ibid., 98.
28. Peter S. Li, "The Emergence of the New Middle Class among the Chinese in Canada," *Asian Culture* 14 (1990): 187–94; and Li, *The Chinese in Canada,* 129. The new middle class is defined here as composed of those in managerial, administrative, professional, and technical occupations.
29. Peter S. Li, "Unneighbourly Houses or Unwelcome Chinese: The Social Construction of Race in the Battle over 'Monster Homes' in Vancouver, Canada," *International Journal of Comparative Race and Ethnic Studies,* 1/2 (1994): 47–66.
30. Li, *The Chinese in Canada*, 120, 136.
31. David Parker, "Britain," in Pan, *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, 304–10.
32. Erich Gutinger, "A Sketch of the Chinese Community in Germany," in Benton and Pieke, *The Chinese in Europe*, 197–208.
33. Ng Kwee Choo, *The Chinese in London* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

34. Live Yu-Sion, "France," in Pan, *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, 311–18; Gabaccia, "The 'Yellow Peril' and the 'Chinese of Europe,'" 19; and Live Yu-Sion, "The Chinese Community in France: Immigration, Economic Activity, Cultural Organization and Representations," in Benton and Pieke, *The Chinese in Europe*, 96–124.
35. David Parker, "Chinese People in Britain: Histories, Futures and Identities," in Benton and Pieke, *The Chinese in Europe*, 67–95.
36. Live, "France," 312.
37. Live, "The Chinese Community in France," 98. Much later on, in 1986, East Germany and China concluded another "work-study plan" that aimed at bringing 90,000 Chinese from China to East Germany. However, only the first part of the plan was carried out, and less than 1,000 Chinese were found in East Germany by 1989; see Gutinger, "A Sketch of the Chinese Community in Germany," in *The Chinese in Europe*, 203.
38. Parker, "Chinese People in Britain," 70–73.
39. Gabaccia, "The 'Yellow Peril' and the 'Chinese of Europe,'" 190.
40. Parker, "Chinese People in Britain," 70.
41. Gutinger, "A Sketch of the Chinese Community in Germany," 197.
42. Parker, "Chinese People in Britain," 73.
43. Li Minghuan, *"We Need Two Worlds": Chinese Immigrant Associations in a Western Society* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 1.
44. Ng, *The Chinese in London*, 47–60.
45. Li, *"We Need Two Worlds."*
46. Parker, "Britain," in *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, 305; and Parker, "Chinese People in Britain," 75.
47. Live, "France," 312.
48. Gutinger, "A Sketch of the Chinese Community in Germany," 204.
49. Ng, *The Chinese in London*, 12–14.
50. Live, "France," 311.
51. Paul Baily, "The Work-Study Movement," in Lynn Pan, *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, 318.
52. Parker, "Chinese People in Britain," 79–81; Live, "France," 104; and Gutinger, "A Sketch of the Chinese Community in Germany," 206.
53. Live, "France," 316.
54. Parker, "Chinese People in Britain," 81.
55. Yuan Cheng, "The Chinese: Upwardly Mobile," in *Ethnicity in the 1991 Census,* vol. 2, *The Ethnic Minority Populations of Great Britain*, ed. Ceri Peach (London: Office For National Statistics, 1996), 161–80.
56. See Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown*; Clegg, *Fu Manchu and the 'Yellow Peril';* and Ward, *White Canada Forever*.
57. See Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown.*

— *Seven* —

Labor Diasporas in Comparative Perspective

Polish and Italian Migrant Workers in the Atlantic World between the 1870s and the 1920s

Adam Walaszek

In the Galician parish of Zaborów, around 1880, a young man who had heard about seasonal job opportunities "set out on a journey to search for the world." During the next thirteen years he traveled to Germany. Migration to work in agriculture or sometimes industry became part and parcel of Polish peasants' life. Soon they "discovered" Denmark and France and other destinations. However, of far more impact was the decision of Majka, a forty-year-old owner of four *morgas* (5.5 acres) and father to three children, who in 1888 borrowed money and went to Chicago. He returned after five years, but later left for the United States again. It is unclear why he selected Chicago, but we know that ever since that day, America had a great impact on the life of Zaborów. "Discovering America was in fact discovering a New World or perhaps new ways of life." [1] Emigrants started to bring others across the Atlantic. At least half of the parish's population migrated. The people in Zaborów were as interested in life in the diaspora, Chicago in particular, as in their local everyday life. Similarly, in the Galician village of Krzywa (Ropczyce county) people had never seen a train and were terrified of the Atlantic. But after the first migrants sent their relatives letters containing dollars, "everyone went completely mad; they borrowed money from wherever they could to buy tickets and leave for the land of gold. Friends and relatives abroad helped their countrymen to leave Poland or encouraged them to leave."[2]

Between 1885 and 1953, citizens of Agnone (southern Italy) emigrated to several cities in Argentina, and also to the United States (New York; Youngstown; Philadelphia; Pueblo, Colorado). It is not clear when and why the first group of *Agnonensi* arrived in Buenos Aires. Some researchers claim that it happened in 1858, but according to others it was in 1870. In the United States, the community of *Agnonensi* first emerged in the 1880s, when, for example, a man named Giuseppe Maria took a boat to New York. After arrival, he learned that some of his compatriots lived in Pueblo. He moved there in 1896 or 1897. He first brought over his brother and then, in 1904, his wife and son, Giuseppe. Agnone has maintained strong links with its diaspora on other continents.[3] The Polish and the Italian diasporas continue to exist into the present.

In his important theoretical work on diasporas, Robin Cohen defines nine main features of a diaspora: (1) dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions; (2) alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade, or to further colonial ambitions; (3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, and achievements; (4) an idealization of the putative ancestral home, and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety, and prosperity, or even to its creation; (5) the development of a return movement that gains collective approbation; (6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate; (7) a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance; (8) a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement; and (9) the possibility of a distinctive, creative, enriching life in host countries with tolerance for pluralism.[4]

The diasporic experiences of Poles and Italians reflect several of these characteristics and in some ways resemble each other. Citizens of both countries began to leave their homelands around the same time and often for similar reasons. In both cases emigration transformed the emigrants as well as their home and the new countries.[5] On the other hand, the destinations of Poles and Italians were usually different, or if they were the same, each group entered a different occupational niche. Although Poles and Italians shared experiences, they did not meet. This chapter explores the connections between diasporas and homelands through global family economies. At an early stage of development, "diaspora" meant connections between local communities. Later, a national consciousness emerged. Emigrants supported the economic and political developments in Europe, but the close connections dissolved in the 1920s.

Within a few decades, millions of Italians and Poles spread over several continents. In the fifty years from 1870 to 1921, 16.6 million men and women left Italy in search of *pane e lavoro*; between 1880 and 1914, approximately 10 million left Poland *za chlebem* (for bread). Some two-thirds of the rural population of Austrian and Prussian Poland and one-third of Russian Poland departed to look for jobs outside their villages; some traveled far,

others stayed nearby.[6] Many returned after a season or after a few years. During the interwar period (until 1939), another 2 million migrated. It is estimated that before World War I the communities of the Polish diaspora numbered 4.3 million people.[7]

Labor Migrations

Both Poles and Italians constituted labor diasporas. In both regions, rural populations, from which the majority of migrant workers came, had long been familiar with the idea of migration as a solution to everyday problems. In the Italian Alpine valleys such journeys began in the eighteenth century. Craftsmen from Val Vigezo traveled to France, while those from Val Massino favored Genoa and Rome. People from the Lake Como area looked for seasonal work as far as Palermo. In the nineteenth century, the volume of migration and the distances covered increased. In the Polish lands, migrations had long been part of social life, though less significant than in Western Europe; they increased after the emancipation of the peasantry from serfdom. From the mid-nineteenth century, unstable economic development and the dependence of Europe's peripheries on the developing West European and Atlantic center forced the peoples of southern, central and northern Europe into mass migrations; Europe's population was constantly in motion.[8] Two major intercontinental migration systems, the Atlantic and the Russian-Siberian, replaced the earlier regional migrations.[9] People from a particular region or village often chose a specific destination and separated according to their skills. For example, textile workers from Biella (Piemonte) emigrated to Paterson, New Jersey, while construction workers went to southern and eastern France.[10] In the early nineteenth century, Sardinians emigrated to Argentina and Brazil.[11] Inhabitants of the Podhale region traveled to Hungary and the United States, while people from the north of Mazowsze chose Germany, Brazil, and the United States. The emerging diasporas thus comprised small enclaves of settlements and networks of information and family relationships. These did not connect a Poland or an Italy to the Americas; they connected a village to one or a few destinations. Identities were local, not national.

Industrial centers during the second industrial revolution needed workers for factories, construction, mining, and domestic service. Agriculture in capitalist countries needed seasonal farm workers; other countries needed settlers. Argentina, for example, inspired by the *gobernar es poblar* slogan, introduced pro-immigration clauses into its constitution in 1853.[12] Where slavery had been abolished, plantation managers were looking for a new work force. From the other side of the Atlantic, most men and women who left home did so for economic reasons; for example, during Italy's agrarian crisis between 1879 and 1883, in a short period one-third of the Mezzogiorno's population left home. Sicilian craftsmen, unsuccessful in their struggle to improve living conditions, began to travel overseas in the early

1890s.[13] Families in postemancipation Polish villages, characterized by land shortage, rapid population growth, and a surplus work force, simply needed money.[14] Migration became a way of coping with harsh realities, an effort to make dreams come true. Although social status was perceived in terms of a peasant system of values, migration involved entry into the mainstream cash economy.[15] Journeys were "positively motivated"[16] to maintain or improve a standard of living.[17] Emigration could also involve opposition to traditions and their limitations as ways of life. It might even involve political aspects: Polish workers in French agriculture commented that Prussians were Poland's enemies, and that they therefore preferred jobs in France.[18] In most cases, emigrants' motives were complex and cannot be reduced to the "unlimited opportunities" cliché.[19]

At first labor migrations were connected with previous travel. In the Polish lands, the earliest long-distance migrations came from regions from which Germans were migrating: Silesia, Greater Poland, and Pomerania. Poles relied on the Germans' experiences when going to the United States or Australia.[20] In Italy, migration overseas began in the highly developed northern part of the country, where the tradition of migrating was the strongest. Soon men and women from the South—Calabria, Abruzzi, Basilicata, and the Naples region—followed. In this aspect, the rhythm of Italian migrations differed from that of Poland, where departure from the most developed centers began latest. Sicily, Galicia, and considerable parts of the Congress Kingdom of Poland were part of Europe's economic periphery. From these areas, members of the "middle class" were usually the first to leave: craftsmen and owners of small-sized farms in Sicily or owners of medium-sized farms in Galicia. The poorest part of the population more often chose closer destinations. But by the late nineteenth century, communication and transport links were numerous and simple enough that major parts of the rural population could learn about more distant options.[21]

Patterns and practices of migration depended on state regulations and migrants' funds. Italian authorities and politicians reacted to migrations differently than Polish authorities. In the divided Polish land, Prussian, Russian, and Austrian authorities were generally unfavorable to migrations, as were Polish politicians and publicists, especially concerning journeys to Germany or rural settlements in South America.[22] During the "Brazilian fever," the *Zorza* weekly in the Kingdom of Poland wrote, "Lord, save us from air, famine, fire and war. Save us from the plague of all those who instigate people to journey to Brazil. God, save our land!"[23] But jeremiads and negative opinions did not stop Poles from leaving the country. "If not to Brazil, they will go somewhere else—even if it has to be Siberia," noted a journalist.[24] Nationalists argued that the movement weakened the country's "demographic potential." Individual misfortunes and tragedies were cited to discourage departure. But migration continued and institutions for the care of migrants emerged.[25]

Many nineteenth-century commentators blamed agitation and the activity of so-called migration agents for migration.[26] In Galicia, legal proceedings

against the Oświęcim branch of the Hamburg-America Line hit the headlines.[27] The Canadian Pacific Line stirred up a big controversy in the early twentieth century by recruiting people to Canada.[28] Agents were, in fact, unreliable or outright crooks. Some Poles intending to go to the United States ended up as agricultural workers in Hawaii.[29] However, agents did not cause people's long-distance journeys but facilitated them. For intra-European migrations, to Germany or Denmark, people relied on middlemen known to them. *Aufseher* (professional recruiters), signed up migrants in the Kingdom and Galicia, accompanied them during the journeys, and were paid by both employers and migrants. For short-distance moves local "guides" prepared the route and found jobs.[30]

In northern Italy professional organizers of migration created a global labor market for unskilled or semiskilled migrants. *Padroni* or *capi* (subcontractors) informed people where to find jobs in construction work on roads, tunnels, and canals. They financed transportation or lent money to migrants. Such labor contractors and their work gangs operated in Switzerland, Brazil, Argentina, the United States, Canada, and Australia.[31] *Padroni* became a major part of the "landscape" of emigration, but they did not play a key part in the migration process,[32] they merely supported the institutional side of the process. According to 1868 regulations of Italy's Ministry of the Interior, people were not even allowed to travel to Algeria or America unaided by a *padrone*. Once migrants had established their own networks, *padroni* were replaced by chain migrations of village neighbors and families.[33] Polish migrants or their families, who covered the costs of travel themselves, were less dependent on agents. This situation was connected to Austrian authorities' efforts to build a centralized system for controlling migrations and thus limiting the activities of travel agents. That was why Polish people's journeys—especially overseas—had earlier been more individual or family-oriented than the Italian *padrone*/work-gang type of mobility.

Multiple Destinations and the Emergence of Two Distinct Diasporas

From the physical geography of migration, a social geography of diasporic relations emerged. For reasons of information and of cost, at first most people migrated to destinations which were close to their homes. In 1909, approximately 500,000 Poles lived in the Russian Empire (excluding the Congress Kingdom and the nine western *guberniyas* which had formerly belonged to the Kingdom of Poland).[34] Italian railway construction workers, through the *padroni* system, also journeyed to Russia, where they constituted about one-tenth of this particular labor force. The two groups hardly met because, in terms of social status, they differed considerably. For Italians, working on Russian transportation lines was basically the same thing as doing so in Canada or elsewhere. Russian-speaking Poles,

on the other hand, could work as inspectors, skilled industrial workers, or even as white-collar workers.

Germany was another nearby destination for Poles and Italians. Between 1876 and 1915, some 1.2 million Italians left for Germany, approximately 870,000 of them after 1901. Most came temporarily as seasonal workers, day laborers, or craftsmen. Southern Germany had been a destination for northern Italian craftsmen long before. Seasonal migrants were employed as agricultural laborers, as construction workers in cities, or as railway construction workers.[35] The Polish diaspora in Germany was slightly larger and lived in different regions. Outside the area of Polish settlement in Greater Poland and Silesia, Polish-speaking people in Germany numbered approximately 1.5 million before World War I. Polish seasonal migrants came to Mecklenburg and Brandenburg in the 1870s and 1880s as agricultural laborers; in Berlin they were employed as factory workers. In Westphalia and the Rhineland, Poles constituted one-third of the labor force, most working in mines. Their wages and salaries there were higher and working conditions better than in Upper Silesia. Starting around the late nineteenth century, people preferred Germany to overseas destinations. In 1913 the number of Poles in Westphalia and the Rhineland was estimated at 400,000 to 500,000. Around the turn of the twentieth century, Germany was the world's second most important destination of emigrants. Economist Leopold Caro has maintained that it was the "army" of Poles that made Germany's industrial development possible.[36] Much smaller communities of Polish migrants appeared in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,[37] and even in the Bukovina.[38]

In late-nineteenth-century France, Italians constituted the largest group of foreigners. One-third of Italy's migrants chose this destination: some 817,633 between 1876 and 1900, and another 897,933 between 1901 and 1915 (gross figures, not adjusted for return migrations). Most of them stayed in rural southern France and in the major cities: Marseilles, Lyon, and Paris.[39] Again, they never connected with the small Polish diaspora (of about 30,000–40,000) in prewar France. Coming as agricultural workers, most were young Polish peasants; few were craftsmen.[40] The first Polish miners in the *département* of Pas-de-Calais were brought from Germany on the initiative of Prince Witold Czartoryski in the early twentieth century. The coal mines in Aniche and Anzin *départements* needed a work force, and the prince had invested in them. At the same time, Polish associations in Paris, in close contact with Polish communities in Westphalia and the Rhineland, were sensitive to attempts to Germanize them. Only 2,000 Polish migrants moved to France before World War I,[41] but a much larger group came from Westphalia (approximately 100,000) and Denmark after 1918.[42] These typical "secondary migrations"[43] give evidence of continuous contacts between diaspora groups. In the interwar period (1919–1938), Poland facilitated mobility by signing migration agreements with France. In 1931 Poles constituted 22 percent of those employed in French mining—compared to Italians' 5.4 percent. In other branches of industry, by contrast,

the number of Italians was almost three times as large as that of Poles, resulting in overlapping but distinct diasporas. A third group of migrants, Spaniards, established a base in agriculture.[44]

Switzerland, Europe's main recipient of Italian workers, was the destination of more than 320,000 workers between 1876 and 1900, and more than one million from 1901 to 1915. During the same period, few Poles moved to Switzerland.[45] Instead, they chose mining in Holland[46] or agriculture and weaving in Denmark, where Italians did not travel. [47]

In the transatlantic migration, 29 percent of all Italian emigrants went to North America (4.2 million) before 1914; 24 percent went to South America (2 million to Brazil, 1.8 million to Argentina). A migration characterized by religious affiliation was that of Waldensians, a small sect from the vicinity of Turin, which first moved to France, and, in the late nineteenth century, to Uruguay.[48] The geography of this Atlantic world was different for Polish men and women. About 2.2 million Poles emigrated to the United States[49] but only 115,000 to Brazil (in the states of Parana, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul),[50] and a mere 32,000 Poles settled in Argentina.[51] During the interwar period, the number of Polish workers and farmers employed in Brazil rose; approximately 150,000 Poles left for Argentina, that is, ten times fewer than the number of Italians.[52] The number of Polish people in Canada was estimated at a mere 33,000 in 1918, but 100,000 (mostly peasants) migrated there during the next two decades.[53] From the beginning of the century, Italians went as railroad construction workers to Montreal and spread out along the tracks they laid. Poles formed urban and rural clusters in the provinces of Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan; Italians formed a web of small railway communities.

Italians built tunnels, first in the Alps, then for subways in New York, and then in the Rockies; they built railways in the Americas and in Asia and dug the Suez and the Panama Canals.[54] They worked on plantations in Louisiana and in Brazil. They paved the streets of American cities. Like Poles, they were also employed in mining, but the mines they worked in were mainly in locations other than those employing Poles. Poles were concentrated in industrial districts of the eastern and central United States, in steelworks and slaughterhouses, in industrial and coal towns.[55] The selection of different occupational niches is evidenced in Caroline Golab's study of Philadelphia, where Italians monopolized the public works and railway construction system, but Poles avoided the city, unable to find appropriate jobs.[56] In the United States, most Italian women worked in the textile industry, while Polish women were employed in slaughterhouses or as servants. In South America Italians were employed in the building industry and in agriculture. While they gradually invested their income and turned into businessmen in São Paulo and Buenos Aires, the Poles in South America remained laborers.

More Italian immigrants than Poles were employed as contract workers in gangs organized by labor contractors, *padroni*, such as Antonio Cordasco in Montreal.[57] Among Poles, community leaders occasionally assumed

similar functions. Thus, Michael P. Knioła helped Polish immigrants in Cleveland to find jobs. In the United States, such roles were even performed by priests.[58] Nevertheless, the majority of Polish migrants preferred to rely on an informal network of family ties. The Polish family economy was different from the Italian work-gang economy in terms of gender roles, income allocation, and community formation.

Global Family Economies

Migrations changed the lives of several generations of Poles and Italians; a culture of migration became part of family life. Members of the diaspora were constantly in touch with their friends and relatives at home and elsewhere. Labor communities in the diaspora and in the old country carried on a continuous dialogue and cooperated.[59] As a result of this international "family economy," people who stayed in Poland began to perceive their everyday lives in altogether different terms. Labor migration led to transnationalism. Seasonal (agricultural) workers regularly returned to the Polish lands from the neighboring countries of Denmark, Germany, Latvia, and Hungary. Approximately 30 percent of those who had left for the United States before World War I returned to their native country. Among Italians, return was about 50 percent (estimate). In the Latin American countries, a considerable number of Italian men and women returned to their homeland, while most Poles stayed. Most returns were preplanned, but a few were "returns of failure," when initial goals could not be accomplished. There was an obvious connection between the return "waves" and periods of economic crises.

Life in Polish and Italian rural areas was transformed in material and psychological terms by experiences gained in the diasporas.[60] Return migrants brought their savings and material culture. In Poland and Hungary, houses which looked more modern were often called "American." Diaspora communities supported native communities in many ways, the most significant of which was financial assistance.[61] The total value of money orders mailed from the United States to Galicia in 1902 reached $3.5 million, another estimated $4 million was brought by returnees, $3.5 million was probably sent to Russian Poland, and $2 million was in all probability mailed in letters.[62] Villages were increasingly dependent on fellow villagers on other continents. The same applies to Italy, but here, too, social advancement was limited and only a small number of the returnees became wealthy landowners.[63] Migrations also influenced gender roles in the villages. Women who took care of households when their husbands were away (termed "white widows" in Italy) became independent and gained more authority. Free from Old World constraints, their role in diasporic communities changed on a far larger scale and news about this reached the old country.[64] This local aspect of labor diaspora reality was perhaps the most important; it involved the most private, family links.

Some Aspects of Adaptation

Immigrants had to create their own worlds, so to speak, to accomplish their goals, whether they wanted to adapt or not. Initially, many emigrant neighborhoods, regardless of culture of origin, were areas of extreme poverty. In Chicago's Back of the Yards district, Poles lived together with other people from central and Eastern Europe,[65] but there were no Italians in the district.[66] Visitors saw utter poverty—the dwellings lacked daylight, electricity, and sewerage, and they were in such bad condition that they did not even deserve to be called houses. Apartments were impossibly overcrowded; tuberculosis and child death rates were the highest in the city. The district epitomized human misery and degradation. Father Zygmunt Chełmicki and journalist Antoni Hempel, who visited Polish workers in São Paulo, found identical conditions in the Bom Retiro suburb, "apartments crammed with people; they cook their dinners outdoors, in courtyards."[67] Italians did not leave *la miseria* in Europe, either. Hard work, exploitation, diseases, wretched accommodations, shortages—all these things were part of immigrants' lives. In New York's Little Italys, they lived in overcrowded tenements on the Lower East Side and in Harlem.[68] In Chicago they lived beyond West and Halstead Streets, and in Toronto, west of Union Station.[69] In San Francisco, Marseilles, and Buenos Aires, Italians lived in small houses, often inhabited by several families and in more ethnically diverse districts. Small houses were also inhabited by workers of textile factories in northern France or cigar rollers in Tampa, Florida.[70] But even though extremely poor, these apartments—at least in the United States, Germany and France—were often better than the accommodations had been in the homelands. An immigrant wrote, "Although my standard of living … was at its lowest compared with the American standards, it was splendid compared with that in the old country."[71] Gradually, the immigrants' standard of living improved because their earnings were higher.

The new society often turned out to be hostile, and antipathy to newcomers largely conditioned diaspora communities. Discrimination was integral to their condition as minority groups. In the workplace it posed a threat to migrants' goals. Employers often took advantage of the fact that immigrants' knowledge about their new country was very poor. The jobs of "aliens" were almost always inferior and underpaid. Native-born workers insulted immigrants, whether Poles, Italians, Irish, African Americans, Chinese, or Sikhs.[72] They blamed newcomers for problems in workplaces and the failure of strikes. Ludwik Krzywicki, traveling by train in the United States in 1893, saw railway-track workers approach the train and curse the immigrants looking out of the windows, using the most rude words, of which "scabs" was the most common and the most kind.[73] American trade unions demanded that immigration be restricted.[74] Supervising personnel belonged to different ethnic groups that had arrived earlier and had succeeded in establishing themselves. In Nanticoke, Pennsylvania, the name of the first Polish foreman was remembered half a century later,

so unusual was the fact that a Pole had held a supervisory post in the 1870s.[75] Hostile working-class attitudes toward immigrants have been termed "proletarian nationalism" by Robert Paris.[76] Immigrants realized that they were not part of the receiving society, that they were considered beasts of burden. Their status was low, and work was hard, which they stressed many times in letters: "in America Poles work like cattle,"[77] or "The Italian people were slaves," wrote an Abruzzese in 1911.[78] "In Cuba," M. Wańkowicz wrote, "the object of the new slavery is *un polaco*—a Polish peasant."[79] "We were treated as the blacks were," Italians employed as railway construction workers used to say.[80]

The first Polish miners brought from Germany to Pas-de-Calais, northern France, in the early twentieth century were treated as Germans. In the atmosphere of tension between the two states, they found themselves in an extremely hostile environment. "The French people would gladly see these foreigners leave," an observer noted in 1910. In an aura of omnipresent xenophobia and contempt, Poles tended to avoid industrial conflicts and did not join trade unions. At the same time, they were too weak to create their own organizations as they had done in Germany.[81] During the Great Depression hostility resulted in a large-scale return migration of the Polish workers from France.[82]

Migrants also faced discrimination outside their workplaces.[83] In the late 1930s, building his *Estado Novo*, President Getulio Vargas of Brazil turned against the cultural distinctiveness of immigrant enclaves and thus destroyed, or at least seriously hurt, the diaspora. In 1938, Brazilians feared that Poland, Germany, and Italy would deal with Brazil in the same way the Nazi Reich had claimed Czechoslovakia's Sudeten Germans. Because of the aggressive rhetoric of their states of origin in Europe, Poles and Italians in Brazil faced repression from their host state. This had a dramatic impact on the future of their traditions, cultures, and languages. In Argentina, ethnic education (including Polonia's) was strongly attacked.[84] Individual migrants and whole diasporic communities were caught in political conflicts, which they had neither interest in nor any influence on.

In general, immigrants successfully adapted their European heritage to meet the challenges of the Americas. The first reaction to the urban industrial order was a "communal response."[85] In order to survive and, above all, to accomplish their goals, immigrants combined to build increasingly dense organizational and institutional networks—to tame the reality and even the landscape.[86] In the process of adjusting to life in their new "homeland," immigrants introduced elements that had been useful or traditional in the old country. In agricultural Wisconsin they erected wayside shrines identical with those at crossroads in Poland. In 1931 in Tioga County, Pennsylvania, emigrants built a mound, an artificial hill commemorating the old country and its heroes; the mound was modeled on Polish mounds and partly built with soil brought from Poland.[87] The social landscape was often key in choosing a dwelling place. "When I saw this church, the Jan Kanty.… It made me cry, 'cause I saw my church in Poland. I was in Poland.

We had this lovely church, tall altars, pillars, everything was so … I'd like to live here in Chicago for these churches," said a Polish emigrant, remembering the early twentieth century.[88] Italian churches in the United States (Holy Rosemary or Our Lady of Mount Carmel in Cleveland) resembled the houses of worship in Italy. In Harlem, the elements applied to make the landscape look more familiar were statues of the Saints and the Virgin Mary in the rooms of slum tenements. There were also street and parish *feste;* for example, the 16 July holiday was a celebration of Our Lady of Mount Carmel held on 115th Street and was a feast of processions, pleasant smells, and food, just like in the old country.[89] The parishes and churches, which the emigrants built immediately after arriving in the United States, were meant to preserve ethnic Catholicism. This was so successful that the U.S. Catholic hierarchy's attitude toward the colorful, folksy Italian and Polish churches was hostile and fearful.[90] Ethnic by nature, the church, however, did not facilitate the two groups' meeting, despite similarities between the situation of the Polish and the Italian Catholics.

In ethnic (Polish or Italian) districts, which were usually created as a result of chain migrations, women who did not go into wage work often rented out rooms to lodgers or boarders. Children worked in factories, in the fields, and in mines;[91] boys sold newspapers and girls worked in home production.[92] Where space permitted, immigrants bred farm animals or grew vegetables. When poverty forced them to, they collected waste food from garbage cans or stole coal from freight cars. Family economies were adapted from the labor of whole families in agricultural villages.

Ethnic institutions provided immigrants with social security, assistance, and information. The Polish National Alliance (PNA) in the United States founded a Labor Secretariat to "collect information and numbers about the working conditions under which industries are currently operating."[93] Parishes, churches, and the ethnic press performed the same role. Saloons were meeting places where one could confide in others, ask for advice, and form opinions about current affairs. Formal social organizations often emerged from such informal meetings.[94] Ethnic groups could achieve what Raymond Breton termed "institutional completeness," an organizational support structure as complete as that of the state in which they lived, a state which did not admit them to political participation and societal resources.[95] Ethnic communities supported workplace struggles. Members of extended families offered help to relatives initiating and organizing "chain migration" and in helping them to find and keep jobs. Support in Polish communities was so extensive that a Polish journalist in America could exclaim, "This is not America! It's Tarnów, Stanisławów."[96]

Encountering similar problems and dealing with them in similar ways, Poles and Italians, however, reacted to them separately. They had little opportunity to confront the reality together since they occupied different economic sectors, lived in different cities, and traveled to different locations—even the similarity of their experiences, joys, or humiliations never led them to plan a protest together.

Ethnic Identity

What made the members of the labor diaspora get together was the memory of home, perhaps nostalgia.[97] We will analyze ethnic identity in both groups, mainly using the example of communities in the United States. People's ways of perceiving their native country is just as significant a factor in shaping their ethnic identity as the exigencies of the new society.

After the last partition of Poland in 1795, when the Polish state vanished from the map of Europe for 123 years, gradual social and economic transformations, the emancipation of peasants, and the struggle for independence strengthened the national spirit in the different social classes.[98] In the late nineteenth century one could speak of Poles in the three partitions as having a full-fledged national consciousness.[99] However, peasants' national identity varied from one village to the next. In some villages, people read Polish publications and by the late nineteenth century boasted a genuinely national spirit; in others, the inhabitants were completely indifferent to national issues.[100] In Galicia fifty years after emancipation, to take one example, clear changes could be observed. Literary critic Artur Górski wrote in 1899, "Someone enters between us who has not yet really confirmed his identity; someone awaited by the entire nation, heralded by those who heard the rhythm of his footsteps in the silence of black gloomy nights.… He is a Polish peasant."[101] In other historians' opinion, people's understanding of an "ideological homeland" was only a result of World War I.[102]

Similarly, few nineteenth-century people of the Apennine Peninsula saw themselves as Italians, and very few participated in the national unification movement.[103] They shared a spirit of *campanilismo*, their identity was more region-based. This spirit was transplanted in the process of emigration. The migration activists who fought for the unification of Italy (*Risorgimento* exiles) had but a minor influence on diasporic villagers. Deep inside their hearts, migrants still belonged to their villages, towns, or "private homelands," as sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski has aptly called them.[104]

Though immigrants longed for their "private homelands, they began to discover translocal inks," in the foreign country. Some social scientists argue that migrants came to be aware of a national identity only by the change of cultural environment. The Polishness of immigrants was expressed in the language, tradition, customs, and a specific, folksy attitude to religion—not in the national ideology. In confronting the foreign country, they quickly realized how dissimilar they were to their neighbors. A young man from Czarny Dunajec, in the mountainous south of Poland, remembered that in Budapest "I [found] various nationalities: Magyars, Germans, [I]talians, Croats, Slovaks, Czechs, and ourselves, Poles from all over Galicia … each one sticking together at work and afterward."[105] During the first stage of labor migration of Poles from Prussian Poland to Germany, "there was practically no community spirit in the immigrants arriving in the Ruhr region," Krystyna Murzynowska noted.[106] However,

Zaranie, a liberal-democratic weekly published in Russian Poland, commented, "If one of our brethren goes abroad, there's nothing wrong with it. Quite the contrary, he will learn from other nationalities how to respect what he has and how to love his homeland."[107] Migration considerably contributed to the rise of Polish national spirit.[108] In 1907, intellectuals and artists from Lvov observed, "Millions are awaking now. The struggle for survival has made people stronger. Emigration made them see completely new prospects."[109] National consciousness emerged from a migration-induced awareness that local and regional differences were smaller than differences between immigrants of a different language. National identities negotiated between smaller and larger differences.[110]

To exist as cultural groups, emigrant communities had to keep up a collective memory. Hence, labor diaspora groups attracted and somehow required the presence of people from other social classes, chiefly the intelligentsia, the "cultural brokers." They were the ones who helped create communities. Among them were members of the "diaspora of warriors,"[111] avowed oppositionists, participants in national uprisings (1830–31, 1846, 1846–49, 1863–64), and soldiers of all ranks, politicians, and artists. They traveled or fled to France, England, Belgium, Switzerland, and Algeria and built organizational structures there.[112] They often moved from their countries of first asylum to other, distant destinations, spreading their ideas and remaining faithful to their Polishness.[113] Polish revolutionaries from the nobility or intelligentsia had a strong sense of national identity. As actors in the era of uprisings and influenced by the Romantic spirit, men such as Henryk Kałussowski, W. Pawlicki, J. Horain, T. Samolińska, and others in the United States kept close contacts with both the homeland and the diasporic communities. They were well educated and some of them became financially independent.[114] To some extent, they succeeded in translating the sense of responsibility for Poland into the language of American reality. Their efforts laid the foundations for the first Polish organizations. Juliusz Andrzejkowicz (1822–1898), one of the founders of the PNA in 1880, left Poland for France in 1848. He then went to the United States where he made a fortune in Philadelphia, and kept in touch with Polish emigrants in Europe. He supported the veterans of national uprisings and was a member of the National Treasury Commission in Rapperswil, Switzerland. Agaton Giller, a Polish emigrant from Switzerland, inspired the PNA. The founding and lasting influence of the PNA, as well as its broad support, are convincing evidence of worldwide ethnic identity in the Polish diaspora.[115]

The Polish intelligentsia, petty déclassé nobles, priests, and members of the middle class, created a sense of attachment to the "ideological homeland" which Polish peasant emigrants adopted. The national ideology, with its historical symbols, emblems, and terminology was based on a heroic past, the history of nobles, the Jagiellonian dynasty and the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. Emigrant self-assistance organizations bore the names of Polish kings, and their press covered these aspects of the past

extensively: the old country was idealized.[116] In the nineteenth century, political leaders of the Polish emigrant communities emphasized the political and cultural role of the diaspora and discussed the way Poles should behave in America. A split between religionists and nationalists did not divide the community; rather, workers turned to nationalistic ideals and developed a strong sense of national identity.

Italians' *campanilismo* in the Americas manifested itself in the cult of the saints worshipped locally in Italy, in the adoration of particular statues, and celebrations modeled on local *feste*. It consolidated the identity of the *paese*, the small agro-town of Italy. At the same time, *prominenti*, the Italian emigrant middle classes, advocated another kind of identity, a different culture. Their approach to *italianità* and sense of attachment to the Italian nation invoked the tradition of the Renaissance and Dante. Italian self-assistance organizations were named after heroes of the struggle for unification, chiefly Garibaldi. Their members wore the uniforms of the carabinieri during celebrations of Italian holidays. Thus, ethnicization of Italians also became national in character from the top down. The nationwide ethnic insurance organization in the United States, founded in 1905, was called the Sons of Italy. Next the tradition of observing Columbus Day as a holiday began. "By placing the Italians at the very beginnings of American history through their surrogate ancestor, the anniversary of the 'discovery' of the New World served to legitimize their claims to Americanness at the same time that it allowed them to take pride in their Italianness," wrote Rudolph Vecoli.[117]

Demonstrating ethno-national pride became one of the middle class's chief objectives. Suitable occasions were created over time. The first Pulaski Day Parade was not held in New York until 1937. The efforts of the middle class and the sense of national identity coexisted with the local spirit of the Polish village or *paese*. Italian migrants were still *domus*-oriented, the home was the center of their life and culture. Their postmigration culture still emphasized "traditional patterns of respect, obligations in the family, and social behavior."[118] The church did not counter this approach. The Polish church invoked national symbols, for example, Our Lady of Częstochowa, while Italian religiosity was based on the cult of local saints. A consensus integrating the culture of *domus*, *campanilismo,* and the sense of national identity was achieved in the 1920s.[119]

While Italian unity had been established in the 1870s, Poland still did not exist as an independent country. Labor diaspora communities increasingly supported national political activities.[120] In the United States, the PNA, the largest fraternal organization of Polish labor migrants, represented the independence-oriented option and kept close links with the Polish Emigrants Alliance in Europe.[121] In advocating the struggle for Poland's independence, the PNA referred to Poles in America as "the fourth district" of Poland (and the Polish community in Brazil's Parana was sometimes referred to as "the fifth district").[122] The culmination of this approach was the Polish National Congress in Washington in 1910, a

patriotic meeting of the members of "Polonia," the Polish community worldwide. In 1912, an attempt was made to create an organizational umbrella for efforts to regain independence.[123] Diaspora links became increasingly strong, and Polish politics more global. The celebration of the anniversary of the Polish Third of May Constitution, organized by miners from Pas-de-Calais *département* in 1914, saw participation of Polonia representatives from Paris, Bochum (Germany), and the United States.[124]

World War I and "Emigrants for Themselves"

The role of the diaspora communities during World War I and at the Versailles conference is well documented and cannot be overestimated.[125] However, the call for patriotism was more and more often accompanied by calls encouraging the emigrants to fulfill their responsibilities to their new homeland. In the United States, Americanization programs were aimed at foreign workers, and there were the America First and the Liberty Loan Bonds campaigns. Service to the United States as well as the liberation of Poland were Polonia goals. The Polish press described the benefits resulting from the U.S. citizenship.[126] Individual workers (with relatives in Poland) and whole ethnic communities enthusiastically supported the purchase of bonds. In Cleveland, immigrant groups competed to raise the highest amounts of money. The contest, which demonstrated the loyalty of the groups to the United States, was supported by all political factions of Polonia: unionists, socialists, conservatives, and clergy. The reason for manifesting loyalty to America in the same way as to Poland was that work for Poland's independence worked for Polonia's good as well. The rebirth of the Polish state implied higher prestige for the Polish groups in the United States. Free Poland allowed people to "legitimize their place in the American society."[127] Mobilizing ethnic assets was, in return, supposed to allow people to better negotiate a safer place for the group in the American society.

Initially, the postwar ambitions of major translocal Polonia organizations were connected with the Polish lands. In 1919, the president of the PNA said that Poles in America "see the voice of the Prime Minister in Poland as the voice of the Polish government.… We must completely obey … this government."[128] In *sejms* (representative assemblies), slogans such as "Everything for Poland" and "Save Poland above all" prevailed.[129] But disappointments with Poland's political leaders, conflicts with Polish diplomatic representatives, the decline of immigration to the United States,[130] and the failure of return migrations to Poland led to a change in attitudes.[131] In a turnabout, American Poles began to promote the idea of "emigrants for themselves." Emigration congresses emphasized the necessity to naturalize Polish immigrants, to adopt the English language and American ideas: "Poland is not here."[132] A spokesman at the Emigration Congress of 1925 concisely stated: "Poland is now independent … and

does not need our help any longer … we must take care of our own business here in this country" in order to "participate in American life like other groups do."[133] Many Poles in America finally came to realize, or decided, that they would not return to Poland and that they would try to exist within the American structures.

Polonia workers, who often belonged to both a trade union and the fraternal organizations, eventually integrated with the working class of their new homeland. The Polonia workers' leaders—like those of other diasporic groups, whether born in the United States or first-generation immigrants—challenged the "proletarian nationalism," and, according to Donna Gabaccia, became "radical ethnic intermediaries."[134] For example, the Polish Section of the Socialist Party supported industrial unionism and was committed to the American labor movement. It also fed Poles' pride in their Polishness, believing that a strong sense of national identity would help Polish workers to organize themselves more effectively.[135] Struggles for control in the place of work helped Polish workers to think about themselves as "American, but of Polish descent." Being recognized as members of the working class, they also believed and hoped to receive recognition by mainstream society as an ethnic group. Polish-American workers, unionists and socialists, proved themselves to be more involved in the American scene and followed the middle-class ideology of "Polish-Americanism."[136]

The turning point of the Italians' nationalization occurred during the interwar period and was unquestionably connected with the growth of Fascism in Italy. Italian workers in France, Belgium and Argentina became strongly anti-Fascist. In America "antifascism offered class-conscious immigrants an opportunity to assert their own definition of *italianità*, as part of 'working-class Americanism,'" wrote Gabaccia and Ottanelli.[137] However, in contrast to Europe, the effects of the "Red Scare" were still present in the United States, and Italian patriotism was often linked with an approval of Fascism. Even if intellectuals rejected it, masses of Italian-Americans were glad about the success of Fascism.[138] Anti-Fascist Massimo Salvadori wrote, "In Italy, they had never been Italians, but in America they became Italian nationalists, and to that degree they were Fascists." Don Luigi Sturzo spoke about Italians' "nationalism with a Fascist label." It was Fascism that helped Italian-Americans see themselves as a minority; it kept up their ethnic identity.[139] The Italian government sought to provide the Italian communities in the world with their own definition of *italianità*, and make them unite. Italian consulates created *fasci* clubs—such as the Fascist League of North America and the Licor Federation.[140] The Dante Alighieri Society and the Committee Pro-Italian Language supported Fascist ideology. Such activities were coordinated by the National United Italian Associations, in close cooperation with Associations of Italians Abroad, managed by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[141] Giovanni di Silvestro, leader of the Sons of Italy, signed an agreement with the Fascist Italian League, responsible for contacts with Italians abroad. They supported Italy for reasons of ethnic pride. As one Italian-American put

it: "Whatever you fellows may think of Mussolini, you've got to admit one thing. He has done more to get respect for the Italian people than anybody else. The Italians get a lot more respect now than when I started going to school. And you thank Mussolini for that."[142] Many shared this opinion. "However, for the most part, this support was nonideological, since they were actually only expressing support for Italy," wrote Ronald H. Bayor.[143] They did not reject loyalty to America: "We love America as one could love his own wife; we love Italy as one loves his own mother," said an activist of the Fascist League of North America.[144] Pilgrimages to Italy organized by the Sons of Italy aimed at making immigrants realize how much they needed this insurance organization and also indoctrinated them with the new Fascist identity. The results of indoctrination were dubious, however. Of the 1,400 participants who set out from New York in the 1929 pilgrimage only 400 reached the official destinations, Rome, Milan and Florence. The others most certainly went to their home towns in the south, to see their friends and families.[145]

At this time, the Poles in the United States did not access the World Association of Poles Abroad (*Światpol*), and the Polish government did not succeed in connecting the Polonia organizations in the U.S. to Warsaw.[146] While individuals still traveled to Poland to visit their place of origin, the Polish group maintained Polish-American cultural heritage and simultaneously supported assimilation. In 1926, for example, the Polish Arts Club was established in Chicago and the Joseph Conrad Literary Club was formed in Buffalo. The Polish Museum of America was founded in Chicago in 1935.

Everyday life guided both Poles and Italians in a similar direction, from diaspora to multicultural host societies. The similarities between the Polish and Italian labor diasporas, resulting from emigration processes as much as from the situation in the countries of immigration, cannot overshadow the differences. Italians and Poles took up distinct occupational niches and often traveled in different directions. Even when they lived in the same country or city their contact was limited. All the same, their reactions to some aspects of life were akin. Nancy L. Green asked, "Who are more alike, an Italo-American and an Italo-Frenchman or an Italo-American and an American Jew?"[147] There is no clear-cut answer, but by the 1920s and 1930s a Pole from New York and an Italian from New York tended to be closer to each other than a Pole from Milwaukee and a Pole from Pas-de-Calais. Still, in the 1930s, Poles and Italians of the diasporas differed in their attitude to their native countries—a result of accidental historic conjunctions.

Notes

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— *Eight* —

Dialectics of Empire and Complexities of Culture

British Men in India, Indian Experiences of Britain

Bernd-Peter Lange and Mala Pandurang

In the last three thousand years of its history, the Indian subcontinent has witnessed continuous incursions of peoples from the outside—the Aryans, and then the Greeks, Huns, Islamic rulers, and early Christian missionaries. "India, diversity is thy name," the poet might say. While the first European trading community to reach Indian shores was of Portuguese origin, it was the British who largely served as agents for the entry of European thoughts and attitudes, at a point of time in history when Western civilization itself was undergoing significant developments. Given the trend of contemporary academics to place Europe as the "sovereign theoretical subject of all histories,"[1] one must be cautious not to assume that the British colonial experience was the most crucial and defining event of the subcontinent's history. Nayantara Saghal puts it thus: "They came, stayed and left. And now they've gone, and their residue is simply one layer added to the layer upon layer of Indian consciousness. Just one more."[2] However, what makes the context of the colonial interaction with the British particularly unique is that for the first time in its history, Indian peoples were subjected to long-distance control by an unfamiliar race and culture in a far off island, separated by an oceanic barrier "which was both navigable and impregnable according to need."[3] Unlike their conquering predecessors, the Islamic Moguls, who did not resist assimilation and gradually Indianized, the British chose to remain "an outside incubus"[4] and did not strike roots in the Indian sociocultural milieu. Men in an enclave ruled a society they did not understand and, in turn, like numbers

of the colonized society migrated to England both to comprehend their rulers and to gain university degrees that permitted entry into the global-imperial-colonial system of administration and thought. Just as Europeans carried their frame of mind and their power with them, Indians carried their different frame of mind with them. Both influenced, subverted, distorted, and fertilized each other.

Colonial Interactions: British Men in India

From a postcolonial point of view, the period of interaction between British and Indian people during the Raj appears as one momentous system unified by the impact of colonialism. While it is obvious that the nature of colonialism changed in its complex evolution, still the subjection of one community by another, Western one was the predominant process that synthesized most cultural variables in a fairly stable way. Looking more closely at the specific characteristics of the relationship between colonizers and the colonized in India, there were remarkable variations contingent on the specific historical conjunctures from first contacts between metropolitan center and colonial periphery to, eventually, the formal severance of colonial ties at India's independence.

It is worthwhile to sketch the different *personae* of British colonizers through the most significant periods of the imperial process, indicating their roles, their functions with regard to the alien society, and, most of all, their relationship and attitude toward the Indian population they were interacting with. One reasonable heuristic premise is the persistence of a set of dispositions that survive their generating conditions, like the concept of *habitus* that the French sociologist Bourdieu introduced to academic discourse. Of course, the British in India were never monolithic, but diversified according to their functions and specific missions. All the same, it is helpful to look at their historical composition as a kind of "structure with dominance" (Althusser) that makes it possible to isolate certain distinct social types representative of the consecutive phases of the British Raj. This will yield a historical typology of the British presence in India as the core area of their world-spanning empire.

In the tourist, one of the earliest types of British visitors to South Asia besides traders and missionaries, a peculiar kind of naiveté, bordering on innocence, emerges that, on the surface, was to resurface in the burgeoning tourist industry in the age of decolonization. In the figure of one early-seventeenth-century British traveler to the Orient, Thomas Coryat, the beginning of a tourist fascination with the East incorporated a mixture of British eccentricity and stereotypical Western habits. Coryat wandered east via the overland route through the Persian Empire, as a private individual with pre-Enlightenment curiosity, not in any of the other options of soldier, trader, missionary, or diplomat. The privacy of travel, however, was combined with abundant textuality. In Coryat's trajectory to visit the Great

Mogul, Emperor Jehangir, he accumulated masses of notes in a travel diary with a view to their eventual publication in a book for a British public whose fascination with the exotic had already been awakened by earlier explorers. The English Ambassador to the Mogul, Sir Thomas Roe, commented unkindly on this obsession with publicizing tourist experiences: it made "any stationer an alderman that shall but serve the printer with paper."[5] Nowhere did Coryat's perspective transcend that of the curious tourist looking at India from a temporary exposure with an exoticizing gaze. However, he was instrumental in connecting the private sphere with the incipient formation of a public domain through journalism and the expanding market for printed information.

The early contacts of British men with the East ran in parallel courses regardless of their specific interests. The same Mogul Emperor Jehangir that Thomas Coryat's tourist interest focused on, in 1612 allowed the newly founded East India Company to establish a trading post (or factory) at Surat. In this early period British traders and merchants were in a markedly submissive position with regard to Indian rulers, a relationship that took almost a century to change into parity. Only after the last of the Stuart kings strengthened the East India Company's claims against its competitors could the company hold up its head against the indigenous powers in Western India. In the words of the liberal Victorian historiographer of India, Henry Beveridge, "the native powers were no longer to be addressed in submissive petitions, but given to understand that the Company would henceforth treat them as an independent power."[6] However, as yet there was little trace of any attitude of superiority on the part of the East India Company's writers, factors, or other employees toward the native population. This may simply have been because no intimate involvement of the British with their temporary surroundings occurred except for the private trade carried on because of the low pay the Company was granting its employees.[7] The British merchants learned no Indian languages, and their social contact was restricted to a few Indian intermediaries in their commercial transactions. In distinction to British colonial settler communities in other parts of the empire, they formed no new identities.[8] Their motivation was unequivocally centered on the financial profits from their temporary activities in the Indian territories.[9]

The social and professional profile of the East India Company was shaped by a hierarchy through which rewards could be reaped:

> Once accepted, the employee beginning a career in the Company on this route would then be sent to the East as a "writer" or "apprentice." By the mid-eighteenth century most writers would be in their late teens (the minimum age being sixteen years), and have undergone some training in commercial or mathematical accounting. With some very notable exceptions for merit, rising through the Company's ranks depended on seniority and perseverance within the hierarchy. Five years service as a writer would be followed by promotion to the post of factor which would, in turn, lead after another three years to an appointment as junior merchant. After another three-year stint in this position,

> the Company employee could then attain the most elevated rank of senior merchant. These senior merchants became the members of the governing councils in each presidency, and, sometimes, even gained the office of governor itself.[10]

This primarily economic motivation survived unchanged into the age of imperial competition between the Western powers in the first half of the eighteenth century. The system behind the ubiquitous fortune hunting and territorial expansion of the East India Company around its trading posts, particularly in Bengal, was the social aspiration of small men to become landowning gentry after their Indian sojourn. The deliberately poor payment of the Company's lower-level servants, writers, factors, and other employees encouraged their exploitative attitude toward indigenous people. Even Robert Clive, one of the more notorious early British agents in India, was scandalized by what he saw in the upstart nabob class in Calcutta: "Corruption, Licentiousness and a want of Principles seem to have possessed the Minds of all the Civil Servants, by frequent bad examples they have grown callous, Rapacious and Luxurious beyond Conception."[11] This view was shared by those at the receiving end, for example by Clive's contemporary, Mir Kasim, then Nawab of Bengal.

The period between the Battle of Plassey (1757) and the assumption of the East India Company's Nawabship over the Mogul possessions in Bengal in 1765, to the reorganization of the East India Company under Governor-General Cornwallis in 1786 (involving sizable increases in the servants' pay), was the heyday of the social figure of the English nabob. In their home country this upwardly mobile group was conspicuous. In Burke's long-lasting polemics against the first governor-general of Bengal, Warren Hastings, one dominant motive, apart from the protest against the mistreatment of some aristocratic Indians, was the conservative fear of the moral and political contamination of manners at home by the returnees from India:

> I was in a manner stupefied by the desperate boldness of a few obscure young men, who, having obtained, by ways which they could not comprehend, a power of which they saw neither the purposes nor the limits, tossed about, subverted, and tore to pieces, as if it were in the gambols of a boyish unluckiness and malice, the most established rights, and the most ancient and most revered institutions, of ages and nations.[12]

Burke's polemical construction of the persona of a nabob, which focused on domestic politics, was not concerned with the reality of Anglo-Indian life. In the Indian territories gradually coming under British control, the increasing presence of British people changed intercultural relations to a greater complexity and ambivalence. Whereas the merchant community had clearly limited goals—and even the early nabobs were fairly single-minded in their pursuit of colonial loot—the increased contacts between British men and their Indian surroundings led to contradictory attitudes on the part of the colonial power:

> On the one hand the old merchants occupied new positions, on the other the supply of Englishmen greatly increased, first as soldiers and then as administrators and traders. The result was to set in motion a double current, of increasing contact and knowledge of Indian life, and of increasing contempt of everything Indian as irrational, superstitious, barbaric and typical of an inferior civilization.[13]

Spear attributes this ambivalence to the different communities that were the local intermediaries of the British. The positive side developed in the privileged contact zone between Hindu and Muslim upper classes and the higher ranges of British administrators. This meeting-ground resulted from the transformation of the East India Company from a combination of merchants into a territorial power with increasingly administrative functions; mercantile objectives and imperial policies became entwined.[14]

The new members of the Company's Council found their most conspicuous representatives in the social figures of the British Orientalists in the Bengal presidency, who in a sense were the cultured layer in a colonial system that rationalized its objectives from direct exploitation into the orderly collection of revenues. The professional experts provided the legal and other administrative frameworks.

In the later eighteenth century, before the direct exposure to the East on a larger scale, enlightened British academic Orientalism had long been established. To some extent it shared the impulses that Edward Said in his classic indictment of Western hegemonic Orientalism has analyzed as the construction of the East as a stereotyped "Other" legitimizing imperialist expansion. If one looks at the Orientalist mind-set as the first ideological template of the British administration of Bengal, matters are more complicated. Company officials and administrators, including judges—for example, William Halhed, H.H. William, Charles Wilkins, and William Jones—were the first significant grouping among the British in India that established a pattern of interaction with native people beyond the pragmatic aspects of their rationalization of hegemony. The small group of scholars around the newly founded Asiatic Society of Bengal took a serious interest in Indian cultures, which, however, was restricted to the records of India's past as well as to those literate exponents of Muslim and Hindu culture that became their mediators to Persian and Sanskrit scholarship as translators and interpreters. In their social dealings with these aristocratic or upper caste experts on traditional Indian knowledge, the early British Orientalists put a high value on the textual heritage. They founded a Hindu and a Sanskrit College in the East India Company's headquarters in Calcutta.

This positive attitude to Indian cultural traditions and their contemporary mediators marked a desire to anchor British rule by integrating local traditions of governance. The Orientalists' own official functions and scholarly contributions depended on this. On the other hand, the social attitudes toward their native intermediaries, *pandits* and *maulavis*, in the

Bengal context was marked by a sharp ambivalence. The most famous, articulate, and liberal figure among them, Sir William Jones, the only early Orientalist to make it into the *Biographical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals*,[15] may serve as an example. Jones, who went to Calcutta as a judge on the High Court, had a long record of Orientalist scholarship and of heterodox political sympathies for the American Revolution. While assembling a code of Hindu and Muslim laws that followed William Hastings's precedent of taking into account native customs in the administration of Indian territories, there was a downside to this productive and respectful interaction with Indian guardians of indigenous traditions, the Brahmin scholars of Sanskrit, and Muslim intellectuals. When financial and economic everyday matters were concerned, William Jones expressed blatantly racist attitudes to members of the native population, as in a notorious letter about the necessity of having to borrow from his financial agent: "I was forced to borrow of a black man, and it was like touching a snake."[16] Jones did not refrain from generalizing his racist and classist prejudices: "in our servants, in the common seamen frequenting our port, in the petty workmen and shopkeepers of our streets and markets, there live the men, who to use the phrase of an old statute, sleep by day and work by night, for the purposes of gaming, debauchery and intoxication."[17]

The tensions in Jones's attitudes toward his Indian surroundings was also reflected in his scientific activities. The Asiatic Society, whose founder he was and whose president he remained until his death in 1794, did not admit Indian members. Jones harbored a philosophical rationale for his ambivalence even before setting foot on Indian soil: the difference between European enlightenment and Oriental despotism called for a (benign) absolutist rule in India that he had rejected in his own country at some risk for his professional advancement.[18] In a sense Jones personified the shifting attitudes of his fellow colonialists from a benevolent if ambivalent sympathy with native Indians to a hardening stereotypic racism.

The elitism of the late-enlightenment European Orientalists had important repercussions on the native population.[19] It generated or accelerated the consolidation of an indigenous privileged class, for example, the Bengali *bhadralok*, particularly after the 1793 Permanent Settlement imposed British codes of individual property on the East India Company's Bengal territories. The formation of Indian elites into a kind of comprador class reciprocated the Orientalists' cultural and social hierarchy, although it also provided the groundwork for the accumulation of a cultural capital that was to have important results in the establishment of an indigenous Brahmin intelligentsia. This new or reformed group in the British presidencies, in the growing cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, also came to be functional in what has been called the "information order" in a recent ambitious attempt at a novel account of British imperial policies.[20] In this interpretation Orientalist stereotypes (positive or negative) were only figments of hypothetical knowledge assembled by a system of runners, spies, and other informants that was fast turning into a close network

indispensable for the running of the colonial machinery in the absence of positive information.

The Orientalists in the upper echelons of the East India Company's civil service were never more than a thin, cultured veneer over the other few thousand British people, mostly men, in the Indian presidencies. The early Asiatic Society of Bengal, although patronized by Warren Hastings as governor-general, did not very often rise above a handful of members. Many of the English in Calcutta had nothing to do with Jones's enlightened universalism or with the scholarship of his native informants. They shared, rather, the distrust and watchfulness that even in Jones motivated his decision to master Persian and Sanskrit as tools of professional communication. Nor was this distrustful attitude restricted to the clerical workforce of the East India Company, even the next governors-general, Cornwallis and Wellesley, fall for opprobrious stereotypes of the Indian people around them. Even before 1800, Hastings's sociable cosmopolitanism was replaced by his successors' moralistic detachment. Soon after returning from India with an immense fortune, one East India Company official close to the Evangelical movement, Charles Grant, in his book *Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain*, reveals his bias in the subtitle "*Particularly in Respect to Morals, and on the Means of Improving It*." He charged Hindus with dishonesty, fraud, corruption, and barbarity; the Muslims with haughtiness, perfidy, licentiousness and lawlessness. This sweeping denigration has been read as being fully in tune with the transformation of the British in India from merchants to rulers in need of legitimizing their domination.[21]

After 1800 such condemnation of Hindu and Muslim depravity became commonplace,[22] and the resulting social agenda consequence was either a complete segregation to resist a hypothetical decline on the British side or a concerted effort to missionize or reshape Indian people in the European image. This model of Anglicization at first competed against and then displaced enlightened Orientalism. With the expansion of colonial personnel following the territorial acquisitions after 1800, segregation was possible only in secluded hill stations such as Simla.[23] The proliferation of these settlements in the nineteenth century reflected this need as much as climatic reasons. The necessity of recruiting British-educated men for the lower clerical functions in the growing civil service made the Anglicist option the operative ideology. There were sound economic reasons for the incipient cooptation of Indian people for the colonial system.[24]

In English middle-class reform movements, for example those around the Clapham sect, Evangelicalism was a religious concomitant to the politics and philosophy of Utilitarianism. Both converged in the deliberate cooptation of Indian subjects of the East India Company for services that required mastering the English language. Behind the utilitarian impulse again stood the discrepancy between radicalism at home and absolutist paternalism in the colony. Its educational drives were conspicuous, the objectives contained in the notorious *Minutes on Education* devised by

Thomas Babington Macaulay and adopted as policy by Governor-General Lord Bentinck (1835): natives were to be "English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect."[25] Gauri Viswanathan's subsumption of this anglophone literacy as yet another "mask of conquest" amounts to a sweeping condemnation of Anglicism in the nineteenth century.[26] However, in a more recent book on the politics of conversion in Britain and India, the same author has interpreted Macaulay's attitude as combining the emancipation of religious minorities at home and the education of colonial subjects abroad, thereby transforming tolerance into incorporation.[27]

Spokesmen of the British servants of the East India Company such as James Mill both shared Macaulay's principles and indicate a deep ambivalence toward imperial rule. The upper-class (or high-caste) cooptation of the ruled by their rulers after 1800 had two extenuating features.[28] On the one hand, it answered the calls for modern, scientific education—as against conservative Sanskrit-based instruction by Brahmins—by members of the educated elite such as Ram Mohan Roy. On the other hand, the reform was seen as a kind of first step toward eventual autonomy of colonial subjects, as expressed in Thomas Munro's, the governor of Madras's "Minute on the Employment of Natives in the Public Service" in 1824:

> We should look upon India, not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstition and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it.[29]

In no way can this vague premonition of a future self-determination for India—which was envisaged as an emancipation from its own culture—be read as an apology of British colonial rule in India at a point in time when it was expanding so fast as to encompass most of the subcontinent's land. Its idealist high tone indicates its ideological function perhaps only too well and Macaulay's philistine utilitarianism was much more in tune with the mercantile community in India.[30]

From just a few thousand, predominantly male, British people in India in the latter half of the eighteenth century,[31] their numbers grew to around 200.000 in the course of the nineteenth century to fall again gradually in the twentieth century, totaling 156,500 in the 1921 census.[32] The sharp increase in the Victorian high period of imperialism included, for the first time, a sizable proportion of women among the British contingent in India, boosting the European quarters in the big cities and in smaller places as well as the hill stations and the mushrooming missionary posts.

The Anglicist discourse lasted longer than the willingness of the early Orientalists to respect indigenous cultural traditions where it mattered in some fields of public life. The structural reason for this was the growing demand for native mediators in some lower-range administrative functions. In the later high phase of British imperialist hegemony, it could also

lead to the admission of some Indian applicants to the Indian Civil Service. It made possible, at the level of social interaction, a degree of benevolent paternalism and it slightly increased contact between British and native Indians outside the customary servant position.

Two formative contextual influences met in the figure of the British high imperialist male as a social type that in historical hindsight has come to epitomize the Raj as no other: one was the Indian rebellion of 1857, the other the growing competition among the Western imperialist nation-states in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The year 1857 proved a watershed in Anglo-Indian politics because it created an impassable gulf between the colonial power and the Indian people never to be bridged before decolonization.[33] On the part of the British it brought to the surface a blatant ethnocentrism and racism that had mostly been under domestic cover in earlier periods or had at least been mixed with more positive attitudes. Members of the British community itself noticed this widening chasm between the rulers and the ruled. When Flora Annie Steel looked back from the 1900s on her experience as a memsahib, she noted that "in India itself the gulf between the rulers and the ruled is widening. There is a half-hidden race hatred nowadays which did not exist fifty years ago,—no! Not even when the shambles of the Mutiny were fresh in men's minds."[34] The social distance between Indian culture and the new sahibs after 1860 was also noticed by contemporary Indian observers such as Gokhale[35] and even sympathetic British historiographers of the Raj do not deny the sharpening racism of the high imperialist age.[36]

The psychosocial profile of the British sahib, the hardening of their attitude toward Indian people into overt racism and their exacerbated need of distance from and social superiority over the native population, had internal rather than contextual reasons. From 1780 onwards, the bulk of British newcomers were young men recruited by the East India Company and later the Indian Civil Service or chosen by patronage to work in business houses, factories, mills, indigo, jute, and tea plantations.[37] A growing minority of women came in hopes of a marital settlement, but their function was basically a strengthening of social hierarchies and a conservative reinforcement of traditional gender identities within the Anglo-Indian community.[38] They also enhanced the genteel identifications that had earlier sustained the nabobs' aspirations and that, a century later, led to the British community's noticeable distance from any liberal viceroy of India.[39]

Nor did the modernization that the British Crown introduced in its reorganization of the Raj upon the dissolution of the East India Company after 1857 diminish the distance between the British and native people. The rationalization of the Indian Civil Service, after the installation of a competitive system of recruitment made possible the admission of Indian applicants, rather than lessening ethnic divisions had the opposite effect. It engendered a new sense of rivalry in the scramble for lower positions and did not break the near monopoly of British professional and upper-middle-class applicants sitting for the public examinations. Records for

the examinations between 1874 and 1884 show that of the 333 successful entrants, "227 were the sons of landowners, army and navy officers, home and Indian civil servants, clergymen, lawyers and doctors, and 84 came from commercial and farming backgrounds."[40] Thus, the bulk of the reorganized Indian Civil Service in the second half of the nineteenth century continued to be composed of young men with a British public school background as the basis of social selection at home.

The connection between the strong sense of masculinity instilled in the educational institutions and transposed into the administration of the empire is a commonplace both in contemporary accounts of the Raj and in recent social history. Many of the most popular late Victorian writers looked at the British Empire as a school of masculinity and consequently as a bulwark against ease and morbidity in the metropolis.[41] The strengthening of heterosexual identities in the "muscular Christianity" instilled in public school boys, with its attendant ethos of gentlemanly codes involving the rigid disciplining of body and mind, shaped the new *habitus* that all over the world was fixed as the ideal type of the Englishman at home and abroad. In the empire, this type of masculinity had a special function, as Kenneth Ballhatchet has analyzed, increasing the social position that the Englishmen's hegemonic role seemed to demand: "Social distance seemed essential to their authority: because they were remote they would be feared as alien and trusted as incorruptible."[42] Conversely, this self-image of a sharply gendered identity was sustained by the downside of a binary projection of other races as effeminate in many high imperialist representations of Indian men.

The picture of the authoritative construct of British imperial masculinity would be incomplete without its legitimization by a sense of civilizational mission. In the earlier campaigns against traditional Hindu customs such as suttee, it had been the ideological grounds on which the claims of white males against brown men for the control of brown women had been staked.[43] The high imperialist British male anchored his social identity in a superiority based on an "absolutism of conquest" that even liberal Victorians such as Fitzjames Stephen took for granted.[44] While one part of this was rule by force, the dominant missionary discourse was educational and aimed at Indian elites in the newly established schools and colleges of the Raj. In them a progressivist synthesis of Eastern and Western learning was to be inculcated "to take a part honourable to themselves and their nation in the creation of an imperial spirit which shall supersede all ideas of severance, and further that fusion of the philosophies of the East and West to which we may now look most hopefully for the moral and intellectual advance of mankind."[45]

The more sensitive representatives of British India such as Rudyard Kipling, in worrying about the "white man's burden" in the East, were aware of the impossibility of forcing British culture on a recalcitrant native Indian population. Against all the evidence they hoped for an equally problematic reconciliation of opposites. This led to an indeterminacy, the

code of differentiation of Kipling's "new Orientalism"[46] that superimposed partial identification with Indian life awkwardly on racial superiority. The partial identification was the dividing line between Kipling and the bulk of other English people in India of whom he usually painted a very unflattering picture in his narratives.

In the long history of British rule in India, some always fell out of step with their compatriots and for various reasons became outsiders in the colonizer community. Some missionaries were converted by the heathens they were to save from idolatry and superstition, some few travelers stayed on, and some officials went native and disappeared from view. But these deviators from the colonial norm were few. Only in the peak phase of imperialism around the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century did some dissenting individuals among the British articulate vocal criticism of imperial policies in India. This kind of anti-imperialist opposition to the Raj in some of its manifestations was less the result of the colonialist dialectic in India or of personal interaction with India's growing nationalist movement. Rather, it owed its existence to rising heterodoxies in Britain after 1880, when the Victorian consensus, never much more than a middle- and upper-class one, gradually dissolved into some cultural or social movements such as Decadence, Aestheticism, and the women's movement.

Some liberal anti-imperialist critics who shared at least some opinions with Indian opponents of the colonial system came from among those prepared to question the rigid gender definitions associated with high imperial masculinity. It is no surprise that both Leonard Woolf and E.M. Forster shared dissident views about the Indian Empire's future—they never were members of the British community in South Asia for any length of time and their English intellectual background was rooted in the Bloomsbury group. They interrogated accepted social roles including received gender demarcations; their identification with the subcontinent remained partial; and they were concerned, in a residually ethnocentric way, with the moral and political untenability of the British Empire in India and elsewhere.

On the surface, the biographical trajectory of a woman such as Annie Besant from a radical, secularist, trade-union activist, and English feminist to a theosophist and leading proponent of the Indian National Congress appears to be a more radical, partly idiosyncratic transformation. Hers was certainly a radical solution to the problems of carrying the "white woman's burden," of familiarizing the Other in the binary Orientalist construction. In her survey of the subject positions available for white women in colonial South Asia—from women doctors, educators to missionaries, and holy mothers—Kumari Jayawardena points to the residually ethnocentric tendency in Besant's double standards for Western and Indian women (suffragettes versus demure submissive wives) that could only be reconciled by some theosophical sleight of hand.[47] Another variant of deviating from the imperialist mind-set was even rarer but significant. It cast the mold for later kinds of identification with India as the spiritual

Other by alternative Western subcultures. It negated Western modernity altogether and looked to India as its binary opposite. Charles Freer Andrews was an early exemplar for a synthesis of nonmodern Western religious nonconformity and a spiritualized "Indianized self"[48] that saw Hinduism as an ideal pattern.

There is no clear picture of the persona of the British man in India in the decades preceding Independence. While the physical presence of British colonial agents declined, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had led to a continuous increase in the first type of intercultural contacts, that of the tourist from the West with a predominantly exoticizing gaze. In a sense interactions turned full circle from precolonial to postcolonial times. Collections of biographical statements by British members of the Indian Civil Service about their stay outside the big cities as district officers leave a melancholic impression of social isolation.[49] Representations of British people in the first half of the twentieth century present no new overriding image matching earlier stereotypes, except perhaps that of the alienated bureaucrat following a routine in an environment that he made no serious effort to comprehend. This did not change significantly after independence. The wide spectrum of self-critical, nostalgic, or newly Orientalizing evocations of India as a component of an empire, found in autobiographical, documentary, or fictional representation of the British past in various media of mass communication, never coalesced into a homogeneous image of another collective identity.

Metropolitan Interactions: Indian Experiences of Britain

Just as British men's constructs of "India" and the colonized people changed over time and included dissenting voices, it is dangerous to construct a monolithic view of the complex relationship between the Indian/colonized and the British/colonizer; or to adopt a simplistic cultural imperialism view like the thesis that the consciousness of the colonial British-Indian subject was a tabula rasa on which colonial education and culture were imposed per se. The larger Indian masses did not come into direct contact with their European rulers. While Indians who were educated in Western-style universities may have incorporated elements of European culture in their outer lives such as leisure and dress, the cultural characteristics of the British did not necessarily become second nature to them. The degree of disorientation varied. It was only in rare exceptions of the "brown sahib" that there was a wholesale adoption of a foreign culture to the exclusion of Indian religious mores and ideas. A further level of cultural interaction in the early stages involved the offspring of European soldiers/traders and Indian women, who were not branded with the mark of inferiority. As this small community of Euro-Asians grew (or Anglo-Indians as they were later referred to), it also enjoyed special privileges. However, when more and more European women traveled to India, the social distance between

racial communities widened, and incidents of interracial relationships after 1857 became increasingly uncommon.

Amartya Sen argues that the "Indian identity" in some ways incorporated a Hindu identity as historically Hinduism has been the mainstay of Indian civilization. "While not all Indians are Hindus," Sen explains, "all Indians have to reckon with Hinduism since it is the dominant psychological and social setting."[50] However, given the religious heterodoxy that has been so central to the subcontinent, one cannot ignore the specifics of a variety of histories. The impact of the British-colonial interaction was at once "socio-culturally disruptive, uneven, economically retrogressive (and) politically unifying."[51] From among the many social groups involved in the metropolitan interaction, we select as a significant example a specific class of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century intelligentsia who were the "offspring of the colonial dispensation."[52] Nirmal Verma argues that "an idealized image of Europe" was presented to the Indian educated in English through a particular type of literary culture imposed from above, and this "fantasy of Europe blocked from view a Europe with its own distinctive and complex cultural character."[53] This complicated the nature of the response to the West. Indian postcoloniality involved two or more worlds. The context of the metropolitan-based English-speaking intellectual, for instance, was quite different from the provincial vernacular intelligentsia of nineteenth-century India who worked toward establishing the universities of Benares, Allahabad, and Osmania as a counterresistance to university education introduced by the British. The latter, as well as the reactions of the Muslim elite to the consolidation of the British rule and the Islamic reform movement thereafter, will remain outside the scope of analysis in this essay. Since it is equally impossible to generalize about the European it is useful to fall back on Chakraborthy's suggestion that Europe and India be treated as "hyperreal" terms in that they refer "to certain figures of imagination whose geographical referents remain somewhat indeterminate."[54]

The 1857 uprising, referred to as the Indian Sepoy Mutiny by early British historians and as the First War of Independence by Indian nationalists, redefined in indelible ways the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. The rapacious anti-European violence during the uprising, and the brutal reprisals by the British in the aftermath destroyed any existing trust between both sides. The colonial administrators came to realize that it might not be wise to coerce Indians to alter their centuries-old beliefs sanctioned by religion or caste, or force their Indian subjects into submission. Rather than interfere with the traditional and religious life of the communities, it would be more beneficial to stimulate a sense of admiration for the Crown, and gratitude for its "good" and therefore necessary governance. As it was logistically impossible for the British to control or conquer the Indian subcontinent through military prowess, it became imperative to consolidate links with the aristocracy and the *zamindaris* (landowners), and, most importantly, to create a buffer class of Indian middlemen who would

sustain the edifice of the empire on behalf of the British. What emerged was a paradoxical situation wherein the Indian subject was schooled, on the one hand, in a passionate admiration for British or European "qualities of character." And yet, on the other hand, external material circumstances gradually compelled the growth of anticolonial sentiments against an empire accused of reducing "a country to penury and a psyche to fracture."[55] The intellectual, educated in English, was therefore caught in a double bind of "wanting and not wanting a relation."[56]

A useful starting point in understanding how this minute but powerful class came into being, is to examine how a particular system of education set up under the colonial aegis played a crucial role in effecting transformations within the minds of a growing Indian middle class. As Susie Tharu points out, "the politics and the history of the English in India, and the politics of literary studies cannot be set aside "[57] Macaulay's famous or infamous *Minutes on Education* (1835) advocated an official education policy that would introduce Western science, history, and English literature into the curriculum of higher education. According to his logic, education in the English language would not only serve to create an English-educated class that would operate from the lower rungs of the administrative machinery, but would also instill an understanding of imperial law, "desire" to appreciate the "rational human and impartial government" that the new rulers were trying to set up. He recognized that one of the most efficient ways to legitimize the colonial authority's ideology of culture was to perpetuate the mythology of England as a place of law, culture, and scientific rationality, through the valorization of specific kinds of literary texts. In contrast, Indians increasingly took to government-sponsored education in English because they recognized the value of a Westernized education. By the 1880s, the number of English-educated Indians approached the 500,000 mark,[58] and within a quarter of a century, a new middle class educated in English had spread a "thin covering over the whole of India."[59] Western education also allowed for an awareness of ideologies without which it would have been difficult to formulate theories of nationalism.[60] Ironically, the English language proved to be the undoing of the empire as it enabled communication in a common language across various linguistic groups and this strengthened an emerging Indian nationalism. While this select group was not representative of the larger masses, it played a crucial role in effecting transformations in the political, economic and social arena of early-twentieth-century India.

In addition to English-language education in India, an increasing number of students traveled to England to obtain a degree that would allow them to enter into the Indian Civil Service or qualify for legal and medical professions. This westward travel belies the assumption that movement from the colonies to the metropolitan core is a postcolonial phenomenon. The list of prominent Indians who journeyed to Britain is long and several of the leaders of the Indian national movement spent formative years in the British Isles; for example, the "architect of Indian nationalism," Dadabhai

Naoroji (1825–1917), was a partner in one of the first Indian firms to do business in England as early as the 1850s, and he moved permanently to Britain thereafter. Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1947) studied law at London Inns of Court, as did Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), who was first a student at Harrow, and then at Cambridge. Aurobindo Ghose (1872–1950) came from an educated Bengali doctor's family and was sent to England at the age of seven and stayed until he was twenty. Troubled by the "denationalization" caused by his foreign education,[61] he returned to Hindu culture and Indian politics. A fiery extremist, Aurobindo eventually withdrew from the political into the spiritual sphere and set up his ashram at Pondicherry. The social revolutionary leader of India's untouchable castes and the author of independent India's Constitution, "Babasaheb" Bhim Roy Ambedkar (1891–1956), was at Grey's Inn for law after securing a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University. Also at Grey's Inn was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), one of the earliest proponents of revolutionary terrorism by Indian nationalists. Savarkar formed the Free India Society in London, which became a base for the recruitment for the secret revolutionary group Abhinav Bharat. Another formidable foe of the empire was Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945). Bose was the son of a prominent lawyer, and received a good British education in a Protestant European school. He was sent to England by his hopeful parents to sit for the India Civil Servant exams, and studied for a degree in philosophy at Cambridge. He had, however, been deeply influenced by Aurobindo's writings on the need for India's emancipation, and although he passed the ICS exams, he resigned from the service soon after to join the noncooperation movement, which was at its peak in the 1920s. A total of 7,000 Indians lived in England and Wales when the 1931 census was taken.

While members of the colonized elites learned to move and act in the British world, colonial administrators worked out a system of social segregation and self-isolation by dividing towns along "civil lines" into sections meant exclusively for the white population. Colonizers' writings of this period projected the European as a representative of a superior master race while the Indian became the civilizational Other or the "not-yet modern," against whom the modern European could measure his or her superiority. "The rulers and the ruled," as Cohn explains, "had proper roles to play in the colonial sociological theatre,"[62] and a certain amount of white racism "had a functional and necessary role in the political and economic structure of colonial India."[63]

The representation of the Self and the Other between the two worlds is a two-way process. Did the Indian subject actually imbibe the myth of white British superiority? Or was the relationship of the middle-class Babus to their white rulers governed more by a pragmatic degree of loyalty than anything else? Nineteenth-century Indians constructed a repertoire of varied images for the white people with whom they came into contact. These images varied from overt admiration (often exaggerated) to contemptuous representations, sometimes bordering on hatred. Swami

Vivekananda, the nineteenth-century social reformer and Hindu missionary, offers an image of what was, in his opinion, the average Indian view of the white rulers: "Intoxicated by the heady wine of newly acquired power, fearsome like wild animals who see no difference between good and evil, slaves to women, insane in their lust, drenched in alcohol from head to foot, without any norms of ritual conduct, unclean, materialistic, grabbing other people's territory and wealth by hook or by crook, without any faith in life to come."[64] Savarkar spares no words in articulating contempt of the *ferangi*/white man in his Hindu-centric chronicle *The Indian War of Independence 1857* (first published in Britain in 1904 and banned in India until 1947). Bengal-born Nirad Chaudhuri describes the colonial framework into which he was born and bred in *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (1951). In his view, the standard reaction of the unsophisticated Indian villager in the face of an Englishman was "headlong flight,"[65] or, in the early years of the twentieth century, "irrational and ineradicable cringing and equally irrational and unconquerable hatred. Grown-ups reserved the first for the Englishman present before them and the second for the absent Englishman."[66] Bengali poet and intellectual giant Rabindranath Tagore acknowledges that the valorization of literary texts in English had led to the belief in the existence of the English citizen committed to higher values of truth, equality, and justice. The ideal was taken to be real. Tagore speaks of how his own perception of the Other was built on the premise of a disjuncture between two types of Englishmen—the *choto* (the petty) and the *bodo* (or the great). The former was the Englishman in the colony, associated with negative impressions, while the latter was the "ideal" or the "cultured" humanitarian Englishman with liberal values. Arriving in England at the age of seventeen in 1878, he describes his disillusionment when he actually touches the physical shores of Great Britain. He speaks of the difference between his expectations of a "certain kind of England," and his encounter with the actual physical manifestation of the "liberal" English: "It seems that we were more intoxicated than nourished by English literature."[67]

Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, is often cited as prototypic of elitist cross-cultural contact. "His was a life," writes Nayantara Sahgal, "lived in two plus one cultures and yet the times he lived in and the role he played in placed his cultures in conflict and confrontation."[68] Nehru acknowledges the "thralldom of Europe" during his youth in his autobiography,[69] but writes in *The Discovery of India* of "two Englands." He asks, "Which of these Englands came to India? The England of Shakespeare and Milton, of noble speech and writing and brave deeds, of political revolution and the struggle for Freedom, of science and technological progress, or the England of the savage penal code and brutal behaviour, of entrenched feudalism and reaction?"[70]

For an idea of the role played by the idealized image of the "first England" in complicating the Indian's relationship with the empire, the life narrative of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi provides an illustration. Perhaps

the most important figure of the Indian nationalist movement, Gandhi was as much a product of the complex British-Indian imperial embrace as were his contemporaries. The first forty pages of his autobiography *My Experiments with Truth* (1927) describe the anxious desire of a young man to become a "modern individual" and a European man. Setting sail for London in 1888, he admits to a passionate desire to study in England, "the land of philosophers and poets, the very center of civilization." During the two decades that he spent in South Africa (1893–1915), Gandhi repeatedly encountered the humiliating conditions of Indian laborers in Natal, then still a British colony. And yet, he offered his services for an Indian ambulance corps during the 1899 Boer War, and again during the 1905–6 Zulu War, stating that it was his duty to defend the empire as a British subject. In his public farewell speech at Cape Town when he left South Africa in 1914, Gandhi reiterated his faith in the innate decency of the British: "Rightly or wrongly, for good or for evil—Englishmen and Indians have been knit together, and it behooves both races so to mould themselves as to leave a splendid legacy of the generations yet to be born, and to show that though Empires have gone and fallen, this Empire perhaps may be an exception and that this is an Empire not founded on material but on spiritual foundations."[71]

Upon his arrival in India in 1915, Gandhi spent a year traveling across the vast subcontinent upon request of his mentor Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1816–1915), considered a moderate for his readiness to cooperate with the British in introducing gradual reforms. It was only then that Gandhi finally began to move out to experience the real India. This was a significant step to recross the Promethean divide created by the nature of his education. Gandhi's political education involved a first hand encounter of the economic exploitation that had reduced Indian peasants and weavers to penury. Gandhi's involvement with the Champaran movement in Bihar in 1917 brought him into direct contact with the pathetic conditions of the peasants forced by European planters to grow indigo and then to part with their crop at a prefixed price. In the Kheda district of Gujarat he organized civil resistance of farmers who were being coerced into paying taxes in spite of widespread crop failure. And yet even as late as 1918, he campaigned as a "recruiting sergeant for the Imperial army" for World War I, under the illusion that India would be better because of the British connection.

The trial of Bal Gangadar Tilak and his sentence to six years transportation and exile to Mandalay, Upper Burma, in 1908 had already set off a series of attacks against British officials by militant revolutionaries. In contrast, the chilling of Gandhi's loyalty toward the empire came only a decade later with the storm of political activities caused by the Rowlatt Act of 1919, which curtailed civil liberties, allowed the trial of political prisoners without jury, and denied the right to appeal. This unrest was followed by the tragedy of Jallianwala Bagh Amritsar, in which General Reginald Dyer ordered his regiment to shoot at an unarmed crowd of 10,000

people at a public ground enclosed by a five-foot wall. The response of the government was to defend Dyer. Gandhi's response was to condemn the Hunter Commission's Majority Report, which absolved the government of all blame. While the official report placed the number of killed at 400 and wounded at 1,000–2,000, Gandhi's own public inquiry put the dead at 1,200 and wounded at 3,600. Particularly hurting was the support of the European community for Dyer, a £260,000 reward from the British public, a jeweled sword inscribed with the words "Saviour of the Punjab," and a vote of support from the House of Lords.[72] If the 1857 uprising had marked an important turning point in Indo-British relationships in the nineteenth century, the Rowlatt Act and Jallianwala Bagh led to a further "seemingly unbridgeable chasm."[73] Gandhi returned medals and decorations received for humanitarian work in the service of the empire, as did Tagore his knighthood. After his arrest on 10 March 1932 for sedition, Gandhi articulated his own transformation from loyal believer to rebel and defined the duties of all Indians as noncooperation and civil disobedience, which eventually led to the historic "Quit India" resolution of 1942. Rajmohan Gandhi suggests that Gandhi eventually resolved the paradox of his own position by deciding that "he would oppose British rule but not hate the British; he would battle the British, non-violently, but also seek reconciliation with them."[74]

Not all of those involved in the freedom movement were sympathetic toward Gandhi's stance of moderation. Subhas Chandra Bose and Savarkar rejected Gandhi's call for passive resistance—any form of loyalty to the British was interpreted as disloyalty to India.[75] Savarkar had established links with Irish and Egyptian activists while coordinating subversive activities. He was the founder of the hard-core Hindu Mahasabha, which was implicated in Gandhi's assassination in 1948. From 1933 to 1936, Bose traveled through Europe and came under the influence of the Fascist governments of Italy and Germany. Bose allied himself with the Japanese, and recruited prisoners of war in the Far East to form the Indian National Army which fought against the British during World War II. This development had an important psychological impact on the British, as they had to realize that they could no longer command the total loyalty of their Indian troops.

The nineteenth-century Indian intelligentsia recognized the possibility of establishing a link with progressive, cultural forces of the outside world through the liberal and humanistic works of European writers. The "navjagran" or "awakening" of the educated bourgeoisie, which began in Calcutta but later spread to other parts of the country, is commonly referred to as the Bengal Renaissance and is characterized by a burst of creativity in literature, historical studies, social criticism, and journalism. The Bengal reform movement passed through different phases of acceptance and rejection of Western intellectual influences, and was, in essence, a reorientation of outlook. The response to the challenge by Europe's "enlightened rationalism" to the Hindu mind—on the one hand deeply

rooted in tradition and on the other hand disturbed by the degeneration of Hindu society—is generally classified into three attitudes. The radicals were led by Henry Derozio (1809–31), a Eurasian teacher who founded the Young Bengal movement, and who attacked Hindu orthodoxy in all its aspects. Many of his followers converted to Christianity. Radhakanta Deb (1794–76) founded the orthodox Dharma Sabha and attempted to combat anti-suttee legislation. Third were the liberal reformists, who did not call for an outright rejection of the alien culture. Rather, they welcomed, as a means of regeneration, Western systems of administration and legal reforms to abolish social evils such as the practices of sati, *thuggee*, and child marriage. Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) is considered the early prototype of the Indian-European who explored the possibility of a synthesis of Hindu thought with progressive impulses introduced by the British. Roy was responsible for the first institution of Western education in India—the Hindu College set up in Calcutta in 1816. In 1828, he formed the Brahmo Samaj or the "Divine" society, which based its creed on monotheism. Roy's most significant contribution to the reform movement was in the field of women's emancipation—particularly in his campaign against the cruel practice of sati, and the appalling treatment of widows. Provoked by the intense evangelizing zeal of Christian missionaries who castigated discriminatory Hindu practices, other sensitive Hindu scholars also turned reformists. Dayananda Saraswathi from Gujarat (1824–83) founded the Arya Samaj in 1875 and received a considerable support among the young and educated in Punjab. The movement preached the infallibility of the Vedas but also challenged the caste system and the oppression of women. In southern India, reformers such as Virasalingam founded the Rajah Mundra Social Reform Association, which encouraged widow remarriage; and K.N. Natarajan established the *Indian Social Reformer* in 1890 to draw public attention to the need for change from within Hindu society.

Hindu reformers reacted to colonial representations of the Indian's cultural inferiority by constructing a counterdichotomy that celebrated the spirituality of the Hindu over the materialistic achievements of the European. For instance, influential spiritual leaders/reformers such as Ramakrishna Paramhansa (1836–1886) and Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) expressed their belief that India had only to return to ancient ideals of renunciation and self-control to demonstrate superiority to the West. The reformist-intellectuals were thus placed in a peculiar position of looking toward Europe for scientific/rational knowledge and material progress, but turning toward their own traditions for salvation. To date, this problematic "schism in the Indian psyche"[76] remains a central preoccupation of Indian academics attempting to deal with the question of the East-West encounter at the level of intellectual and philosophical exchange.

While European Orientalists such as Jones and Max Mueller had retrieved Vedic-Aryan classical Sanskrit texts, they had also projected these texts of upper-caste traditions as representative of an entire people, history, and cultures. Simultaneously, in order to add legitimacy to the British

civilizing mission, nineteenth-century India was projected as having fallen into a decrepit state of being. Colonial rule was the only means of improving the state of affairs and fighting regressive elements. Similarly Indian reformers, preoccupied with the task of mounting a defense of Hindu culture, turned to the glorified images from the Vedic past and thus fell victim to the "twin myths of past glory and present degradation."[77] While nationalist sentiments grew under the stimulus of rediscovering a common rich civilizational legacy, this rediscovery also sidelined the non-Brahmanical native cultures and traditions. Ganesh Devy, in *After Amnesia: Tradition and Change in Indian Literary Criticism* (1992), therefore suggests to call the colonial period "a period of forgetting" that enforced a lapse in collective Indian memory of, for example, the rich traditions of the Basha literatures, that is non-Sanskritized regional languages.

For centuries large sections of Indian society had been denied access to education on the ground of caste and gender, and it is to the credit of the British to allow for the democratization of education. There was no provision for organized education of women until the arrival of the Christian missionaries, who set up schools for women as well as for low castes which, however, often meant the children of converts. B.M. Ambedkar was born into the untouchable Mahar caste. His father left traditional low-status work associated with the caste to join the British army, and this gave Ambedkar the opportunity for an education. Jyotiba Phule (1826–90) came from the Mali (gardener) caste. He founded the Satyashodhak Samaj in 1875, and opened schools for girls and untouchable boys. Both Ambedkar and Phule regarded the presence of the British as a "necessary evil" and felt that the social goals of equality were more likely to be achieved under British rule than under upper-caste Hindu hegemony.

By the late nineteenth century, a number of boarding schools in hill stations such as Simla, Missourie, Dehra Doon, and Ootacamund were set up along the lines of British public schools. They played a crucial role in the production of the image of the "ideal citizen" within the Indian elite. Their students, mainly privileged young men of the aristocratic classes, were nurtured to believe in specific ideas about who was and who was not part of civil society. Therefore, they came to believe that it was their duty to govern on behalf of the illiterate and superstitious masses. Bal Gangadar Tilak, one of the first verbally militant leaders of the nationalist movement—and therefore often called "the Father of Extremism"—recognized the widening chasm between the educated (largely Brahmanical) elite and the rural proletariat. He therefore demanded a repeal of the English language, and English systems of education. Mahatma Gandhi also warned of the dangers of creating an elitist political class far removed from the common people: "Those in whose name we speak we do not know, nor do they know us."[78] Gandhi's program of noncooperation not only expressed itself through resignation from government jobs but also through an exodus from schools and colleges of British-sponsored educational systems.

Jawaharlal Nehru was a product of the public school culture, and his writings reflect a strong consciousness of his personality as a compound of two cultures and of an elitist class background. "I have become a queer mixture of East and West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere." But he denies being any less Indian for the interaction, and defends the "westernized" Indian: "Perhaps my thoughts and approach to life are more akin to what is called western than eastern, but India clings to me, as she clings to all her children, in innumerable ways."[79]

Out of this mix of two ideal-type representations of British and Indian culture, out of the abominations and democratizations of colonizer rule, out of a complex love/hate relationship, and out of two heterogeneous societies, independence emerged. Independent India still retains the legacy of the British in terms of its legal and administrative framework, but more importantly in its education system and widespread use of the English language for economic and social mobility. A serious concern among the post-independence Indian intelligentsia is the extent to which cultural influences from the West (now associated with the United States) continue to penetrate the psyche of the urban middle class. While regional intellectuals are sharply critical of their counterparts within English academia, and constantly remind them that the use of the language of the former colonizers immediately excludes them from affiliation with India's masses, they too have to come to terms with the impossibility of freeing the self from rationalist modes of Western scientific thinking. The post-independence relationship between India and the West remains one of economics—of a developing country as against the developed—and therefore of a power hierarchy. It is this element, in combination with the legacy of colonial cultural colonization, that continues to add to the sociopsychological complications in contemporary Indians' relationship with the Occident.

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Part III

CULTURAL BELONGINGS AND CITIZENSHIP

— *Nine* —

From State Constructions to Individual Opportunities

The Historical Development of Citizenship in Europe

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In today's political culture, citizenship (of some countries) has taken the form of a treasure. Some people seek to find and obtain it and some people seek to guard it, claiming exclusive access. And as the prolific research on citizenship during the last decades has shown, it is also a very malleable albeit historically grounded category in its political dimension as much as in its social or personal dimension. Much as the nation is a product of historical development and discursive construction, so is citizenship. And since citizenship is an important element of the nation-building process, it is not surprising that citizenship reflects in form and content the historical development of particular territories that emerge as nation-states in the nineteenth century. Any subsequent changes in the concept of citizenship in the twentieth century are equally the product of historical-political expediencies or necessities, albeit within nation-building myths and ideas. This essay will first look at examples of historical conditions producing the various forms and concepts of citizenship; it will then briefly outline citizenship as a set of relationships indicating political, socio-cultural and transnational forms of belonging and finally will show how citizenship may serve as a vehicle to reach personal goals, beyond any elemental or unchangeable sense of identity.

Historical Construction of Citizenship

Citizenship and the nation depend on each other; the emergence, meaning, content, and form are interdependent. Over the last decade, historical,

sociological, and political-scientific research has shown the historical constituency of the nation. Its primordial value has been thoroughly dismantled, despite still widespread sentiments to the contrary. Thus, the nation has been shown to be at the same time a product of *vorsätzlicher Gestaltung*, a *handlungsleitende Fiktion*, and a very powerful social reality.[1] It is the result of multifaceted, interrelated modernization processes guided and activated by interested social forces. Whether the nation-building process was fairly unrelated to sociopolitical needs or arising from a genuine desire of cultural belonging is a matter of debate;[2] the historicity of the process is nonetheless without question. Equally evident is that in order to arouse some sense of national identity or nationalism, the criteria distinguishing one "nation" from another have to be sufficiently plausible in order to stimulate people. Thus, language, culture, (invented) traditions, religion, and common history emerge as elements to justify exclusion or inclusion.[3]

The emergence of the modern European system of "states" turned nations may be explained as the result of modernization processes in which factors such as bureaucratization, industrialization, and democratization in their various combinations and impacts bring about nationally (state) specific results. Thus, as Puhle argues, capitalist industrialization and commercialization of agriculture impacted national development in Britain, with bureaucratization coming only later. The specific French development may be explained as a mixture of bureaucratization and political democratization with a rather belated industrialization, whereas a weak bourgeoisie, bureaucratic absolutism, militarism, and mercantilism brought forward a nation-building process in other parts of continental Europe. In Prussia, again, a different blend of industrialization and bureaucratization with very little democratization influenced the nation-building process.[4] In these seemingly soulless entities, people of different ethnic, class, and religious backgrounds lived their lives and interacted with each other. They influenced the state-turned-nation process as much as their activities and lives were structured by it. The concept of citizenship was an important organizing device regulating the relations between the individual and the state.

Analyzing nation-building processes under the paradigms of centralization (of administration) and homogenization discards the fact that Britain, France, and Prussia—though states with strong central administrations—were as much populated by people with varying concepts of their own ethnicity (ethnic groups) as the better-known examples of the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires, where ethnicity was (already) recognized and impacted political and economic structures. The desire to rationalize and administer (bureaucratization), which accompanied the industrialization/modernization processes at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, often clashed with the traditional lifestyles and customs of people who had a sense of ethnicity. "Such disregard of traditional life styles from the top of the power

hierarchies elicited resistance from emerging middle classes and, to some degree, peasant strata."[5] This resistance was expressed with recourse to folk cultural forms and languages, traditions which eventually became the vantage point for the many ethnic/national cultures which dominated the political system at the next turn of the century.

These various roads toward modernity, constructed out of blends of bureaucratization, industrialization, and democratization together with people's emerging sense of cultural resources, constitute the framework for the specific nationalization processes giving shape to Europe's conglomerate of nations. Of course, it made a difference whether these processes took place among nations built on territory that already had the form of a state, as in the case of France or Britain; whether they affected the so-called "stateless" nations of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov Empires; or whether they were unifying processes integrating disparate smaller territories such as Italy (1870) and Germany (1871).[6] In the first instance, nationalization implied homogenization; in the second, nationalization came from below; and in the third, nationalization was imposed from above.

These differences in nationalization processes show that each specific development toward modernization and nation building brought forward very specific relationships between the individual and the administrative entity (state) that are captured by the concept of citizenship. For Prussia turned *Kleindeutschland* turned Second Reich/Kaiserreich, we may outline the following relational development. In the eighteenth century, with mercantilism still dominating as the governing ideology, with peasants still bound to their respective rulers, and with movement restricted, residence implied a membership right. This membership right as the right of domicile brought with it most notably the right to poor relief. Thus, rulers had an interest in enlarging "their" population and holding on to those in residence, but at the same time in restricting the right of domicile to only those who would be productive and able to work. The impact of the Napoleonic Wars at the same time brought forth an outburst of national sentiments and advances in modernization; that is, various bureaucratic and agrarian reforms that in the long run would favor industrialization, most notably the emancipation of serfs. It also linked, as Hagemann argues, modern German nationalism to military service and military service to citizenship rights.[7] With the subsequent freedom of mobility, which was strongly needed to enhance the national labor market, the need to define and regulate the relationship between residence and membership arose anew. It was after the Congress of Vienna that Bavaria in 1818 first introduced the concept of membership by descent, realizing that this *ius sanguinis* was more suited to deal with an increasingly mobile population. According to Torpey, *ius sanguinis* helped create a situation which he labels "migratory mercantilism" (as opposed to sedentary mercantilism using *ius soli*, as in France), by enabling the "state" to keep in touch with its population. It also fostered the emergence of a national labor market by facilitating migration between the various German states.[8] In the 1840s, the Prussian citizenship

law then defined membership independent of residence, which served as a blueprint for various other citizenship laws in the German *Länder* and became a building block in the construction of a national labor market. Thus, a system emerged where federal and state citizenship, and regional and national identities overlapped but were not convergent—and *ius sanguinis* rather than the territorial *ius soli* appeared more suitable.

The establishment of the Norddeutsche Bund (1867) and the emergence of the Kaiserreich in 1871 did not create a nation-state of Germans only. It excluded all those people in Austria who had belonged to the former "Holy Roman Empire of German Nation" and who, by language and culture, were a regional variant of "ethnic Germans." It included a variety of ethnic groups—Danes, Poles, and Alsatians—who had little or no desire to consider themselves Germans. The new state also did not provide for a centralized administrative structure such as in France, which could have fostered homogenization; instead, it built upon the traditional *Länder*, maintaining a federal structure in which each entity still fostered and regulated its own citizenship.

The point of departure for a discussion of German citizenship is the law of 1913, which still provides the basis for today's legislation.[9] Previously, the 1870 citizenship regulations of the Norddeutsche Bund had created a federal German citizenship while maintaining the citizenship of the various German states (Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg etc.). Thus, every German held dual citizenship: the one of his or her state and the one of this new political entity that was to become the second German Reich. In this context, dual citizenship was considered useful in the process of creating identification with this new state.

The debate on the new law began as an attempt to modernize the law of 1870 in order to harmonize citizenship regulations with political and economic changes within and outside of Germany.[10] One of the major changes was the abolition of automatic expatriation after ten years' residence abroad. The underlying theme and the main incentive of the new law was the concept of "community of arms" equals "community of people" ("Wehrgemeinschaft gleich Volksgemeinschaft") or "without community of arms no community of people." Under the impact of massive emigration in the preceding decades on the one hand and imperialist visions of a German mission in the world ("Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen") on the other, political elites wanted to tie those Germans living abroad closer to the Reich. Sons of German immigrants were to be reintegrated into the "community of German people" via three years of military service. That it may have been just these three lost years which enticed many young men to emigrate was pointed out by the representative of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Karl Liebknecht, but to no avail. However, it was not only young men the Reich's elites were interested in. Strategically important descendants of emigrants in commerce and industry in Britain, Latin America, or elsewhere were brought "home" (*heim ins Reich*) through the new law's imposition of citizenship based solely on descent. As was argued

in the Reichstag, to be a German was not a political category but a biological constant. Thus, it was (almost) impossible to "ungermanize" (unless one misbehaved while living abroad) just as it was (almost) impossible to become German. Accordingly, those Germans abroad who for economic reasons considered it expedient to take up foreign citizenship were permitted to keep their German citizenship. Again, dual citizenship was considered expedient.[11] In short, the aim of the new citizenship law was to win back Germans, to increase the number of people abroad who felt obliged to serve in the interest of Germany. A closer scrutiny of the sources and documents pertaining to the citizenship applications may very well show, among other things, a preparation for the imperialist war effort.

During the Weimar Republic, not even Social Democratic politicians sought to change citizenship laws; for a country which had to cede one-eighth of its territory, *ius sanguinis* provided a way to maintain contact with "its" population beyond territorial boundaries.[12] In 1934/35, the Nazis imposed uniform citizenship tied solely to the Reich. At the same time they repudiated citizenship rights of Jews and Gypsies, although the ancestors of these groups had lived on German soil for centuries.

Limited political and civil rights for those who were defined as non-Germans were among the instruments in Hitler's project to make the Third Reich an ethnocracy. The law to protect "German blood and German honor" prohibited all marital and extramarital ties between Jews and "Aryans." The extermination of Jews and Gypsies was the decisive and final step in the attempt to achieve a homogenization of state and nation, unique in Europe. Ethnic origin, language, and "race" had become the sole measure of German citizenship rights.[13]

In 1949, when the present German constitution was conceived and passed, the Reichs- und Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz of 1913 with its *ius sanguinis* aspect remained in force. Again the reasons were legal relationships and national bonds with those ethnically German populations that no longer lived on the new state's territory or were dispersed throughout Europe (and the world). It served as an instrument to uphold the notion of one German nation despite its two stately forms; and—as was also argued—the *ius sanguinis* principle also applied in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and was thus one of the few political concepts the two states had in common.[14]

From the late 1950s to the 1980s, Germany became a country of immigration, not by design but by reality. This development Germany shares with many other European core industrial countries. However, what makes Germany unique is the fact that it did not adjust politically to this changed social and cultural reality. Germany has by far the largest proportion of "foreign" workers, and, together with Belgium and Austria, the largest number of "foreigners" living on its territory (both in relative and in absolute numbers), partly because of the low level of naturalizations.[15] In other words, many of those who remained foreigners in Germany would have become citizens in France or the Netherlands. About 49 percent of so-called foreigners in

Germany have lived in the country ten years or more, an additional 7 percent for eight to ten years; that is, 56 percent of the foreigners would have had the right to naturalize under most European citizenship regulations. The most recent changes in German citizenship regulations, which produced a *ius soli* for children born to legal immigrants and granted naturalization as entitlement after eight years, have not generated the envisioned results; the number of naturalizations remains small.[16]

In contemporary political discourse about the relationship between citizenship and nationhood, France and Germany have been constructed in dichotomous terms, as quintessential opposites: cultural versus republican concepts of citizenship. However, as Brubaker has pointed out, "[to] characterize French and German traditions of citizenship and nationhood in terms of such ready-made conceptual pairs as universalism and particularism, cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism, Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic irrationalism," lends itself more to caricature than to characterization, let alone adequate historical description.[17] Although this rigid, dichotomous discourse has been used to "explain" the different policies, administrative regulations, and ideologies of the present-day immigration situation, thus politicizing the analysis, the historically different developments toward nationhood still hold "analytical and explanatory potency." As Brubaker argues, the French nation-state is the product of centuries of state building and of gradual nation building—with historical-political personalities such as Henry IV, Richelieu, and Louis XIV shaping the historical master narrative. The process pertains to and operates within a more or less fixed territorial-geographical entity, with fairly set boundaries in the south, west, and north since the sixteenth century. Only the boundaries to the east remained in flux with Alsace and Lorraine moving back and forth. German national consciousness, on the other hand—so Brubaker argues—developed outside and against state-bound (Prussian) aspirations.[18]

However, despite a seemingly straightforward relationship between territory, state, nation building, national consciousness, and understandings of citizenship, even in France the concept of citizenship underwent almost radical changes from its first codification in the 1790s to its reformulations in 1945, and again in the 1990s. As in other countries, these changes were reactions to or corresponded with changing political and demographic needs.

The present discussion of French citizenship refers to the constitution written in the wake of the Revolution. From 1791 to 1799, citizenship was constructed as *ius soli*, demonstrating the political desire to establish equality before the law beyond social and economic privileges. However, these laws were of short impact, and it was the Code Civil of 1804 that came to regulate French citizenship during the nineteenth century. It established a *ius sanguinis* citizenship through the father, although it gave every child born in France the option of French citizenship upon reaching adulthood. It has been argued that the alleged need for patriotic cohesion during the

Napoleonic Wars provided the justification to discard the more republican concept of citizenship established in the aftermath of the Revolution. *Ius sanguinis*, it was assumed, was the carrier of a stronger sense of national unity.[19] In addition to these "military" arguments, demographics provided another clue for restriction: France, as the most densely populated country in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, did not need a *ius soli* principle to increase its population. Nevertheless, the law of 1804 reiterated the very liberal 1790s regulations by which a person could become a French citizen just by declaring to establish domicile in France. In the mid-nineteenth century, after France experienced not only a declining birthrate but also a considerable amount of immigration, the desire and the need to expand the French population led to a reintroduction of the *ius soli* principle in 1851. The wish to turn foreigners into Frenchmen and thus bind them to the French nation-state was so pronounced that it had to be restricted again in response to protests from other European governments.[20] In 1927 a new citizenship law maintained the *ius soli* principle but also granted French citizenship to any child born to a French man, independent of the child's place of birth, thus establishing the most common and familiar mix of the two principles. This law also introduced a new gender component: a French woman no longer automatically lost her citizenship upon marrying a foreigner—thus breaking with the principle of "one-family/one-citizenship."

All over Europe, changes in the subsequent decades expressed a growing mistrust and suspicion of foreigners, expanding control, reducing the rights of naturalized citizens to hold office, and so forth. During the last war years, the needs for revisions of the 1927 law became pressing, and a new *code de la nationalité française* was introduced in 1945. But despite the ambitious intentions of legislators to preempt any future changes by designing detailed prescripts, post–World War II developments necessitated further changes. In 1973 the law was revised to secure gender neutrality; in 1983 the differential treatment of citizens by birth and by naturalization was abolished; and in the 1990s the political impacts of a growing foreign population, assimilationist and individualist demands, and European Union developments mandated further changes as in other European nations. The result is a mixture of options previously practiced and responses to the alleged threat of being "swamped" with foreigners.[21]

The development of British citizenship, or better, British subjecthood, is as much an expression of feudal relationships as it is closely related to Britain's status as an imperial and colonial power. Although the terms citizen and subject are often used synonymously, they nevertheless indicate different content. Subjecthood, as has been pointed out by Hansen, gives expression of a direct, unmediated relationship between the Crown and Subject, and the privileges attached to that status can be granted or removed by the sovereign. A citizen, on the other hand, derives his duties and rights from membership in a community.[22] The principle of *ius soli*, which dominated Britain's Nationality Law (with varying inclusions and

exclusions) thus does not spring from a political concept of equality but from feudal notions of subjecthood: whoever was "within the realm of the lord belongs to the lord."[23] The concept of *ius soli* reaches back to the conquest of the Normans in 1066, when anyone born within the Crown's dominion became a "British citizen." The concept was confirmed in the so-called Calvin's Case of 1608, which ruled on behalf of a Scottish subject that British Subjecthood was bestowed on anybody within the realm of the power of the Crown. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, subjecthood was expanded to include children born to British subjects abroad, thus introducing—at the time of colonial expansion—the mixture of the two principles to British nationality.

In the following decades, several nationality and naturalization acts adjusted the concepts to political and human-rights needs. In 1870 the concept of "perpetual allegiance" was altered to allow for the right to dissolve the subjecthood relationship in case of competing citizenships by birth to a father with a different *ius sanguinis* citizenship. Toward the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century it became more and more obvious that the relationship between subjecthood and the British nation-turned-empire had to be renegotiated. Particularly the "white" dominions, which had become settler societies with an emerging national consciousness of their own, became aware of the discrepancy arising from the need to bestow some kind of membership status on their inhabitants who were, however, British subjects. Until then they had turned immigrants into British subjects, a status valid only within the boundaries of the respective dominion. In 1901 the Home Office thus proposed to recognize the British subject as a common status in all of the British Empire. Since this implied some common code of acquiring subjecthood, the Nationality Law of 1914 was passed. It involved British subjecthood for those born abroad if the father was a British subject either by birth or by naturalization. Hence, the many immigrants who arrived to settle in Canada from parts of Europe other than the British Isles became British subjects upon request of citizenship in Canada. The potential for conflict between dominions and mother country became obvious when Canada introduced its own citizenship act in 1946.

Canada's legislation implied that people would become British subjects via being Canadian citizens and not the other way around. At the time this was regarded by British policy-makers as a serious threat to the cohesion of the old Commonwealth. A reform of the British Nationality Act (BNA) was intended to buttress that cohesion. The BNA of 1948 basically implied that there were three kinds of people in the world: those who were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies; those who were citizens of Independent Commonwealth Countries, and those who were neither, that is, aliens.[24] Individuals who belonged to the first two categories were allowed to enter freely, seek residence and employment, and enjoyed preferences with regard to vote. Since the new act provided for the Commonwealth countries to institutionalize their own citizenship, it secured, once again, a sense of imperial cohesion under the Crown. It did not anticipate that rising

migration to the mother country in the 1950s and 1960s would test the limits of a British subjecthood based on an empire. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act separated citizenship rights from immigration rights, and immigration restrictions began to apply to people holding passports of the United Kingdom. This ended free immigration to Britain from the "colonies" at a time when Britain was already on its way to become a racially mixed and multicultural society. The 1981 revision of the BNA put an end to the imperial concept of British subjecthood; a British citizenship put the country on a road toward European normalcy. It also allowed for gender equality. In the present, British citizenship is acquired through the familiar mix of birth and descent, allowing naturalization rights to second- and third-generation immigrants via fairly liberal procedures (no language tests and a short waiting period of four years).[25]

When Italy, during unification, decided upon national citizenship regulations (1865), it followed the French Civil Code and adopted *ius sanguinis a patre*. This was supplemented by *ius soli* regulations granting Italian citizenship to children born in Italy to a foreign father who had lived in Italy for more than ten years. It also included the option to choose citizenship upon reaching legal age. This procedure would later become the most widely used naturalization process for labor migrants and their offspring in European countries. Another aspect also foreshadowed contemporary concepts of citizenship. Italy provided for a "large" and a "small" version of naturalization: the large version granted full political rights and was regulated by law; the small version provided a minimum of private rights and could be granted by royal order. Repeated modifications of the 1860s provisions were consolidated into a new law in 1912, which maintained the basic mix of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli*. However, in keeping with the nationalist mode of the second half of the nineteenth century, the *ius soli* options became more restricted. The concept of one-family/one-citizenship was also maintained, thus forcing a foreign wife into Italian citizenship and denaturalizing an Italian woman upon marriage to a foreigner. It was only in the late 1970s that this principle was revised according to principles of gender equality. The 1912 law and subsequent modifications also responded to the vast emigration. Not dual citizenship but a rapid resumption of former Italian citizenship was designed to ease and maintain the bonds of the fatherland with its "lost sons and daughters."[26] Changes in the 1920s reacted to the increasingly exclusionary nationalist mode all over Europe, but were particularly prevalent in Fascist Italy (after Mussolini came to power in 1922) and Nazi Germany. Today Italy still maintains a basic *ius sanguinis* principle (*padre e madre*) but has liberal naturalization laws and accepts dual citizenship—again most likely to maintain contact with its vast 1950s emigration.[27]

Austria, similar to Germany, has a particularly varied and multifaceted migration history, experiencing a large amount of internal migration as well as emigration, immigration, and transit migration. However, as in Germany, this historical experience did not lead to a more enlightened

negotiation of citizenship in the present politically charged context. The Habsburg Empire introduced its first citizenship law in 1811, stipulating that every child of an Austrian citizen should be Austrian by birth. And it provided three historically rather unusual ways to obtain citizenship: by employment in public service, by uninterrupted domicile in one of the Austrian communities, and by establishing and maintaining a business (*Gewerbe*). In all of these cases the candidates had to be without any criminal record. The second option in practice provided *ius soli* for children growing up with parents who had lived in Austria uninterruptedly for more than ten years.[28] Needless to say, these options became more and more restricted in the following decades.

Despite massive internal movements and a large amount of emigration in the nineteenth century, it was not until the 1860s that people were allowed to move in all directions more or less without restrictions or special permissions. Here, too, *Freizügigkeit*, or freedom of movement, was a prerequisite for industrialization. While the 1867 law guaranteed the right to leave, the concept of the Austrian *Heimatrecht* made it difficult for internal migrants to settle down in a new location. It established the boundaries between "foreigners" and the "native" population of a specific locale. Only those with *Heimatrecht* had the unrestricted right to stay and to demand welfare. A law of 1863 made the *Heimatrecht* even more exclusionary by preventing automatic naturalization after ten years of residence, and an 1871 law allowed for the expulsion of "foreigners"[29] without sufficient means to support themselves. Within the multiethnic state of the Habsburg Empire, the *Heimatrecht* served as a form of regional citizenship. As Lichtblau, Hahn, and John have shown, it was a very powerful tool for regulating the relationship between natives and newcomers in a state where linguistic and ethnic boundaries—which would be national boundaries in later contexts—did not necessarily prevent migration and ethnic mixing.[30]

Though Austrian citizenship law underwent a number of minor changes throughout the following decades, the larger historical developments in 1918, 1938, and 1945 had a more decisive impact on how the state chose its citizenry; that is, who was to be included and who prevented from becoming part of the polity. The demise of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918 made it necessary to redistribute its citizenry, and the relationship between ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship had to be renegotiated. Many of the new Austria's residents now were, by culture and by language, potential citizens of another state. Once again the *Heimatrecht* was of importance. The law of December 1818 stipulated that anybody with *Heimatrecht* in one of the (German-Austrian) communities was to be an Austrian citizen under *ius soli*. Subsequently the concept of "race" was used to sort out the mixture of peoples who had lived side by side in the former Habsburg Empire. People who had *Heimatrecht* in one of the new successor nations and who differed—according to "race" and language—from the majority around them, were to receive Austrian citizenship after six months if they belonged—according to "race" and language—to the

German majority of the Austrian population. These complicated arrangements mainly served to exclude Jewish refugees coming from the eastern part of the former empire. Because the other nation-states which had emerged in the wake of the Versailles peace treaty also used the treaty's minority clause as an opportunity to "cleanse" themselves of minority ethnic groups, the interwar years were a period of persecuted minorities and stateless people.[31] In 1938, when Austria became part of Nazi Germany, German law dissolved federal and state citizenship regulations and turned every Austrian into a German citizen. After all Nazi regulations had been declared null and void in 1945, Austria, in 1949, proclaimed a new citizenship law, maintaining the standard principles of *ius sanguinis a patre* and one-family/one-citizenship.

In the 1950s and more so in the 1960s, Austria also, like most northwestern European countries, experienced rising immigration and in consequence had to rethink its citizenship regulations. Attempts to reform and liberalize the naturalization procedures in 1973 failed because of popular opposition. Ten years later it was at least possible to abolish derivative citizenship for women and introduce *ius sanguinis a matre*. But the *ius sanguinis* concept as the basic principle for citizenship was maintained, and citizenship still serves as the main element of distinction between "natives" and "foreigners." Neither dual citizenship nor part-citizenship (allowing for local voting rights for immigrants) was allowed to blur this demarcation line.[32]

Citizenship as a Set of Relationships

This historical analysis of citizenship has shown two things: (1) It is generally assumed that the state has the power and right to control "citizenship," thus choosing its own citizenry and (2) it identifies much more than a legal status. Rather, the construction of citizenship indicates a process of modernization which is at the same time inclusive and exclusive. This construction creates a growing notion of inclusive equality in membership rights and duties while it increases the barriers that have to be overcome for inclusion. The process of construction thus establishes a category, if a malleable one, of not belonging. In the tradition of T.H. Marshall, citizenship is usually defined as indicating full membership in a polity, to which civil, political, and social rights and duties are attached. In order to better understand the many related issues (and subtexts) discussed in the context of this definition of citizenship, Miriam Feldman discerns four central dimensions: the regulation of citizenship, its institutionalization, its ideology, and its locus (i.e., the nation-state).[33] I would like to carry the relational and multidimensional concept of citizenship a step further and define citizenship as a set of political, sociocultural and transnational relationships regulating the liaison between the individual and the state. The political relationship organizes political rights and duties such as active

and passive voting rights, political activism, and military service; the sociocultural relationship arranges access to the welfare system and negotiates concepts of belonging and difference; and the transnational relationship regulates movement across borders within a power-hierarchical system of states. In each of these relationships, variants along a bipolar spectrum are possible: active/passive, private/public, exclusive/inclusive, and gender are important determinants. The political culture of the respective nation-state provides the framework for negotiating these relationships with these dimensions.

The Personal Objective of Citizenship

While it is generally assumed that the state sets up the rules for the negotiating process and decides on who is to be included or excluded and on what terms a person may become a member, I want to introduce the individual as an agent in the quest for citizenship, pursuing his/her own sets of rules and ideas. Surprisingly neither the academic discourse on citizenship nor the analyses about how to obtain different versions of citizenship has looked at people as active agents, as decision makers in their own destiny as citizens. Citizenship is usually analyzed as ascribed or attributed: a person is born into it; it is granted by the state; and rights and obligations are derived from it. However, little do we hear about people choosing to become a member of a state, choosing to enter a relationship or choosing to remain outside, nothing do we know about their reason, their rationale. Not everything regarding citizenship is predetermined either by birth or by state legislation. People have choices and they exercise their right to choose.

In the context of increasing mobility across borders, the question of why someone decides to become a citizen of another country and what the incentives are to change citizenship arise more often. I argue that—unlike claims with regard to national identity and acculturation—"taking out citizenship," from the migrant's point of view, is a very individual decision related on the one hand to personal circumstances, and on the other hand it is related to the country's position in the international, hierarchically structured system of states. To argue my case I will look at citizenship negotiations in the German context.

The value of citizenship for German immigrants to Canada in the 1950s and 1960s is difficult to determine. The question of at what point, if at all, these immigrants took out citizenship had very little to do with voting, with exercising their democratic rights, or with the possibility of sponsoring other immigrants. Despite its public dimension, choosing to become a citizen was a very personal decision, often related to an event in the family cycle. When a new baby was born a Canadian, the rest of the family may have decided to become Canadian, too, thus choosing to uphold the one-family/one-citizenship principle. Or German citizenship was kept for fear of forgoing German pension rights and claims. One daughter, who

was described as "the most German of the family" also was the only Canadian citizen of the family.[34] Most immigrants did not seem to worry one way or the other. There may have been one point in life that seemed to be the right time to make the decision—a baby, a job, an event. If this point did not come, they lived happily without Canadian citizenship. The lack of political inclusion, that is, being deprived of voting rights, was not considered a loss. The question of travel also did not arise in this context. Most immigrants traveled frequently between Germany and Canada, sometimes to the United States, but hardly anywhere else. Passports and visas did not present problems. Citizenship, such a highly contested concept in present day debates about migration, to those postwar Germans in Canada was not an important issue. The attempt to utilize citizenship as part of the process of creating a national identity failed with them.

Present-day immigrants to Germany present a similar picture, as may be illustrated by a former citizen of Yugoslavia (or a citizen of the former Yugoslavia) who had lived and worked in Bremen for over twenty years. He owned some property in one of the Yugoslav states but had the "wrong" ethnicity in relation to where his house was situated. He could not go back to claim his property and deal with the bureaucrats. Thus, he applied for German citizenship because as a German all doors seemed open to him. The interest in his property induced him to pay the fee to become denaturalized from the respective Yugoslav state. Ironically his incentive to obtain the citizenship of his new country was, in fact, the possibility to maintain ties to his country of origin.

Another important enticement for citizenship is the desire for family reunification and—in the Canadian case—sponsorship. Again, it is the possibility to maintain "old" ties in addition to being able to fulfill a number of personal and family obligations, which turns citizenship of the host society into an attractive option.

The "external" or transnational aspect of citizenship today provides another convincing incentive to obtain citizenship of a "powerful" nation with potent bargaining power in the international, especially European, context. Unlike the experience of German Canadians in the 1950s, it is the moment of travel—no longer back to the culture of origin but to Italy on vacation or to the United States on a student exchange—which makes citizenship of a powerful nation attractive. When visas have to be applied and paid for or when people, students for example, who are otherwise part of a peer group, are singled out and become outsiders while waiting in airports or at border crossings with the "wrong" passport, this is not only humiliating but also costly and time consuming. In this case, being a U.S., Canadian, British, or German citizen proves to be advantageous.

Once the decision has been made, the next issue is how people negotiate the process of becoming a citizen, of confronting their personal needs with bureaucratic demands. Dual citizenship, a concept strongly rejected by German "gatekeepers," provides a platform for such negotiations. So far, political opportunism and "hegemonic ethnicity" determine who is accorded

the right to dual citizenship. So-called ethnic Germans from Poland or the states of the former Soviet Union do not have to renounce their Polish or Russian citizenship when becoming German—and very few of them do so voluntarily. A sense of belonging with regard to their home country, tradition, friendship ties, and homesickness makes them retain their former citizenship while at the same time profiting from the benefits of being a German, having an inclusive membership card with extensive membership rights.[35] For Turks living in Germany, the situation is more complex. On the one hand, officials still consider it opportune to deny dual citizenship. On the other hand, Turks often find it particularly difficult, for cultural and legal reasons, to forgo their Turkish citizenship. However, proclaimed policy begins to be undercut by practice. When in the late 1980s a young Turkish woman was elected as a member of the Green Party to one of the city governments, she explained publicly how, in order to stand for election, she had to deny her Turkish citizenship when obtaining German citizenship. She had "deposited" her Turkish citizenship at the Turkish consulate and, after "becoming German" she went back to pick up her Turkish citizenship papers again. No outcry accompanied this public demonstration of law bending. Many Turkish-Germans have followed her example. In the case of Turkish men, military service had been one of the major obstacles to denaturalization. In 1995 the Turkish government adjusted its citizenship regulations. Only then were sons of emigrants born and/or living abroad exempt from the draft and thus permitted to denaturalize and to accept citizenship in their country of residence.[36] For those who refrain from the final step of denaturalization, the Turkish state offers partial exemption from military service and has turned the process into a profitable source of income for the state's treasury. Men have to pay dearly for this procedure. Turkish men are eligible for military service between the ages of 18 and 35. In order to receive permission to naturalize elsewhere, men have to pay about €5,000 and to serve one month in the military. A special military camp has been established for male Turks living outside the Turkish territory. Women have considerably less market value for the state. For them the process of denaturalization and citizenship applications involves considerably less bureaucratic wheeling and dealing.

Regarding the sociocultural aspect of citizenship, the question of what amount of assimilation is demanded by the (German) state before allowing for naturalization may be discussed. The ongoing political reassessment negotiations indicate some basic parameters required to prove a "lasting orientation" toward German culture at the time of applying for citizenship: language skills, an ability to deal with bureaucracy, and—most important—employment. In the eyes of naturalization administrators, the ultimate measure for a "lasting orientation" toward the German State is *employment*. No matter how much proof a person has given of ongoing involvement in German society, no matter how often a person has been employed and has paid contributions to unemployment insurance, citizenship may be denied if that person is unemployed at the time

of the final decision. Thus, it is not the unemployment benefits which are denied, "only" the right to become a citizen.

The modern welfare state imposes a tight network of links between state institutions and residents—not just its citizens. From student allowances to spouse and child support in case of divorce to old age insurance, throughout the life course and the family cycle a multifaceted regulation of rights and obligations has been instituted which demands continuous documentation of status. This, at first, seems to have little connection to formal aspects of citizenship. A migrant has entered into all of these relationships with the state before he or she even applies for citizenship by participating in the welfare state's labor market and thus being incorporated automatically into the social security system. The state bureaucracy ensures that applicants live up to their responsibilities before making them citizens. These are not obligations to the state per se but to the numerous institutions and responsibilities the welfare state has created for its residents. In Marshall's terms the responsible involvement in social and civil citizenship are a prerequisite for political citizenship. Political citizenship has become a residual category implying voting rights and easier cross-border travel conditions. Citizenship applicants seem to share this approach. They rarely mention the right to vote when giving reasons for citizenship applications.

Today people use citizenship as a tool to support their needs and life strategies. To the Belgian/American couple with one spouse having additional Canadian citizenship it is access to the European/North American labor markets that makes multiple citizenship attractive. For young Turkish men in Germany it is being able to enter a disco, for another to go abroad on a scholarship restricted to citizens.[37] Others may want to use their status as Canadians, Americans, or Germans to negotiate business connections in the global economy. Many will make use of the family concept in citizenship regulations to bring together relatives and family members. The decision to "take out citizenship" has little relationship to state sovereignty, assimilation, or abstract ties to the state. It rather is usually the result of a bundle of reasons related to one's personal circumstances, triggered by one aspect that at one particular time and moment seems to be important. Social citizenship, on the other hand, that is, involvement in welfare state networks and institutions, is much less voluntary, much less subject to the discretionary power of administrators or to personal decisions.

While in the past European and other states, in the rhetoric of the political gatekeepers, used to demand an emotional attachment to the nation before allowing newcomers to become members of the political citizenry, in the present, citizenship has become almost completely instrumentalized in the interest of those who, upon application for political citizenship, command the respective resources and are able to manage and negotiate their rights. This seems to hold irrespective of the host country's immigration policy.

As the first part of this essay has shown, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries citizenship was a malleable instrument in the hands of the state to negotiate inclusion and exclusion and to regulate membership rights and duties depending on the political needs of the nation-state. The procedure was part of a modernization and homogenization process and marked by expanding the rights of those included and by limiting the rights of those excluded. Social and political rights were less divergent; those who had social rights also had political rights and vice versa. It was generally assumed that the state was the agent in control of the process of granting citizenship. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite the fact that the state still is in control of the citizenship process, people exercise their own choices and control their own negotiating process with the state as regards political citizenship. Social citizenship allows denizens full participation in the welfare state in most European countries, but—in contrast to political participation—binds people to obey the rules and regulations of the welfare state. Political (traditional) citizenship has become less obtrusive than the social security regime. While forgoing their political rights people may still live happily ever after.

Citizenship may best be understood, first, as a personal relationship with the state, with each person deciding what suits him/her best. Secondly, however, if a polity is interested in a well-functioning civil society, it should provide inclusive political citizenship with low entry barriers which enables residents/citizens to negotiate this relationship in the best interest of both parties involved.

Notes

1. Quotes by Juan Linz and Max Weber respectively in Hans-Jürgen Puhle, *Staaten, Nationen und Regionen in Europa* (Vienna: Picus, 1995), 28.
2. For a brief summary of that debate, see Christiane Harzig, "Of Minority Policy and (Homogeneous) Multiculturalism: Constructing Multicultural Societies on a Nationalist Model: The Post–World War Two 'Western' Experience," in *The Social Construction of Diversity: Recasting the Master Narrative of Industrial Nations*, ed. Christiane Harzig and Danielle Juteau, with Irina Schmitt (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).
3. See Hans-Jürgen Puhle, *Staaten*.
4. For a more historical and detailed account, see Hagen Schulze, *Staat und Nation in der Europäischen Geschichte* (Munich: Beck, 1999).
5. Dirk Hoerder, "Nation and Multiculturalism in German Past and Present: Comparative Perspectives," unpublished manuscript, Montreal 1996, 9.
6. See Puhle, *Staaten*.
7. Cf. Karen Hagemann, "A Valorous *Volk* Family: the Nation, the Military, and the Gender Order in Prussia in the Time of the Anti-Napoleonic Wars, 1806–15," in *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. Ida Blom et al. (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2000), 179–206.
8. John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 72.

9. In today's controversial discussion of German citizenship, this law provokes two different sets of reactions. On the one hand, in a nation and in a political culture such as that of the Federal Republic, in which the concepts of "total breakdown" and "rebirth" (*Neuanfang*) after 1945 are important aspects of nation building and national identity, it is unsettling that in this particular instance, which is so important for future development, we are burdened with concepts from the past, a past believed to be left behind, a past which is indeed considered history and not the source of political continuity. On the other hand, since we are used to looking into history in search of political explanations and understandings of the present, we look at the historical context and reasoning which brought forward this particular Reichs- und Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz of 1913 and its reliance on *ius sanguinis*.
10. For an account of the legal-historical development of European citizenship, see Gerard-René de Groot, *Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht im Wandel: Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie über Erwerbs- und Verlustgründe der Staatsangehörigkeit* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1989), 54–72.
11. "Dual Citizenship of those whose Germanness is without question since it is an inescapable biological fate, and the protection of which is in the country's interest, is something very different from the dual citizenship of those who carry the stigma of 'non-Germanness' by birth and who do not guarantee to always act according to the benefit of Germany" (Georg Hansen, *Frankfurter Rundschau,* 10 February 1999, 7; trans. Christiane Harzig).
12. Hans Åke Persson, "Foreigners, Historical Ethnic Immigration, and the Successful Western German Model," in *Encounter with Strangers: the European Experience*, ed. Hans Åke Persson (Lund: University of Lund Press, 1997), 61.
13. Ibid., 62.
14. *Die Zeit*, 11 February 1999, 1. Also, during the first two decades after the war, Germany's citizenship regulations were quite in accordance with European norms. In the 1960s it was reaffirmed on the European level that dual citizenship was something to be avoided and allowed only as an exception.
15. Of the people living on German territory, 7.4 million or 9 percent are foreigners; 4 million of those have lived in Germany more than eight years, 3 million over fifteen years. Every year 50,000 "foreign" children are born in Germany. Even the Kohl government recognized the fact that no state can tolerate to have such a large portion of its inhabitants as noncitizens. However—this being said—it remained silent.
16. The law was passed in 1999 and came into effect in January 2000. Its most controversial aspect, to allow for dual citizenship, had to be dropped due to protests expressed in elections to the Hessen Landtag in 1998. In January 2003, the political debate on comprehensive immigration legislation is ongoing.
17. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 2.
18. Ibid., 3.
19. Cf. de Groot, *Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht im Wandel*, 76; and Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*, 87ff.
20. The 1889 law implied that a child born in France to a French mother and a foreign father who imposed his own citizenship on his child due to *ius sanguinis* was nonetheless Frenchified. European governments protested against this violation against the rule of paternal transmission of national belonging.
21. In the mid-1990s France allowed for dual citizenship and required a five-year period of residence for naturalization.
22. Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38.
23. Ibid.
24. Cf. Hansen, *Citizenship*, 45. Irish people constituted a fourth category. To outline their citizenship relationship to the United Kingdom would extend the scope of this essay beyond its limits.
25. Cf. Hansen, *Citizenship*, 212f.

26. Cf. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 105.
27. A child born with dual citizenship is urged to choose upon coming of age.
28. Cf. de Groot, *Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht im Wandel*, 141, 149.
29. Here the word "foreigner" indicates *Fremde*, in this case not necessarily people from a different country (nation-state) but people born outside a particular community. The Austrian concept of citizenship in the nineteenth century recognized three levels: the federation (*Bund*), the state (*Land*), and the community (*Gemeinde*). The federal vs. state distinction is still valid today.
30. Albert Lichtblau, "The Jews' Search for '*Zugehörigkeit*' in Austria up to 1938," and Sylvia Hahn, "Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants in the Multicultural Realm of the Habsburg 'State of Many Peoples,'" both in *Negotiating Nations: Exclusions, Networks, Inclusions*, ed. Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder, and Adrian Shubert, *Histoire sociale/Social History* 23, no. 66 (November 2000): 231–50 and 307–24 respectively; Michael John, "National Movements and Imperial Ethnic Hegemonies in Austria, 1867–1918," in this volume.
31. Rainer Bauböck, *'Nach Rasse und Sprache verschieden': Migrationspolitik in Österreich von der Monarchie bis heute*, Political Science Series, no. 31 (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 1996), 4–5.
32. Ibid., 16.
33. Miriam Feldman, "'Citizenship Matters': Contemporary Trends in Europe and the United States," *Stanford Electronic Humanities Review* 5.2 (1997) ISSN 1048-3721, 3 (accessed 25 April 2001).
34. Cf. Harzig, "'When You Are a New Immigrant You Are Just Half and Half': The Process of Becoming Canadian among Post–World War Two German Immigrants," in *Selbst und andere/s: Von Begegnungen und Grenzziehungen*, Beiträge zur Kanadistik Band 7, ed. Doris Eibl and Christina Strobel (Augsburg: Dr. Bernd Wießner, 1998), 66–79.
35. This, of course, expresses a somewhat top-down view of immigration of ethnic Germans. Their citizenship is often of limited use with regard to organizing everyday life in modern, urban Germany.
36. The German representative for foreigner's affairs provides detailed information on dual citizenship and military service. There are a number of governmental agreements within the European Union (esp. with Greece) and Argentina. Cf. Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer, "Doppelstaatsangehörigkeit und Wehrpflicht," Bonn/Berlin, n.d.
37. "In Germany the Turkish passport is sort of a scar/brand, which brings a number of disadvantages with police controls when visiting discos or searching for jobs, claims Güvan, a young Turkish man. Tarkan offers a large number of examples of spoiled Saturday nights, which failed because bouncers had decided that there were already enough foreigners in their dance clubs." "My Condition Needs Two Passports: Residence Bremen, Turkish Passport, Kurdish Heart—Or: The Unfulfilled Dream of Multiple Citizenship," *Bremer Nachrichten*, 27 May 1997 (trans. Christiane Harzig).

— *Ten* —

PLACE-SENSITIVE CITIZENSHIP

The Canadian Citizenship Regime until 1945

Jane Jenson

Canada is a miniature world. It has problems of geography, climate, resources, language and religion. Yet out of a diversity of racial groups scattered over half a continent, the builders of Canada have moulded a nation with a spirit strong and distinctly its own. But Canadianism is a blend—the very diversity has softened, and at the same time broadened it, but not detracted from its inherent worth.

— W.J. Lindal, *Canadian Citizenship and Our Wider Loyalties* (1947)

Is there one Canadian people or are there many Canadian peoples? Who are we? Whence do we come? Whither shall we go? Are we a rope of many strands, or are we solidified into a nation by a pure and durable cement? Survey Canada and what do you discern between sea and sea? Where the Atlantic rolls upon Canadian shores there is as great variation in the Canadians as there is between the tides which, in the Bay of Fundy, sometimes rise and fall ten feet an hour, and other side of the peninsula do not exceed ten feet a day.

— Arthur Hawkes, *The Birthright: A Search for the Canadian Canadian and the Larger Loyalty* (1919)

At first sight, allegiance to a common state, appears to be the test of nationality; and in that sense the word is probably most frequently used. But the word nationality should not be confused with the word nation in the sense of a state. The state is the casing; the nationalities are the encased.

— William Henry Moore, *The Clash! A Study in Nationalities* (1918)

Introduction: Creating Canadian Citizens from British Subjects

We have become accustomed to thinking of the years after 1945 as foundational for the Canadian citizenship regime. With its Citizenship Act, which came into effect on 1 January 1947, Canada was the first country in the Commonwealth to create a separate citizenship and thereby to break with the alternate myth of the imperial subject as both a legal and subjective identity.[1] Prior to the new act, the terms most commonly used were "Canadian national" and "British subject."

Since the nineteenth century, a range of immigration and naturalization laws had regulated who could enter and leave the country, who could claim a passport, and the treatment of individuals who changed their status, such as women upon marriage. These were a mélange of arrangements. Therefore, as its author Paul Martin said, the Citizenship Act was intended to remedy the "deplorable state" of the naturalization and immigration laws.[2]

But it was more than that. Paul Martin recalled that he became convinced of the need for such legislation after visiting the battlefield cemeteries of postwar Western Europe. "Nothing has since epitomized the concept of our nation more poignantly for me than that cemetery. Of whatever origin, these men were all Canadian."[3] Therefore, as he went on to say:

> Symbols, I told the House, were important to a nation, and the government's decision to clarify and regularize the status of Canadian citizenship constituted a major feat. Our membership in the family of nations had been recognized; we had won our certificate of nationhood; it now remained to designate ourselves citizens of our country, not only in fact but in legal enactment.[4]

Yet attention to citizenship was not new. A half-century earlier John Millar, the Deputy Minister of Education for Ontario, had written a book for the new century, *Canadian Citizenship: A Treatise on Civil Government*.[5] It opened with the statement, "The end of all government is the cultivation of good citizenship." His words would, with a little adjustment of discourse, serve equally well for those at the beginning of the twenty-first century concerned about matters of social cohesion, social capital, and citizen engagement, not to mention civic education:

> Good citizens are those who have mastered self, and the institutions of the state should aid in this object.… The cost of administration would be greatly lessened if people were at all times anxious to do right. If all citizens were law-abiding the large sums now expended to pay policemen and to erect and maintain prisons would be saved. The problem of government would be simple if the family and school were sufficiently powerful to form character to a high order, before people enter upon the active duties of life.[6]

In these references we see two different but interconnected ways of thinking about citizenship. For Paul Martin, it is a matter of recognition, of

identity, and of status. Passports and nationality are important, but of even greater importance is the symbolic recognition of nationhood, expressed through the sacrifices of war. Of course, as we also know, those same wars were moments of profound dispute within the country, precisely over the question of whether Canada should participate in them as an expression of it membership in the British Empire, as an expression of its autonomy, or not at all. And, as the maintenance of the status of British subject for Canadian citizens for a generation after 1947 demonstrated, the new symbols were only a partial break with the past.

The second way of understanding citizenship is found in the Millar book. He describes citizenship less in terms of identity or nationality than in terms of responsibilities and some rights; indeed for him "Canadian citizens" already exist.[7] His notion of citizenship is of the ties that bind the society together, allowing it to function with basic levels of civility. Thus, public institutions are important because they can aid in that functioning. He devotes a chapter to citizens' rights and duties, with the most important being political and civil rights and duties.[8]

With just these two examples it is clear that the process of making citizens out of subjects, particularly making Canadian citizens out of British subjects and the "aliens" who flocked to the northern half of the North American continent, was no simple matter. It was complicated for reasons of definition, but also because a "nation" had to be constructed. If by 1945 Paul Martin could speak confidently of nationhood, this was much less the case in the previous seventy-five years of Canadian history. The citizenship regime in place in those years was constructed on its own set of principles, ones that did not immediately recognize Canada as the basic unit of attachment nor its central institutions as the ones deserving most loyalty. Rather, the nation was imagined as a set of "island communities," whose political discourse and identities were more regional than national. This essay describes this citizenship regime, in part to illuminate the fact that creation of a "national identity" involves much more than reconciling "different nations within a single state." While pre-1945 Canada was obviously marked by the linguistic and cultural divide that was the legacy of settlement patterns and the Conquest of 1759, it was also cleaved by other differences. Diversity of class and gender relations simply multiplied the identity issues of citizenship.

Citizenship and Citizenship Regimes

The work of historical sociologists teaches that citizenship is a social construction.[9] As such, it varies across both space and time. As so many authors, T.H. Marshall included, have remarked, the story of progress from civil to political to social rights that Marshall recounted was only the story of Britain.[10] Other countries were destined to live their own histories; there would be variation across space. A second legacy from Marshall is the idea

of change through time. His story is one of new rights won, of new groups gaining access to citizenship, and of definitions of community altering through time.

Taking these two Marshallian insights as its foundation, the *concept of citizenship regime* stands on two theoretical legs. The first follows from the notion that because citizenship is a historical construction, its forms will vary. Particular political struggles, particular trajectories of development, and institutional legacies underpin the forms of citizenship as well as the timing of acquisition of rights. Moreover, because the emergence of the idea of citizenship parallels the history of the modern state, the space in which such struggles, institutions, and acquisition has occurred thus far has been bounded by national frontiers protected by sovereignty. The result is that one may speak of citizenship regimes, just as one can speak of social-welfare regimes. We can say that the concept of citizenship regime denotes the institutional arrangements, rules, and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims-making by citizens.[11] This theoretical leg calls for comparison across space and/or time.

In addition, embedded in this definition is an analytic proclivity for uncovering and attributing importance to ideas as well as practices. A citizenship regime encodes within it a paradigmatic representation of identities, of the national as well as the model citizen, the second-class citizen, and the non-citizen. It also encodes representations of the proper and legitimate social relations among and within these categories, as well as the borders of "public" and "private." It makes, in other words, a major contribution to the definition of politics that organizes the boundaries of political debate and problem recognition in each jurisdiction.

These representations of identities and social relations are the foundation for claims-making. It is only by representing their identity that groups and individuals can make sense to themselves and others of their interests. In other words, representation of self is an integral aspect of representation of interests. The state has a role, too, in that it has the power to recognize citizens, both in general and as particular categories of citizens. The state uses such recognition to make sense of the claims addressed to it.

The second theoretical leg of the concept of citizenship regime is drawn from the regulation approach's notion of stability and change in the patterning of social relations. Without revisiting this approach to political economy in detail, it is sufficient to say that regulationists accept that in some historical moments there is a certain stability in basic social, economic, and political relations that allows us to say that regimes exist. Then, with the arrival of crisis—defined essentially as an intensification of contradictions always present in the regime—profound change and redirection may result. Organizing and legitimating principles can break with one model and give rise to a quite different conceptualization. Moreover, the content, direction, and long-term stability of such movement are not given in advance; they are the products of concrete struggles in particular places.

Adopting this perspective, this essay argues that citizenship regimes exist as the concrete forms in a particular place of a more general model of citizenship corresponding to the general form of regulation. This theoretical leg of the argument leads to an analysis over time and a characterization of the moments of stability and subsequent alterations. We might characterize a stable regime as one in which the status proffered and the status anticipated match, so that the representation of citizens by the state accommodates citizens' representations of themselves.

Being a regime, citizenship does not alter quickly or even easily. Nonetheless, we can expect and seek change at moments of economic and political turbulence. In such moments of fundamental restructuring of the role of the state, the division of labor between the state and markets and between public and "private," definitions of the "national" as well as of the "model citizen" may alter. Citizenship regimes are likely to come under pressure at such times precisely because they are a crucial component of a model of development ordering and stabilizing social relations. When the model of development enters into crisis, it is very likely that the citizenship regime embedded within it will also be altered.

Citizenship—a Multidimensional Concept

The next step in the argument is to identify the several dimensions that make up citizenship. It is, as indicated in the introduction to this essay, much more than nationality. At its most general, citizenship establishes a system of inclusion and exclusion. It defines boundaries, recognizing the citizenship status of the included and denying that status to the excluded. This notion of inside/outside leads directly to a further specification of two dimensions of the concept: citizenship as the conferring of rights and citizenship as grounding for feelings of identification with a particular community.[12] Some studies of citizenship have made inclusion and exclusion correspond to the political border of nationality (the citizen of a country). But boundaries of allegiance have never been confined to national frontiers. Indeed, as this quotation from 1918 puts it so eloquently, these boundaries have very recently been fluid and not homogeneous. William Henry Moore was writing at a time when Canada was still within the British Empire and Canadians were British subjects. He describes the diversity this implied:

> Only one English-speaking man in three is a Britisher, and only one Britisher in six is a Protestant. We who live under the protection of the Union Jack are of no particular race: we are of all races; we are of no particular language: we were born to all languages; nor are we of any particular Church: for in Greater Britain, God is worshipped after the manner of all Churches. The word "British" in the sense of nationality, expresses a "super-nationality," incorporating without weakening the various nationalities which compose the humanity of the British Empire.[13]

Internal borders also have always separated the *full citizen*—the person entitled to full rights—from the national with limited rights, a sort of "second-class citizen."[14] Attention to internal distinctions makes it evident that schemas of recognition of citizens are important. Yet much analysis of the identity dimension of citizenship proceeds from the assumption that citizenship practice generates a sense of community loyalty among those grateful to be included. Indeed, since the nineteenth century many have assumed that extension of the political rights—and even more so the social rights—of citizenship would calm the revolutionary fervor of the working class. In this formulation we see that the arrow of causality is from rights to identity: having access to rights will create a feeling of belonging.[15]

Such a formulation fails to address the content of citizens' identity. How does one recognize a citizen? What does a model citizen look like in each citizenship regime? What is the model relationship between citizens and the state? The silence around such questions arose, no doubt, because of three tendencies: to see citizenship as part of nation-building, and therefore to assume that a national identity results from the extension of rights; to take the universalist claims of citizenship discourse for reality, without realizing that second-class citizens may exist; and to have a society-centric theory of the state, which does not attribute an interest of state to particular representations of citizens' identities.[16]

Once we realize that citizenship involves a lot more than the boundary between nationals and nonnationals, that distinctions across time may exist, we are then led to a historical examination of the form and content of concrete citizenship regimes. In this particular analysis, I will focus on the belonging dimension of the citizenship regime in the post-1867 years of nation-building. I will examine the ways in which prior to World War II, Canada's citizenship regime was a "place-sensitive one," and in particular that the units of loyalty were "island communities." The belonging dimension was not isolated from the other two, of course. The dimensions of rights and access also had the same form, such that the regime was, for a time, a coherent one. By the 1930s, however, as the interwar model of development entered its final crisis, the citizenship regime was already facing claims for a more Pan-Canadian vision.

Building a Nation with a Place-Sensitive Citizenship: Equity for "Island Communities"

In the decades after 1867, nation-building was clearly a principal goal of the state, as it was for Paul Martin and so many others after 1945. Nonetheless, as we will see in this section, the citizenship regime constituted in these years was a place-sensitive one with neither the Pan-Canadian focus nor the focus on individual Canadians characterizing the successor regime. In large part this was because the universe of political discourse was dominated for the first three decades of the twentieth century by disputes over

the factors contributing to regional inequalities as well as a strong regional content to identities.

None of this meant, however, that the state did not recognize the importance of building a nation and did not take this as a fundamental role for itself. Nor did it mean that the Canadian state was not actively engaged in distributing rights and responsibilities. What it did mean was that the ways these actions were performed, and the meanings attributed to them, were not the same as in the later period.

If Lord Durham was one of the first observers to note the central role of the state for Canadian economic, political, and social development, many social scientists have shared his vision. However, they have not always agreed. There *is* general agreement among students of political thought that Canadian citizenship values reflect at least in part a collectivist tradition. While displaying a commitment to liberal principles, particularly with respect to the notion of limited government and individual rights, Canada also has been influenced by both the "Tory touch" and the traditions of social solidarity coming from social democracy. These have had consequences for both the rights dimension of its various citizenship regimes and the notions of equitable access embedded in them.

In his comparisons of Canada and the United States, S.M. Lipset has isolated the absence of a single event, a "revolutionary moment," to account for the greater commitment to collectivism in Canada than in the United States.[17] For Lipset, the formative event for Canadian society—and its approach to citizenship values—was the counterrevolution, the in-migration of Loyalists at the time of the American Revolution. These Loyalists committed to Tory values helped to ensure that Canada in the nineteenth century would be more elitist, particularistic and ascriptive.[18]

In his analysis, Lipset for the most part ignored the contribution of French-Canadian political thought to the substance of political culture. Other approaches have paid more attention to it, and particularly the contribution of conservative Catholicism to buttressing the Tory ideas of Loyalists. George Grant, for example, stressed the Catholic tendency to put virtue before freedom, as a principle contributing to the legitimization of restraint of individual liberty in the name of the common good.[19] For Grant, French-Canadian Catholicism fit well with the Calvinist Protestantism of English-speaking Canada. Neither religious tradition sought emancipation of the passions. Therefore, both inhibited the move toward the liberalism of self-realization that he described as characteristic of the hegemonic liberalism of the United States.[20]

A second description of Canadian political thought which stresses the contribution of French Canada to the collectivism of Canadian society is the "fragment thesis." Taking off from the argument of Louis Hartz, both Kenneth McRae and Gad Horowitz have shown the ways in which the pure liberalism of U.S. political thought was tempered in Canada by the values of Tory collectivism characteristic of both English Tories and French Catholics.[21]

Moreover, in the patterns of immigration and the relative tardiness with which Canadian political culture gelled, Horowitz found the reasons for the presence of social democratic thought associated with left-wing parties and unions in Canada but not the United States. For him, collectivist values were found in right and left-wing thought, both of which moderated their enthusiasm for individual liberty and individual rights with a commitment to societal well-being. While left-wing thought took from liberalism a greater concern for equality than was found in the more hierarchical Tory map of society, both involved a reliance on the expression of the whole—usually through the state—against the individual, when necessary in order to achieve the common good.[22]

In early twentieth century Canada we see the mix of these ideas about citizenship in a number of realms. Most often singled out is the willingness of Conservative politicians to use the state for purposes of nation-building as well as economic accumulation. A brief comparison across citizenship regimes makes this clear. Where the Canadian state at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was the legitimate tool for fostering economic development and organizing social well-being north of the 49th parallel, this was not so to the south. In the United States these years were marked by a Supreme Court that insisted on "freedom of contract" to block any move toward legislated regulation of social relations. This situation has been described as a "state of courts and parties," in which the presence of national legislative institutions was enfeebled.[23] Thus, the rights and access dimensions of citizenship in the United States were quite different from those in Canada. Notions that rights were only individualistic and protected by courts were inscribed in American citizenship at the time. In Canada, political institutions and practices were more important.

The Canadian response to the "social question" associated with the dislocation created by massive immigration, urbanization, and industrialization also provides an expression of approaches to citizenship. Both Tories and socialists sought ways of ameliorating the destructive effects of these processes at the beginning of the twentieth century. Various combinations of state and private efforts to reassert stability emanated from Conservative politicians and their supporters. But this discourse of reform was also important to the social gospelers who would later form the backbone of the movement which gave birth to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in the 1930s. Reforming women of both English and French Canada also shared this discourse.

These turbulent years from Confederation until World War I were ones of fundamental economic, social, and political restructuring, as a new model of development was put into place. The discovery of certain regulatory principles in each of these realms contributed the specific content of the notions of citizenship rights that held until the 1940s. In the universe of political discourse that took shape at this time the tensions between liberty, equality, and solidarity were visible. While the principles of

liberalism provided the center of gravity for the universe of political discourse, there was substantial space available for other views mapping the world in more solidaristic ways, either from the left or the right.

Throughout this period, national development was a fundamental concern. Profoundly important to Canadian political thought was the idea that the country's very existence depended upon the nation-building activities of a state that could act in the name of an as yet nonexistent nation. Thus, the effects of market relations were supposed to be tempered by actions for economic development (railway building, tariffs) which would create employment as well as generate trade and capital accumulation.

The parties of Macdonald and Laurier, as the other institutions which came into being after Confederation, were supposed to be nation-building ones. The country had been created from colonies which had centuries long traditions of difference. As father of Confederation Sir John A. Macdonald remarked of the Maritime provinces, they were as unwilling as Lower Canada to "lose their individuality, as separate political organizations."[24] Thus, it took several decades to establish national institutions, even a single party system.

After 1867, governments depended on their ability to cobble together support based on ministerialism, which involved promises for policy to certain areas in return for their electoral support. For example, the western constituencies remained ministerialist as long as they needed the railroad. "The westerners did not sell their support in return for the petty favors of the patronage machine and the pork barrel but only in return for the railway, the whole railway, and nothing but the railway."[25] By 1896, however, a national party system was in place, but only for a short time. The election of 1911 "marked a turning point in Canadian party politics," as the two-party system so recently established fractured over issues of class, regional, and cultural conflicts.[26]

In this experience of fracturing, we see that despite—or perhaps because of—the emphasis on nation-building, a place-sensitive citizenship regime was emerging. If in 1887 the Nova Scotia legislature had voted to secede from Canada, by the end of the century the Maritime provinces were gradually accepting that the alliance forced on them by London was unlikely to dissolve. Nonetheless, that did not mean accepting the dictates of central Canada. Nor was Oliver Mowat, Premier of Ontario for fifteen years and ferocious guardian of provincial rights, willing to do so; he convoked the first conference of Premiers. These have generated what historians such as W.L. Morton, John Herd Thompson and J.M.S Careless, all writing of—or in—the interwar years, have described as Canada's "limited identities."[27]

Out of all of this came a mobilization of linguistic, religious, or class identities that were expressed in a regional discourse, and claims on the state in the name of fair treatment of regions and their inhabitants were frequent. This place-sensitive citizenship derived from a number of sources. One was that the lottery of resource distribution and the effects of industrialization via branch plants both mapped a regional cleavage into the

heart of the Canadian working class and re-created through time a framework for interpreting class relations through the lens of region. In this way, class identities were regionally rather than nationally defined.

The western trade union movement was dominated by workers in resource industries, such as logging, lumbering, and mining. Their experience—often in one-industry isolated settlements—was very different from that of the craft workers in the factories of the East. They were also organized into unions according to industry, a form of politics that simply reinforced the notion of difference and even competing interests. No country-wide confederation existed to bridge this gap.

Therefore, differences that were rooted in experiences at the point of production came to be represented politically as being "regional." Grounding for regional identities lay in the shared interests of eastern workers—mostly organized in the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC)—and those parts of the business community promoting the first National Policy, and its protectionism. The particularities of the Canadian economy were such as to make eastern unionists, concentrated in the manufacturing enterprises of central Canada, dependent upon the maintenance of tariffs. Western unionists, in contrast, were organized in industrial unions, and shared with western farmers a real material interest in less expensive manufactured goods.

As a result of separate political organization and diverging interests, differences in the experiences of the workers themselves were veiled by a discourse of place. This then translated into a politics of regional conflict, which was sustained in the West by support from farmers. Regionally based protests of farmers took shape as western wheat farmers developed a dense network of institutions to protect themselves against the politics of the "East" and the notoriously fickle international market. Their goal was to use the state to achieve fairer treatment from the railways, the banks, and the international market.

Other actors also injected attention to place into political discourse. One important source followed from the crucial decision taken by the French-Canadian elite at the end of the nineteenth century to concentrate efforts to sustain its culture by reinforcing the power of the province.

Attention to the particulars of place was also reinforced by conservative nationalists and the Catholic Church's analyses of the dangers of geographical mobility—to the cities or towns in search of jobs—for the continuation of the French "race" in North America. Thus, the contribution to the citizenship regime was a representation of cultural politics and identities which put place front and center by designating the province as the space in which French-Canadians would realize their own goals. As J.-P. Tardivel wrote in his debate with Henri Bourassa,

> Our own brand of nationalism is French-Canadian nationalism. We have been working for the last twenty-three years toward the development of a French-Canadian national feeling: what we want to see flourish is French-Canadian

> patriotism; our people are the French-Canadian people; we will not say that our homeland is limited to the Province of Quebec, but it is French Canada; the nation we wish to see founded at the time appointed by Providence is the French-Canadian nation.[28]

This focus on the space of French-Canada led him to advocate growing wheat in Quebec, in order to ensure self-sufficiency.

Even the alternative vision insisted on the importance of guarantees of institutional spaces for protecting difference. When Bourassa responded to Tardivel by laying out his vision of Canadian nationalism, federalism and its autonomous provincial governments were integral to his view. Thus, he wrote:

> Our own brand of nationalism is Canadian nationalism, based on the duality of the races and the special traditions this duality imposes. We are working toward the development of Canadian patriotism, which in our eyes is the best guarantee of the existence of two races and of the mutual respect they owe each other.… Our homeland is all of Canada, that is, a federation of distinct races and autonomous provinces. The nation we want to see develop is the Canadian nation, made up of French Canadians and English Canadians, that is, two elements separated by their language and religion as well as by the legal arrangements necessary for the preservation of their respective traditions, but united by brotherly affection and a common love for a common homeland.[29]

The division of powers in federalism also contributed to a place-sensitive citizenship. Ottawa was not a major actor in social policy because the British North America (BNA) Act assigned such matters to the provinces, who then turned services over to their dependants, the municipalities. The important role of the municipal governments in building the infrastructural sinews of the city as well as providing relief services meant that in rapidly growing cities a political philosophy emerged that has been labeled the "Booster Ethic." It sought to model municipal government on business practices.[30] This discourse clearly linked economic prosperity to place, that is, to the growth of the cities.[31]

All matters were shaped by this place-sensitive discourse of citizenship. The move toward female suffrage provides a good example, demonstrating the ways in which women's demands for fair access to the policy process became claims privileging representation of program over representation of social characteristics. Even before they could vote, women participated in constituting a definition of citizenship with such a programmatic focus. This could occur because women contributed their own notion of place—the distinction between the private and the public—to place-sensitive citizenship, as well as utilizing the discourse of other groups to which they belonged.

The vision of gender relations embedded in this citizenship put elements of place first for women, such that notions of their proper social roles were adjectival. Farm women, working women, French-Canadian

women, Protestant women, western women, and city women had quite different collective identities following from the ways in which class, religion, and language entwined with place in Canadian politics. There was no single identity, nor was there a unified "women's politics."

Therefore, as maternal feminism set out to "feminize" Parliament by advocating social reforms which would improve "public housekeeping," divisions within the movement reflected place-sensitivity. The identities thereby mobilized meant that claims for representation *of* women gave way to demands for representation of "women's interests," usually by men who were similar to them in terms of language, class, or region. By the time they finally got the vote, women were already living out the consequences of earlier actions that had created a notion of citizenship whose gendering effects were differentiated by place.

The discursive weight in considerations of citizenship was on the community for Catholic feminists in Quebec at the end of the nineteenth century, and this generated a place-sensitive language of "protection."[32] Women, organized as women, joined male nationalists and priests in trying to protect Quebec society from urban ills, another but different place.[33] One result was that, while empowering women, such feminism could not make claims for equality, because the Church and much of the male power structure was adamantly opposed to female suffrage, for nationalist and religious reasons. By joining such conversations, talk of the vote for women became impossible.

There were identifiable consequences for Canadian society, then, in the ways citizenship claims were generated in these years. While Canadian politics in these years of turbulence at the beginning of the twentieth century was anchored, to be sure, by a liberalism that drew clear distinctions between state and civil society, there were also important tropes which justified claims for solidarity of regions and provinces. From all these strands, then, a place-specific response to fundamental political questions emerged, as the meaning of being Canadian took shape. The "nation" was under construction, but it was a nation of "island communities." While "national organizations" and institutions were coming into being, they were structured as "attempts to find collective solutions to the similar problems of the Dominion's 'island communities.'"[34]

The result was a citizenship cleaved by language, religion, and class, but within several different geographical spaces. Moreover, it was a citizenship around which a new consensus on the basic terms existed. The consensus was to maintain the diversity of the island communities, defined in spatial or regional terms. This agreement then served to limit conflict. While competition continued over the actual operation within that definition of citizenship, a framework had been set down.

Among the basic principles of this definition was the idea that the collectivity required careful tending if the liberalism of the market was to be prevented from reorganizing space and removing the border between Canada and the United States so painfully constituted by Confederation.

Moreover, distributional justice depended on representation of the regions at the center to reflect their diverse needs. Because regions were distinct, they could not be reduced to a single interest and represented in ways that blurred their differences. Virtually all efforts to fashion access focused, then, on efforts through the party system and Cabinet government to recognize the specificity of spatially based needs. Place-sensitive citizenship also generated social movements organized according to such logic (trade unions for example), just as it allowed for the continued separation of the two cultural solitudes.

Two crucial institutions served to underpin this citizenship regime. One was federalism and the other was the party system that organized federal elections and the government in Ottawa. Each was a set of representational institutions that operated in ways that reinforced place-sensitivity and the representation of Canada as composed of island communities.

With respect to federalism, as historian Michel Brunet has written:

> Several decisions of the Privy Council, especially between 1883 and 1896, limited the jurisdiction of the federal government in favour of provincial governments. The latter came to think of themselves as the free agents of sovereign States. The provinces maintained the illusion that they had, themselves, created the central State. Provincialism had been stronger than nationalism, whether British American or Canadian.[35]

The history of pre-1945 federalism is sufficiently familiar that I do not need to recite it here. Suffice it to say that both the provincial governments guarding their constitutional prerogatives and supported by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council meant that no Pan-Canadian system of social rights could take hold. A single unemployment program to respond to the needs of the 1930s was proposed by Ottawa and overthrown by the courts until 1940, despite the mounting signs that federalism as described by Brunet was unsustainable. Other programs, such as mothers' allowances and poor relief, which are also the origins of modern social citizenship, were developed by provincial governments, with little consultation or coordination. Moreover, given the importance of municipalities already described, many of these services were actually delivered by local authorities.

The party system provided a second institutional expression of these representational forms. It was crucial because this party system not only organized electoral politics in a place-sensitive way, but it also resulted in the peopling of the federal Cabinet and House of Commons with those who themselves represented the world in such terms.

The intensely local party system created by the post-Confederation patronage system gave way to the politics of regional accommodation in the first decades of the century.[36] The brokerage system constituted most successfully by Mackenzie King "places a premium on the regional representativeness of the executive and encourages the emergence of regional

power brokers as key cabinet ministers, who thus play a double role as administrators and as political leaders of regions."[37] This system provided for vertical integration of subcultures concentrated in particular places and for mechanisms of horizontal accommodation by an elite acting as a broker.[38] In this process, the party system itself took on a federal form. As Escott Reid wrote in 1932, "In caucus the party is sectional. In public it is homogeneous. In reality it is federal.… Out of the alliances of sectional parties are created the federations of sectional groups—the national Conservative and the national Liberal parties."[39]

This party system was, then, uniquely designed to represent the demands for equitable treatment of regions and fair representation. Each place could see its representatives in the Cabinet. Each place could hope that its sectional needs—whether those of class, language, or religion—would be well represented by the ministers from that place. This party system thereby contributed to a representation of Canadian society as being first and foremost a country where region mattered and where politics was about fair treatment of such diverse spaces. This representation reinforced, thereby, a citizenship which stressed collectivities over individuals, which emphasized difference more than equality, and which defined fairness in spatial terms.

Conclusion

This representational complex of meanings and practices did not last, however. After the crisis of the Depression and the political and economic restructuring which occurred during the war, the place-sensitive citizenship regime gave way to other understandings. Pan-Canadian nationalism had been mounting during the 1930s, born by a generation of intellectuals and activists who sought to remake their country in another image. For these thinkers, inside state institutions and outside, nation-building was still necessary. The previous seventy-five years had *not yet* produced a fully autonomous nation, one that could stand alone in the world. Thus, one of their number, the preeminent—and poetic—journalist Bruce Hutchison wrote in 1942:

> No one knows my country, neither the stranger nor its own sons. My country is hidden in the dark and teeming brain of youth upon the eve of its manhood. My country has not found itself nor felt its power nor learned its true place.… But no longer are we children. Now our time is come, and if not grasped will be for ever lost.[40]

This was the generation that would fashion the postwar citizenship regime around another discourse of nation-building, anchored around an active federal government and an autonomous position for Canada in the world.[41] By 1945 the universe of political discourse was dominated by a

new language of nationalism, in which attention to region was attenuated. As Michel Brunet was forced to acknowledge:

> Instead of the old provincialism there is now a new kind of thinking, which is Anglo-Canadian, or simply 'Canadian'. The English-Canada of 1953 is a true nation-state.… This gigantic work of unification has been accomplished in less than twenty years. It is a masterpiece of human planning which deserves the admiration of any impartial observer.[42]

Individuals—as citizens, as consumers, as producers—began to gain greater discursive visibility. Identities and interests shifted as a new designation of space came into being. A Pan-Canadian citizenship regime would be constructed over the next decades, as the party system and even the institutions of federalism worked so as to provide a common set of citizenship rights, access for individuals, and a new sense of belonging. It would, of course, be a regime that generated much conflict, leaving as it did little space for recognition of cultural differences and spaces. Nonetheless, the desire to break with the past was clearly understood by one of the architects of the new regime. As Paul Martin Sr. said when he presented the new Citizenship Act to the House of Commons in 1946:

> It is not good enough to be a good "bluenose" or a good Ontarian or a good Albertan. Sectional differences and sectional interests must be overcome if we are to do our best for Canada. The only way this can be done is through encouragement of the feeling of legitimate Canadianism.…[43]

Notes

1. William Kaplan, ed., *Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 7. However, despite the hopes of many who originally proposed a new law, controversy surrounding the act resulted in retaining the status of British subject for more than a generation. Some understanding of why that status was popular, beyond the ranks of imperialists, is seen in an intriguing vision of the "wider" postwar world. For example, enthusiasts of the new act often described membership in the Commonwealth, and being a British subject, as a way that Canadians could demonstrate pluralism. For example, after describing the loyalty to Canada inherent in Canadian citizenship, W.J. Lindal writes: "But this man of Manitoba is also a British subject.… It is relatively easy to be loyal to your native land, to be nothing but a Canadian, a Greek or a Belgian. The wider the outlook the more adjusting has to be done in our thinking. From that point of view and in that sense it is more difficult to be a British subject than a Canadian citizen." A few paragraphs later he says: "If the people of Canada succeed in properly correlating their diverse loyalties, they have reason to feel that Canada is providing a pattern which other nations may well follow." W. J. Lindal, *Canadian Citizenship and Our Wider Loyalties* (Winnipeg: Canada Press Club, 1947), 153–54, 157.
2. The confusions were multitude and much analyzed at the time. For example, immigration laws and naturalization laws were often contradictory, giving conflicting statuses.

For two contemporary discussions, see Grant Dexter, *Canadian Citizenship*, Pamphlet no. 8 (Winnipeg: Winnipeg Free Press, 1947) and Lindal, *Canadian Citizenship*.

3. Paul Martin, "Citizenship and the People's World," in Kaplan, *Belonging*, 66.
4. Paul Martin quoting his speeches in the House of Commons and elsewhere, in "Citizenship and the People's World," 77.
5. John Millar, *Canadian Citizenship: A Treatise on Civil Government* (Toronto: William Briggs, 1899), 9.
6. Millar, *Canadian Citizenship*, 11–12.
7. "A citizen of the country is one born in that country. For instance, a Canadian is a person born on Canadian soil and living in Canada. A Canadian is also a British subject or a British citizen, and therefore entitled to those important privileges which are free to all subjects of the Queen in every part of her vast empire." Millar, *Canadian Citizenship*, 34.
8. Millar, *Canadian Citizenship*, chap. 4.
9. In addition to T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (New York: Anchor, 1965), see, for example, Reinhard Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship* (New York: John Wiley, 1964).
10. Marshall is quite clear about the "reach" of his thesis about the timing and ordering of rights acquisition. His references are all to British history, as are his explicit presentations of what he is trying to do. See, for example, Marshall, *Class*, 91. It is perhaps to his popularizers that we owe the widespread notion that he meant his schema, laid out in the essay "Citizenship and Social Class," to be a general story. See, for example, S.M. Lipset's introduction to the collection re-edited in 1965. Lipset locates Marshall in the "modernization" literature, the structuralist approach then becoming hegemonic.
11. This definition is a modified version of the definition of a welfare-state regime in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 80.
12. These three dimensions—rights, access, and belonging—are derived from the history of citizenship. See Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips, "Regime Shifts: New Citizenship Practices in Canada," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* (fall 1996): 111–36.
13. William Henry Moore, *The Clash! A Study in Nationalities* (Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1918), xi–xii.
14. As a result, studies have further specified the rights dimension of citizenship so as to assess the extent to which there is an inequality or hierarchy of rights *within* the same citizenship regime. The basic question is which citizens have access to which rights. Analysis also measures the reality of access against the constitutionally defined ideal of universal rights. For example, studies of citizenship and gender have focused on the ways in which the social rights of citizenship were often unequally distributed by social welfare regimes treating the male breadwinner as the "model" citizen. These studies have also documented the ways in which some social programs may be defined as citizenship rights while others on a secondary track continue to be viewed as no more than assistance or charity, with all the consequences in terms of the disempowerment of citizens which follow.
15. This formulation is exactly the one used by the institutions of the European Union which since the 1970s has explicitly designed its motion toward a common citizenship as a strategy for creating support for itself. See Antje Wiener, *"European" Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-State* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998).
16. Social democrats of various stripes have been the most likely to see citizenship politics as a "politics of struggle," usually led by the organized working class. But classical Marxists, who demonstrated little interest in "citizenship" and saw the state as a version of the "best political shell for capitalism" also described rights following from the needs of bourgeois society. Various correctives to these views have been offered, but there is relatively little yet available which addresses the question of why the state might begin to alter its recognition of certain identities.
17. S.M. Lipset, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Canada and the United States," in *The Revolutionary Theme in Contemporary America*, ed. T. Ford (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1965).

18. This selection of labels for values in Canada comes of course from the political sociology of Talcott Parsons. This structural-functional approach to explaining societal integration and values has had a profound influence on thinking about Canada, not only with regard to political culture but also for our understanding of party politics and the role of the state. Certain structural-functionalist notions can also be identified in current concerns about "social cohesion." See Jane Jenson, *Mapping Social Cohesion* (Ottawa: CPRN F-03, 1998).
19. George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 75–76.
20. Grant, *Lament*, 70–71.
21. Kenneth D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in Louis Hartz et al., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964), chap. 7; Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), chap. 1.
22. George Grant, whose distinctions between American liberalism and left-wing thought are very close to those of Horowitz and Hartz, points to the centrality of the idea of the perfectibility of man in left-wing thought. This notion provides a justification for the role of the state, an argument that is absent in liberal thought, especially that of the skeptical variety. See *Lament*, 59–63.
23. Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
24. Quoted in Gilles Bourque and Jules Duchastel, *L'Identité fragmentée: Nation et citoyenneté dans les débats constitutionnels canadiens* (Montreal: Fides, 1996), 31.
25. Escott M. Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada," in *Party Politics in Canada*, ed. Hugh G. Thorburn (1932; Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 16.
26. Hugh G. Thorburn, "The Development of Political Parties in Canada," in Thorburn, *Party Politics*, 6.
27. Careless, *Canadian Historical Review*, 1969.
28. J.-P. Tardivel to Henri Bourassa, "J.-P. Tardivel (1851–1905) and Henri Bourassa: A Controversy," in *French-Canadian Nationalism: An Anthology*, ed. Ramsey Cook (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), 147. The exchange of letters occurred between 1899 and 1904.
29. Henri Bourassa to J.-P. Tardivel "Tardivel and Bourassa," 149–50.
30. John C. Weaver, "Elitism and the Corporate Ideal: Businessmen and Boosters in Canadian Civic Reform, 1890–1920," in *The Consolidation of Capitalism*, ed. Michael Cross and Gregory Kealey (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983).
31. John Taylor, "Sources of Political Conflict in the Thirties: Welfare Policy and the Geography of Need," in *The "Benevolent" State: The Growth of Welfare in Canada*, ed. Allan Moscovitch and Jim Albert (Toronto: Garamond, 1987), 147.
32. Marie Lavigne et al., "The Fédération nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste and the Women's Movement in Quebec," in Kealey, *Not an Unreasonable Claim*, 21ff.
33. Susan M. Trofimenkoff, "Henri Bourassa and 'the Woman Question,'" in *The Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women's History*, ed. Susan M. Trofimenkoff and Alison Prentice (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 108ff.
34. Veronica Strong-Boag, "'Setting the Stage': National Organization and the Women's Movement in the Late 19th Century," in Trofimenkoff and Prentice, *The Neglected Majority*, 87.
35. Michel Brunet, "Canadians and *Canadiens*," in *French-Canadian Nationalism: An Anthology*, ed. Ramsey Cook (French orig., 1954; Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), 288.
36. David E. Smith, "Canadian Political Parties and National Integration," in *Canadian Parties in Transition: Discourse, Organization and Representation*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and Brian Tanguay (Toronto: Nelson, 1989), 13.
37. Reg Whitaker, "Party and State in the Liberal Era," in Thorburn, *Party Politics*, 146.
38. Whitaker, "Party and State," 147.
39. Reid, "The Rise," 17. See also Smith, "Canadian Political Parties," 134.
40. Bruce Hutchison, *Canada and Her People* (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1942), 9–10.
41. Bourque and Duchastel, *L'Identité fragmentée,* point to the Statute of Westminster as well as the Citizenship Act and the end of the appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy

Council as crucial institutional changes that allowed this new vision of Canadian citizenship to emerge. See, for example, p. 47.

42. Brunet, "Canadians and *Canadiens*," 289–90. He went on to say, "Should French Canadians decide to resist complete assimilation to English Canada, the only kind of Canadianism they could approve of or practise would be one that gave them the political and economic means of maintaining the independence of their culture.… To achieve this legitimate aim, they have need of maximum provincial autonomy." Ibid., 292.
43. Paul Martin quoting himself in "Citizenship and the People's World," 73.

— *Eleven* —

The Diversification of Canadian Literature in English

Tamara Palmer Seiler

With the exception of work done in the interwar and early postwar period by literary scholar Watson Kirkconnell, scholarly interest in the relationship between immigrant and ethnic experiences in Canada and Canadian literature did not begin in earnest until the late 1960s. Fueled to some degree by the nationalism connected with Canada's Centennial in 1967, this interest was also propelled by many of the same concerns that animated several parallel developments, including the Canadian Studies and the social history movements. Over the next thirty years, study after study of groups that had previously been largely ignored—women, immigrants, ethnic and racial minorities, the working class—transformed the intellectual landscape of Canada.

If a certain nationalistic fervor fueled the growing sense in the 1960s and 1970s that Canadians should know and understand themselves better and that Canadian culture should be nourished, so too did a sense that the univocal or at best bivocal master narratives of Canadian nationhood were misguided and out of date. John Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic* (1965) had an enormous influence on subsequent Canadian scholarship, particularly in sociology, of course, but also in other fields. Influenced by Porter's delineation of the relationship between ethnicity and class in Canada (and by other theoretical discourses, particularly feminist, postmodern and postcolonial), literary scholars could more clearly see important if complex connections between social stratification, politics, and Canadian literature. They became increasingly aware of a gap between an obviously multicultural society and the predominantly Anglo-Canadian and genteel face of Canadian cultural expression.[1]

Discomfort with this apparent gap prompted a new scholarly interest in literature produced in Canada that depicted the experiences of non-British and non-French immigrants and their descendants, some of it written in the many languages that diverse immigrants had brought with them, and thus perhaps understandably unknown to anglophone readers. However, even when such literature had been written in English, particularly if it were by a writer whose background was not Anglo-Canadian, it was usually not on the reading lists for Canadian literature courses. As well, whether out of print or just not on library shelves, this literature was usually not available to any but the most persistent academic readers.

Literary scholarship began to foreground these absences by exploring the relationships between immigration, cultural diversity, and Canadian literature, making clear that over the past century (during which the country was transformed from an outpost of the British Empire into a post-colonial and multicultural nation), Canadian literature broadly construed was remarkably diverse; the canon of Canadian literature in English, on the other hand, diversified only gradually over the twentieth century, and has changed most dramatically since the late 1960s.

Today this canon is notably polyphonic, as reflected, for example, in current reading lists for Canadian literature courses and in the Canlit sections in Canadian bookstores, which are as likely to include the works of aboriginal and ethnic minority writers as those by writers from the Anglo-Canadian majority. Prevailing critical assumptions about Canadian literature have also changed; for example, the once popular idea of a unified Canadian literature, one that expresses a clearly defined if not homogeneous national voice, is virtually dead.[2] The notion that literature might indeed express a unified national culture was widely assumed in English-speaking Canada from at least the time of Confederation to the 1970s. In fact, the history of Canadian literature in English has often been constructed as the story of an evolution from a small collection of merely imitative colonial texts to (by the mid-twentieth century) an impressive collection of authentic "national" texts, albeit reflecting a complex relationship with region.[3] The latter were seen as products of a confident nation which, with "Hugh MacLennan's 1941 novel, *Barometer Rising*, experienced a period of liberal reassessment of Canadian culture,… a period which declared Canada's freedom from external constraints, a Canadian role in world affairs, and the viability of Canadian subjects in literature."[4]

Nourished by the Canada Council (established in 1957), Canadian literature in English continued to be seen by many during the 1960s as a reflection of a unitary national culture. During this period of assertive nationalism in English-speaking Canada, literature (and literary criticism) was widely regarded as a site where the remnants of the old colonial relationship with Britain, and the newer one with the United States, could be resisted, in part by pinpointing what was quintessentially Canadian. Writers and critics, such as Margaret Atwood, in her novel *Surfacing* (1972) and more explicitly in her critical work *Survival* (1972), attempted to delineate

the essential patterns of Canadian literature.[5] Even as the Quiet Revolution was setting the stage in Quebec for the rise of separatism, some critics in English-speaking Canada saw a common literary tradition emerging from Canada's "two solitudes," growing out of a shared experience of the land and a perpetual awareness of the other "founding group."[6]

Although the literatures of Canada's two official languages clearly constitute two separate and quite different literary traditions, French-Canadians have had a considerably stronger presence in Canadian literature in English—as subjects and via translation—than have the "other" immigrant groups. For example, several late-nineteenth-century writers, such as the "confederation poet" Charles G.D. Roberts and the popular fiction writer Gilbert Parker depicted French-Canadian characters, used Quebec settings, and valorized the dual nature of Canadian nationhood. Some also translated the work of Quebec writers. Poets such as E.J. Pratt and F.R. Scott continued this tradition, which was expressed perhaps most directly by Hugh MacLennan in his novel *Two Solitudes* in 1945.[7] The work of several French-Canadian writers—Ringuet (Phillipe Paneton), Gabrielle Roy, Anne Hébert, Roch Carrier, Michele Tremblay, and Antonine Maillet, to name some of the best known—have became virtually part of the canon of Canadian literature in English via translation.[8] Particularly interesting in relation to the issue of diversity is the work of Gabrielle Roy, particularly texts such as *Where Nests the Water Hen* (1950) and *Street of Riches* (1957) that reflect her experiences growing up in a diverse Manitoba community in the first decades of the twentieth century. So too is the work of Acadian writer Antonine Maillet, whose novels and plays assert the distinctive nature of Acadian experience and culture.[9]

Today, of course, despite this francophone strand in Canadian literature in English, the idea that Canadian literature could express a single national character is virtually untenable in light of the insights offered by postmodernist and feminist criticism and perhaps also in the context of increasing globalization. Replacing it is the notion that Canadian literature(s) should be understand as plural and polyphonic.[10] I will discuss the intellectual dynamics of this shift in thinking later, but first I must highlight the other major change over the past thirty years that has contributed substantially to the diversification of Canadian literature, and that is a demographic transformation, in large measure the result of a major overhaul of the immigration laws between 1962 and 1976. The old immigration quotas based on race and ethnicity were replaced with a points system that is (theoretically, at least) "color blind." This change in policy contributed mightily to a dramatic recasting of Canadian society. After 1967, immigrants from various parts of the developing world entered Canada in ever-increasing numbers. The percentage of immigrants from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America combined provides a dramatic illustration, jumping from less than a quarter of the total number of immigrants in 1966 to three-quarters in 1992, as does a demographic profile of Toronto, Canada's largest city: today well over 40 percent of its

inhabitants are immigrants, "drawn from all continents and from all the world's major ethnic groups."[11] In addition, Canada became officially multicultural in 1971, thereby acknowledging extant diversity, as well as providing an ideology of pluralism and a high-profile political site for negotiating the politics of diversity in what was becoming an increasingly heterogeneous nation.[12]

Along with, and in part because of these changes in policy and demography, there has been a stunning proliferation of literature in Canada by ethnic minority writers, and an impressive growth of relevant literary criticism. Equally important (and clearly related to the political and demographic transformations I have mentioned), the entire intellectual landscape in which the diversification of Canadian literature has occurred has changed dramatically. Once on the periphery of literary studies, the interrelated issues of race, ethnicity, identity, politics, and culture are now situated near the center of the ideological and theoretical ferment (in Canada and elsewhere) that is currently transforming academic discourses. As Kwame A. Appiah and Henry L. Gates Jr. have noted, "[A] literary history might very well characterize the eighties as the period when race, class, and gender became the holy trinity of literary criticism."[13] As they and the other contributors to the issue make clear, no less than a major "shift of paradigms" has occurred.

This shift has been neither simple nor uncontested. Nor is it complete. For example, in 1997, postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha positioned remarks in relation to "tensions that haunt the theoretical enterprise" which have emerged from "that decade of difference and diversity—the mid eighties to the mid nineties that we might call, after the manner of historians, the *long* 1990s."[14] Clearly, issues related to difference continue to be at the center of academic and societal attention, championed by such variously and often loosely aligned discourse communities as ethnic studies (particularly in Canada), multicultural studies (particularly in the United States), postcolonial studies, women's studies, gay and lesbian studies, subaltern studies, and perhaps most currently popular (and seemingly all-encompassing), cultural studies—all of which in various ways have challenged the form and content of traditional disciplines, often as part of a larger challenge to economic/social/political inequities.[15]

Of course, the histories of the intellectual movements that have given rise to each of these areas of study are complex, and conflating them oversimplifies; however, it can be said that they share a concern with the relationships between knowledge and power and a desire to challenge dominant political configurations in the interests of a more democratic culture.[16] Scholars in the related fields of postcolonial theory and criticism have been similarly interested in ameliorative change. They have not only "enlarged the traditional field of English studies," but also, along with "other relatively recent critical discourses as various as feminism and deconstruction," changed profoundly "the modes of analysis which were dominant within the discipline … from 1945 to 1980."[17]

Not surprisingly, the ferment surrounding these broad political/cultural issues—both within and without the academy—has developed somewhat differently in Canada than in the United States and elsewhere.[18] As Enoch Padolsky makes clear in several articles, the Canadian situation is unique. Probably the foremost reason for this is Canada's history of English-French duality "which thwarted the attempted formation in the last century of a unitary (American style) pan-Canadian national narrative … and resulted in a number of ideological and institutional consequences" not found elsewhere.[19] One of these consequences has been the tendency in Canada for the discourse of difference to focus on language and culture. Another important and related dimension of the Canadian situation is the role that race has played in Canadian discourses of difference. For several reasons, including demographic ones, this role has been less pronounced in Canada than in the United States, where race, which has tended to be constructed around the black/white binary, has dominated the national discourses of difference.

These factors and others too numerous to discuss in detail here have combined to produce very particular and complex dynamics with regard to ethnic/racial/cultural difference in Canada. As Will Kymlicka has pointed out in a recent book on Canada's approach to citizenship, "Canada, with its policy of 'multiculturalism within a bilingual framework' and its recognition of aboriginal rights to self-government, is one of the few countries which has officially endorsed both polyethnicity and multinationality."[20] This, along with the multivalent nature of Canada's contemporary discourse on race, ethnicity, and culture, suggests that as a site for negotiating difference, Canadian space is perhaps unique in the degree to which its current structures promote/allow "plural, cross-boundary and intersecting concerns."[21]

The combined effect of all of this activity—social, political and intellectual—has been transformative, not only of social and political relations in a variety of contexts, but also of a variety of academic disciplines (from anthropology to literary studies) and of a variety of cultural practices, including the writing, publishing, reading, and teaching of literary texts. Thus, the dramatic diversification of Canadian literature over the past thirty years has been a complex process that cannot be understood apart from these wider contexts. However, it is also important to see this diversification as in part a product of the literature itself, and in particular of the literature produced by ethnic minority "insiders." Indeed, I believe ethnic minority writing constitutes a kind of resistance literature, one which has, over the century, worked to undermine Canada's historical ethnic hierarchy and to open up cultural space for a multiplicity of voices.

In the sections that follow, I employ an eclectic theoretical framework drawn from the scholarly discourses referred to above (in particular those of Canadian ethnic studies and of postcolonial theory) to argue that these "insider" texts bear a complex imprint of the social stratification and political conflicts that have shaped ethnic minority experiences in Canada; that

the subordination/marginality often associated with those experiences has been encoded in recurring structural patterns and themes that constitute textual resistance; and finally that this resistance has contributed significantly to the diversification of the Canadian literary canon.

The Sociohistorical Framework of Canadian Literature

Political and cultural discourse in Canada can clearly be seen as a long-standing "site of struggle" evolving out of the country's dual colonial inheritance.[22] Ethnic hierarchy was both a shaper and a product of a colonial perspective. In many ways, the discourse of nation that constructed Canada, particularly at the level of symbolic interaction, if not interpersonal relations, essentially marginalized those who did not fit into its English/French framework: aboriginal peoples and non-British and non-French immigrants. The latter were designated "the other ethnic groups" in English-speaking Canada.[23] That is, public discourse, arguably into the 1930s, confirmed Canada's alignment with the British Empire and until somewhat after World War II, it did the same for Anglo-Canadian privilege. In this discourse, Anglo-Canadian ethnicity paradoxically disappeared, becoming the position from which all others were judged. Its representation of "the other ethnic groups" is not unlike the West's representation of "the Orient" in the manner that Edward Said delineates in his well-known *Orientalism* (1978). In both cases, the other is constructed as "backward," which justifies the entire project of dominance/assimilation in the interests of reaffirming the 'natural' superiority of hegemonic values and structures.[24] A similar dynamic prevailed in Quebec, though one that was complicated by the hierarchical and tension-laden relationship between Anglophones and Francophones. The ethnic voice that emerged in Quebec through such writers as A.M. Klein, Irving Layton, Mordecai Richler, Leonard Cohen, and others was in English, not French. It was not until the early 1980s that this situation began to change, and an ethnic voice began to find expression in Quebec literature, with the work of such Italo-Quebecois writers as Marco Micone with his play *Gens du silence* (1982) and a volume of writings by Italo-Quebecois authors edited by Fulvio Caccia and Antonio d'Alfonso (1983).[25] Quebec literature, like Canadian literature in English, has become increasingly polyphonic over the past two decades. However, my focus here is on the latter.

This sociopolitical map of Anglophone Canada with its hierarchical subtext had a counterpart in the literary map which highlighted "mainstream" (or Anglo-Canadian) literature, and required the terms "ethnic literature," "literature of lesser diffusion," "ethnic minority literature," and the like for work produced by writers from "other" ethnic backgrounds. In recent years, the terms "multicultural literature" and "diasporic literature" have tended to replace "ethnic literature."[26] Despite the greater fluidity of these recent categories, such terminology continues to

point to the historical legacy of colonialism, and the continuing sense of the distinct positioning in Canadian literary territory of work by "multicultural minority writers," as do the categories of Native or aboriginal or First Nations literature for the growing body of work being produced by aboriginal writers in Canada, though the two groups of writers are occasionally brought together in anthologies of "multicultural literature."[27] One can see this hierarchy in the history of critical response to ethnic minority literature, in terms of both presence and absence. Although one needs to be sensitive to shifts over time and to the differences in response to texts in English and those written in other languages, in general, until relatively recently, the reception has been (with a few exceptions) most notable by its absence.

However, critical reception of texts by the aboriginal and ethnic other—like Canadian society itself—has changed dramatically. Clearly, there has been a reevaluation of the discourse of national identity and of public policy regarding pluralism, and a reconfiguration of the Canadian literary institution, one that has decentered what was formerly regarded as the "mainstream"—a term that is fast becoming a historical artifact.[28] A few commentators lament the persistence of the old ethnic hierarchy and its continuing power to determine the critical reception of literary texts. For example, Natalia Aponiuk points to "the continuing marginalization of ethnic minority writers and their exclusion from the mainstream of Canadian literature to the detriment of both the writers and the larger literary tradition."[29] While one can undoubtedly find evidence of this persistence—of writers, critics and readers who "retain[s] a fundamental imaginative relationship with the imperium"[30]—overall the contemporary cultural economy in Canada has become quite remarkably inclusive (particularly in the last decade or so) of the work of minority writers. As I argue below, this is not unrelated to the literary production of ethnic minority writers. Over the century, their fictions have resisted the old ethnic map of Canada (the two solitudes/the vertical mosaic), ultimately helping to diversify the Canadian literary landscape as well as demanding a more enlightened reading of Canadian literature.[31]

The "Ethnic Voice" as Resistance

Postcolonial theorist Stephen Slemon explains that resistance in writing is not merely transparent, that it is "necessarily a place of ambivalence: between systems, between discursive worlds, implicit and complicit in both of them."[32] Reinforcing this point, my analysis situates ethnic minority writing at the complex social/cultural/political site where immigration, ethnicity, nation building, and imaginative literature intersect. I attempt to uncover some of the ways in which this fiction has served as a vehicle for representing and resisting the social, political, and cultural hierarchy in "English" Canada from the perspective of non-British immigrants and their

descendants, who have occupied a complex "third" position.[33] Canadian historians and sociologists have amply discussed the dynamics of negotiating this "third space."[34] Drawing on their work, but most particularly on my own close and comparative reading of a large corpus of fiction by writers who write from inside a particular ethnic minority experience, I delineate four recurring and particularly significant structural patterns that I see as key vehicles of textual resistance: binary opposition, generational tension, ghettoized space, and double-edged social critique. In the following sections, I look briefly at each in turn, while at the same time highlighting their interrelatedness. I point to the ways they resist ethnic hierarchy and discursive hegemony, and have thus contributed to the diversification of Canadian literature.

Binary Patterns and Transformative Strategies

Eli Mandel, Robert Kroetsch, and other literary critics have argued that duality is a central motif in fiction written in Canada about immigrant and ethnic experience; that the sensibility evoked is one of tormented ambivalence.[35] Mandel asserts that at the core of this "schizophrenia" is what R.D. Laing has called "a form of psychic anarchy" brought on by an "involuntary attempt of the self to free itself from a repressive social reality."[36] According to Mandel, that "repressive social reality" is the state of painful otherness that is the result of being suspended between two worlds. He then suggests that the way out of this uncomfortable state (whether it is viewed as a psychological, a sociological, or a literary problem) is an act of imagination—of fictionalizing, myth making. Or, as Robert Kroetsch puts it, "[I]n ethnic writing there is often an attempt at healing by the rewriting of myths."[37]

Other commentators have suggested that binary patterns are a characteristic feature of literature written in colonial societies. Abdul JanMohamed, for example, refers to a dualistic "cognitive framework" that shapes both politics and literary representation in such societies.[38] JanMohamed argues that the fundamental discursive formation in hierarchical societies is dualistic and that those voices constructed as "other"/lesser by this formation will both reflect this "Manichean" structure and attempt to deconstruct it in order to be "heard." Edward Said's arguments, first in *Orientalism* and later in *Culture and Imperialism* foreground the binaries of Occident/Orient, colonizer/colonized, and in the latter in particular highlight the decolonization processes that, paradoxically, reinforce these binary poles as well as those (which he champions) that attempt to move beyond them, toward "the possibility of discovering a world *not* constructed of warring essences."[39]

Taken together, these observations delineate the structural framework of many insider fictions about immigrant and/or ethnic experience in English-speaking Canada. The binary narrative patterns characteristic of these fictions both replicate and attempt to subvert the Anglo/Other dualism of

the dominant discourse that has constructed the "ethnic other" in Canada. Story after story and novel after novel about the experiences of immigrants and their progeny encodes dislocation through a series of interlocking binary patterns that are projected through a variety of interrelated channels in the texts—structural, narrative, and linguistic patterns as well as thematic motifs and tone. The *topoi* that seem to be the most relevant vehicles for this attempt to "rewrite myths" are those of the Edenic garden and the long journey. That these deep structures should be the ones used to provide the fundamental frameworks for narratives of immigrant and ethnic experience is not surprising when one considers the literal appropriateness of the journey motif as well as how deeply entrenched in Western civilization is the image of the New World as Garden of Eden.[40]

Nor is it surprising that one looking for resistance in fictional texts would find binary patterns. In addition to the connection Jan Mohamed and others have suggested between colonial hierarchies and a Manichean "cognitive framework," immigrant experience per se could be said to produce such a cognitive framework. Informed as it is by a gap between old and new, there and here, past and present self, perception and language, the immigrant sensibility, one might argue, is virtually fated to experience the world through a binary framework. As Shirley Geok-lin Lim puts it in a recent article on the literature of Asian migration: "[M]inority writers, especially first-generation immigrant writers, the ones straight off the boat or the Boeing 747, contain within themselves this double perspective; as in an optical illusion, their identities encompass more than one figure simultaneously."[41] The literature produced by this sensibility "explores and exudes, perhaps even celebrates, this bifurcated … identity as both alien and native … posing for culture at large a problematized definition … of the concept of 'home.'"[42] Interrogating both the location and the meaning of home, it is "literature existing at an interface of two cultures, a form concerned with defining itself, its voice, the dialectic of self and other and the duplicities of self creation, transformation and identities."[43]

Robert Kroetsch identifies five binary patterns that grow out of this dialectic: success/failure, inferiority/superiority, revelation/concealment, integration/resistance, and forgetting/remembering. He suggests that each of these tensions is played out in language itself and the polarity inherent in language between silence and speech.[44] To his list I add old world/new world, garden/inferno, loss/gain, parent/child, illusion/reality, and victim/villain. Here I focus briefly on the old-world/new-world binary, arguably the most fundamental to immigrant and ethnic experience and to fictionalizing it. It is primarily through this polarity (along with that of success/failure, which I discuss more fully later) that the journey and garden narratives are ultimately subverted or "re-written."

That a book published about the literature produced by German-speaking Canadians should be entitled *The Old World and the New* would not surprise students of immigration.[45] This duality is so familiar as to be a cliché. That the old-world/new-world binary is the primary focus of

many fictions of immigrant and/or ethnic experience is perhaps less well known.[46] For example, the essential differences between Europe and North America preoccupy the German-Canadian writer Frederick Philip Grove explicitly in his *A Search for America* (1927) and *In Search of Myself* (1946) and indirectly in his novels that depict the nature and impact of materialism, such as *Fruits of the Earth* (1933) and *The Master of the Mill* (1944).[47] The contrasts and yet inescapable connections between Europe and America also preoccupy Austrian-born Canadian writer Henry Kreisel in his short stories and particularly in his two novels, *The Rich Man* (1948) and *The Betrayal* (1964). Image after image in the work of these and other writers, whether contemporary or from an earlier era, contrast old and new worlds.[48] Indeed, one could argue that Susanna Moodie's *Roughing It in the Bush* (1852), a "founding" text of Canadian literature in English, is built on the structural framework of the old-world/new-world binary; and that the exilic sensibility it expresses is, if not "quintessentially Canadian," as Margaret Atwood and others have argued, is at least representative of a very significant and influential strand in Canadian discourse.[49] Said argues that the (old to new) voyage is a central topos in both colonial and postcolonial discourse, a site of "battle over projections and ideological images." He quotes Joyce's *Ulysses* to suggest that in the discourse of resistance, the voyage "sounds a note of crisis of banishment, banishment from the heart, banishment from home."[50]

One sees this exemplified in Caterina Edwards's *The Lion's Mouth* (1983), since the old-world/new-world binary structures the entire novel. Edwards uses light to suggest the striking contrast between the nuanced, sensuous complexity of Venice and the stark frontier clarity of Calgary and Edmonton. Continuing to highlight the old/new contrast as the plot unfolds, Edwards's narrator tells her friend that the early draft of her novel "illuminates the depth of the shock my family's emigration from Venice to Canada caused. For my life was split into two seemingly inimical halves."[51] Ultimately, however, the sharp contrast between old and new worlds softens as both worlds become more and more complex and ambiguous through the narrator's increasingly sophisticated vision, which works to subvert the binary frame.

Edwards's careful, self-reflexive blending of form and content in *The Lion's Mouth* allows the reader to see with particular clarity the function served by such images of contrast between old and new, which are repeatedly evoked in ethnic minority fiction. First, they concretize dislocation, the feeling of having been cut in half, of living in two incongruous, even incompatible worlds. Second, they point the reader toward the transformations required in the fictions to bridge, perhaps even to blend, two very different cultural spaces. Such binary images of contrast inform the work of Italian-Canadian writers C.D. Minni and Frank Paci. For example, in his story "Roots," Minni juxtaposes picture-postcard images of lush Italian gardens with raw, windswept images of Canada's westernmost shore, using them as emblems of his main character's duality:

the internal discrepancy he feels between "the boy" of his Italian youth and "the man" of his Canadian adulthood.[52] The novels of Italian-Canadian writer Frank Paci are likewise built around images of contrast between the old and the new.

In addition to evoking personal dislocation and confused identity, the old/new dichotomy generates three interrelated binaries: paradise/inferno, inferiority/superiority, and exile/integration. The tension inherent in these polarities highlights a more general communal dislocation that is at least as extreme as the personal one embodied in the recurring immigrant character who cannot adjust. A focus on community experience is apparent, for example, in Illia Kiriak's depiction of the spiritual struggle that the entire group of Ukrainian settlers undergoes in *Sons of the Soil* (1959); in Marlyn's depiction in *Under the Ribs of Death* (1957) of the "scabrous" and "decaying" buildings that seem to symbolize the general malaise of Winnipeg's North End; in Mordecai Richler's depiction of spiritual failure—personal, familial, communal—in *Son of a Smaller Hero* (1955) and in *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz* (1959); in Paci's depiction of family breakdown and urban decay in his fictions of Italian immigrant experience; in Kogawa's complex portrayal of communal victimization and communal failure and loss in *Obasan* (1981); in M.G. Vassanji's depiction of Asian-African immigrants in *No New Land* (1991), whose Don Mills high-rise apartment community hovers between confining and enabling its members.[53]

These and many other fictions of ethnic minority experience in Canada portray the difficulty of adaptation for entire communities, as well as for individuals through binary patterns. And the old world/new world binary is very often central to representing these kinds of dislocation. One reads ambivalence in this pattern: is paradise in the old world or the new, the golden past, or the bright future? The fictional "answer" to this question is often equivocal. At times the immigrant experience is constructed as one of bitter exile, at other times, one of fulfillment—albeit perhaps delayed for several generations.

This "insider" fiction about immigrant and ethnic experience builds on the journey motif, which highlights the contrasts discussed above, and thus emphasizes the great distances (both literal and figurative) between old world and new. The journey motif also highlights the process of bridging, finding a place, which is, I believe, the subtext of the journey topos as portrayed by many ethnic minority writers. That is, the journey becomes, as Said suggests, a site of struggle, a vehicle for representing the processes of domination and the strategies of resistance.[54] This fiction links several interrelated categories of experience: historical and imaginary (fictional, mythological), personal and communal. More precisely, it is a site where these categories intersect. The fictional journey becomes a prototype of the processes of transformation connected with migration; as such, it constitutes a strategy for claiming space in a new world that has already been defined by imperial cartography.[55]

Generational Tensions and Resistance

The fictions of immigrant and ethnic experience in Canada have been sites of resistance, and have worked as mediums of intercultural adjustment and adaptation; this is largely because of the nature of the particular positions occupied by the second and third generations, both real and fictional.[56] Inevitably mediators, they stand on the border(s) between the old world and the new. One could indeed argue that the very delineation of generations, which determines an individual's exact position in relation to these two places, is itself fundamental to the way the immigrant narrative has been constructed, both in "real" life and in fiction. The notion that immigrant adaptation is bound up in distinctive generational sensibilities is widely accepted, even taken for granted. This is apparent in the scholarly literature on immigration and ethnicity, in the self-descriptions of immigrants and their progeny, in the language of everyday conversation, as well as in fiction about immigrant and ethnic experience.

This well-known schema generally constructs a first generation of "founders" or "pioneers," primarily middle-aged, whose time and energy is almost totally taken up with the physical tasks of settlement and economic survival, and whose deepest emotional ties remain to the "old world"; a second, troubled generation (either brought over by their parents when very young or born here) who are often painfully caught between their parents' old-world language, practices, and expectations, and those of the new world, a position which forces them into the role of mediator, but also predisposes them to reject their parents and the old world they represent; and a third, redemptive generation. They have been born in the new world to parents who were born or at least raised here, and they are interested in integration: in regaining what the second generation lost of the old world, while also being comfortable in the new. Often more figuratively than literally accurate, at least in fiction, this generational schema allows for an evolution through all of the positions represented as characteristic of each generation, but particularly for a spiritual passage from the second to the third generation.[57]

Movement from one generational position to another provides an important part of the structural framework for many fictions of ethnicity. It becomes a vehicle for developing both of the central motifs identified in the first section, the long journey and the Edenic garden, and for answering the questions intrinsic to each of these motifs: Is the new country a worthy destination? Can anything brought from the old country (including individuals and families as well as cultural artifacts and practices) be successfully transplanted into the new? Generational interaction thus becomes a significant site of resistance, where, for example, the second generation's desire to jettison the old in favor of the new, or the first generation's inability to adjust to Canada is interrogated.

Writers frequently combine binary patterns with generational ones in evoking the dynamics of immigrant adaptation. Those most closely linked

with the generational schema are success/failure, victim/villain, illusion/reality, and remembering/forgetting. Often, this pattern is produced by second- or third-generation writers, those whose position is almost inevitably bicultural, and upon whom falls the "postcolonial task" of appropriating English, making it "'bear the burden'" of their cultural experience, "or, as Raja Rao puts it, of 'convey[ing] in a language that is not one's own the spirit that is one's own.'"[58] Such writers often become (whether reluctantly or otherwise) spokespeople for their group. Fraught with tensions, this role is a particularly powerful one, since it involves challenging, subverting, and opening up dominant discourse. Although Werner Sollors is discussing American literature when he notes this phenomenon, his comments are applicable to Canada:

> The point of departure of classic ethnic literature, and especially of writings in English, often was to blur ethnic stereotypes by presenting an inside view of ethnicity, which could make "otherness" understandable to American readers. Consciously or unconsciously, ethnic writers often assumed the roles of pleaders, mediators, or translators who explained ethnic traits, annotated ethnic jokes and phrases, or provided glossaries for the benefit of the reader.… Thus the ethnic writer as 'mediator' went out to break down the partition walls between ethnic group and larger culture.[59]

Thus, the ethnic writer's apologist project, which has been influenced greatly by the well-documented connection in Canada between ethnicity and class, can be understood as a resistance project, one which is very often expressed through a narrative frame that combines a generational schema with binary patterns, giving "ethnic minority writing (in Canada) … its emphasis on life experiences of immigrants, dislocation and duality."[60] It also explores the impact of the "vertical mosaic," delineating what Kroetsch identifies as the "extreme tension between ideas of success and ideas of failure."[61]

From the ages of exploration and colonization and even before, the "New World" has been a symbol of Europe's dreams, both spiritual and material, and a significant element in its magnetism for the immigrant has been the potent mythology of North America as the new Eden.[62] Inextricably tied up with this mythology, particularly as it relates to the immigrant experience, has been the dream of success, and of course its mirror image, the nightmare of failure. If one decides to leave one's home for the promised land, one is perhaps inevitably going to feel obligated to find it.

Symbols of easy success abound: the golden mountain and streets paved with gold. Such images are often interrogated in fictions of ethnic minority experience, revealing "a land of invisible ghettos."[63] For example, in the opening pages of *Son of a Smaller Hero*, Mordecai Richler establishes the central conflict between the aspirations of the protagonist, Noah Adler, and his ethnic identity. He does this through a vivid, poetic description of the dimensions and contours of the Jewish ghetto in Montreal, a ghetto that

"has no real walls and no true dimensions. The walls are the habit of atavism and the dimensions are an illusion. But it is a ghetto that exists all the same."[64] In describing Montreal's social geography, Richler makes it clear that the ghetto generates an enormous energy directed toward "moving up." The milieu of St. Lawrence Street, "the aorta of the ghetto," where most of the working class Jews "do their buying and their praying and their agitating and most of their sinning"[65] is florid, vibrant, but unsavory: a place "where the Jews speak quaintly like the heroes of nightclub jokes."[66]

This reference to the quaint language of the immigrants who become heroes of "jokes" is an interesting one, because in juxtaposing seemingly contradictory attributes, the heroic and the comic, it embodies the ambivalence of Richler's upwardly mobile characters toward their ethnicity. Encoded in language, and urban geography, this theme of ambivalence is common in fictions that depict second-generation experience. One sees this in Marlyn's *Under the Ribs of Death* perhaps most vividly in a scene where Sandor Hunyadi, the young protagonist, deeply ashamed of his Hungarian roots, goes with his family to meet a group of newly arrived immigrants, and finds their kinship "odious."[67]

Although the boundaries and subtle gradations within the ghetto are somewhat less clearly delineated in *Under the Ribs of Death* than in Richler's novels, the ghetto is nevertheless a very real entity in Marlyn's fiction, one that symbolizes failure as well as community, and engenders in the young Sandor a fierce determination to escape. This is also true in Adele Wiseman's *The Sacrifice* (1974), where it is generally projected through the secondary characters of Chaim Knopp, the *shoichet*, and his son Ralph, rather than through the main character, Abraham, and his son Isaac, perhaps largely because the struggles of the latter are more spiritual than material. Chaim, like Abraham and his family, still lives in "the flats," the older immigrant center of the Jewish ghetto. His son Ralph, on the other hand, has succeeded in moving to "the heights" because he owns a factory.[68]

In this fiction as in others, the image of urban geography is a vertical one, disturbingly reminiscent of the configuration of Dante's inferno. The ghetto's center is at the bottom and each remove up from that bottom level is a successive move away from "pure" ethnicity toward assimilation and success, envisioned (albeit ultimately ironically) as existing somewhere at the top, in wealthy "English" or blandly "non-ethnic" neighborhoods. One might read this vertical image as a trope of imperial relationships, with the ethnic "other" occupying the lowest rungs.

The success/failure polarity is equally fundamental to many other fictions about immigrant and ethnic experience. Brian Moore's *The Luck of Ginger Coffey* (1960) is representative, with its focus on the struggle of an Irish immigrant—the tragicomically boyish Ginger—to find a "respectable" niche in Montreal's stratified urban landscape. The verticality of the struggle and Ginger's inevitable descent are captured in the recurring image of the elevator, which Ginger rides up to various unsuccessful job interviews and down to his eventual employment as a proofreader in the bottom

floor of the *Gazette* building. Urban images of verticality, including the elevator, are similarly, if more tragically, central to Austin Clarke's depiction of a failed Caribbean immigrant in his short story "Canadian Experience."[69]

In addition to being symbolized in urban geography, tension between ethnicity and upward mobility is very often represented as part of a generation gap. Upwardly mobile second- and third-generation sons and daughters feel isolated from their immigrant parents and grandparents because of the often substantial differences between their customs and Canadian ones, and because of language barriers that make it difficult for them to communicate with each other, as, for example, in Frank Paci's *The Italians* (1978) and *The Black Madonna* (1984), in which the second-generation characters literally cannot talk with their parents about complex subjects. They are also (often) so deeply ashamed of their immigrant parents that they refuse to acknowledge them because their "blatant" ethnicity poses such a threat to their fragile "Canadian" identities.[70]

Thus, generational interaction—often focused around a wrenching break with the past, and an intense need to reconcile disparate elements in order to discover or create an integrated identity in a sterile, materialistic and potentially destructive North American setting—becomes an apt vehicle for representing a postcolonial struggle of identity. As well, the "vertical mosaic" is a pervasive element in this struggle. Whether with a humorous tone or a profoundly disillusioned one, this frequently ironic fiction dissects the dynamics of upward mobility in Canada and the nature of "success," often rejecting it on the grounds that the price is too high, and the reward illusory. By depicting the "vertical mosaic" from a position other than that of the genteel upper rungs and dramatizing its power to "make or mar" the lives of individuals, ethnic minority writers have brought an illuminating and transformative perspective to Canadian literature.

The Ghetto and Decolonization

As suggested above, portrayals of the ethnic ghetto play a central role in the representation of ethnic minority experience, and in particular serve as metonymic evocations of social stratification. In this section, I analyze this in more detail, arguing that ghettoized space becomes a vehicle for decolonization—for claiming space for the ethnic "other." That a fictional setting could be so potent is perhaps not surprising. Among the contributions that fiction writers have made to our imaginations, both individual and collective, are a number of evocations of place so compelling that they have, arguably, become more real to many people as fictional landscapes than as actual ones. Hardy's Wessex country, Conan Doyle's London, Twain's Hannibal, and Faulkner's Yoknapatowpha County are such places for readers of English and American literature. Readers might add to such a list Winnipeg's North End prior to World War II, not so much because of its re-creation in the work of one writer, but because of its significance in

the work of a number of Canadian writers, particularly those interested in portraying minority ethnic experience.

As a fictional creation, the North End has been rendered in a variety of seemingly contradictory ways as a vehicle for various kinds of social criticism and as a means of both closing off and opening up new discursive spaces. Such is the case with one of the earliest "outsider" versions of the North End—that provided by Ralph Connor (Charles Gordon) in his novel *The Foreigner* (1909).[71] Though a moderate voice in his day, Connor very definitely speaks from a hegemonic position. From it he creates a North End that is dark, seamy, violent, primitive—very much a Social Problem in need of the ministrations of the enlightened Anglo-Saxon "race." Connor describes a "Galician" wedding to suggest the vast gulf that separates the ethnic North from (Anglo-Canadian) South Winnipeg:

> Meantime, while respectable Winnipeg lay snugly asleep under snow-covered roofs and smoking chimneys, while belated revelers and travelers were making their way through white, silent streets and avenues of snow-laden trees to homes where reigned love and peace and virtue, in the North End and in the foreign colony the festivities in connection with Anka's wedding were drawing to a close in sordid drunken dance and song and in sanguinary fighting … foul and fetid men stood packed close, drinking while they could.[72]

In this and in similar evocations of the depravity contained within the boundaries of the ethnic ghetto, Connor constructs a North End "colony" that both symbolizes and helps to create the vast distance he believes separates the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon, between whose "points of view stretched generations of moral development."[73] Connor's North End is clearly constructed around a "Manichean dualism" and in this regard, despite the Anglocentrism of his dualism, it constitutes a prototype for the later depictions by male ethnic writers. But, in emphasizing distance, negative difference, and potential threat, Connor's depiction of the North End becomes primarily a rhetorical device—a way of vividly laying out a problem in such a way as to call for a particular solution. He does this through his missionary character, Mr. Brown, when the latter asserts that "these people here [i.e., in the North End] exist as an undigested foreign mass. They must be taught our ways of thinking and living, or it will be a mighty bad thing for us in Western Canada."[74] By defining success for immigrants as denunciation and rebirth, Connor attempts to control the space they can occupy; their past selves must be cast aside and forgotten. They must assume a new identity, the superior "Anglo-Saxon" one.

Writing years later and from perspectives very different from Connor's, a number of second/third-generation ethnic writers have also fashioned the North End into a fictional vehicle for social criticism and a means of making space for themselves in the Canadian cultural landscape. In so doing, they have together, as apologists for their respective groups, made the North End a kind of emblem of their displacement, marginality, and

ambivalence, or in postcolonial terms, a site of resistance. In the work of such ethnic writers as Vera Lysenko, John Marlyn, Adele Wiseman, Maara Haas, and Ed Kleiman, evocations of the North End and its place in the lives of their characters are among the chief means of developing the fundamentally binary patterns that to varying degrees shape and animate their narratives. In so doing, their fiction critiques hegemonic processes and claims space for the ethnic other. Adele Wiseman's *Crackpot* (1974) is a particularly effective example.

Through her main character, Hoda, and through a web of stories that constitute the shared history of Hoda's family and of the larger Jewish community, Wiseman paints a North End that is a comfortable home, despite its shabbiness. Drawing on Jewish culture and history, she delineates the boundary between the Jewish ghetto and the Anglo-Canadian establishment, profoundly critiquing some of the fundamental assumptions of the latter, particularly its privileging of its own history and its related failure to acknowledge the cultural validity of the ethnic others—the legitimacy and value of their potential contribution to Canadian society. Wiseman does this through the novel's characters, themes, and structure, all of which are based on the notion of a paradoxical union of opposites, expressed most intensely in the inscription at the beginning of *Crackpot*: "He stored the Divine Light in a Vessel, but the Vessel, unable to contain the Holy Radiance, burst, and its shards, permeated with sparks of the Divine scattered through the Universe."[75]

Although the metaphor embodies a mystical doctrine too complex to explore fully here, it captures the inseparability of good and evil; it suggests that a cracked pot is not just a useless piece of pottery but a vessel whose bursting allowed the divine to permeate the universe, rendering dichotomies meaningless and erasing boundaries between inside and outside. Hoda is just such a vessel and she and her story are profoundly subversive of the dualistic sensibility that confines the immigrant both from without and from within. Through her, Wiseman creates a space from which her characters can assert the paradoxical power of a love that can unite opposites, and of an artistry that can draw on its unique past and present circumstances to create an illuminating synthesis, one that, in revisioning the ethnic ghetto and the people who live there, refuses to be defined and confined by the larger society.

Ethnicity as Social Criticism

The notion that literature might be a means for criticizing and even changing society, in short that literature is political, is by no means a new one associated only with the recent "paradigm shift" discussed earlier. As G.N. Sharma reminds readers in his introduction to *Literature and Commitment*, Plato's argument for banishing poets from his Republic was based on his belief that they were dangerous to the State.[76] The interpretive framework that I have applied to fiction by ethnic minority writers

highlights the political significance of this fiction. Viewed as an expression of "the ethnic voice" or as "ethnic" apologist fiction, this fiction is strategically situated between a dominant group and a subordinate one making it a natural vehicle for group advocacy and social criticism; or, as Sollors puts it in discussing the role of ethnicity in American literature, "[T]he alliance of ethnic realism, spokesmanship, and social criticism has remained powerful for more than a century."[77] Viewed as postcolonial, such writing is inevitably political, since a postcolonial perspective highlights the political significance of art, asserting that "'culture' mediates relations of power as effectively, albeit in more indirect and subtle ways, as more public and visible forms of oppression."[78] And, as Said and other postcolonial analysts point out, cultural domination inspires cultural resistance—"an immense wave of anti-colonial and ultimately anti-imperial activity, thought, and revision."[79]

In his analysis of ethnicity and American literature, Werner Sollors often clarifies, in one way or another, the significance of the mediator position that minority ethnic writers occupy and the way that position shapes both the content and the form of their texts. "The point of departure of classic ethnic literature," he contends, "especially of writings in English, often was to blur ethnic stereotypes by presenting an inside view of ethnicity which could make "otherness" understandable to American readers."[80] Sollors's statement is, I would argue, applicable to insider literature about immigrant and/or ethnic experience in Canada. And further, it suggests the complex constraints inherent in apology. Presenting an "inside view" of a group defined as marginal by a variable combination of recent immigrant status and/or race, ethnicity, and class is to some considerable degree a perilous enterprise, as suggested by the reaction to the work of such Canadian writers as Mordecai Richler, Rudy Wiebe, Di Brandt, and Joy Kogawa, all of whom have been criticized by the groups they portray for having painted an unflattering portrait of an already unappreciated people, and/or by the larger society for having unfairly criticized its institutions and values.[81]

Arguably, the writers I have discussed, and many others who write about ethnic minority experience from the inside, not only speak from this difficult, bifurcated position, but actually situate their work in this fraught psychocultural borderland, drawing discursive energy from the tensions that are generated by its discomfiting but thematically rich overlay of conflict and ambivalence, insight and misunderstanding. One could point to a number of ethnic minority fictions in which a critique of the marginal group seems as central, if not more so, to the text as does a critique of the larger society. For example, Mordecai Richler's *Son of a Smaller Hero* and *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz* expose the narrowness and hypocrisy, the personal and familial failures in the fictional Jewish community where the protagonists, Noah Adler and Duddy Kravitz, come of age. Vera Lysenko's *Yellow Boots* (1954) exposes superstition, ignorance, and blind devotion to patriarchal order in her fictional Ukrainian community, all of which threaten to destroy the artistic and freedom-loving

soul of her female protagonist. Indeed, in Lysenko's fiction, the social critique of the ethnic community and of the larger society is so finely balanced that it ultimately champions synthesis, hybridity: both societies are flawed, but by blending the best of both, one can create a better world.[82]

In discussing fiction as social critique in Canada, one would be remiss not to point to fiction by women who write from an insider position about female immigrant and ethnic experience, both because of the numbers of such fictions and their significance. As Linda Hutcheon points out in *The Canadian Postmodern,* it is hardly surprising that women writers would contribute significantly to such a critique and at the same time to a revisioning of Canadian literature:

> The fact that postmodernism values difference and ex-centricity is due in great part to the fact that feminisms (along with studies of post-colonial racism, Marxist class analysis, and gay theory, of course) pushed it in that direction.…
>
> These two forces have come together today in their related challenges to the canon.… Both … situate themselves … in historical, social, and cultural (as well as literary) contexts, challenging conventions that are presumed to be literary "universals," but can in fact be shown to embody the values of a very particular group of people.…
>
> … women writers … have done much to challenge systems that "totalize"—that unify with an eye to power and control, with an eye to obliterating traces of difference.[83]

For example, Byrna Barclay, in her interconnected novels, *The Last Echo* (1985) and *Winter of the White Wolf* (1989), constructs a profound metaphysical challenge to ethnic and gender hegemonies via structurally innovative texts. Barclay's shifting narrator in *Winter of the White Wolf* decenters her text in a way that cleverly marries form and content. The novel is an epic portrayal of the interface in North America, over several centuries, of European and aboriginal cultures—as well as a very particular story of the migration of a small group of young people from southern Sweden to northern Saskatchewan at the end of the nineteenth century. It is also the story of a search half a century later for her origins by the young Canadian descendant of those pioneers; she longs to understand the specific details of her familial and cultural story and the cultural and psychological space she occupies as a result of her ancestors' immigrant journey. Barclay's fiction also eloquently evokes the complex ethical questions underlying the dominance of settler culture in North America.[84]

In resisting dominant constructions of history, Barclay focuses on aboriginal people; her strategy for inscribing them is linked with her strategy for including the female voice. In her fictional world, only marginalized female voices, both aboriginal and immigrant, can reveal the secret at the heart of the story of immigration: that the plan of colonization was deeply flawed and that its implementation has been profoundly destructive of aboriginal peoples. Only those voices seem able to provide the vision for illuminating and acknowledging the mistakes, and the spiritual strength

that will be required to rebuild on a new plan. Thus, the representation of female immigrant experience by women writers can be seen as an important, and at times even the most radical, strand in the larger critique of social hierarchy in Canada that can be found in fiction by immigrants and their descendants. Of course, this vision has been advanced even more powerfully in recent years by many aboriginal writers, both male and female; for example, it is at the heart of the work of such writers as Tomson Highway, Jeannette Armstrong, Lee Maracle, and many others.

More recent immigrants to Canada have also mounted a transformative social critique, those from various "Third World" countries of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Their impact on Canadian literature has been evident in recent years in the work of such high profile writers as Rohinton Mistry, Neil Bissoondath, and Bharati Mukherjee, as well as in that of many others who are less well known.

The British imperial order, its extensive and powerful reach, its lingering effects, and indeed, its contemporary replication in and through Canadian society, is the underlying subject of M.G. Vassanji's novel *No New Land* (1991). Of South Asian background and an immigrant to Canada in the 1970s from Tanzania, Vassanji fictionalizes the experiences of South Asian/African immigrants in Toronto. He depicts life in a South-Asian immigrant community ensconced in the Don Valley apartment building, Sixty Nine Rosecliffe Park Drive, focusing on one family, the Lalanis. His delineation reveals two closely related features of empire, hierarchy, and discrepancy; that is, the hierarchy of an ethnic and racial "pecking order" with the British on the top, and the discrepancy between the inclusive rhetoric of empire, and the hierarchy which mandates degrees or levels of inclusion. Refugees from the imperial dynamics in Dar Es Salaam, the Lalanis find themselves in Canada. It is a world whose material wealth dazzles them, renders them dowdy, backward, and second class, whose doors are only partially open and whose spaces are circumscribed. Indeed, Vassanji's fictional Toronto, with its immigrant ghettos and race-conscious inhabitants, is a miniature replica of the larger empire whose peripheries it (ironically) occupies; and Sixty-Nine Rosecliffe Park, the apartment building where the Lalanis eventually live, is a miniature Dar Es Salaam.

The insecurity of their position as Asian intermediaries in nationalizing East Africa is replicated in Toronto, a situation made clear by the ugly racist incident in which Esmail, one of their neighbors, is verbally and physically abused as a "Paki" by a gang of white youths at a downtown subway station. Afterward, one of Nurdin Lalani's friends laments, "'The blacks kicked us out, now the whites will do the same.… Where do we go from here?"[85]

That this search for a place within the remnants of empire, and the difficulty of finding it, should be a theme in the work of South Asian writers such as Vassanji is not, of course, surprising. For example, it is central to the fiction of Himani Bannerji, who immigrated to Canada from India in 1969.[86] Her story "The Other Family" can be read as a representative, late-century "writing back" to Connor's 1909 fictionalization of the place of

foreigners in British North America. A short, seemingly simple story of the stresses involved in immigrant adaptation, it depicts a young girl of Asian background who comes home from school and shows her immigrant mother a picture that she has drawn and colored of "the family." Her mother is angered and upset. The little girl has made "the family" blonde and blue-eyed, apparently in accordance with the teacher's instructions and in imitation of the generic picture in the child's textbook. Upset and confused by her mother's tearful response to her picture, the little girl at first reacts defiantly: "I drew it from a book … all our books have this same picture of the family. You can go and see for yourself. And everyone else drew it too!"[87] But unlike Connor's "foreigner," Kalman Kalmar, who aspires deeply to be remade in the Anglo-Celtic image, both of Bannerji's characters resist rejection and absorption. The mother's refusal to be erased in her angry insistence to the child that "'this is not your family. I, you and your father are dark-skinned, dark-haired'"[88] is ultimately enacted by the child when she insists that the teacher must add "the other family" to the picture. Perhaps easily dismissed by some readers as too blatantly didactic, "The Other Family" can also be read as a powerful claiming of space, a bitter critique of racism and of the vision implicit in Connor's text, with its insistence that the "foreigner" must disappear.

What is perhaps much more surprising than the recurring representation of lingering remnants of imperial hierarchy in the work of these contemporary "new" immigrant writers is the preoccupation with the imperial structures and attempts to subvert them in ethnic minority fiction written much before the current articulation (not to mention considerable influence on contemporary writers) of postcolonial analysis. I have suggested that Ralph Connor's 1909 novel *The Foreigner* can be read as an imperialist text, one that represents discursively both Canada's place in the imperial structure and its particular imperial responsibilities. And further, that a number of fictions written later by ethnic minority writers write back to this empire and to Connor's discursive representation of it.

Beginning primarily in the 1920s, ethnic minority writers have created fiction that evokes a fraught and bifurcated borderland space where the Anglo-Canadian center intersects with the ethnic immigrant culture, often through Canadian-born characters who straddle the line between these two complex and evolving cultural spaces. Focusing now on the flaws of the marginalized culture, made all the more glaringly apparent by hegemonic assumptions, now on the hierarchies and hypocrisies of the dominant society, such texts highlight this postcolonial space as a site of struggle over the right to social and cultural validation, the right to the subject position.

Another closely related objective in this struggle is a redefinition of identity, in both center and margin. Double-edged social criticism becomes a tool to negotiate more inclusive cultural spaces, indeed to negotiate overlapping spaces. Among the narrative strategies these writers adapt in a variety of ways to critique both spaces are confession and irony,

each of which deconstructs to varying degrees the sociocultural dynamics of the status quo.

Interestingly, Vassanji's *No New Land* subverts the imperial project not only through irony but also by opening up imperial discourse. He depicts the postcolonial landscape of Toronto as a place of incongruous juxtapositions and partial mergings that have the potential to deconstruct old hierarchies and to create new spaces, new possibilities. The novel ends on an optimistic note, with Nurdin Lalani having been cleared of the legal charges against him (that were a result of a cultural misunderstanding) and with his growing openness to Canada, but, importantly, a Canada that has also been opened to his influence. This opening up of dialogue within the discursive structures of empire is symbolized by the long awaited visit of the Muslim community's religious guru from their old home in Tanzania. Appropriately called "Missionary," he comes to bring his religious message to Canada, able at last to turn a one-sided commentary into a conversation.

Missionary's presence transforms the sociocultural landscape, thereby not only reversing the direction of imperial influence, but also creating space and a future in Canada for the Lalanis and the rest of their community. In so doing, Vassanji's text joins a growing body of fiction in Canada by ethnic minority writers that "has contributed to the widespread interrogation of the history and presuppositions of … dominant discourse" in Canada, "particularly in its relation to Western imperialism in both its colonial and neo-colonial phases."[89] Taken together, they have, over the past century and particularly since World War II, subverted a univocal discourse, replacing it with a multiplicity of narratives and voices. By critiquing the hierarchies implicit in Canada's particular legacy of empire, they have unsettled the imperial gaze, placing those marginalized by that gaze at the center of their own stories. This is the process at the center of the diversification of Canadian literature in English.

Notes

1. John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). For a recent look at the impact of Porter's work, see Rick Helmes-Hayes and James Curtis, eds., *The Vertical Mosaic Revisited* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
2. W.H. New, *Literary History of Canada: Canadian Literature in English,* 2d ed., vol. 4. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), xxxii.
3. Northrop Frye was particularly influential in developing the idea that culture is essentially local, but at the same time that this local expression can reverberate nationally. See, for example, Northrop Frye, *The Bush Garden: Essays on the Canadian Imagination* (Toronto: Anansi, 1971).
4. W.H. New, ed., "Literature in English," in *The Canadian Encyclopedia* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), 1019; Hugh MacLennan, *Barometer Rising* (New York: Duel, Sloan, and Pearce, 1941).

5. Margaret Atwood, *Surfacing* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972); *Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature* (Toronto: Anansi, 1972).
6. See Ronald Sutherland, *Second Image: Comparative Studies in Quebec/Canadian Literature* (Toronto: New Press, 1971); and Ronald Sutherland, *The New Hero: Essays in Comparative Quebec/Canadian Literature* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977).
7. Hugh MacLennan, *Two Solitudes* (Toronto: Collins, 1945).
8. See Beverly J. Rasporich and Tamara P. Seiler, "Canadian Culture and Ethnic Diversity," in *Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples*, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 311. See also Philip Stratford, "Translation," in W.H. New, *Literary History of Canada*, 97–108.
9. All of Gabrielle Roy's works were originally published in French, so there is often a discrepancy between the date of first publication and the date of publication in English. For example, *La Petite Poule d'Eau* was published in Montreal in 1950, and a year later in English as *Where Nests the Water Hen*, trans. Harry L. Binesse (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1951). See also *Street of Riches*, trans. Harry L. Binesse (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1957). The same applies to Acadian writer Antonine Maillet, and her works such as *La Sagouine*, trans. Luis de Céspedes (Toronto: Simon and Pierre, 1979), and *Pelagie: The Return to a Homeland*, trans. Philip Stratford (New York and Toronto: Doubleday, 1982).
10. See, for example, Linda Hutcheon, *The Canadian Postmodern: A Study of Contemporary English-Canadian Fiction* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1988), and Frank Davey, "(Con)figuring a 'Canada': Some Trends in Anglophone Literature, Criticism and the Arts," in *Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada*, ed. Kenneth McRoberts (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995), 117–37.
11. Robert M. Stamp, "Of People and Place in Twentieth-Century Toronto," in *A Passion for Identity*, ed. David Taras and Beverly Rasporich (Toronto: Nelson, 1996), 391. For recent demographic statistics, see Augie Fleras and Jean Leanard Elliott, *Unequal Relations*: *An Introduction to Ethnic, Racial and Aboriginal Dynamics in Canada*, 4th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall, 2003). For a discussion of the origins and evolution of multiculturalism, see Stella Hryniuk, ed., *Twenty Years of Multiculturalism: Successes and Failures* (Winnipeg: St. John's College Press, 1992). See also Tamara Palmer Seiler, "Melting Pot and Mosaic: Images and Realities," in *Canada and the United States: Differences that Count*, ed. David Thomas (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000); and Yasmeen Abu Laban and Davia Stasiulis, "Ethnic Pluralism under Siege: Popular and Partisan Opposition to Multiculturalism," *Canadian Public Policy* 18, no. 4 (1992): 365–86.
12. For a fulsome analysis, see Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott, *Engaging Diversity: Multiculturalism in Canada*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Nelson, 2002).
13. Kwame A. Appiah and Henry L. Gates Jr., "Multiplying Identities" (editors' introduction), *Critical Inquiry* 18, no. 4 (1992): 625.
14. Homi Bhabha, "Minority Maneuvers" (editor's introduction), *Critical Inquiry* 23, no. 3 (1997): 433.
15. Examples abound, such as Cynthia Willet, ed., *Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998).
16. Chicago Cultural Studies Group, "Critical Multiculturalism," *Critical Inquiry* 18, no. 3 (spring 1992): 530–31.
17. Bart Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics* (London and New York: Verso, 1997), 5.
18. Anthony W. Rasporich, "Looking Backward: A Brief Twenty-Five Year Retrospective," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 25, no. 3 (1993): 1–4. See also, J.W. Berry and J.A. LaPonce, eds., *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
19. Enoch Padolsky, "Ethnicity and Race: Canadian Minority Writing at a Crossroads," *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes* 31, no. 3 (1996): 132–33. See also Padolsky's "Olga in Wonderland: Canadian Ethnic Minority Writing and Post-Colonial Theory," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 28, no. 3 (1996): 16–28.

20. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 22, as quoted in Padolsky, "Ethnicity and Race," 133.
21. Padolsky, "Ethnicity and Race," 133.
22. See, for example, Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*; Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book 4: *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967); Howard Palmer, *Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975); Reg Whitaker, *Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration* (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1987); Jean R. Burnet with Howard Palmer, "*Coming Canadians*": *An Introduction to a History of Canada's Peoples* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988); Peter S. Li, *Ethnic Inequality in a Class Society* (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing Inc., 1988); Donald H. Avery, *Reluctant Host: Canada's Response to Immigrant Workers, 1896–1994* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995); Fleras and Elliott, *Unequal Relations*; Helmes-Hayes and Curtis, *The Vertical Mosaic Revisited*; Rasporich and Seiler, "Canadian Culture and Ethnic Diversity," 304–16.
23. Terrence Craig, *Racial Attitudes in English Canadian Fiction 1905–1980* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1987); W.M. Verhoeven, "How Hyphenated Can You Get?: A Critique of Pure Ethnicity," *Mosaic* 29, no. 3, special issue: "The Idols of Otherness" (1996): 97–116.
24. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978). One is reminded here of the important point made by several analysts that discrimination *within* Western liberal societies can be seen as a form of colonialism. As Robert Young points out on page 125 of *White Mythologies: Writing, History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1991), the postcolonial critique of humanism has included the argument that such violence against the internal Other—even the Holocaust—is not simply an aberration, "rationalism gone wrong," but rather "colonialism brought home to Europe."
25. Marco Micone, *Gens du silence* (Montreal: Quebec/Amerique, 1982). See Sherry Simon and David Leahy, "La recherche au Quebec portant sur l'écriture ethnique," in Berry and LaPonce, *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada*, 387.
26. I have elsewhere argued for the utility, albeit temporary, of the term "ethnic literature." See Tamara Palmer Seiler, "When Politics, History, Sociology and Literary Criticism Meet: The Case of Ethnic Literature," in *Blurring Genres*, ed. Ashok Mathur and Brian Rusted (Calgary, Alb.: Egg Press, 1994). "Literatures of Lesser Diffusion" was the title of a conference organized under the auspices of the University of Alberta's Comparative Literature department and held in Edmonton in April 1988. A volume of articles developed from this conference and was published as an issue of *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* in 1989. Enoch Padolsky has developed the terminology of "ethnic minority writers" in several articles. See, for example, "Cultural Diversity and Canadian Literature: A Pluralistic Approach to Majority and Minority Writing in Canada," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 3 (1990): 111–28.
27. See, for example, Smaro Kamboureli, ed., *Making a Difference: Canadian Multicultural Literature* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996). There has also been a remarkable proliferation of aboriginal literature, including such anthologies as Thomas King, ed., *All My Relations: An Anthology of Contemporary Native Fiction* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990); and Terry Goldie and Daniel David Moses, eds., *An Anthology of Canadian Native Literature* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1998).
28. For an example of this argument, see Frank Davey, "(Con)figuring a 'Canada': Some Trends in Anglophone Literature, Criticism and the Arts," in McRoberts, *Beyond Quebec*, 117–37. See also Beverly Rasporich and Tamara P. Seiler, "Multiculturalism and the Arts," in *A Passion for Identity*, 243–64.
29. Natalia Aponiuk, "'Hyphenated-Canadian Literature'—Will It Ever Be 'Canadian'?" *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 28, no. 1 (1996): 1–7.
30. Diana Brydon, "Commonwealth or Common Poverty? The New Literature in English and the New Discourse of Marginality," in *After Europe*, ed. Stephen Slemon and Helen Tiffin (Sydney, NSW: Verso, 1989), 8.

31. This greater critical receptiveness to diversity is apparent in the growing number of academic volumes devoted to analyzing some aspect of cultural pluralism, including volumes devoted to literary criticism. For example, over the past fifteen years, *Canadian Literature* (arguably the major "mainstream" academic journal for the subject) has devoted a number of special issues to "minority literatures," and in the past several years, at least three academic journals in Canada have produced special multicultural literary issues, to say nothing of the numerous journals and books produced in other countries. See, for example, *Journal of Canadian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1996); *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 28, no. 1 (1996); *Mosaic* 29, no. 3 (1996). For a recent look at the literary dimension of pluralism in Quebec, see Sherry Simon and David Leahy, "La recherche au Québec portant sur l'écriture ethnique," in Berry and LaPonce, *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada*, 387–409.
32. Stephen Slemon, "Unsettling the Empire: Resistance Theory for the Second World," *World Literature Written in English* 30, no. 2 (1990): 37.
33. One is reminded here of the analyses of postcolonial theorists such as Homi Bhabha, with his notion of the "third space" being a paradoxically enabling position, as discussed in Bart Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory*, chap. 3. Similarly, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes the ambiguous impact of imperialism as "an enabling violence." See, for example, her *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1987).
34. See, for example, Fleras and Elliott, *Unequal Relations*, 239–308.
35. I have made this argument elsewhere; see, for example, Tamara Palmer, "The Fictionalization of the Vertical Mosaic: The Immigrant, Success and National Mythology," in *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 16, no. 3 (1989): 619–55; see also Rasporich and Seiler, "Canadian Culture and Ethnic Diversity," 304–16.
36. Eli Mandel, "Ethnic Voice in Canadian Writing," in *Identities: The Impact of Ethnicity on Canadian Society*, ed. Wsevold Isajiw (Toronto: Peter Martin and Associates, 1977), 58.
37. Robert Kroetsch, "The Grammar of Silence: Narrative Patterns in Ethnic Writing," in *Canadian Literature* 106 (1985): 68.
38. Abdul R. Jan Mohamed, "The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonialist Literature," in *"Race": Writing and Difference*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 82.
39. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 229. See also Young, *White Mythologies*, 4, for an illuminating discussion of the historical and philosophical issues and arguments involved in "the dialectic of the same and the other." For a discussion of binary patterns and moving beyond them, see Homi Bhabha, "The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism, " in *Literature, Politics and Theory*, ed. Francis Barker et al. (London: Methuen, 1986), 148–72.
40. This idea has been developed by a number of cultural historians. For example, Howard Mumford Jones gave it particular emphasis in his influential book, *O Strange New World: American Culture, the Formative Years* (New York: The Viking Press, 1965).
41. Shirley Geok-lin Lim and Amy Ling, "The Ambivalent American: Asian American Literature on the Cusp," in *Reading the Literature of Asian America*, ed. Shirley Geok-lin Lim and Amy Ling (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 22, as quoted in Geoffrey Kain, *Ideas of Home*: *Literature of Asian Migration* (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 8–9.
42. Kain, *Ideas of Home*, 8.
43. Eli Mandel, "Ethnic Voice in Canadian Writing," 65.
44. Kroetsch, "The Grammar of Silence," 65–66.
45. Walter Riedel, *The Old World and the New: Literary Perspectives of German-Speaking Canadians* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).
46. See William Boelhower, "Italo-Canadian Poetry and Ethnic Semiosis in the Postmodern Context," in *Canadian Literature* 119 (winter 1988): 171–78, for an insightful discussion of the significance of this old world/new world polarity. Boelhower calls it "an aesthetic of spatial juxtaposition" that is the basis of a "topological system that generates an open series of binary isotopies."

47. Frederick Philip Grove's novels have been reprinted in McClelland and Stewart's important New Canadian Library series: *The Master of the Mill* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1961); *Fruits of the Earth* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965; *A Search for America: The Odyssey of an Immigrant* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971); *In Search of Myself* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974). For the groundbreaking scholarship that revealed Grove's true identity, see Douglas O. Spettigue, *Frederick Philip Grove* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969).
48. Henry Kreisel's work has also been reprinted as part of the New Canadian Library Series: *The Rich Man* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971); *The Betrayal* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).
49. For a book-length version of this argument, in addition to Atwood's well-known chapter on "Immigrant Exile" in *Survival*, see Halvard Dahlie, *Varieties of Exile: The Canadian Experience* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986). Clearly, Moodie's text is also significant for the way it encodes the ethnic hierarchy implicit in Canada's evolution as an outpost of the British Empire. See Carole Gerson, "Nobler Savages: Representations of Native Women in the Writings of Susanna Moodie and Catharine Parr Traill, *Journal of Canadian Studies* 32, no. 2 (1997): 5–21, for an interesting discussion of the varied treatment of "subordinate" groups in Moodie's writing. Although my focus here is on fiction, it is interesting to note that the old/new dichotomy is very common in poetry by immigrant poets, from eighteenth-century Scots bards to contemporary poets. Representative is German-Canadian poet Walter Bauer, who repeatedly juxtaposes the world-weary landscape of war-torn Europe with the comparative *tabula rasa* of Canada, noting that "The sun here must be a different sun from the one under which I used to live," in *A Different Sun,* trans. Henry Beissel (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1976), 10.
50. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 210–11.
51. Caterina Edwards, *The Lion's Mouth* (Edmonton, Alberta: NeWest Press 1982), 76.
52. C.D. Minni, "Roots," in *Italian Canadian Voices: An Anthology of Poetry and Prose (1946–1983)*, ed. Carolyn M. DiGiovanni (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1984), 67–74.
53. Illia Kiriak, *Sons of the Soil* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1959). John Marlyn, *Under the Ribs of Death* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1957). Mordecai Richler, *Son of a Smaller Hero* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966); idem, *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1970). Joy Kowaga, *Obasan* (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1985). M.G. Vassanji, *No New Land* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991).
54. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 214.
55. For an analysis of the significance of the return journey in Italian-Canadian fiction, see Joseph Pivato, "The Return Journey in Italian-Canadian Literature," *Canadian Literature* 106 (fall 1985): 91–113. Pivato's analysis suggests the return journey's significance in the resistance activity of re-creating one's identity (both individual and communal) through insisting on discovering/telling one's *whole* history, not just one's limit/ed/ing history as a member of an undervalued immigrant group in Canada, or as Said puts if, of inscribing "a holistic vision of community history; an alternative vision to human history" as a means to resist the forces of dominance.
56. For an interesting discussion of the significance of the generational schema, and its relationship to literary form, see William Boelhower, "Ethnic Trilogies: A Genealogical and Generational Poetics," in *The Invention of Ethnicity*, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 158–75.
57. See Werner Sollors, *Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 219.
58. As quoted in William D. Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (London: Routledge, 1989), 38–39.
59. Sollors, *Literature and Ethnicity*, 658.
60. Joseph Pivato, "Ethnic Minority Writing and Literary Theory" (editor's introduction), *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 28, no. 3 (1996): 1.
61. Kroetsch, "The Grammar of Silence," 66.

62. Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); William and Elaine Hedges, *Land and Imagination: The Rural Dream in America* (Rochell Park: Hayden Book Co., 1980); Dennis Duffy, "Heart of Flesh: Exile and Kingdom in English Canadian Literature," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 18, no. 2 (1983): 58–69; Anthony W. Rasporich, "Utopian Ideals and Community Settlements in Western Canada, 1880–1914," in R. Douglas Francis and Howard Palmer, eds., *The Prairie West: Historical Readings* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1992), 352–76.
63. George Woodcock, as quoted in Mandel, "Ethnic Voice in Canadian Writing," 59.
64. Mordecai Richler, *Son of a Smaller Hero,* 14.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 15.
67. Marlyn's *Under the Ribs of Death*, 16.
68. Adele Wiseman, *The Sacrifice* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956).
69. Brian Moore, *The Luck of Ginger Coffey* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960). Austin Clarke, *Nine Men Who Laughed* (London: Penguin, 1986).
70. Frank Paci, *The Italians* (Oakville, Ont.: Oberon Press, 1978); *The Black Madonna* (Oakville, Ont.: Oberon Press, 1984).
71. Ralph Connor (Charles Gordon), *The Foreigner* (Toronto: Westminster, 1909).
72. Ibid., 87.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 255.
75. Adele Wiseman, *Crackpot* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974). The quote appears on the frontispiece of the novel.
76. Govind N. Sharma, ed., *Literature and Commitment: A Commonwealth Perspective* (Toronto: TSAR, 1988), 7–14.
77. Sollors, *Literature and Ethnicity*, 658.
78. Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory*, 8.
79. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 195; Stephen Slemon, "Unsettling the Empire: Resistance Theory for the Second World," in *World Literature Written in English* 30, no. 2 (1990): 31.
80. Sollors, *Ethnicity*, 658.
81. See, for example, Joy Kogawa, "The Japanese-Canadian Dilemma," in *Toronto Life* (December 1985): 29–30.
82. Vera Lysenko, *Yellow Boots* (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1992).
83. Hutcheon, *The Canadian Postmodern*, 108.
84. Byrna Barclay, *The Last Echo* (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1985); *Winter of the White Wolf* (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1988).
85. Vassanji, *No New Land*, 103.
86. Linda Hutcheon and Marion Richmond, eds., *Other Solitudes: Canadian Multicultural Fictions* (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 145.
87. Himani Bannerji, "The Other Family," in *Other Solitudes,* 143.
88. Ibid.
89. Young, *White Mythologies,* 126.

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